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O iáiá, meu sinhô mandou chamá 
 
Eu dei um nó guardei a ponta 
Você não vai desatá, ô iáiá 
 
O iáiá, meu sinhô mandou chamá 
 
Pois tanto faz cê dá no nego 
Como no nego não dá, ô iáiá 
 




The content of empty time 
The varieties of History1 that have been trying to specify their particular modus operandi by 
using specialised qualifications such as global, transnational, transregional, translocal, cross-
national, cross-border, entangled, shared, connected, etc. have been occasionally presented 
as the historiographical part of a larger “spatial turn”.  
As these self-denominations suggest, the space taken as subject matter is here constituted by 
the relation of assemblages, which thus enjoy an epistemological precedence over other units 
of analysis that correspond to territorial frameworks—be it a city, a region, a continent or, as 
a master-unit, the nation-state (to which an infra-unit like a city will always belong to, or a 
supra-unit like a region or continent will consist of). Rather than in endogenous change, these 
approaches focus on the interaction, on relations and processes, in short, on what might have 
happened between, across and through those usual units of analysis. 
																																																								1	In	this	work,	“History”	(with	a	capital	H)	refers	exclusively	to	historiography.	The	word	will	be	capitalised	also	in	its	derivations,	so,	expressions	like	“Historical	writing”,	“Historical	event”	or	“Historical	explanation”	as	well	as	the	noun	“Historian(s)”	will	be	found	too.	This	orthographical	artifice	aims	at	stressing	the	double	character	of	the	epistemologically	privileged	position	occupied	by	this	particular	form	of	representation	of	the	 past.	 “Capitalisation”	 links	 here,	 first,	 the	 grammatical	 use	 of	 the	majuscule	with	History’s	 claim	 of	precedence	 in	 what	 concerns	 the	 issues	 of	 truth	 and	 truthfulness.	 Under	 certain	 circumstances,	 some	Historians	would	not	refrain	from	stating	that	there	are	those	who	write	“History	with	a	capital	H”,	namely	they	themselves,	and	those	who	just	tell	stories,	even	if	they	do	write	them.	In	this	latter	case,	we	had	to	do	with	“lower	case”,	“minuscule”	representations	of	the	past—or	“minor	pasts”	in	Chakrabarty´s	formulation	(Chakrabarty	2000:	100–101)—which	offered	either	no	or	feeble	truth	warrants.	The	second	meaning	of	“capitalisation”	refers	to	its	economic	root	and	points	to	the	problems	involving	scholarly	research	in	an	atmosphere	saturated	by	the	tension	between	the	elitism	of	the	Humboldtian	ideal	of	university	and	the	financial	and	bureaucratic	pressures	coming	from	the	implementation	of	the	so-called	“Bologna	Process”	in	Germany	(Pechar	2012;	Menninghaus	2009;	Müller-Schöll	2009).		
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As a result, a new vocabulary comprised by spatial metaphors such as network, territoriality, 
geopolitics, fractals, flows, circulations, rhizome, etc. emerges. As Sebastian Conrad remarks, 
it “tend[s] to replace an older temporal vocabulary of development, time lag, and 
backwardness. This also implies a rejection of the teleologies of modernization theory” 
(Conrad 2016: 66); a rejection that is at once a critique both of methodological nationalism 
and of the idea that social change follows a unidirectional trajectory that conducts necessarily 
to Western modernity.  
The following thesis is a contribution to this discussion, and one that tackles a sore point: the 
question of long-term Historical continuity. In fact, the very effort to avoid the almost 
irresistible naturalness of the idea that the History of any social phenomena can be phrased 
in terms that eventually amounts to the formula “from the archaic to the modern” begs the 
question of how to define modernity in the first place and, consequently, open up the 
Pandora’s box from which will fly, perhaps at first, the conceptual (d)evils of the Entzauberung 
der Welt and of the development of capitalism, but soon afterwards those of colonialism, 
colonial slavery, imperialism, etc. All these events reach, when seen from the viewpoint of the 
social sciences, the temporal range of the long-term. And the social sciences have been, in 
turn, a major element in the constitution and establishment of another long-term event that 
renders fundamentally paradoxical and implausible their own attempts at dismissing 
modernity’s teleology: Eurocentrism. 
In some academic circles, and global History and its variants belong to them, to stress the 
importance of being self-reflective on the issue of Eurocentrism is meanwhile an almost 
mandatory concern. It would be deleterious to allow this concern to degenerate into a sort of 
usual commonplace remark whose effect does not go further than the performance of a 
renewed Eurocentric and complacent self-aggrandisement.  
The problem, of course, is that the very rhetoric of “scientificity” in matters related to the 
analysis of social phenomena makes that pronounced Eurocentric perspectives seize hold of 
the position of analytical condition of possibility. Eurocentrism turns out to be thus so 
pervasive that the question might no longer be how not to be Eurocentric but rather how to 
conceive a critical2 discursive construct that, while assumedly Eurocentric, must be 																																																								2	This	“critical”	attitude	meaning,	as	Michel	Foucault	suggests,	“die	Kunst	nicht	dermaßen	regiert	zu	werden”	(Foucault	 1992:	 12	 –	 emphasis	 added),	 where	 “dermaßen”	 refers	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 Eurocentrism’s	epistemological	power.		
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articulated, if not entirely outside the scholarly protocols of the social scientific institution, 
then at least not completely in conformity with it. This thesis is an attempt to unfold an 
epistemological argument in this way.  
There is one3 very precise reason why the ideas presented by Paul Gilroy in his Black Atlantic 
– Modernity and Double Consciousness provide adequate theoretical guidance on how to 
accomplish such a task in the disciplinary field of History. It is not only that in placing the issue 
of colonial slavery in the center of the discussion on modernity he keeps the focus on (one) of 
its so-called “dark-side(s)” or, as it were to say, he casts a shadow upon the brightness of the 
enlightened principles of modernity. This is significant because it can be used to re-periodise 
and re-accentuate historiographical accounts that, concerned with a re-assessment of the 
weight of colonialism and scientific racism in modernity’s development, would offer a stern 
rebuke to the alluring idea of history as progress and thus provide an opportunity 
To transcend the unproductive debate between Eurocentric rationalism which banishes the 
slave experience from its accounts of modernity while arguing that the crises of modernity can 
be resolved from within, and an equally occidental anti-humanism which locates the origins of 
modernity’s current crises in the shortcoming of the Enlightenment project.” (Gilroy 1993: 54) 
 
But perhaps even more important than that is the fact that Paul Gilroy performs his analysis 
by suggesting that substantial epistemological force might be derived from the very 
transnational and transcultural forms integral to the counterculture of modernity that he calls 
the Black Atlantic World. One could say, resorting to the conceptualisation Gilroy borrows 
from Seyla Benhabib, that one might engage in a “politics of [academic] fulfillment” through 
the deliberately more opaque means of a “politics of transfiguration”4. This is another way of 
asserting that a critique of “modern” historiography, likewise the critique of modernity itself, 
																																																								3	An	excursus	on	the	debates	that	Paul	Gilroy’s	Black	Atlantic	–	Modernity	and	Double	Consciousness	have	sparked	 off	 in	 variegated	 disciplines	 over	 the	 last	 decades	 would	 show	 that,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 point	emphasised	in	this	thesis,	there	are	many	others	that	explain	the	diffusion	and	influence	of	Gilroy’s	ideas	for	underpinning	critical	perspectives	on	Eurocentrism.	(Costa	2007,	2008,	2011;	Olmos	2009;	Williams	2013)	4	 Seyla	Benhabib	uses	 the	 terms	 “fulfillment”	 and	 “transfiguration”	 to	 refer	 to	 two	different	projects	 of	emancipation	 that	 she	 conceptualises	 as	 follows:	 “By	 the	 term	 “fulfillment”	 I	 mean	 a	 view	 of	 social	transformation	according	to	which	emancipation	carries	to	its	conclusion,	in	a	better	and	more	adequate	form,	 the	 already	 attained	 results	 of	 the	 present.	 Emancipation	 is	 realising	 the	 implicit	 but	 frustrated	potential	of	the	present.	The	term	“transfiguration”,	by	contrast,	is	intended	to	suggest	that	emancipation	signifies	a	radical	and	qualitative	break	with	some	aspects	of	the	present.	In	certain	fundamental	ways,	the	society	of	the	future	is	viewed	to	be,	not	the	culmination,	but	the	radical	negation	of	the	present.”	(Benhabib	1986:	41–42)	
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“cannot be satisfactorily completed within its own philosophical and political norms, that is, 
immanently.” (Gilroy 1993: 56)5  
The question of how to conceive and construct long-term continuity of social phenomena in 
historiographical writing is an ideal locus for such a critique, for it is the region of Historical 
knowledge where the hard empiricism associated with the intense work with primary sources 
characteristic of the Historian’s craft is softened by the ostensive necessity of emphasising 
abstract constructs and theoretical pre-assumptions taken from the neighbouring social 
scientific disciplines.  
Small wonder then, that one of the most influential theoretical contributions of History to the 
body of the social sciences (Rojas 1999; Wallerstein 2004; Lee 2012), namely, Fernand 
Braudel’s concept of longue durée, addresses precisely this matter.  Braudel does it by bringing 
to the fore the intractable issue of Historical time, i.e., the problem of the nature and status 
of temporal categories in History. This feature reinforces the traditional association of History 
with a deep concern with, or privileged access to, time in human affairs. Along these lines, 
History would then be the field of knowledge in the best position to provide an analysis that 
demonstrated the centrality of time as an explicit conceptual category within the social 
sciences.  
Braudel’s works has played an important role in the firm establishment of the scholarly 
habitus of thinking about Historical time in terms of a multiplicity of temporalities which are 
based on the distinction between three main types of continuity: the short-term or episodic 
(évènementielle), the term of cyclical phases (conjoncture) and the long-term (longue durée). 
History, Braudel writes, is nothing other than this “dialectic of continuities” (Braudel [1958] 
2012: 258). The most important of these continuities is, of course, the one that lends its name 
to the concept itself: the longue durée. This evinces how much Braudel was concerned with 
conceiving an analytical framework that would enable one to grasp historical continuity in a 
non-linear way, and especially in that dimension in which accomplishing this task seemed to 
be most troublesome. 
																																																								5	 Such	 a	 positioning	 challenges	 not	 only	 a	 defeatist,	 paralyzing	 or	 cynical	 acknowledgement	 of	Eurocentrism’s	 inevitability,	 but	 also,	 firstly,	 the	 well-intentioned	 but	 often	 ineffective	 mere	“recommendation”	of	a	“critical”	attitude	towards	it	and,	secondly,	that	complacent	stance	characterized	by	conspicuous	anti-Eurocentric	statements	always	eager	to	celebrate	the	power	and	greatness	of	its	own	self-reflectivity	while	“trivializes	the	potency	of	the	negative”.	(Gilroy	1993:	56)	
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Contemporary scholars engaged in developing a robust critique of Eurocentrism have not 
failed to recognise this remarkable feature of Braudel’s work. Olaf Kaltmeier points out that 
postcolonial authors have been explicitly using Braudel’s concept of longue durée in order to 
expose the resistant permanence of deeply rooted colonial structures after the formal end of 
colonialism (Kaltmeier 2011: 205). Mielants’ words best summarize what one should expect 
from Braudel’s concept: 
“If one can traverse the micro, meso and macro levels as Braudel did, from the structures of 
daily life to the wheels of commerce and ultimately a perspective of the world, one is inevitably 
forced to rethink Eurocentric epistemological assumptions about temporal linearity. […] One 
major challenge of mainstream social science is to overcome its Eurocentric limitations in an 
attempt to make Western models ‘fit’ the non-West.” (Mielants 2012: 206) 
 
Still, contrarily as one may perhaps infer from these somehow excessively flattering 
statements, it would be misleading to think of Braudel’s longue durée as intrinsically non-
Eurocentric. Steve Feierman6 emphasizes that “Braudel selbst konnte aus einer Geschichte 
der Welt mit Europa in ihrem Zentrum und nur einer Entwicklungslinie nicht ausbrechen” 
(Feierman 2002: 55). 
Such a History, as Walter Benjamin cunningly observes, “cannot be sundered from the idea of 
its progression through an homogenous, empty time.” But History, so reads Benjamin’s 
fabulous insight, “is the subject of a structure whose site is not a homogenous, empty time, 
but time filled by the presence of the now [Jetztzeit]7 (Benjamin [1942] 2007: 261]. 
The ambivalence of Braudel’s concept towards Eurocentrism lies in its spatial metaphoricity. 
The longue durée provides a relatively simple model by means of which continuities in 
Historical time are conceived in terms of a spatialised structure8 that allows for eschewing the 
smooth temporal linearity that evolutionarily leads from the archaic to the modern.  
However, in order to look at past events through the lenses of the longue durée, one must 
presuppose the Braudelian Historian as a Cartesian subject (Hall [1996] 2011: 601–611), who 
is able to distinguish clearly between the substance of historical matter and the substance of 
																																																								6	According	to	Weinstein,	Feierman	offers	“through	the	creation	of	multiple	macrohistorical	narratives”	a	way	out	of	what	she	calls	“postcolonial	dilemma”.	Under	“postcolonial	dilemma”	should	be	understood	the	necessity	to	explain	macro-historical	events	based	on	the	notion	of	causation	without	coming	back	to	the	positivist	master-narratives.	(Weinstein	2005:	88–89)	7	 “Benjamin	 says	 “Jetztzeit”	 and	 indicates	 by	 the	 quotation	 marks	 that	 he	 does	 not	 simply	 mean	 an	equivalent	to	Gegenwart,	that	is,	present.	He	clearly	is	thinking	of	the	mystical	nunc	stans.”	[translator’s	note]	8	“Structure”,	Braudel	says,	is	the	most	important	and	useful	term	in	the	discussion	on	longue	durée;	it	is,	in	one	word,	what	the	concept	is	about	at	all	(Braudel	[1958]	2012:	248).	
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Historical thought, who can cut with calculated precision the homogenous mass of the past 
into three parallel slices and then endow them with qualities precisely defined. Such a subject 
is however an essential part of an empiricist-historicist view of History, a view that needs to 
be questioned for the sake of constructing alternative epistemological approaches. 
In this sense, it is correct to say that, to the extent to which it is a seminal concept that has 
been making plain the potential of metaphorical spatialisation as a way of theorising Historical 
time so as to give rise to abstract constructs that can be turned into an analytical weapon 
against Eurocentric excesses, Braudel’s longue durée constitutes a kind of prototype of the 
work intended to be done in this dissertation. On the other hand, the concept itself will play 
no significant role in the elaboration of the argument unfolded here, for substantial elements 
of its epistemological premises as well as typical features of the most influential 
historiographical current associated with its disciplinary employment are part of that which 
shall be laid at History’s door.  
Paul Gilroy also has recourse to a spatial metaphor when he delineates the long-term 
Historical contour of the Black Atlantic. With the purpose of creating the underlying 
understanding that fractal patterns of cultural and political affiliation characterise the 
dynamic between “the stereophonic, bilingual, or bifocal cultural forms originated by, but no 
longer the exclusive property of, blacks dispersed within the structures of feeling, producing, 
communicating, and remembering” which he heuristically calls the ‘Black Atlantic world’ 
(Gilroy 1993: 3), he provides a set of concrete Historical events co-related on the basis of 
criteria of self-similitude. Gilroy does not deny that the selected sample of Historical examples 
were not the only ones he could have chosen, although he hopes that the fact that they span 
a century will be taken as evidence for the existence of those fractal patterns (Gilroy 1993: 
87–88). Then, he explains that he was “thinking of fractal geometry as an analogy […] because 
it allows for the possibility that a line of infinite length can enclose a finite area. The opposition 
between totality and infinity is thus recast in a striking image of the scope for agency in 
restricted conditions.” (Gilroy 193: 237 – emphasis added) 
According to Braudel's terminology, something that spans over a century would fall into the 
category of those things of “sustained breath”, its history being of a long—even a very long—
duration: the longue durée (Braudel [1958] 2012: 244). In the spatial language that Braudel 
uses to illustrate this idea, such long-term events would form the depths of the “whole thick 
reality of history” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 246). They would be there, where things remain 
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almost the same in spite of the disturbances in their surface. The slow pace of their historical 
development would be considered the reason of their long permanence, and thus of their 
existence in the present.  
In the understanding suggested by Gilroy, where the events are presented as fragments 
thought to be part of the structure of a fractal pattern, the core of the problem is displaced 
from the presumed inherent characteristic of the Historicised phenomenon, e.g. the slow pace 
of its historical development, to the forms of recognition which allow it to be regarded as 
being of long-term. On top of that are the relations of force—the re-presentation of agency—
that give the shape to every representation of the past. 
According to Benoit Mandelbrot, who coined the mathematical term “fractal”, this geometric 
conception of space was thought to study the patterns of the natural world whose forms are, 
for all practical purposes, infinite. These are forms that “Euclides leaves aside as being 
formless”. Fractal geometry endeavors “to investigate the morphology of the ‘amorphous’”. 
(Mandelbrot 1983: 13)  
In this sense, fractal spatiality, if employed to conceive abstract representations of historical 
continuity, would require the mobilisation of a vocabulary and imagery which compels one to 
consider history’s infinitude and shapelessness without straightaway dismissing the possibility 
of recognising patterns and boundaries, which, in turn, must not be presented as if they were 
derived from an infallible Euclidian (or Cartesian) logic. Furthermore, in such spatiality there 
is no room for hidden elements. Thus, it precludes the mesmerising idea that there are forms 
of knowledge specialised in unveiling what happens under the visible9 surface of social reality.  
In Gilroy’s account the “empty time” is filled up with events that are neither presented as 
adroitly arranged for the sake of Historical coherence nor as necessary developments derived 
from a clear-cut pre-established structure. Things that happened earlier do determine10 the 
emergence of those which came later into being, but in so far as they result from the agency 
of a twofold overdetermined subject: those acting in the past, and those representing them 
historiographically in the present. In this sense, Gilroy opens the door to a prompter 
																																																								9	As	Dona	Haraway	remarks,	“vision	requires	instruments	of	vision;	an	optics	is	a	politics	of	positioning.”	(Haraway	1988:	586)	10	“Determination”	bears	here	Raymond	William’s	sense,	that	is,	it	is	thought	not	as	the	“laws	of	a	whole	process”,	but	as	“the	setting	of	limits”	and	“the	exertion	of	pressures”	(Williams	[1977]	2009:	83–89).	
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comprehension of the fact that those who have been writing History are also those who are 
inscribed in, and ascribed through, the History that has been written.  
Historical accounts guided by a fractal sense of Historical spatiality would thus represent an 
attempt at the fulfillment of Benjamin’s messianic wish to advance an understanding of 
History fiercely hostile to historicism and, by extension, to the most repressive and 
dispossessing traits of Eurocentric representations of the past. In such Histories, time is 
neither empty nor homogeneous but fulfilled by Jetztzeit (Benjamin [1942] 2007: 261; 2006b: 
268) or, summarized paradoxically: Jetztzeit is the content of History’s empty time. 
 
Time Between Spaces 
The Black Atlantic is the kind of social process whose existence cannot gain social scientific 
contour within the container model of society that reduces its analytical focus to the 
boundaries of the nation-state. It is thus a phenomenon that must be conceived as existing in 
a state of in-betweenness that negatively stresses the centrality of main unities among which 
the nation-state, as a dominant political-institutional actor, as well as nationalism, as a 
powerful ideological discourse, occupy a distinctive position (Wimmer/Glick-Schiller 2002). 
There are two further main lines of force that share this epistemological privilege: whiteness 
as Europeanness (also in its US-American derivation) and maleness. This means that to think 
of the Black Atlantic as an anti-Eurocentric approach entails considering a fundamentally anti-
phallogocentric perspective that must also be especially attentive to anti-racist arguments, as 
they have been advanced in fields such as critical whiteness and critical racial studies. 
In fact, it is Gilroy’s ability to articulate the issues of experience, identity and corporality on 
the basis of concepts such as diaspora and difference (Costa 2007: 127–134; 2011: 153–163) 
that makes his approach attuned to the task of tackling the omnipresent risk of reproducing 
the master-narrative of Western modernity—with its biased blindness toward issues involving 
race and gender—within the possible spaces which aim at constructing its actuality “in-
between” chief unities that need not to claim for existence at all. 
The vocabulary required to bring about such entities is not properly a petty problem. In the 
case of The Black Atlantic, the idea of fractal spatiality is part of the rhetoric arsenal that Paul 
Gilroy deploys to work it out. This thesis represents an attempt to elaborate on Gilroy’s insight 
so as to draw the sketch of a metaphorical model of Historical time especially concerned with 
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long-term continuity. In a (narrow) sense, this is the ideal and ultimate goal of this 
dissertation. 
Still, it is important to underline that in The Black Atlantic the notion of fractal spatiality is by 
no means conceived of as a theoretical or methodological contribution to the conduction of 
historiographical research. In point of fact, whereas fractal spatiality harmonises very well 
with the critical undertaking represented by the type of analysis advanced by Paul Gilroy, it 
stands in blatant inharmonious relation to the prevailing understanding of some indispensable 
concepts usually employed within the historiographical milieu. For this reason, a reflection on 
History’s disciplinar11 vocabulary imposes itself as a welcome epistemological necessity that 
will be gladly satisfied in the course of this dissertation. Even more gladly to the extent that it 
will be also an extended meditation12 on colonial slavery presented in the form of a 
circumstanciated review of the recent Brazilian historiographical production about the issue. 
The general strategy employed for carrying out this task will be fairly simple: widespread 
disciplinary understandings of a selected group of concepts will be submitted to a 
“commentative13 analysis” whose purpose is to endow them with other meanings. There is 																																																								11	“Disciplinary”	bears	here	not	only	its	usual	academic	meaning	but	also	that	sense	of	a	power	as	theorised	by	 Michel	 Foucault.	 Foucault	 argues	 that	 in	 any	 society	 “there	 are	manifold	 relations	 of	 power	 which	permeate,	characterise	and	constitute	the	social	body,	and	these	relations	of	power	cannot	themselves	be	established,	 consolidated	 nor	 implemented	 without	 the	 production,	 accumulation,	 circulation	 and	functioning	 of	 a	 discourse.	 There	 can	 be	 no	 possible	 exercise	 of	 power	 without	 a	 certain	 economy	 of	discourses	of	truth	which	operates	through	and	on	the	basis	of	this	association.”	The	“disciplinary	power”	exposes,	as	Foucault	would	say,	“the	how	of	power”.	It	is	not	overly	concerned	with	repression,	restriction	and	 punishment	 but	 rather	 with	 the	 “production	 of	 effective	 instruments	 for	 the	 formation	 and	accumulation	 of	 knowledge—methods	 of	 observation,	 techniques	 of	 registration,	 procedures	 for	investigation	and	research,	apparatuses	of	control.”	This	type	of	power	“never	ceases	its	interrogation,	its	inquisition,	its	registration	of	truth:	it	institutionalises,	professionalises	and	rewards	its	pursuit.”	It	is	in	this	sense	that	even	though	they	are	“extraordinarily	inventive	participants	in	the	order	of	these	knowledge-producing	apparatuses	[of	control]	[…]	disciplines	are	the	bearers	of	a	discourse,	but	this	cannot	be	the	discourse	of	right.	The	disciplines	may	well	be	the	carriers	of	a	discourse	that	speaks	of	a	rule,	but	this	is	not	the	juridical	rule	deriving	from	sovereignty,	but	a	natural	rule,	a	norm.	The	code	they	come	to	define	is	not	 of	 law	but	 that	 of	 normalisation.	 Their	 reference	 is	 to	 a	 theoretical	 horizon	which	 of	 necessity	 has	nothing	common	with	the	edifice	of	right.	It	is	human	science	which	constitutes	their	domain	[…].”	(Foucault	1980:	92–93;	102;	106–107	-	emphasis	added).		From	the	consideration	that	“normalisation”	is	what	is	at	stake	with	respect	to	the	“disciplinary	power”	of	History,	one	can	then	easily	infer	the	strategic	importance	of	the	concern	with	its	semantic	vocabulary.	12	 This	 “extended	 meditation”	 is	 conducted	 throughout	 in	 a	 state	 of	 mind	 that	 Paul	 Gilroy	 defines	 as	“unhappy	 consciousness”,	 which	 is	 one	 that	 demands	 a	 rethinking	 of	 the	 “meanings	 of	 rationality,	autonomy,	reflection,	subjectivity,	and	power	in	the	light	of	an	extended	meditation	both	on	the	condition	of	the	slaves	and	on	the	suggestion	that	the	racial	terror	is	not	merely	compatible	with	occidental	rationality	but	cheerfully	complicit	with	it.”	(Gilroy	1993:	56)	13	The	“commentary”	 is	 thought	here	as	one	of	 those	“internal	rules,	where	discourse	exercises	 its	own	control;	rules	concerned	with	the	principles	of	classification,	ordering	and	distribution.”	It	is,	according	to	Foucault,	a	procedure	involved	in	the	mastery	of	a	precise	dimension	of	discourse:	that	of	events	and	chance.	(Foucault	1972:	220)	
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no ambition to create new meanings. If something at all might be considered new in this 
operation, this will not be the meanings themselves, but perhaps the particular way and 
context in which they are attributed. It is fair to characterise such an analysis as a semantic 
exploration theoretically oriented towards an epistemological comprehension of 
historiographical representation that, using Spivak’s words, aims at fraying the textile of 
History into frayages14 or facilitations that breach open15 a way for post-colonial thinking 
(Spivak [1993] 2009: 202). 
The concepts chosen as subject of this exploration are organised in pairs: 
ideology/anachronism, History/theory of History, time/event. In a manner that will grow 
intelligible in the course of the dissertation, anachronism constitutes the content of ideology 
(in the writing of History) in a way similar to that in which theory of History constitutes the 
content of History while, concurrently, event constitutes the content of time. This means to 
say that the notion of fractality was mobilised not only in the choice of the concepts but also 
in their pairing, which follows a parallel guided by the fractal principle of self-similitude. 
Further, the reader will notice that the very structure of the dissertation adheres to this latter 
principle: Part One is comprised of three chapters which, addressing those three pairs of 
concepts, are literal and respectively entitled after them. Part Two replicates this same 
structure. After Part One and before Part Two there is a Transition, a chapter that neither 
deals with those three pairs of concepts nor, accordingly, repeats the formal subtitle-structure 
of the two others parts. It symbolizes a temporalized boundary that stands for the indelible 
in-between element that through its very difference defines the mutual form of every unit in 
the absolute contiguity of a fractal. 																																																								“Whatever	 the	 techniques	 employed,	 commentary's	 only	 role	 is	 to	 say	 finally,	 what	 has	 silently	 been	articulated	deep	down.	It	must—and	the	paradox	is	ever-changing	yet	inescapable—say,	for	the	first	time,	what	has	already	been	said,	and	repeat	tirelessly	what	was,	nevertheless,	never	said.	The	infinite	rippling	of	commentary	is	agitated	from	within	by	the	dream	of	masked	repetition:	in	the	distance	there	is,	perhaps,	nothing	other	 than	what	was	 there	at	 the	point	of	departure:	 simple	recitation.	Commentary	averts	 the	chance	element	of	discourse	by	giving	it	its	due:	it	gives	us	the	opportunity	to	say	something	other	than	the	text	itself,	but	on	condition	that	it	is	the	text	itself	which	is	uttered	and,	in	some	ways,	finalised.	The	open	multiplicity,	the	fortuitousness,	is	transferred,	by	the	principle	of	commentary,	from	what	is	liable	to	be	said	to	the	number,	the	form,	the	masks	and	the	circumstances	of	repetition.	The	novelty	lies	no	longer	in	what	is	said,	but	in	its	reappearance.”	(Foucault	1972:	221)	14	“’Facilitation’	is	the	English	translation	of	the	Freudian	term	Bahnung	(pathing)	which	is	translated	as	




Part One is entitled “Articulating History and Linguistic Turn”, where “articulation” bears that 
“nice double meaning” to which Stuart Hall draws attention:  
“‘articulate’ means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate. It carries that sense of language-
ing, of expressing, etc. But we also speak of an ‘articulated’ lorry (truck): a lorry where the 
front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but need not necessarily, be connected to one another. The 
two parts are connected to each other, but through a specific linkage, that can be broken.” 
(Hall 1996a: 141) 
 
It articulates thus not only two contingent subject matters—a particular current of the 
“linguistic turn” and History—but also a specific stance on Historical knowledge. Taken as a 
whole, this part represents a strong epistemological statement. Analytical philosophy of 
History, particularly the works of Arthur Danto, Louis Mink and Frank Ankersmit, authors who 
have played a significant role in the later developments of theory of History, provides the main 
code used for constructing a theoretical framework within which postcolonial arguments—at 
this point represented chiefly by Gayatri C. Spivak and Dipesh Chakrabarty—are mobilized in 
order to sediment some epistemological propositions on which that sketch of a metaphorical 
model of Historical time based on fractal spatiality could be premised upon. 
 “Ideology and Anachronism”, the first chapter of this part, is divided in two sections, which 
respectively deal with each one of these subjects.  
In “The noise of ideology or the sound of historiographical silences”, the first section, Maria 
Cristina C. Wissenbach’s Sonhos Africanos, Vivências Ladinas – Escravos e forros em São Paulo 
(1850-1880) provides the stage where the immanence of “narrative sentences” as well as the 
creation of “temporal wholes”, both features that ensue from the ontological narrativity of 
History as theorised by Arthur Danto (Danto [1965] 2007), are highlighted in order to show 
how ideological positions happen to be occupied.  
Without proposing any periodisation, Wissenbach moves back and forth between the events 
she addresses in such a manner that creates a temporal gap which emerges as the “time of 
oblivion” (of the historical role of slaves and freedmen) and makes it possible to present 
contemporary Social History, which her own work is part of, as “rescuer” of those forsaken 
people. History as “rescuer”, if not “savior” or “emancipator”, of the “wretched of the earth”, 
who are thus seen as “survivors”, is in fact a recurring motif in the History of Slavery16.  																																																								16	This	rhetoric	is	often	mobilised	in	discussions	about	whether	slave	criminality	should	be	regarded	as	a	form	of	open	resistance	or	whether	it	was	rather	a	way	of	accommodation	within	the	constraints	of	the	
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In her celebrated essay “Can the subaltern speak?” Spivak chose as point of departure a 
“friendly exchange” between Deleuze and Foucault because the “unguarded practice of 
conversation” enables “one to glimpse the track of ideology” (Spivak 1988: 272). 
Paraphrasing Spivak, it could here be said that the “friendly exchange” between past and 
present that Wissenbach carries out through her “unguarded practice of moving in time” also 
enables “one to glimpse the track of ideology”. If a key analytical maneuver for interpreting 
ideology, as Spivak explains resorting to Pierre Macherey, is to comprehend the importance 
of listening carefully to “what the work cannot say […] because there the elaboration of the 
utterance is carried out, in a sort of journey to silence.” (Spivak 1988: 286), then the relevance 
of being attentive to the relation of narrativity and Historical time is that it may provide 
Historians with an analytical tool for “measuring the silences” spoken by the most inexorable 
features of their craft: the construction of Historical continuity. For the writing of History, the 
concluding remark of this section reads, few notions may be of greater utility than the one 
that teaches how to keep a watchful eye not exactly on what can be read between History’s 
lines, but rather on how to hear the tensed lines of Historical accounts. 
The second section, “The treachery of History or History as ‘controlled anachronism’”, was 
entitled after Magritte’s famous painting “The Treachery of Images”. It develops the argument 
that in the same way as images can be particularly “treacherous” towards the sense of sight, 
so can History be respecting the sense of time.  
The most elementary evidence that this sense can be duped by History is the fact that 
Historians are intensive and ostensively trained to protect themselves against the perils of 
anachronism17. In fact, few attributes can disqualify a Historian’s statement as deeply as being 
regarded as “anachronic”. Nevertheless, on the basis of an analysis of the works by João José 
																																																								slavery	system.	In	stressing	that	the	crimes	performed	by	those	who	had	to	live	under	the	burden	of	slavery	was	much	more	a	matter	of	negotiating	their	surviving	than	of	rebelling	against	the	oppression,	the	slaves’	everyday	 life	 functions	as	a	“floating	buffer	zone”	(Spivak	1988:	285),	 the	mobilisation	of	which	plays	a	crucial	role	in	the	representation	of	central	issues	such	as	the	brutality	of	slavery	regime	and	the	slaves’	agency.		The	implications	of	approaching	the	Brazilian	slavery	system	from	this	point	of	view	have	been	sharply	criticised	by	Jacob	Gorender.	From	a	Marxist	perspective,	he	argues	that	some	Historians,	eager	to	draw	attention	to	“the	world	the	slaves	made”	(Genovese	1976),	thrust	the	systemic	and	economic	constraints	of	slavery	excessively	into	background,	so	that	in	the	end	what	results	is	a	kind	of	rehabilitation	of	slavery	itself.	“Neopatriarcalistas”,	the	term	Gorender	coins	to	designate	these	historiographical	works,	gives	some	idea	of	how	highly	ideological	the	atmosphere	in	which	this	debate	has	been	conducted	is	(Gorender	1978).	17	Evidently,	among	these	perils	is	that	of	rough	chronological	inaccuracy,	which	is	reprovable	to	the	extent	that	it	is	more	or	less	easily	avoidable.	In	addition	to	its	lack	of	importance	from	an	analytical	point	of	view,	this	type	of	anachronism	is	a	mistake	that	professional	Historians	are	rather	unlikely	to	make.		
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Reis (Death is a Festival – Funeral Rites and Rebellion in Nineteenth-Century Brazil) and Sidney 
Chalhoub (Visões da Liberdade – Uma história das últimas décadas da escravidão na Corte), 
this section expounds the way in which Historical description operates through a studied and 
permanent time displacement of its agents so as to render anachronism into a sort of 
condition of possibility of Historical knowledge rather than a danger or an error. Therefore, 
and in that very sense of exploring the disciplinary semantic of History’s field, it is argued that 
the writing of academic Historical accounts shall be seen as the true practice of a specific mode 
of “controlled anachronism”, which, in consequence, should not be demonised but rather felt 
as the divine breath that brings History to life. 
This whole argument about anachronism is derived from what Arthur Danto calls “the 
paradoxes of perceptual indiscernibility.”18 The most intelligible examples of such paradoxes 
are found in the art world, where commonplace objects such as a urinal (Marcel Duchamp) or 
soap cardboard boxes (Andy Warhol) were transformed into works of art. The term Danto 
coins to talk about this “subtle miracle” art can perform is “transfiguration of the 
commonplace” (Danto 1981: v-vi). Adapting the term to History, Lydia Goehr speaks of “the 
transformation of the chronicle” as a way of pointing to the similarity between the way in 
which common artifacts are transfigured into artworks and the way in which Historian’s 
descriptions of common events are transformed into explanations as well as into theory-, 
interest-, and value-laden assessments (Goehr 2007: xxii).  
These remarkably provocative observations also guide Part One’s second chapter, which is the 
one that deals with the pair “History/theory of History”. Altogether, this chapter is a long 
digression that aims basically at eroding the taken for granted disciplinary separation between 
an empirical-theoretical (historiography) and a meta-theoretical level (theory of History) in 
History. The kernel of the argument can be condensed in three main propositions. The first 
one, based on Danto’s aesthetics, reads that History should not be thought of comprising an 
epistemological domain separable from theory of History, for historical accounts are 
substantially constituted by what they are theoretically believed to be. The second proposition 
establishes that this indivisible theoretical substance of History consists of what Chakrabarty 
calls “hyperreal Europe”, an abstract entity that has remained the implicit but nevertheless 																																																								18	This	is	also,	according	to	Danto’s	view,	the	general	subject	to	which	philosophy	is	devoted	to:	philosophy	is	what	enables	one	to	distinguish	that	which	could	not	be	told	apart	without	the	aid	of	some	theory	(Carrier	1998:	5;	Carrol	1998:	19).	
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sovereign subject of all histories. Finally, the third one, which also draws on Chakrabarty’s 
theorisation of History, refers to the idea that this “hyperreal Europe” should be subjected to 
a “politics of translation”, which, oriented towards translucence (or opacity, in Glissannt’s or 
Gilroy’s terms) instead of transparency, may produce Historical difference (instead of lack or 
incommensurability). (Chakrabarty 2000) 
“Time and Event”, the third and last chapter of the first half of the dissertation, focuses 
properly on the subject matter of long-term continuity in Historical writing. “Time” and 
“event” are two singularly ineffable concepts. Making a reference to Wittgenstein19, Frank 
Ankersmit remarks penetratingly that “in Historical writing: […] everything is regarded from 
the perspective of time—but apparently it is precisely this which makes it impossible to speak 
about time itself.” (Ankersmit 2012: 30) History appears here as a kind of Augustinian 
discipline, schizophrenically repeating to itself: “What is time then? If nobody asks me, I know: 
but if I were desirous to explain it to one that should ask me, plainly I know not.” (Augustine 
2014: 239) 
 Event is another notion whose generality is such that it makes an appropriate definition 
almost impossible. The makeshift solution is to accept that “an event is never explained, if at 
all, as an event merely, but always under a description” (Mink 1987: 143). In a sense, there is 
no such a thing as an “event itself” but only “an event under a description”.  
That the matter involving time and event might grow extremely intricate one can infer from 
these few philosophical observations. Nevertheless, there is a way of immediately relating 
“time” [as unspoken or non-referred] and “event” [under a description] that simply assumes 
that “time is event”. Concerning History, a field where time only happens insofar as it results 
from events that must be in some way or another described, one can easily grasp how much 
truth is in this assumption. 
When a historiographical study aims at covering a chronological time that goes beyond —or 
far beyond—the one from which its sources originated or to which they can be assigned, 
Historians have then to deal with the quite ordinary problem of how to establish temporal 
continuity in a manner that is fairly based on these sources, but which these same sources are 
																																																								19	 Wittgenstein’s	 aphorism	 to	 which	 Ankersmit	 refers	 runs	 as	 follows:	 “Where	 in	 the	 world	 is	 a	metaphysical	subject	to	be	noted?	You	say	that	this	case	is	altogether	like	that	of	the	eye	and	the	field	of	sight.	But	you	do	not	really	see	the	eye.	And	from	nothing	in	the	field	of	sight	can	it	be	concluded	that	it	is	seen	from	an	eye.”	(Wittgenstein	[1922]	2014:	87–88)	
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not an empirical proof of. This is the moment where some particular types of abstract 
constructs usually presented as methodological devices play a conspicuous role in Historical 
writing.  
In A Negregada Instituição, a prominent work about capoeira in Brazil, the Historian Carlos 
Eugênio Líbano Soares advances the explication that the Nagoas and the Guaiamuns, the main 
“maltas de capoeiristas”20 of Rio de Janeiro, had different origins. The Nagoas, he explains, 
were related to Africans and “Baianos”, worshipper of the Orishas, or at least close to this 
religion, whereas the Guaiamuns stemmed from a native creole tradition, in this respect being 
then related to the slaves born in Brazil. (Soares 1994: 39-87) 
Soares’ methodological point of departure in attempting to underpin this genealogical 
hypothesis is Carlo Ginzburg’s “evidential paradigm”, which, as the latter writes, is concerned 
with the problem of finding intermediary connections between “the abstract depth of the 
structure and the superficial concreteness of the event” or, put differently, to open up “an 
intermediary path between the level of the structure and that of the event.” (Ginzburg 1991: 
22) 
Ginzburg finds in the theorisation on “family resemblances” as formulated in Wittgenstein’s 
idea of “übersitchtliche Darstellung” as well as in the cladistics of Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism 
the keys for transforming a series of events into a “general image that does not have the form 
of a chronological development” (Ginzburg 1991: 15). Louis Mink, in turn, also influenced by 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, suggests that such a form of representation might indeed be a 
distinctive characteristic of Historical understanding which consisted of comprehending a 
complex event by “seeing things together” in a total and synoptic judgment which cannot be 
replaced by any analytic technique”. One intriguing consequence which results from accepting 
this view is that temporal order is removed from its traditional refuge as integral to  
”the essence of historical judgment. […] That events occur sequentially in time means not that 
the Historian must ‘relive’ them—by reproducing a determinate serial order in his own 
thought—to understand them, but that he must in an act of judgment hold together in thought 
events which no one could experience together.” (Mink 1987: 84 – emphasis added) 
 
When one comes to understand that what might be termed a long-term Historical event 
happens as this kind of unifying abstract relation among events, the consequence is that 
chronology, span and pace—elements central to the ordinary disciplinary understanding of 																																																								20	“Malta”	was	the	name	given	to	the	different	group	of	capoeiristas	in	19th-Century	Rio	de	Janeiro.	
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Historical time21—become marginal. This gives a hint of where the impression that History 
constitutes itself not by exposing but by concealing time comes from, as well as explains, to 
some degree, why Historical time may also be thought of as the result of a logic of [production 
of] resemblances within which sameness and long duration stand always in intimate 
relationship.  
 
Having articulated a stance on Historical knowledge by making all these points concerning 
central conceptual issues, what follows is a transitional chapter that connects Part One’s 
overarching theoretical analysis to the more particular epistemological perspective inspired 
by Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic, which will be advanced in Part Two. 
The discussion’s guideline of this Transition is that which Michel Foucault defines as “the 
problem of [Historical] consciousness”, which, in the case of the present dissertation, 
following W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Gilroy, shall be more appropriately denominated “the 
problem of (counter-hegemonic forms) of double consciousness” in History.  
The relevance of taking this step may be perfectly understood if one considers this clear-cut 
and penetrating thought by Foucault: “Making historical analysis the discourse of the 
continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development 
and all action are the two sides of the same system of thought” (Foucault 1972: 12). To behave 
towards this system of thought so as to posit the perspective of a “doubly conscious” subject 
is then the task set to be performed.  
Not by accident, the focus lies here on works, the main claim of which is that they represent 
the slaves’ point of view. In fact, the Brazilian historiography of slavery presents the 
constitution of the slave’s self-consciousness as a process of developing a double 
consciousness repeatedly expressed in a talk about a “double life”, “double role”, “double 
learning” of lives consumed in the pursuing of a type of recognition different from the one 
they were supposed to deserve.  
																																																								21	These	three	elements	would	then	be	functionally	a	mere	artificial	mnemonic	by	which	one	can	maintain	a	minimum	sense	of	possible	relations	of	particular	events	to	each	other.	(Mink	1987:	57)	
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Kátia Mattoso’s Ser Escravo no Brasil (1982), Maria Cristina C. Wissenbach’s Sonhos Africanos, 
Vivências Ladinas (1989), and Sydney Chalhoub’s Visões da Liberdade (1990) are examples of 
books that put forward such a viewpoint. They form the bulk of the analysis in this chapter22.  
All these works place great emphasises on the slaves’ agency with the purpose of presenting 
them as self-conscious subjects of their own history rather than passive victims23. But the 
vocabulary deployed to carry it out sometimes manifests a patent evolutionist character, like 
is the case of, for example, Kátia Mattoso’s qualification of slave insurrections such as the 
Malê Revolt as “pre-political” 24. The evolutionism of Mattoso’s scheme “pre-political → 
political” tends to reproduce itself in a more attenuated manner in the pair “slave → worker” 
used by Sydney Chalhoub, where the second term of the pair stands for the discipline, 
assiduity, punctuality and efficiency that shall guide the “modern” rationality of capitalist 
labour in contrast to the backwardness of slavery, as well as in Wissenbach’s “slave → citizen”, 
where “citizenship” means to be torn from the personified tyranny of slavery and enter into a 
broad community of people freely subjected to the impersonal power of the state. 																																																								22	The	analysis	also	takes	into	account	other	contemporary	works,	such	as	Ciro	Flamarion	Cardoso’s	Escravo	
Ou	Camponês	-	o	Protocampesinato	Negro	nas	Américas	(1987),	João	José	Reis’	Rebelião	Escrava	no	Brasil	(1986)	and	João	José	Reis	&	Eduardo	da	Silva’s	Negociação	e	Conflito:	a	Resistência	Negra	no	Brasil	Escravista	(1989),	which	held	a	dialogue	with	the	three	main	authors	chosen.	In	addition,	classics	written	in	the	prior	decades,	such	as	Da	Senzala	à	Colônia	(1966)	by	Emilia	Viotti	da	Costa	or	O	Escravismo	Colonial	(1978)	by	Jacob	Gorender	as	well	as	more	recent	studies	like	Vera	Malaguti	Batista’s	O	medo	na	cidade	do	Rio	de	Janeiro	
(2003)	and	Ricardo	Figueiredo	Pirola’s	Jutiça,	escravidão	e	pena	de	morte	(2012)	are	addressed	in	parallel	as	well.		23	In	a	sense,	these	three	books	carry	out	a	re-examination	of	the	simplifying	equation	that	presents	the	relation	of	violence	to	self-consciousness	as	always	inversely	proportional:	the	more	intense	the	violence	exercised	upon	a	subject,	the	less	shall	be	the	room	for	the	subject’s	self-consciousness.	The	thesis	at	stake	here	is	not	an	unimportant	one,	it	reads	that	the	assumption	of	the	insane	brutality	of	slavery	ought	not	to	conduct	to	another	one,	namely,	that	of	the	slaves’	“social	death”,	which	had	been	schlepped	through	the	ages	by	anti-black	racism	until	the	present	time.	(Wilderson	2010)	24	Since	the	80s,	the	fairly	evolutionist	approach	that	adopts	notions	like	“pre-political”	has	been	criticised	within	Brazilian	History	of	Slavery.	In	Negociação	e	Conflito:	a	resistência	negra	no	Brasil	escravista,	Eduardo	Silva	remarks	that:	“Essa	terminologia	de	inspiração	evolucionista,	elaborada	com	certo	cuidado	por	Eric	Hobsbawm,	já	foi	habilmente	criticada	por	nossos	antropólogos	e	historiadores.	Eles	colocaram	as	peças	no	lugar	certo:	não	se	trata	de	uma	questão	de	“pré”	ou	“pós”,	trata-se	do	diferente.	Os	‘rebeldes	primitivos’	faziam	a	política	que	podiam	fazer	face	aos	recursos	com	que	contavam,	a	sociedade	em	que	viviam	e	as	limitações	estruturais	que	enfrentavam”	(Reis/Silva	[1989]	2009:	99).	In	fact,	as	early	as	in	1975,	Maria	Isaura	Pereira	de	Queiroz	argued	that	Hobsbawm’s	use	of	the	concepts	of	“political”	and	pre-political	were	“relacionados	 a	 julgamentos	 de	 valor	 depreciativos	 que	 persistem	 relativamente	 às	 sociedades	consideradas	pouco	desenvolvidas,	às	camadas	sociais	inferiores,	aos	grupos	que	são	classificados	como	marginais.[...]	Numa	sociedade	e	cultura	como	as	atuais,	em	que	a	valorização	recai	sobre	o	que	é	moderno,	o	 emprego	 de	 termo	 que	 encerra	 o	 sentido	 de	 “antigo”	 dá	 forçosamente	 um	 sentido	 negativo	 e	desprestigiado	àquilo	que	foi	qualificado.”	She	ends	her	criticism	with	a	stern	admonishment	of	Hobsbawm:	“Assim,	não	é	apenas	pelas	confusões	que	o	emprego	dos	termos	“pré-político”	e	“político”	traz	ao	estudioso	da	sociologia	e	da	ciência	política,	que	seu	emprego	deve	ser	abandonado;	é	também	–	e	principalmente	–	devido	aos	juízos	de	valor	que	ele	contém,	e	que	caracterizam,	já	dentro	de	uma	certa	perspectiva,	os	fatos	por	ele	qualificados.”	(Queiroz	1979:	285)	
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No great amount of perspicacity is required to perceive how much such a mode of explanation 
brings about a discursive context within which the slaves’ agency ended up engendered in a 
History that is corollary to a subliminal master-narrative of transition to capitalism and 
modernity. Shall this be unquestioningly accepted as the “point of view of the slaves”? 
This is why the chapter is called “The Heart of Blackness”. It performs, to speak like Spivak, an 
“awkward way” of invoking positionality (Spivak 1988: 271), and one which addresses the 
obvious question of what it means to affirm that one is able to represent the slaves’ point of 
view when one is bounded by the protocols of “modern” historiography. 
The reader will notice in this “Transition” the reappearance of a particular feature that will 
remain present until the conclusion of thesis: the opening of every chapter with epigraphs 
comprised by excerpts of capoeira, samba and rap songs. Mirroring the sorrow songs of W.E.B 
Du Bois’ The Souls of the Black Folk (1903), they are a determinant epistemological source 
from which sprang vital ideas which, so to speak, set the tempo and the mood of the argument 
developed in each chapter. The quotation that opens these introductory remarks does the 
same with the thesis as whole. 
“The Heart of Blackness” can also be seen as the textual re-enactment of an intellectual 
course. Du Bois’ stay in Germany, his knowledge of the German language and acquaintance 
with German idealism, especially with Hegel’s philosophy, plays a central role in the 
development of the ideas that led to the type of critique instantiated in The Souls of the Black 
Folk and which would later impel him to a sharp criticism of his early historiographical 
writings25. (Gilroy 1993: 134–136; Gregg 1998: 77–99) 
So, Hegel’s ideas, principally his dialectic of the master and the slave, which might be regarded 
as the epitomised form of his philosophical reflections on consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of the Spirit, as well as his Philosophy of History, provide the starting point for 
an exercise in Historical writing that, in the end, runs somehow against Du Bois’ words, for it 
in no way aims at yielding “true self-consciousness” by “lifting the veil” of the Other’s eyes 
that creates the “second-sight” proper of the “double consciousness” (Du Bois [1903] 1994: 
1-8). This means that there is no attempt at unifying the “double consciousness” in a full and 																																																								25	It	is	about	his	doctoral	thesis,	The	Suppression	of	Slave	Trade	(1890),	a	historiographical	monograph	full	of	the	time-honoured	positivism	of	the	19th	Century	and	which,	unsurprisingly,	was	so	well	received	that	a	preliminary	version	was	chosen	to	be	read	before	the	American	Historical	Association	at	its	annual	meeting	in	1891.	The	final	version	was	published	as	the	first	title	in	the	series	of	Harvard	Historical	Studies	(Gregg	1998:	77–99;	Du	Bois	1986:	586).	
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total position which would characterise “the fetishised perfect subject of oppositional history” 
(Haraway 1988: 586). “The Heart of Blackness” dares not enjoy the “privilege of partial 
perspective” but claims the shortcomings of the pretension of universality instead. 
 
In Part Two the analysis of the Brazilian historiography of slavery is intensified to the same 
extent as the conceptual analysis is funnelled out towards a more precise discernment of the 
concerns distinctive of the particular comprehension of History, which would be susceptible 
of underpinning that sketch of a model of Historical time based on the notion of fractal 
spatiality. 
As mentioned above, the three chapters of which Part Two consists were entitled exactly like 
Part One. Shall this procedure fail to convey the type of suggestive self-reflectivity hinted at 
by the principle of fractal self-similitude, it may at least grant some certainty that what comes 
is in fact a re-examination of the preliminary conceptual notes made in the theoretically 
oriented semantic explorations conducted in the first chapter. 
In this sense, the issues of ideology and anachronism are resumed in Part Two’s first chapter. 
But whereas they had been analysed separately in Part One, they are now considered together 
through the discussion of a fact about which there is not much quarrel among Historians: no 
matter their theoretical-methodological affiliations, Historians generally agree that History 
springs from present concerns and that these concerns play an decisive role in shaping 
historiographical representations. It is as though they were stating that all History, as in 
Croce’s famous phrase26, is contemporary history. 
A fundamental aspect of the problem of the present in History consists of the comprehensible 
uneasiness provoked by the suspicion that everywhere where the contemporary shines 
through the historiographical account, it ends up contributing to obfuscate what should be 
made visible, to wit the past.  
Oversimplifying a quite delicate matter, the assumption is more or less that the more 
“contemporary” a historical account, the more anachronic it may be and, as consequence, the 
bigger becomes the risk of excessive ideological traces.27  																																																								26	“The	practical	requirements	which	underlie	every	historical	judgement	give	to	all	history	the	character	of	 ‘contemporary	history’	because,	however	remote	in	time	events	there	recounted	may	seem	to	be,	the	history	 in	 reality	 refers	 to	 present	 needs	 and	 present	 situations	wherein	 those	 events	 vibrate.”	 (Croce	[1938]	2000:	8)	27	This	formulation	is	drawn	on	Foucault	,	who	puts	the	problems	as	follows:	
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How it feels it in ordinary historiographical existence is shown through a comparative analysis 
of the culturalist approach by Eduardo França Paiva and Douglas Cole Libby, both 
representatives of the research group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens”, with the Marxist and anti-
racist view adopted by Petrônio Domingues in Uma História não Contada: Negro, racismo e 
branqueamento em São Paulo no pós-abolição (2004). 
These two positions silence themselves mutually, although not by explicit reference or open 
debate; rather, they silence themselves in that moment of confluence in which Historians lay 
bare, first, what and how their work is made of, and second, the reasons why their accounts 
should follow some specific theoretical-methodological guidelines that meet the demands of 
their own time.  
This whole operation could be rightly called “synchronisation” for, in fact, Historians are here 
adjusting their conceptual apparatus so that it operates in two times at the same time: the 
past (of the referred historical facts) and the present (of the Historical representation thereof). 
On the other hand—and resorting to a cinematic metaphor—it would be analytically seductive 
instead of “synchronisation”, to translate it into “Synchronisierung”, for in German common 
parlance this word bears a meaning which is absent in English: it also stands for the process 
of replacing the voice of the actors shown in the screen with those of different performers 
speaking another language.28 “Synchronisierung” would then not only be the process of 
making theoretical-methodological adjusts so as to correlate the subject (of the past) with the 
demands (of the present), but also the very act of silencing Others’ voice by paradoxically 
uttering what they had said; and uttering it in a way that ideally grants full meaningfulness: a 
translation. 
It is by now clear that in this explanation the approach to ideology as a “measuring of silences” 
as well as to History as “controlled anachronism”, as they had been previously denominated, 
were put together: the silences produced by the refusals one states in dealing with the 
immanent anachronism of History is what constitutes the ideological dimension of a 
																																																								“The	more	History	attempts	to	transcend	its	own	rootedness	in	historicity,	and	the	greater	the	efforts	it	makes	to	attain,	beyond	the	historical	relativity	of	its	origin	and	its	choices,	the	sphere	of	universality,	the	more	clearly	it	bears	the	marks	of	its	historical	birth,	and	the	more	evidently	there	appears	through	it	the	history	of	which	 it	 is	 itself	a	part	(and	this,	again,	 is	 to	be	found	in	Spengler	and	all	 the	philosophers	of	history);	 inversely,	 the	more	 it	accepts	 its	 relativity,	and	 the	more	deeply	 it	 sinks	 into	 the	movement	 it	shares	with	what	it	 is	recounting,	then	the	more	it	tends	to	the	slenderness	of	the	narrative,	and	all	the	positive	content	it	obtained	for	itself	through	the	human	sciences	is	dissipated.”	(Foucault	1970:	371)	28	In	English,	“dubbing”,	a	word	that	does	not	convey	the	idea	of	temporalisation.		
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historiographical work. Thus, ideology and controlled anachronism bear a relation of mutual 
conditioning. The problem is just that, at this point, every ideological position may be as good 
as any other, for it seems to legitimate itself entirely in its own terms. 
A proper answer to the potentially harmful effects of such a relativistic view requires a careful 
analysis of it in the light of its relationship to the distinction between History and theory of 
History. So, this is, like in Part One, the subject of the next chapter. 
In the chapter “History and theory of History” of Part Two it is argued that a third meaning 
can be attached to Synchronisierung if one, following Shohat/Stam’s analogy29, considers that 
empiricist historiographical approaches constructed in the manner of Ranke function as a kind 
of Greenwich Mean Time, that is, as a sort of regulating centre of epistemological 
measurement that establishes the yardstick against which the degree of deviation from the 
Eurocentric centre of History can be measured in metaphorically temporal figures. 
The “measuring of silences” which enables one to discern between ideological positions would 
then be the “measuring of deviation” from this Eurocentric midpoint. The instrument needed 
to gauge it takes the form of an examination of the issue of representation in Historical 
writing. 
With these ideas in mind, the production of the research group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens” 
as well as Petrônio Domingues’ work is reassessed. They fall now into two main categories: 
the first is that of those who, carrying out a crude form of empiricist analysis, put into practice 
a naive “representationalist realism” (Kellner 1995: 9; Spivak 1988: 275), the main 
consequence of which is doing away with the issue of representation. They are devotees of a 
Rankean-style History supposed to represent the past that “actually happened”, rather than 
of a History that represents the past as an actual representation of what happened.30 Eduardo 
França Paiva and Douglas Cole Libby belong to this group. In such an approach, the Historian 
pushes the interpretation to the point at which it becomes entirely transparent: the Historical 
representation becomes then something through which one sees the past without seeing that 
																																																								29	“Eurocentrism,	like	Renaissance	perspectives	in	painting,	envisions	the	world	from	a	single	privileged	point.	It	maps	the	world	in	a	cartography	that	centralizes	and	augments	Europe	while	literally	“belittling”	Africa.	The	“East”	is	divided	into	“Near”,	“Middle”,	and	“Far”,	making	Europe	the	arbiter	of	spatial	evaluation,	just	as	 the	establishment	of	Greenwich	Mean	Time	produces	England	as	 the	regulating	centre	of	 temporal	
measurement.”	(Stam/Shohat	2012:	2	–	emphasis	added)	 	30	Frank	Ankersmit	recommends	distinguishing	between	“representing	that”	and	“representing	as”.	In	the	first	case	the	accent	lies	on	qualities	of	what	is	being	represented	and	in	the	second	case	on	those	of	the	representation	itself.	(Ankersmit	1995:	229)	
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which one is seeing it through. It is, in fact, as if the Historian had arrived at the “actual content 
of the past”. Here lies the empiricist trap that conflates re-presentation and representation.31  
The second category is of those who work with a conceptual apparatus that allows one to 
avoid precisely this conflation. Petrônio Domingues’ Marxist point of view is what enables him 
to do so. Even though he also incurs a raw type of empiricism, he does it by drawing attention 
to—stead of diverting it from—the essential role of ideology and asymmetries of power in 
academic historiographical production. This feature grants the issue of representation a place 
of indelible importance in his account and, in the end, entirely prevents him from claiming 
that historicist transparency. 
Coming back to that sense of Synchronisierung inspired by Shohat/Stam’s analogy between 
the Greenwich Mean Time and Eurocentrism, one may conclude that the historiographical 
studies by França Paiva und Douglas Cole Libby are synchronised with London’s time: they aim 
at occupying that ideal Eurocentric position. Petrônio Domingues’ work deserves to be 
greeted with a gesture symbolically sympathetic to its Marxism and synchronised perhaps with 
Trier’s time; that is, in temporal terms its degree of deviation amounts to one grade in time 
away from the line that separates the “West” from the “Rest”, namely, towards the Orient32. 
Thus, there is no great discrepancy between the plead for “mestiçagem” and “hibridismo” 
patronized by the group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens” and the cry for radical ethnic otherness 
raised by Petrônio Domingues: with respect to Eurocentrism as an ideal against which one can 
measure hegemonic and counter-hegemonic ideological deviations, both may be seen as 
helplessly Eurocentric attempts to defend History against Eurocentrism.  
																																																								31	 One	 of	 the	 points	 Spivak	 makes	 most	 painstakingly	 in	 her	 Can	 the	 Subaltern	 Speak	 concerns	 the	problematic	 conflation	of	 two	 senses	 of	 the	word	 “representation”.	Analysing	Marx’s	 original	 texts,	 she	distinguishes	between	“representation	as	‘speaking	for’	(vertreten),	as	in	politics,	and	representation	as	‘re-presentation’	(darstellen),	as	in	art	or	philosophy.”	(Spivak	1988:	275)	32	The	founding	legend	of	Trier,	Karl	Marx’s	birthplace,	reads	that	the	city	was	founded	by	Trebeta,	who	is	said	 to	 be	 son	of	Ninus,	 the	 legendary	King	 of	Assyria	 and	 founder	 of	Nineveh	 (the	 capital	 of	 the	Neo-Assyrian	 Empire),	 and	 stepson	 of	 Semiramis,	 the	 queen	 who,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 her	 long	 reign	 over	Mesopotamia	(after	Ninus’	death),	built	Babylon.	(Encyclopædia	Britannica	Online)	The	fact	that	this	legend—which	connects	the	History	of	the	town	that	claims	the	title	of	“Germany’s	oldest	city”	with	symbolic	places	in	the	“Middle	West”—is	historiographically	regarded	as	a	“gelehrte	Sage”	that	has	been	used	for	political	purposes	(Haari-Oberg	1994:	12;	79–86;	165–169;	Binsfeld	1984:	7–8)	might	be	taken	 as	 an	 interesting	 starting	 point	 for	 redrawing	 the	 terms	 of	 that	 “political	 vision	 of	 reality	whose	structure	promoted	the	difference	between	the	familiar	(Europe,	the	West,	‘us’)	and	the	strange	(the	Orient,	the	 East,	 ‘them’).”	 (Said	 [1978]	 2003:	 43)	 This	 “style	 of	 thought	 based	 upon	 an	 ontological	 and	epistemological	 distinction	 made	 between	 ‘the	 Orient’	 and	 (most	 of	 the	 time)	 ‘the	 Occident””,	 where	Western	means	“superiority”	and	Oriental	“inferiority”,	is	what	Edward	Said	calls	Orientalism.	(Said	[1978]	2003:	2)	
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The small degree of deviation attributed to Domingues’ Uma História Não Contada is yet not 
at all indifferent. It is tantamount to the slight difference of angle between the fatal and 
clumsy backwards move that precipitates a pugilist into an even more vulnerable position, 
and the smart defensive manoeuvre that opens up the possibility of a prompt counterattack. 
Despite all similitude, the consecution of each of these two movements is distinct to the 
extent that they have potentially decisive effects on the course of what happens thereafter.  
In this sense, in order to gain some insight into the type of historiographical account that may 
ensue from each of those programmatic approaches, two further historiographical studies are 
analysed in this chapter. The approach preconized by the group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens” 
is represented by the article “O Braço armado do Senhor” (2008), where the author, Kelmer 
Mathias, outrageously speculates, for example, whether Joana, an enslaved black woman who 
had been giving birth to the children of her master throughout her whole life (the first one 
when she was just fifteen years old), had not been “unfaithful” to him, the master! While 
writing such asinine comments33, Kelmer Mathias argues that his text is chiefly concerned 
with an exposition of the “recursos e orientações valorativas” of the slaves! Although, judging 
by his account, issues such as the vulnerability to sexual harassment and rape, which were 
integral to women’s experience in general but played an even more determinant role in the 
experience of black and enslaved women, must not at all be a matter of concern when he 
writes his HIStory about her, Joana.  
Sidney Chalhoub’s A Força da Escravidão – Ilegalidade e Costume no Brasil Oitocentista (2012) 
is taken here as the example of a viewpoint near to the one adopted by Petrônio Domingues. 
Chalhoub’s book is a sensitive and in many senses brilliant analysis that shows how 
endangered the freedom of freeborn people as well as of manumitted blacks was, all 
throughout the last century of the regime of slavery in Brazil. In pushing to the fore the issue 
of the precariousness of black people’s experience of freedom, he not only explores an avenue 
that has had little room in the Brazilian History of Slavery hitherto but also makes an 
innovative critique of what the “rule of law” means as cornerstone both of the nation state 
and of democracy in Brazil.  
																																																								33	In	a	case	of	flagrant	and	distasteful	abuse	of	[writing	style]	in	approaching	Joana’s	life,	Kelmer	Mathias	does	it	by	using	the	vulgar	expression	“pular	a	cerca”:	“Por	castigo	à	pulada	de	cerca	de	Joana	[...].”	(Mathias	2008:	106)		
	 28	
With this review of Kelmer Mathias and Sydney Chalhoub’s works a course is completed that 
matches this chapter with its sibling in Part One, in the sense that those three main 
propositions developed previously will have been addressed again, but now from an even 
more disciplinary point of view. 
In the first moment, on the basis of a reassessment of the works by Eduardo França Paiva and 
Douglas Cole Libby, representatives of the research group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens”, as well 
as of Petrônio Domingues’ book Uma História Não Contada (2004), the notion of 
Synchronisierung was explored in order to expound the assumption that Historical accounts 
are substantially constituted by what they are theoretically believed to be. This is the most 
evident reason why it is not possible to write a historiographical account without writing, by 
the same token, the theory thereof. Next, the same works were analysed again, but this time 
with the purpose of seeking to measure their deviation from Eurocentrism understood as an 
ideal position (the second meaning of Synchronisierung). At this point, the manifest intention 
was to demonstrate how much those works are premised upon that “theoretical skeleton” 
which Chakrabarty calls “hyperreal Europe”. Finally, the appraisal of Kelmer Mathias’ “O Braço 
Armado do Senhor” and of Sidney Chalhoub’s A Força da Escravidão expresses the concern 
with the idea of translation (the third meaning of Synchronisierung). Chalhoub’s book is 
presented as an exceptional example of translational disruption capable of destabilising 
asymmetrical relations of power premised upon (excessively) Eurocentric theoretical 
categories, whereas Kelmer Mathias’ article represents the opposing tendency. 
In “Time and Event”, the last chapter, the issue that constitutes the dissertation’s core, i.e., 
Historical continuity of long-term, is opportunely resumed. Previously it has been argued—
adopting the very Wittgensteinian vocabulary of the theoreticians analysed—that a “logic of 
resemblance” is operative in the construction of long-term Historical continuity. Now, this 
proposition is considered with respect to the idea of totality. 
To address the question of Historical continuity of long-term from the point of view of the 
discussion about totality is a problem that has occupied Historians since the beginnings of the 
institutionalisation of the profession (Jay 1984: 74). Frank Ankersmit points out—on the basis 
of an analysis of the holism of the concept of “historical idea” as formulated by Humboldt and 
Ranke—the close philosophical kinship between historicism and Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy of history and the latter’s concern with totality. Both, he suggests, “seem to be 
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scions of the same stem and to be more intimately interrelated than is often believed to be 
the case” (Ankersmit 2012: 15). 
It is not an exaggeration to say that a great deal of the holistic bias of 19th-Century historicism 
is still alive and kicking in contemporary Historical discourse. Evidence thereof is the strong 
and enduring influence of Fernand Braudel’s approach to long-term Historical continuity. With 
his longue durée schema Braudel was perhaps the one who at best managed to combine what 
Martin Jay calls “longitudinal and latitudinal totalities”34 so as to put them at the service of 
History. Doubtless both the methodological rigour and the theoretical approaches that the 
Annales School adopted from the neighbouring social sciences are elements that grant 
credibility to Braudel’s ideas. However, it shall be added, and what follows is the thesis 
advanced in this last chapter, that the remarkable epistemological force of Braudel’s 
conceptualisation of Historical time lies yet also in the metaphoricity that lends his longue 
durée a “metaphysical pathos”.35 
In a historiographical account, the metaphor shares its place with an event. How exactly this 
happens is shown by the example of Luiz Felipe Alencastro’s O Trato dos Viventes (2000), a 
work that has been considered an “instantaneous classic” within the Brazilian 
historiographical milieu (Ohata 2001: 209). Summarising in very few words a quite long 
analysis, one can say that in O Trato dos Viventes, due to a complex and creative way of dealing 
with long-term Historical continuity, there was plenty of room for exploring a “black diasporic 																																																								34	Discussing	Hegel’s	contribution	to	the	holistic	tradition	of	Western	thinking,	Martin	Jay	argues	that	he,	Hegel,	 “made	 plausible	 the	 ‘longitudinal’	 notion	 of	 closed	 yet	 dynamic	 totality	 that	 incorporated	 all	 of	history	 into	 the	whole.	 […]	Universal	 history	 included	 the	past	 and	 the	 future	 to	 their	 farthest	 reaches	because	they	were	ultimately	identical.	Nothing	exists	outside	the	totality	of	history,	which	has	no	external	boundary.	Hegel’s	totality	was	thus	both	temporally	and	spatially	immanent.”	Jay	makes	more	precise	the	rather	diachronic	character	of	the	“longitudinal	totality”	by	distinguishing	it	from	the	“latitudinal	totality”,	which	emphasises	the	spatial	and	synchronic	element	in	Hegel:	“by	employing	the	term	’totality’	to	refer	to	all	coherent	entities	within	the	cosmic	whole,	Hegel	encouraged	the	vision	that	lesser	or	partial	totalities	existed	on	all	levels	of	the	meta-totality.	This	acceptance	of	what	we	have	called	‘latitudinal	totalities’	meant	that	any	part	of	a	larger	whole	might	itself	be	considered	an	organised	whole	from	the	perspective	of	its	internal	 dynamics.	 Thus	 reality	 for	 Hegel	 was	 populated	 by	 multitudes	 of	 hierarchically	 linked	 or	horizontally	 juxtaposed	 totalities,	which	 defied	 comprehension	 through	 reduction	 to	 their	 components	parts.	Indeed,	the	concreteness	of	the	meta-totality	depended	on	the	existence	of	these	internally	related	but	differentiated	sub-totalities.”	(Jay	1984:	59)	The	programmatic	approach	Fernand	Braudel	advances	in	his	“History	and	the	Social	Sciences:	the	Longue	
Durée”	might	be	seen	as	understanding	History	as	this	type	of	longitudinal	and	latitudinal	[Hegelian]	meta-totality.	This	idea	is	explained	at	some	length	in	the	course	of	the	chapter.	35	The	“metaphysical	pathos”	is	a	term	coined	by	Arthur	Lovejoy	to	name	one	of	the	“dynamic	units”	that	should	comprise	the	history	of	ideas	(Lovejoy	[1936]	1978:	7).	As	Martin	Jay	explains	rephrasing	Arthur	Lovejoy’s	own	definition,	 the	 “metaphysical	pathos”	 is	characterised	by	“the	power	 to	arouse	a	positive	mood	on	the	part	of	its	users	by	the	congeniality	of	its	subtle	associations”.	According	to	Jay,	this	pathos	is	a	feature	with	which	the	Western	discourse	of	totality	has	normally	been	imbued	(Jay	1984:	21).	
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time”36, which was nevertheless decidedly swept away by the “unitary white light” emanating 
from Braudel’s longue durée, a Historical time that, as is argued in the course of the discussion, 
enlightens erasing differences. 
 
Having reached this point, a whole array of issues, all of them related to time in History, will 
have been discussed: from the temporal wholes sprung from the ontologically narrative 
character of History (Arthur Danto) to the empty time of historicist History 
(Benjamin/Chakrabarty); from the Historical absence of time characteristic of the synoptic 
configurational mode of comprehension (Wittgenstein/Mink) to the different senses of 
Synchronisierung (Stam & Shohat/Spivak); from the ‘sovereign consciousness’ of the longue 
durée (Braudel) to the ‘unhappy consciousness’ of the fractal spatiality of Historical time 
(Gilroy). All these issues will have been considered both in broad terms and with particular 
respect to the Brazilian historiography of slavery. Finally the time will come to end the text, 
even though no reason can be given for putting a full stop in the analysis, or at least not a 
reason that unmistakably derives from the logic of the text itself.  
In fact, the reasons why texts irrevocably loaded with an epistemological character that is also 
a narrowly institutional one (as is the case of those supposed to be awarded with an academic 
degree); the reasons why such texts in one way or another come to an end, have to do with 
circumstances that always extrapolate what can be written without running the risk of 
committing analytical suicide.  
At any rate, the conclusion, “Time Between Spaces: fractal spatiality and long-term Historical 
time”, consists of a circumstantiated argument that, resuming once more the three pairs of 
concepts repeatedly analysed in the course of the dissertation, i.e, reproducing (in formal 
terms) the fractal pattern that constituted its very guiding idea, spells out the epistemological 
consequences of a metaphorical model of Historical time based on the notion of fractal 
spatiality. As whole, the text is just a sketch, in a pretty much37 literal sense: it was “done 
extemporaneously”, that is, without having the necessary preparation, the needed time and, 
therefore, its point of departure and of saturation is, as Judith Butler remarks remembering 
																																																								36	This	time	is	one	that	“reinforces	the	obligation	that	space	and	time	must	be	considered	relationally	in	their	articulation	with	racialised	being.”	(Gilroy	1993:	198)	37	“Pretty	much	may	be	not	elegant	English,	but	it	is	high	time	it	was.	There	is	no	elegant	word	or	phrase	which	means	just	what	it	means.”	(Twain	[1880]	1997:	282)	
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Marx, “the historical present” (Butler [1990] 2007: 7). Therefore too, incompleteness and 
provisionality must be taken as its final goals, as the sign of its adequateness. This feature is 
inoculated in the proper metaphorical model sketched, which is thought to bring into effect 
an active negation of the teleological Historical time of any coming perfectibility.  
As the title of the thesis already hints, the suggested “Time Between Spaces” is the result of 
the expansion of two subject matters: the Black Atlantic AND the recent Brazilian 
historiography of slavery. Here, as in Rosi Braidotti’s “study of women in contemporary 
philosophy”38, where she analyses “the new feminism AND the crisis of philosophical 
knowledge […], the conjunction AND marks not only the point at which two series converge, 
but also the point at which they diverge, opening into an infinite series: women and 
philosophy and crisis and psychoanalysis, and so on.” (Braidotti 1991: 9) So, one may imagine 
the Black Atlantic AND the recent Brazilian historiography of slavery AND the crisis of 
Historical knowledge AND the critique of Eurocentrism, etc. This “etc.” (as well as Braidotti’s 
“and so on”) at the end of such an open-ended list is not an embarrassed one. It might be seen 
as a failure but, if so, this failure is however instructive, for it is “a sign of exhaustion as well 
of the illimitable process of signification itself. It is the supplement, the excess that necessarily 
accompanied any effort to posit identity once and for all. This illimitable et cetera […] offers 
itself as a new departure for feminist political theorising.” (Butler [1990] 2007: 196 - emphasis 
added) 
The “excess” committed in this dissertation comes in the very person of its conclusion, which 
is, in fact and unlike all other chapters including this introduction, written in the first person. 
This substantial stylistic change is part of a discursive strategy that is fraught with danger. A 
danger that literally lies in the words chosen to compose the argument.  
In order to perceive it, one ought to read into the person of the text a speaker-subject who 
takes the floor39 by carrying out an analysis that is, performatively speaking, the practice of a 
																																																								38	This	is	the	subtitle	of	her	book,	which	she	suggestively	entitles	Patters	of	Dissonance.	39	Mind	 the	 two	 senses	 of	 the	 expression:	 1)	 begin	 to	 dance	 on	 a	 dance	 floor;	 2)	 speak	 in	 a	 debate	 or	assembly	(Oxford	Dictionary).	
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theoretical-drag40 which, intonated in that “nameless voice” of the “order of the discourse”41, 
articulates its position within the terms of the equation “almost the same but not quite - 
almost the same but not white” of a [post]colonial mimicry42.  
No doubt, it is an oblique, indeed a queer manner of advancing an argument. It is not 
sanctioned by custom and somehow even interdicted by the law.43 Its transparency is reifying 
disavow. But it is an epistemological expedient that generates the type and amount of 
emancipatory energy needed to envision an understanding of Historical time that—by 
																																																								40	Judith	Butler	argues	that	through	parodic	imitation	“drag	fully	subverts	the	distinction	between	inner	and	outer	psychic	space	and	effectively	mocks	both	the	expressive	model	of	gender	and	the	notion	of	a	true	gender	identity.”	She	also	stresses	that	the	“notion	of	gender	parody	defended	here	does	not	assume	that	there	is	an	original	which	such	parodic	identities	imitate;	Indeed,	the	parody	is	of	the	very	notion	of	the	original.	To	be	more	precise,	it	is	a	production	which,	in	effect—that	is,	in	its	effect—postures	an	imitation.”	In	this	way,	“parodic	proliferation	deprives	hegemonic	culture	and	its	critics	of	 the	claim	to	naturalised	or	essentialist	gender	identities”	(Butler	[1990]	186–188	-	emphasis	and	rearrangement	of	the	argumentation	added).	In	this	sense,	the	conclusion	ought	to	be	read	as	a	written	enactment	of	these	ideas	in	the	form	of	a	reflection	upon	Historical	time.	41	“I	wish	I	could	have	slipped	surreptitiously	into	this	discourse	which	I	must	present	today,	and	into	ones	I	shall	have	to	give	here,	perhaps	for	many	years	to	come.	I	should	have	preferred	to	be	enveloped	by	speech,	and	carried	away	well	beyond	all	possible	beginnings,	rather	than	have	to	begin	it	myself.	I	should	have	preferred	to	become	aware	that	nameless	voice	was	already	speaking	before	me,	so	that	I	should	only	have	needed	to	join	in,	to	continue	the	sentence	it	had	started	and	lodge	myself,	without	really	being	noticed,	in	its	 interstices,	 as	 if	 it	 has	 signaled	 to	me	by	pausing,	 for	 an	 instant,	 in	 suspense.”	 (Foucault	1981:	51	–	emphasis	added)	In	the	case	of	the	discussion	addressed	in	the	conclusion,	the	“order	of	the	discourse”	refers	the	hegemonic	configuration	of	the	discourse	on	Historical	consciousness,	that	is,	the	Eurocentric	one.	42	In	a	very	insightful	essay,	Homi	Bhabha	remarks	that	“If	colonialism	takes	power	in	the	name	of	history,	it	 repeatedly	 exercises	 its	 authority	 through	 the	 figures	 of	 farce”.	 One	 of	 these	 ‘farceful’	 elements	 of	colonialism	 is	mimicry,	which,	 still	 following	Bhabha,	 “emerges	as	one	of	 the	most	elusive	and	effective	strategies	of	colonial	power	and	knowledge:	[…]	the	colonial	mimicry	is	the	desire	for	a	reformed	recognised	Other,	as	a	subject	of	a	difference	that	is	almost	the	same	but	not	quite”	(Bhabha	1994:	122	–	italics	in	the	original).	This	Other	remains	always	a	‘partial	presence’,	it	is	an	‘incomplete’,	‘inappropriate’	subject	whose	strategic	failure	is	ensured	by	the	very	mimicry,	which,	is,	in	this	case,	“at	once	resemblance	and	menace”.	“It	 is	 as	 if	 the	 very	 emergence	of	 the	 ‘colonial’	 is	 dependent	 for	 its	 representation	upon	 some	 strategic	limitation	or	prohibition	within	the	authoritative	discourse	itself.”	(Bhabha	1994:	123)		But	this	mechanism	works	the	other	way	round	too.	Acting	as	“parodist	of	history”,	the	colonial	subject,	the	Other,	 can	use	 this	 “authorised	versions	of	otherness”	 to	protect	 themselves	against	 the	 [return	of	 the]	Same.	It	can,	“through	the	repetition	of	partial	presence,	which	is	the	basis	of	mimicry,	articulate[s]	those	disturbances	of	cultural,	 racial	and	historical	difference	 that	menace	 the	narcissistic	demand	of	colonial	authority.	(…)	The	menace	of	mimicry	is	its	double	vision	which	in	disclosing	the	ambivalence	of	colonial	discourse	also	disrupts	its	authority.”	(Bhabha	1994:	126	–	italics	in	the	original)	The	point	in	which	Bhabha’s	“mimic	men”	touches	the	Black	Atlantic	view	comes	in	the	form	of	a	remark	on	Freud.	Exploring	Freud’s	analogy	between	the	“partial	nature	of	fantasy,	caught	inappropriately,	between	the	unconscious	and	the	preconscious,	making	problematic,	like	mimicry,	the	very	notion	of	‘origins’”	and	“individuals	 of	mixed	 race	who	 taken	 all	 round	 to	 resemble	white	men	 but	who	 betray	 their	 coloured	descent	by	 some	 striking	 feature	or	other	 and	on	 that	 account	 are	 excluded	 from	society	 and	enjoy	no	privileges”,	Bhabha	explains	the	way	in	which	the	“almost	the	same	but	not	quite”	of	the	colonial	mimicry	entails	an	“almost	the	same	but	not	white”	(Bhabha	1994:	126–127	–	italics	in	the	original).	43	“Law”	meaning	also	[the	part	of]	Eurocentrism	that	ought	to	be	discarded	from	a	postcolonial	vocabulary.	This	usage	stem	from	feminist	interpellations	of	psychoanalytic	theories	of	binary	sexual	difference	based	on	the	so-called	“Law	of	the	Father.”	(Butler	[1990]	2007:	38–42)	
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performatively making more difficult the uncritical reproduction of what is fairly exclusionary 
in Eurocentrism (understood in the broad sense indicated above, which strives to put into 
relief phallogocentric and racist axes)—may be more suitable for the task of accomplishing 
the written re-presentation of the past of those who have been not, cannot (and perhaps may 
even want not) to be appropriately represented within the current Eurocentric 
epistemological frame of History. It is indeed a time that opens space for figuring 
historiographical temporalities for the future.	  
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PART	ONE	-	ARTICULATING	HISTORY	AND	LINGUISTIC	TURN	
The boundaries of History’s goal 
For students who have been trained to become professional Historians, what could be the 
practical usefulness of trying to learn lessons from a work, the central aim of which is to raise 
philosophical objections against the very possibility of Historical knowledge44? Why should 
they not turn a deaf ear towards those who go as far as to assert that Historical discourse does 
no more than constantly repeat “it happened”45? And finally, after all the postmodern 
experiments and postcolonial upheavals which have shaken Western Historical thinking 
(Rüsen 2005: 1–11; Burke 2005: 15–30), how could one not consider the suggestion that 
History nowadays should be as historicist as it used to be at Ranke’s and Humboldt’s time, as 
a mere provocation devoid of any sincere intellectual interest?46 
Professional Historians would perhaps argue that those who raise such questions are either 
acting in bad faith, or fully misunderstand the rules of the game one is supposed to be playing 
in writing academic History.  
In fact, it seems pointless to point out, say, to football’s players, that when they shoot the ball 
into the other team’s goal they are, according to the rule of the game, simply kicking it out of 
the game’s field. Equally not pertinent would be to explain to them that the goals actually 
delimitate a kind of liminal space, the function of which is to change the meaning of a certain 
shot’s trajectory, which in itself would be indiscernible from another shot. What matters in 
football, they have to learn, happens in the tiny time needed by the ball to cross that liminal 
space demarcated by posts, crossbar and the goal line, which marks so special a boundary 
between inside and outside, that to trespass it without breaking any game’s rule leads 
suddenly to a complete rearrangement of all players’ positions. 
It is in no way necessary to be a football connoisseur to recognize that by thinking of the game 
in these terms, anything in its rules and way of playing must be changed. This reasoning then 
																																																								44	The	third	chapter	of	Danto’s	book	Analytical	Philosophy	of	History	is	indeed	entitled	“Three	objections	against	the	possibility	of	historical	knowledge”	(Danto	[1965]	2007:	27-34).	45	An	often	quoted	passage	of	Barthe’s	famous	essay	Historical	Discourse	reads	“(…)	historical	discourse	does	 not	 follow	 reality,	 it	 only	 signifies	 it;	 it	 asserts	 at	 every	moment:	 this	 happened,	 but	 the	meaning	conveyed	is	only	that	someone	is	making	this	assertion.”	(Barthes	1970:	154	–	italics	in	the	original)	46	This	is	the	thesis	defended	by	Ankersmit,	Frank	in	his	most	recent	book:	“There	is	one	basic	assumption	underlying	this	entire	book:	that	the	historicist	account	of	historical	writing,	here	associated	primarily	with	the	writings	of	Leopold	von	Ranke	and	Wilhelm	von	Humboldt,	is	basically	correct.”	(Ankersmit	2012:	1)	
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allows for the possibility of playing a game in the very same manner while conceiving it in 
different ways. Yet, how to make this new understanding of the game workable?  
An avenue, which might be the most natural unfolding of any reconceptualising operation, 
would consist in thinking about a new semantic that, in this hypothetical case of football, 
would at least disturb, if not completely alter what the notions of ‘inside’, ‘outside’ and 
‘boundary’ mean. In suggesting this approach, one has to assume that some essential 
dimensions of the game might be transfigured either by reforming the language, or by 
understanding more about the language presently used to address it (Rorty 1992:3). 
Even if there were no mandatory bibliographic reference closing the paragraph above, 
everyone reasonably familiar to linguistic philosophy would not fail to recognize the last two 
lines as a transcription of Richard Rorty’s famous definition of what constitutes the 
philosophical guiding principle of the so-called “linguistic turn”. Furthermore, be this person 
equally familiar to football, he or she would equally not fail to recognize that, based on such 
a linguistic reasoning, in all probability no insight into a better way of playing football could 
ever be yielded, nor could any better training methodology be developed.  
An argument similar to this has been used by professional Historians against those who 
attempt to approach History from the antiempiricist perspective characteristic of the 
“linguistic turn” (Evans 2000: 75-102; Cardoso 2005: 55-94). And the Historians’ complaint 
seems to be entirely justified because, in fact, to what extent is it possible, based on 
antiempiricist linguistic reasoning, to gain insights into a better way of writing History or to 
develop any historiographical methodology?  
Interestingly, some linguistic philosophers of History agree with Historians in this respect. For 
instance, Frank Ankersmit, one of the most prominent contemporary theoreticians of History, 
recommends that “philosophers of history should not meddle with historical methodology—
for that is a different game.” (Ankersmit 2012: 118) 
With all due respect, Ankersmit’s recommendation is going to be ignored in this work, since 
its aim, as already exposed in the introduction, consists in the attempt to conceive a sketch of 
a metaphoric model of Historical time, i.e. a methodological device for dealing with the 
general issue “time and temporality” in academic Historical writing.  
The reason for adopting this epistemological stance results from the fact that once the 
inescapable narrative-like character of Historical knowledge (Rüsen 2008: 3) has been 
acknowledged, it follows that a plea for a strict separation between methodology and theory, 
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within the framework of a linguistic-based reflection on academic Historical representation, 
would be analogous to that distinction between Historical research (Geschichtsforschung) and 
Historical writing (Geschichtsschreibung) made by nineteenth-century theorist J.G. Droysen 
(Ankersmit 2012: 60). This distinction, as Ankersmit himself underlines, has been “rejected as 
a remnant of a crude nineteenth-century positivism, that still maintains the possibility of 
strictly separating fact from theory” (Ankersmit 2012: 61).  
Being a discipline within which theoretical and “meta-theoretical” levels stand in an especially 
delicate relationship, it seems that History would have little—if not nothing—to gain with a 
work interested in reasserting a presumed incompatibility between theoretical thinking and 
the development of methodologies thought to be useful in the everyday life of the 
construction of academic Historical knowledge.  
History may be, as Fernand Braudel once assessed, “perhaps the least structured of the human 
sciences” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 242); in spite of that, Historians can consider facts as such 
only in the framework of a theory, even when, as Paul Veyne ironically remarks, they often 
strongly believe they have none (Veyne 1983: 14). This means that also in History, as 
everywhere else in the landscape of human sciences, the deepest epistemological challenge 
consists in seeing the role of theory as empirically as the role played by empirical data.  
There are three further good reasons for having chosen Historical methodology concerning 
time as being the core of this dissertation. Firstly, the absolutely essential character of the 
subject within the field of History, which, in uncountable variations of Bloch’s famous 
formulation, has been defined as the “science of men in time” (Bloch [1940] 1963: 27). 
Secondly, despite the agreement that time is History’s most basic category, the function of 
time in the study of history, as Frank Ankersmit argues, seems to be to make itself invisible 
(Ankersmit 2012: 30). François Hartog makes a similar remark, but in his formulation time is 
the “unthought” element of History (Hartog 2013: 19; 26). Thirdly, the centrality of the dialog 
between History and Linguistics in the development of the Braudelian conception of Historical 
time: the so-called longue durée, which happened to become the most celebrated and 
widespread analytical approach originated in the field of History. 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss questions like these by exercising a kind of reflection that 
might be rightly denominated as the practice of a theoretically oriented semantic exploration. 
Three pairs of concepts were chosen as the target of the task to be here performed: 
ideology/anachronism; History /theory of History and, finally, time/event. 
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In the first section, departing from Danto’s concept of “narrative sentences” and based on an 
analysis of two important historiographical works on slavery in Brazil, a particular 
interpretation of the connection between the pairs “time/ideology” and “time/anachronism” 
will be developed. The second section, still taking a concept by Danto as point of departure, 
this time yet his thesis on the end of art, will address the widespread view that in dealing with 
History one should always take the precaution of devising two sharply distinct kind of issues: 
the “theoretical” and “meta-theoretical” ones. These issues, according to this distinction, 
would then respectively correspond to the realm of the Historiography and that of the theory 
of History. In the last section, moving from Arthur Danto to Louis Mink as the provider of the 
central theoretical approach, namely, the notion of “configurational comprehension”, the 
question of historical continuity of long-term will be considered in the light of an analysis 
whose purpose is to furnish some arguments in favor of the claim that there is a necessary 
relation of dependence between sameness (of events) and long duration (of time). 
This analysis shall be seen as a way of developing the reflection on and of preparing the terrain 
for the proposition of the sketch of a temporality model based on the idea of fractal spatiality. 
Permeating the whole chapter will be found the criticisms offered by Historians who see 
political danger rather than epistemological advantages in such linguistic raids on History 
(Evans 2000; Cardoso 2005). 
 
Traditionally, time delimitates the boundaries of the field within which the game of writing 
academic History shall be played. This is something that every freshman in History is taught 
quite early at college and is highlighted by the indefectible presence of an explicit time period 
usually presented in the very title of most historiographical theses. 
Still, what particular Historical accounts do, is that they allow for the possibility of making 
references which go far beyond their temporally circumscribed subject, while concurrently, in 
order to eschew accusations of anachronism or futurology, they toil hard to keep themselves 
within the self-imposed chronological limits. In this sense, as in football, History’s goal is also 
achieved by projecting the object which Historians are dealing with out of the (temporal 
delimitated) game’s field, but without ever uttering this fact. This means to say that in 
performing a theoretically oriented semantic exploration, whose aim is to analyze some 
relevant concepts of the disciplinary vocabulary of History in what concerns their relation to 
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the issue of time, one is more precisely engaged in unthinking the boundaries, within which 
the game of writing academic History has been expected to be played.  	  
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Chapter 1 - Ideology and Anachronism 
 
Narrativity and Historical knowledge 
“Arthur C. Danto, a philosopher of art, is dead at 89”. This was the title of Danto’s obituary, 
published in the New York Times on October 27, 2013. A philosopher of art, definitely, but not 
less a philosopher of History, since at the bottom of Danto’s view on art is a theory concerned 
with a definition of the Historical character of the artworld rather than with the aesthetical 
qualities of artworks.  
In fact, one would probably understand better Danto’s aesthetical ideas by paying attention 
to his philosophy of History. In the end of 1964, as he publishes “The Artworld”, the essay that 
would become a canonical text in Philosophy of Art, he had already finished writing Analytic 
Philosophy of History, a book the reading of which allows for understanding more clearly the 
later development of Danto’s reflections on art, which was synthesized in the works The 
Transfiguration of Commonplace (1981), The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (1986) 
and After the End of Art – Contemporary Art and the Pale of History (1997).  
In “Analytic Philosophy of History”, philosophy of History is conceived as the “theory of 
narrative representation” (Danto 2007: xiii), as Danto himself explains in an introduction to 
the book written in 1984, twenty years after the first edition. The core of the argument, he 
continues, “was that narrative structures penetrates our consciousness of events in way 
parallel to those in which […] theories penetrate observation in science.” (Danto 2007: xiii) 
This was a new idea in the mid-60s, when the fashionable topic centered on the different 
character of Historical explanation, basically the distinction between Erklären and Verstehen 
(Ankersmit 2007: 364; Goehr 2007: xlvii–xlviii).  
 
What Danto exposes, primarily based on his conception of “narrative sentences”, is that 
narrative is not one among many others models of Historical explanation, but that the very 
logic of narrative determines both the relationship to the past and the past’s historicity. 
Danto’s insights provoked somewhat of an awakening to the fact that the asymmetry between 
the past and the present is truly unsurpassable, and furthermore, the definitive inclusion of 
the concepts ‘narrativity’ and ‘historicity’ in the agenda of theoretical investigations on History 
(Ankersmit 2007: 364–365). 
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In the meantime, along with the establishment of these terms in the Historians’ current 
language, much more attention has been paid to the analytical pair ‘narrativity/historicity’ in 
the field of theory of History. However, far from having been exhausted in this process, 
Danto’s idea remains as new as it was almost forty years ago, so argues Ankersmit, for 
philosophers of History still do not seem to be fully aware of the far-reaching implications of 
the narrative-like nature of Historical knowledge (Ankersmit 2007: 364). 
Philosophers maybe not yet, but Historians did already realize the theoretical complexities 
involved in the assumption of the narrative-like character of their craft. They just do not see 
great usefulness in what theoreticians of History generally write about the construction of 
Historical knowledge (Evans 2000: 1–14). 
Sydney Chalhoub, for example, a first-rate Brazilian Historian, openly admits that historical 
facts are constructions resulting from the “controlled imagination” characteristic of History as 
an academic discipline (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 18). He also concedes that both “historical 
research is indetermination” and periodizations are “works of imagination, of interpretation” 
(Chalhoub 2012: 27-31). Chalhoub has been regarded as a quite “traditional” Historian, who 
does not claim to be a representative of any “post” (post-modernist, post-structuralist, post-
Marxist, post-colonial, etc.) tendency in History.  
When told that it is logically impossible to know what people of other periods thought because 
“not knowing how it is all going to end is the mark of living through events” (Danto [1965] 
2007: 294), Historians would on principle not only do not disagree but also let slip a derisive 
smile, since this assertion is a platitude which they are fully aware of.  
This banal appearance of presumably elaborated analytical problems constitutes an essential 
dimension of each theoretical approach to History; its best known expression is the ad 
nauseam discussed ambivalence of the word “history”, which in the vernacular use of many 
modern languages designates both the “facts of the matter and a narrative of those facts, 
both ‘what happened’ and ‘that which is said to have happened’” (Trouillot 1995: 2).  
In History, in fact, the endless variety of actions performed by human beings down the ages 
fall under descriptions covered by principles similar to those generally employed in everyday 
life. It is this, in turn, that prevents Historians from speaking preferentially in theoretical terms 
and, by the same token, supports the recurrent claim that History is not a proper social 
science. For this reason, coming back to Danto’s thesis, the suggestion that “narration yields 
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certain categories of thought that might be said to compose the metaphysics of everyday life” 
seems to be so promising from analytical point of view (Danto 2007: xiv). 
It is exactly this type of metaphysical role of Historical narratives towards everyday life’s 
events that Danto elaborates anew when he deals with the central theme of his theory of art, 
namely, the problem of visual indiscernibility of common objects and artworks (Danto 1981). 
Examining the affinities between Danto’s theory of History and philosophy of art, Lydia 
Goehr’s argues that the difference between the transformational character of History and the 
transfigurational47 power of art is not as great as Danto thought.  
Actually, according to her, the ties of kindred between both concepts were so tight, that one 
could speak of “The Transformation of the Chronicle”, adapting to History the title of one of 
Danto’s best-known titles in philosophy of art, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace 
(Goehr 2007: xxii). This amounts to say that there is a similarity between the way in which 
common artifacts are transfigured into artworks and the way in which Historian’s descriptions 
are transformed into explanations as well as into theory-, interest-, and value-laden 
assessments (Goehr 2007: xxii). 
The aim of this first chapter can be described as an attempt to develop Goher’s insight by 
exposing how academic Historical writing is by virtue of its intrinsic relation to the issue of 
time (at least) twofold embroiled in what, following Danto’s vocabulary, can be called 
“paradox of perceptual indiscernibility”.  
In the course of the analysis it will become clear why this indiscernibility has to do with the 
issues of anachronism and ideology. 																																																								47The	question	Danto	wants	to	address	is	how	“the	subtle	miracle	of	transforming,	into	works	of	art,	objects	from	the	Lebenswelt	of	commonplace	existence:	a	grooming	comb,	a	bottle	rack,	a	bicycle	wheel,	a	urinal”	occurs	(Danto	1981:	vi).	First	approach	to	be	ruled	out:	the	difference	between	works	of	art	and	mere	real	things	could	not	rest	in	any	presumed	aesthetical	difference,	since	both	shared	all	sensory	qualities.	This	feature	 renders	 suddenly	 inapplicable	 a	 whole	 tradition	 of	 philosophical	 definitions	 of	 art	 based	 on	aesthetical	examinations	of	artworks.	(Danto	1981:	v–viii;	Danto	[1986]	2005:	1–21)	A	conventionalist	or	an	institutional	theory	of	art	would	answer	that	the	difference	between	art	and	reality	is	either	just	a	matter	of	conventions,	that	is,	“whatever	convention	allow	to	be	an	artwork	is	an	artwork”,	
or	a	matter	of	political-institutional	power:	“a	work	of	art	is	a	‘candidate	for	appreciation’,	a	status	conferred	upon	an	artifact	by	[…]	an	institutionally	enfranchised	group	of	persons.”	(Danto	1981:	28–32;	90–94)	Danto	argues	that	there	is	an	element	of	truth	in	these	theories,	but	at	the	same	time	they	are	shallow	for	they	do	not	account	for	the	qualities	that	constitute	an	artwork	once	something	is	one.	His	own	answer	reads	that	what	transfigures	a	commonplace	object	into	an	artwork	are	the	aesthetical	questions	posed	by	propounding	a	“brash	metaphor”:	the-mere-things-as-work-of-art.	The	focus	on	the	metaphoric	attributes	explains	why	 the	 core	 of	 Danto’s	 argument	 about	The	 Transfiguration	 of	 the	 Commonplace	 is	 that	 “the	structure	of	artworks	is	of	a	piece	with	the	structure	of	rhetoric,	and	that	is	the	office	of	rhetoric	to	modify	the	minds	and	then	the	actions	of	men	and	women	by	co-opting	their	feelings.”	(Danto	[1986]	2005:	21)		
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The noise of ideology or the sound of historiographical silences 
The concept of “narrative sentences” is the most basic category of Analytical Philosophy of 
History, and, as usually happens to concepts of such stock, it is expounded in primarily abstract 
terms.  
It might appear paradoxical but it is important at this moment, when the most basic category 
of Danto’s philosophy of History is about to come to the fore, to give the word first to 
professional Historians.  
In his In Defence of History, Richard J. Evans rightly remarks that  
“the level of abstraction at which most studies of historical epistemology operate is so 
theoretical, so far removed from actual problems experienced by historians, that the subject 
in general is of little practical relevance to what historians actually do.” (Evans 2000: 10) 
 
These words shall echo ceaselessly through this chapter, even through this whole dissertation, 
functioning as a warning against possible abuses of theoretical digression. Therefore, at least 
one “actual problem” experienced by Historians, namely, the problem of having to ascertain 
that they write “what actually was” will always be taken into account. This assertion of 
actuality is in general a subject of great practical relevance, for, regardless the particular 
circumstances under which they work, Historians are never allowed to avoid dealing with it, 
no matter whether just selecting sources or advancing some new explanation. 
Once clarified this guideline, the way one must proceed in order to examine the notion of 
“narrative sentences” presents itself lessened of some treacherous dangers.  
The most general characteristic of “narrative sentences” is, according to Danto, the fact that 
“they refer to at least two time-separated events though they only describe (are only about) 
the earliest event to which they refer ” (Danto [1965] 2007: 143 - italics in the original).  
Adapting to Danto himself the kind of example that he uses in his book, Goehr contrasts the 
sentence “Arthur Danto was born on January 1, 1924” with “On this day, the author of 
Analytical Philosophical of History was born.” Clearly, the latter sentence could not be uttered 
before 1965 (the year in which the book was published), since it puts together two time-
separated events so that its very content of truth depends exactly on this time asymmetry. 
The former sentence does not perform such an operation. It is merely or basically factual 
(Goehr 2007: xxvi).  
By strict Rankean criterions, that means that on the basis of an image of the past—wie es 
eigentlich gewesen ist—it could be said that both sentences are equally Historical. Still, Goehr 
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insists48 that the first sentence is not, rigorously speaking, a historical one, for it does not 
create a temporal whole by putting events in relationship to one another, nor does it make of 
this time asymmetry a necessary truth condition (Goehr 2007: xxvi). 
What a sentence like “Arthur Danto was born on January 1, 1924” provides is accuracy, and 
accuracy, as E.H. Carr remarks, is a Historian’s duty, not a virtue. It is, to sum up in more 
theoretical terms, a necessary condition, but not the essential function of History (Carr [1961] 
2001: 6). That is the main reason why chronicles or annals fail as proper History: in organizing 
the order of discourse concerned essentially with the exactness of the events chronological 
order, such forms of Historical exposition can hardly offer the kind of meaning attainable by 
narratologically governed accounts (Ankersmit 2012: 29–47; White 1990: 1–25).  
Danto illustrates the impossibility of being Historical without being narrative by supposing the 
existence of an Ideal Chronicler, who knows whatever happens the moment it happens, even 
in other minds. Such a creature would be then able to write a full description of all happenings. 
In spite of the unquestionable knowledge of this being, it would be incapable of writing one 
single sentence that were properly Historical, since its vocabulary would lack some referring 
devices used uniquely for designating “certain events, persons and places, by making use of 
relative pronouns—‘the place where …’, ‘the person who …’, —where the blank is filled with 
an expression which refers to an event which takes place temporally later than the earliest 
time at which there is such an individual to refer to”. (Danto [1965] 2007: 157–158)  
In the Ideal Chronicle, there would also never be found a phrase as simple as “This man is 
planting roses”, even for the purpose of describing a man who has been putting seeds of roses 
into the soil. The reason is quite easy to understand: if for any reason the roses fail to come 
forth, the Ideal Chronicle will have falsified the description of the event and, consequently, 
will not fulfill its role as ideal! Because the use of the verb in phrases like “planting roses”, 
“building a ship” or perhaps “writing a dissertation” describes actions with a view to an 
indefinite future, Danto denominates such verbs “project verbs”	49 (Danto [1965] 2007: 159–
181).  																																																								48	 Respecting	 this	 problem,	 Goehr	 points	 out,	 she	 just	 follows	 Danto,	 who	 sometimes	 calls	 “narrative	sentences”	also	“historical”	or	“tensed”	sentences.	49	Ankersmit	remarks	that	Danto’s	“project	verbs”	constitutes	what	one	might	describe	as	the	“microlevel”	of	the	dimension	of	unintended	consequences	of	human	action,	a	central	topic	in	philosophy	of	history	at	least	since	Hegel’s	“the	cunning	of	the	Reason”	(Ankersmit	2012:	42–43).	Although,	it	might	be	misleading	to	regard	Danto’s	logical	explorations	on	Historical	language	as	concerned	with	such	a	“microlevel”,	since	in	History	written	language	is	the	very	intended	human	action.		
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If the above discussed referring pronominal constructions account for temporal wholes 
oriented towards the past, so do the “project verbs” respecting the future. Still, both do not 
enter the scene of History in the form of temporal wholes as such, but respectively as 
necessary correspondence between past and Historical account, and as potential discrepancy 
between expectations about the future and the actual course of events. (Ankersmit 2012: 42) 
At any rate, from what has been argued until now, one has no other choice but to conclude 
that ideal descriptions of events would be ideal only when totally deprived of temporal 
injunctions. No special philosophical training is necessary to see that neither History nor 
stories could ever be written in this way. Who would dream of writing such an “ideal 
description” of any event? Historians surely not.  
Moreover, countless sorts of texts are made out of referring pronouns, project verbs, 
narrative sentences, in a word, of tensed language, which is also a natural part of common 
speech. As such, they are general aspects of language rather than a distinctive feature of 
Historical knowledge.  
One may concede that Danto’s analysis provides clever insights into the language necessarily 
used to describe events in Historical perspective50, but what could be, to come back to Evan’s 
remark, the practical relevance of that to what Historians actually do? How far are these 
reflections removed from actual problems experienced by Historians? 
It may be convenient to stress that, actually, it is not properly a child’s play to define what 
Historians actually do. This is, in fact, such a major question in History that the dispute over 
the point provides one with arguments ranging from the seminal Aristotelian distinction 
between history and poetry up to Hayden White’s postmodern controversies.  
Clearly, it would not be especially clever try to enter this terrain right now. Thus, with the 
purpose of answering straight away those questions, and even running the risk of 
oversimplification, a quite pedestrian way of conceiving “what Historians actually do” will be 
here adopted. It runs as follows: on the basis of interpretation of different sorts of sources, 
preferentially primary ones, Historians put time-extended events in relation to each other in 
order to write accounts that make sense of the past.  
																																																								50	In	fact,	Danto’s	asserts	that	the	use	of	narrative	sentences	“suggests	a	differentiating	feature	of	historical	knowledge”	and	that	they	“are	so	peculiarly	related	to	our	concept	of	history	that	analysis	of	them	must	indicate	what	some	of	the	main	features	of	that	concept	are.”	(Danto	[1965]	2007:	143)	
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On the basis of what has been so far explained, it is sufficiently clear that “narrative sentences” 
are made of quite ordinary language means. As such, the temporal wholes that they bring 
about may go as unnoticed as the many other language aspects that do not interfere directly 
in the immediate understanding of the meaning of a text51. The temporal wholes’ 
inconspicuousness must not be a problem. However, if Historians fail to recognize the effect 
of this present absence i.e. the presence of this particular mode of time in their texts, they 
become liable to be faced with similar problems that they are bound to deal with by ignoring, 
misunderstanding or underestimating the ideological dimension of their Historical accounts. 
A concrete example may be helpful to cast some light on this point. Based substantially on 
criminal suits, Maria Cristina C. Wissenbach wrote a fascinating book about the life of slaves 
and freedmen in the last decades of slavery in São Paulo, a “city of freemen”, where, she 
stresses, the historical role of slaves has been for a long time disregarded (Wissenbach 1998: 
13).  
In the two passages transcribed below, Wissenbach explains, respectively, the reasons why 
the historical role of slaves have been forgotten and to which extent the progress in Social 
History has helped to address crimes as a category of Historical interpretation.  
“Na cidade dos bandeirantes desbravadores e dos imigrantes pioneiros, o papel histórico do 
negro cativo e forro foi por muito tempo desconsiderado. Sob o regime da escravidão urbana, 
condição menor num sistema econômico marcado pela grande lavoura, numa cidade em que 
predominavam senhores remediados ou pobres, numa cidade de homens livres, a figura do 
negro escravo sintetizou a desclassificação social e só recentemente foi retirado do anonimato 
pelo olhar atento da historiografia. As raízes desse esquecimento são, em parte, históricas. Na 
cidade oitocentista, desprezava-se sua presença incômoda, disciplinavam-se suas andanças 
pelas ruas e aglomerações tidas como ameaçadoras e, no máximo, aceitavam-se os tutelados, 
os domésticos, os cocheiros dos barões com seus trajes de gala. Nas fontes históricas da época 
era referidos a partir do trato social dos dominados, impregnado pela coibição, vigilância e 
punição de atos transgressores. Pouco interesse houve em registrar suas vidas obscuras, seus 
meios de sobrevivência, seus conflitos internos, seus valores e aspirações. 
Este estudo é uma tentativa de reconstituir as vidas escravas e forras no município paulista da 
segunda metade do século, por meio dos testemunhos deixados pelos processos criminais.” 
(Wissenbach 1998: 13 – emphasis added). 
 
“Os avanços da historiografia social foram incorporados pela produção brasileira mais recente, 
descortinando-se, nos estudos sobre escravidão, novas tendências nas quais os crimes 
despontam como categoria de interpretação histórica que, revelando múltiplas tensões 
envoltas no regime de trabalho escravo, devem ser avalizados internamente à dinâmica das 
relações sociais. Contou-se, para tais abordagens, com um contexto histórico privilegiado: na 																																																								51	Think	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 phonemes	may	 constitute	 a	 system,	 the	unawareness	 of	which	does	not	 at	 all	interfere	in	the	language	understanding	at	the	level	of	speech.	(Lévi-Strauss	[1958]	1963:	1–27)	
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segunda metade do século XIX, a criminalidade transformou-se num fenômeno social 
marcante [...]”(Wissenbach 1998: 24 – emphasis added). 
 
In the first passage, putting in relation to each other the social disqualification of black slaves 
in São Paulo, that place which would be branded as “the city of the bandeirantes and of the 
pioneer immigrants”, and the oblivion into which the historical role of the slaves sank, 
Wissenbach draws an unbroken line of temporal continuity that comes from the 19th century 
until the present; her very book, being an exemplar of a “mindful historiography”, stands for 
a moment of rupture of this oblivion. When she comes to explain the “historical roots” of this 
process, she performs another temporal jump of the same length, but now the other way 
round: from the present to the second half of the 19th Century, and then again, in the 
beginning of the next paragraph, from the São Paulo of the 19th Century to that of her 
dissertation, defended in 1989.  
The second passage presents a similar pattern. In order to expose some sociological 
approaches to crime, which had been fruitfully applied by English Marxist Historians such as 
Eric Hobsbawn and E.P. Thompson, explaining how they were also suitable for a discussion of 
a Brazilian History of Slavery, Wissenbach states that existed in Brazil a “privileged historical 
context”, namely, 19th Century’s criminality, which became a compelling problem in São Paulo. 
Here, once more, she departs from the present—exemplified in the figure of the current Social 
History—and flies non-stop to 19th Century São Paulo! 
In principle, there is nothing wrong with Wissenbach’s procedure: there is no way to set any 
criterion for establishing which kind of relations of events should be considered illegitimate, 
so that the temporal wholes created by them could be invalidated. As long as Historians 
proceed with accuracy, that means, moving themselves within the temporal references to 
which every time-extended event is compulsorily bound, they can relate events in whatever 
way they please. 
Nevertheless, this unpretentious coming and going between events is what creates the 
temporal gap that emerges as the “time of oblivion” (of the historical role of slaves and 
freedmen) and makes it possible to present somehow triumphantly the contemporary 
historiography as “rescuer” of these forgotten people.  
History as “rescuer” is, in fact, what sets the tone of her book. The vocabulary fits perfectly 
when she enters into the discussion about whether slave criminality should be regarded as a 
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form of open resistance or whether it was rather a way of accommodation within the 
constraints of the slavery system. The slaves, she argues, were primarily struggling to survive: 
“Sobreviver, em seus significados e dimensões multivariadas, era, por vezes, a exigência maior 
a eles [slaves and freedmen] imposta pelo regime da escravidão.” (Wissenbach 1998: 32) They 
were survivors. The historiography rescues them.  
It is important to address this point because in stressing that the crimes performed by those 
who had to live under the burden of slavery was much more a matter of negotiating their 
survival than of rebelling against the oppression, Wissenbach moves them factually to a 
position that no longer represents the extreme pole of the social system. They are posited in 
a more medial position, in a kind of deviation of the dialectical ideal formulation “master-
slave”. In this position, the very concept of “slaves’ everyday life” functions as a “floating 
buffer zone” (Spivak 1988: 285), the mobilization of which plays a crucial ideological role in 
the Brazilian History of Slavery52. 
Wissenbach was, of course, not obliged to say that historiography itself is to blame for the 
oblivion that she denounces, nor is it the case that she purposefully did not say it. She simply 
did her work—an outstanding piece of historiographical work by the way—and her moving in 
time results in a silence that also speaks for her.  
In her celebrated essay “Can the subaltern speak?” Spivak chose as a point of departure a 
“friendly exchange” between Deleuze and Foucault because the “unguarded practice of 
conversation” enables “one to glimpse the track of ideology” (Spivak 1988: 272).  
Paraphasing Spivak, it could here be said that the “friendly exchange” between past and 
present that Wissenbach carries out through her “unguarded practice of moving in time” also 
enables “one to glimpse the track of ideology”. And a key analytical maneuver for interpreting 
ideology, Spivak explains resorting to Pierre Macherey, is to comprehend the importance of 
listening carefully to “what the work cannot say […], because there the elaboration of the 
utterance is carried out, in a sort of journey to silence” (Spivak 1988: 286). 
																																																								52	See	Jacob	Gorender’s	A	escravidão	Reabilitada	for	a	Marxist	review	of	the	debate	about	the	ideological	implications	of	approaching	the	Brazilian	slavery	system	from	the	socio-culturalist	point	of	view	adopted	by	some	currents	of	Social	History.	The	core	of	Gorender’s	argument	is	basically,	as	the	very	title	of	the	book	stresses,	that	some	Historians,	eager	to	draw	attention	to	“the	world	the	slaves	made”	(Genovese	1976),	thrust	the	systemic	economic	constraints	of	slavery	excessively	into	background,	so	that	in	the	end	what	results	is	a	kind	of	rehabilitation	of	the	slavery.	Gorender	coined	the	term	“neopatriarcalistas”	to	designate	these	historiographical	works.	
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Answering, finally, Evan’s question: the relevance of being attentive to Danto’s reflection on 
the relationship between narration and historical knowledge is that it may provide Historians 
with an analytical tool for “measuring the silences”53 spoken by the most inexorable feature 
of their craft: the construction of Historical continuity.  
For writing academic History, few notions may be of greater utility than the one that teaches 
how to keep a watchful eye not properly on what can be read between History’s lines, but 
rather on how to hark the tensed lines of Historical accounts. 
 
The treachery of History or History as “controlled anachronism” 
“This is not a pipe” wrote Magritte below a picture of a pipe. Just imagine what would be to 
submit to a board of examination comprised by eminent History professors a doctoral thesis 
on the cover of which were written, right below the title: “This is not history.” There are many 
reasons to entertain doubts that any serious aspirant to an academic career would dare to do 
that. Indeed, the bold remark could be read as an underestimation of the examiners’ 
intelligence, since it amounts to conjecture that they would able not to discern, say, a 
representation of slavery system from the slavery system itself. On the other hand, for it is 
simply too evident that a History book is just a representation of what happened, it seems to 
be justified to ask which other intentions this hypothetic and playful apprentice of Historian 
may have in mind, because, what is History if not such dissertations and other academic 
oriented historiographical products (books, articles, expositions, etc.), that means, if not 
Historical representation? 
Magritte calls his painting “The Treachery of Images”. Be images particularly “treacherous” 
towards the sense of sight, so does History respecting the sense of time. This sense can be 
duped by History, so fully and frequently duped that History professors never neglect to warn 
their students against the perils of anachronism. Equally, few attributes can disqualify a 




It may be profitable to distinguish between three different kinds of anachronism. The first 
type of it corresponds to mere chronological inaccuracy. In addition to its unimportance from 
an analytical point of view, is a kind of mistake that professional Historians rarely make. To 
take a popular example from mass culture: assuming that a Last Supper effectively took place, 
a historiographical depiction of the body position and spatial disposition of Jesus and his 
apostles would probably be considerably different from Da Vinci’s famous picture, since 
Historical sources do not indicate that that particular kind of table was known at the time and 
place where the event occurred.  
The second variant raises some more problems. When one refers to Brazil regarding an event 
which happened in the 15th century, it is not especially difficult to see that “Brazil” stands for 
that place which came to be called Brazil at a future point in time. Something similar happens 
with historical references to events like the Thirty Years War: each reference to it supposed 
to have been made before 1648 must suppress its future denomination, since no one could 
have known that the war would last thirty years nor that it would be named exactly according 
to its 30-year duration.  
But these are only archetypal examples that perhaps over-emphasize how this sort of 
anachronism works. The usual content of Historical accounts is comprised of countless, almost 
prosaic statements made preferentially on the basis of primary sources, or “uttered” by the 
“sources” themselves by means of quotations inserted in the body of the text.  
By the way of exemplification, a brief review of a passage of João José Reis’ book Death is a 
Festival – Funeral Rites and Rebellion in Nineteenth-Century Brazil is given: in the third chapter, 
“Brotherhood and Baroque Catholicism”, there is a subtopic entitled “Life is a Festival”, an 
evident play on words with the title of the book. Reis begins this subtopic explaining that black 
confraternities were primarily, but not exclusively, the chief vehicles for a kind of popular 
Catholicism, which, in Reis’ words, was not “the Roman version but rather one that was 
steeped in magic and permeated with paganism and sensuality” (Reis [1991] 2003: 53). About 
this brand of Catholicism, Reis writes: 
“In a tradition dating from colonial times, popular religion, festivals, and sexuality were 
intertwined in the collective mentality of Bahia de Todos os Santos. Even under the gaze of the 
Senhor do Bonfim (‘The Lord of the Good End’, personifying the crucified Christ), its paramount 
‘saint’, the city established a highly permeable boundary between paradise and perdition. 
After attending a Christmas festival on Senhor do Bomfim, Lindley commented that Bahians in 
general—white, black and mulatto—cleared ‘their consciences of old sins [and then] 
commit[ed] new ones’. Wheterell described the Bonfim festival as a veritable orgy. Religious 
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fervor and sensuality frequently converged within the churches. In 1817 French merchant 
Louis François de Tollenare was amazed that paintings of ‘lovely erotic subjects’ were hung on 
the vestry wall of a parish church and observed, ‘This singular mixture of the profane and the 
sacred was only noted by foreigners.’ Another French traveler, Claude Dugrivel, noticed that 
in 1833 what he viewed as singularly bold flirtations between young people attending church, 
one of the few public places frequented by respectable girls. Their seductive gazes, seen above 
veils that covered most of their faces, impressed and intimidated the European visitor. 
Wetherell thought that churches were the main stage of Bahian voyeurism, for he had the 
impression that people attended mass only to ‘to see and be seen’.” (Reis [1991] 2003: 53) 
 
Reis firstly remarks that the “traditional” character of the intertwinement of “popular religion, 
festivals, and sexuality” in the “collective mentality” of the city dates from “colonial times”. 
He then concatenates a set of literal quotations of writings by four foreign observers, Lindley, 
Wheterell, Tollenare and Dugrivel, whose first-hand observations come all in support of the 
thesis on the sensualistic character of the Bahian popular Catholicism.  
A disciplinary commonsensical belief avers that when Historians make such plunges into the 
past, unearthing eyewitness accounts, what they do is trying to understand the past as the 
people who lived it understood it. In other words: they avoid judging the past by the standard 
of the present, but see it in its own terms. This procedure, Evans points out, laid one of the 
foundations of History as an academic discipline and is considered to be one of the major 
contributions made by Ranke to historical scholarship (Evans 2000: 17). 
Taking into consideration another theoretical approach, it is also be possible to say that 
through the insertion of the commentaries above, delivered by contemporaries the past 
events described, Reis provides his readers with a Collingwoodian “re-enactement of the 
past”54, the function of which is to evidence that there is a distance existent between the 
author´s standpoint and the sources’ standpoint on the events. 
No matter if clothed in Rankean or Collingwoodian fashion, the aim of the procedure is 
unambiguously to get things straight: what belongs to the past shall be assigned to the 
sources; what does not belong to it, shall not. It is also justifiably believed that in employing 
their sources in this way, Historians avert anachronism.  
Yet, if one bears in mind that Danto’s “paradox of indiscernibles” and takes a second look at 
the issue, the whole picture will grow substantially different. 
																																																								54	In	his	celebrated	book	on	The	Idea	of	History,	R.	G.	Collingwood	put	forward	the	argument	that	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	”History	cannot	be	scientifically	written	unless	the	Historian	can	re-enact	 in	his	own	mind	the	experience	of	the	people	whose	actions	he	is	narrating.“	(Collingwood	[1946]	2005:	283)	
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There is no doubt that the eyewitnesses were speaking of what they had experienced. Yet, 
once articulated simultaneously with the Historian voice, they suddenly appear on the scene 
in support of an idea, namely, the socio-aesthetical interpretation of the local religion as 
“Baroque Catholicism”, which is itself a kind of “unintended consequence” of what they wrote 
about their own experiences in Bahia. 
Besides the circularity of the operation, which is anyway quite evident, the most important 
point to be here stressed is that in the moment in which one is supposed to see the past as 
Lindley, Wheterell, Tollenare and Dugrivel saw it, what one sees is these four people doing 
something they would never be able to: speaking in the name of an idea conceived more than 
a century after their lifetime! 
By the same token, Reis, intending to make the past understandable in its own terms, presents 
himself performing something he also would never be able to: talking about the past as if he 
had never known that such an idea like Baroque Catholicism would be conceived. 
Reis’ Historical description thus operated a time displacement of its agents that makes it 
especially difficult to discern “when”55 is the order of the Historian’s interpretation and 
“when” is that one of what is being interpreted. In other words: it constitutes itself in the form 
of a permanent exercise of anachronism. 
As this analysis of Reis´ passage helps to show, anachronism operates in History not simply by 
“misplacing things in time”, as the usual meaning of the word denotes (Davies 2003: 130), but 
rather by deploying them narratively in such a manner that may confuse one´s sense of time 
by taking over the elementary cognitive task of discerning between different temporal orders.  
Explaining what is meant by the expression “space-time” in Physics, Russell gives an example 
that may be quite helpful to “imagine”56 time as it works in Reis passage and, additionally, to 
make sense of the third variant of anachronism: 
																																																								55	This	formulation	is	a	reference	to	Stuart	Hall´s	article	“When	was	the	post-colonial?	Thinking	at	the	limit”.	In	this	text,	among	others	rejoinders,	he	replies	to	Shohat´s	criticism	of	the	“undecidability”	of	postcolonial	theory,	which,	in	attempting	to	be	both	epistemic	and	chronological,	occasions	a	“structured	ambivalence”,	to	which	she	were	not	very	sympathetic.	According	to	Hall,	“it	is	possible	to	argue	that	the	tension	between	the	epistemological	and	the	chronological	is	not	disabling,	but	productive.”	(Hall	1996b:	254)	Hall´s	words	were	chosen	due	to	the	fact	that	instead	of	answering	“what”	or	“in	which	consist”	post-colonial	theory	(in	substantive	form),	he	interestingly	prefers	to	use	the	temporal	adverb	“when”	and	formulates	the	 question	 in	 the	 past	 tense,	 making	 in	 this	 way	 a	 unequivocal	 reference	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	relationship	between	the	construction	of	a	particular	notion	of	time	and	one´s	stance	towards	a	subject-matter.	56	Russell	thinks	that	the	new	phrase	space-time	“is	from	a	philosophical	and	imaginative	point	of	view,	perhaps	the	most	important	of	all	novelties	that	Einstein	introduced.	(Russell	[1925]	2009:	37)	
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“Suppose, for instance, that some notable event happens on the sun: there is a period of 
sixteen minutes on the earth during which no event on the earth can have influenced or been 
influenced by the said notable event on the sun. This gives substantial ground for regarding 
that period of sixteen minutes on the earth as neither before nor after the event on the sun.” 
(Russell [1925] 2009: 40) 
 
It is as if Historical accounts moved themselves within this sixteen minutes interval that is not 
definitely after nor definitely before the events that are made by the account itself. But, of 
course, if there is something that is not at all indifferent in reporting an event this is the fact 
of being posited after or before it happened. Thus, this temporarily time indiscernibility, this 
unnatural difficulty in ascertaining one’s time position turns out to be what endowed History 
with the property of casting light on an event from different, even opposed temporal 
standpoints, which although, being part of a sole stream, seems never to lose its unified focus.  
Russell’s provides that example in the framework of an explanation the purpose of which is to 
make intelligible Einstein’s theory of relativity. Opposed to what the theory’s name may 
suggest, it does not attempt to prove everything in the physical world to be relative, but “to 
exclude what is relative and arrive at a statement of physical laws that shall in no way depend 
upon the circumstances of the observer” (Russel [1925] 2009: 9). The logical side effect of 
having been successful in this enterprise was to lay bare that everything in Newtonian Physics 
is relative to an observer.  
In order to rule out the observer’s standpoint, what Einstein introduces in his theory of 
relativity is nothing else but an epistemologically ontological time that, as surprisingly as it 
may appear, should puzzle everyone excepting professional Historians, for History, as 
surprisingly as it may appear, is equally concerned with conceiving time ontologically.  
Owing to its patent immaterial character, time usually lends itself to all sorts of ontological 
enterprises (recall the famous words by St. Augustine of Hippo mentioned in the 
introduction!). History although explores this feature of time in a rather negative way: by 
assigning to time the concreteness of events narrated on material basis57 History comes into 
the ontological character proper to time.  
Sydney Chalhoub’s Visões da Liberdade provides an example that may make this point clearer.  																																																								57	Explaining	why	any	fiction	can	pass	for	History,	Trouilott	writes:	“the	materiality	of	the	socio-historical	process	(historicity	1)	sets	the	stage	for	future	historical	narratives	(historicity	2).	The	materiality	of	this	first	moment	is	so	obvious	that	some	of	us	take	it	for	granted.	It	does	not	imply	that	facts	are	meaningless	objects	waiting	to	be	discovered	under	some	timeless	seal	but	rather,	more	modestly,	that	history	begins	with	bodies	and	artifacts:	living	brains,	fossils,	texts,	buildings.”	(Trouillot	1995:	29)		
	 53	
More than with an exposition of aims and objectives, motivations, circumstances of 
elaboration, difficulties in accomplishing the task, all that stuff that commonly surfaces in the 
opening pages of History books, the introductory chapter of Visões da Liberdade is concerned 
with an explanation of the Historians’ modus operandi. This is perhaps one of the features 
that, together with Chalhoub’s fine writing, catapulted this book to the selected list of those 
works of scholarship that escape from the university prison and become a kind of academic 
bestseller.  
Chalhoub begins the book telling the story of Zadig, the Babylonian wise who is the 
protagonist of Voltaire’s Zadig or Destiny. Having dedicated himself entirely to the study of 
the properties of animals and plants, this old wise man acquired such a shrewdness that 
enables him to point out thousand differences where other men would see only sameness. 
This ability soon puts him in great trouble, when by chance he runs into the queen’s chief 
Eunuch who, together with several attendants, has been desperately looking for the missing 
queen’s dog. Asked whether he had seen the pet, Zadig replied to them first with a correction: 
“It is a bitch, not a dog.” And adds: “She is a very small spaniel. She has recently had a litter, 
and she limps with her left front paw, and she has very long ears.” (Voltaire [1747] 2014: 13) 
After such an exact description, the Eunuch concludes that Zadig had seen the animal and 
wanted to know which direction it had taken. Still, the old wise said he had never seen it nor 
heard thereof! He was then arrested on the spot under suspect of having stolen the queen’s 
bitch. The animal turned up again later, what freed Zadig from jail, but not from the payment 
of a fine for having lied. Paid the fine, the magistrates acquiesced in listening to Zadig’s 
explanation: 
“I have never seen the Queen’s dearest bitch […]. What happens was this: I was out walking 
near the little wood where I met the venerable eunuch and the most illustrious Master of the 
Hunt. Seeing some animal tracks in the sand, and I could easily tell they were of those of a 
small dog. Long, shallow grooves drawn across tiny heaps of sand between paw-marks told me 
that it was a bitch whose teats were hanging down, which meant that she had had a litter few 
days previously. Other traces going in different direction, an apparently made by something 
constantly over the surface of the sand beside the front paws, told me that she had very long 
ears. And I noticed that the sand was always less indented by one paw than by the other three, 
I realized that the bitch belonging to our most august Queen had, if I may dare say so, a slight 
limp.” (Voltaire [1747] 2014: 15–16) 
 
Zadig’s method, Chalhoub states, had found adepts also among Historians. Robert Darnton of 
The Great Cat Massacre (1984) and the Carlo Ginzburg of the The Cheese and the Worms 
(1976) are two remarkable examples of them. Chalhoub intends to join this select society of 
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authors: in his book “a cadela da rainha é o processo histórico de abolição da escravidão na 
corte.” (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 16–18). Based on a discussion of some theoretical 
contributions by Clifford Geertz, E.P. Thompson and Mintz & Price, Chalhoub explains that the 
subject to be elected to elucidate the logic of change proper of this historical process should 
be delimitated in the confluence of many social struggles: 
“no ‘lugar’ onde não seria possível determinar com qualquer precisão o que seriam os aspectos 
econômicos, sociais, políticos ou ideológicos do processo histórico em questão. A cadela da rainha 
precisaria estar numa encruzilhada, na confluência de muitos caminhos e na incerteza de vários 
futuros.” (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 28) 
 
In the case of Brazil, Chalhoub argues, this “place” [lugar] was the “significado da liberdade 
dos negros”. In this sense, asserting that “os rastros da cadela da rainha estão visíveis logo 
adiante”, he closes the introduction inviting his reader to “virar a página e começar a busca 
…” (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 28). 
Chalhoub’s analogy is especially ill suited to grasp the Historian’s craft. It is evident that the 
existence of the queen’s bitch does not depend neither on the particular traces left behind by 
it in any particular circumstance nor on Zadig’s capacities of inference based on them. The 
same cannot be said about the Historical process of abolition of slavery in Rio de Janeiro in 
the particular form presented in Visões da Liberdade, whose existence completely depends 
on the traces left behind by it as well as on Chalhoub’s capacity of inference based on them. 
Interestingly, Chalhoub is aware of that. He even stresses as well as Zadig had never saw the 
queen’s bitch, Historians 
“jamais se depararam com os fatos históricos ao dobrarem uma esquina mais ou menos 
deserta de arquivo. Não, os fatos nunca estiveram lá, de tocaia, prontos pra tomar de assalto 
as páginas dos historiadores; foi preciso investigar seus rastros – os documentos – e construí-
los a partir de interesses específicos [...].” (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 18) 
 
Nonetheless, he seems not to realize that the analogy with Zadig’s story suggests exactly the 
opposite position, namely, that historical processes (as the queen’s bitch) are the sort of thing 
that stay somewhere (hidden or lost?) waiting to be found by the laborious work of Zadig-
Historians who can read the traces it left behind when it had escaped (towards the past). Here, 
the relation between Historians and their subject matter is not intrinsically constructivist but 
rather of exteriority. However, if the analogy is not only inappropriate but also somehow 
contradictory, why it seems to be so plausible in Chalhoub’s pen?  
The reason for that lies at least partially in the way in which Historical events are frequently 
enunciated. Danto himself, who is someone philosophically attentive to the narrative 
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character of them, refers to events like the “French Revolution” or “the Renaissance” as if 
they had the same ontological status of Napoleon and Petrarca (Danto [1965] 2007: 390; 
Baumgartner 1997: 284-294). So does Chalhoub when he draws the analogy between the 
“historical process of abolition of slavery” and the missing queen’s female dog.  
The biological nature of the metaphor suggests that historical processes share the ontological 
unity and continuity of organisms. The notions of unity and continuity are those that bring 
about the very sense that something actually existed: they form the being and the time of 
things. 
However, the way in which historical processes “exist” is far from “analogous” to that of living 
beings. The employment of organicist metaphors58 is just one among many ways to 
simultaneously explain, justify and produce a type of ontologizing power proper of Historical 
accounts.  
Coming back to the core of the issue at stake in this topic: what has all that to do with 
anachronism? Is there a more equivocated way of mistaking the time of something than 
presenting it as ontological, when it is a Historical one? Probably not. Here is, finally, a 
formulation of the third type anachronism, which consists precisely in this “ontologizing” 
property conceded to History by Historians. 
 
*       *       * 
 
Anachronisms are the most distinctive feature of the, to use an expression by Michel de 
Certeau ([1975] 2002: 65–106), “historiographical operation”. As a mere chronological 
mistake, anachronism is just embarrassing when made by Historians. This is its first and rather 
uncommon type. As a way of covering a broad field of sight, it were to say that in the course 
of a Historical account there is no point at which a statement concerning the past does not 																																																								58	Maurice	Mandelbaum	points	out	that	the	conception	of	the	organic	nature	of	man’s	social	life,	and	the	use	of	organic	analogies	tended	to	dominate	all	of	nineteenth-century	European	thought.	The	Historicism	of	those	 days	 rested	 firmly	 upon	 such	 analogies.	 Mandelbaum	 mentions	 Troelsch’s	 long	 chapter	 on	“Organologie”	in	Der	Historismus	und	seine	Probleme	as	an	example	of	the	extent	to	which	organic	analogy	was	used	as	the	basis	for	interpreting	history.	(Mandelbaum	1977:	57-61;	385)	In	Chalhoub’s	hands	 the	 idea	of	 the	organic	 is	 still	 the	basis,	but	 there	 is	no	need	 to	develop	 it	 further,	because	what	he	wants	to	explain	is	not	history	as	“man’s	social	life”	but	History,	that	is,	the	Historian’s	craft.	However,	the	idea	of	“reading	the	traces”	[left	behind	by	a	living	organism],	which	his	analogy	of	the	queen’s	 bitch	 aims	 at	making	more	 easily	 understandable,	 is	 rooted	 in	 an	 epistemological	 change	 that,	according	to	Carlos	Ginzburg,	emerged	also	as	a	late	development	of	nineteenth-century	European	thought.	Ginzburg	denominates	it	“evidential	paradigm”.	(Ginzburg	1989:	96–125)	This	point	will	be	resumed	later	(see	the	section	‘Historical	continuity	of	long-term,	“logic	of	resemblance”	and	empirical	proof’).	
	 56	
necessarily cross another point situated at a later time, weaving in this way the knots of 
meaningfulness that constitute the fabric of History (the second type). Finally, the degree of 
consistency and integrity that grants History’s meaningfulness would never be reached 
without the presupposition that whatever enter the order of the Historical time had the unity 
and continuity proper of what enjoys an ontological existence outside of the historiographical 
text (the third type). 
Therefore, in that very sense of exploring the disciplinary semantic of History’s field, it seems 
not to be far-fetched to suggest that students might be taught that the writing of 
historiographical accounts is the truly practice of a specific mode of “controlled anachronism”, 
which, in consequence, should not be regarded as a danger, but rather as the divine breath 
that brings History to life. 	  
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CHAPTER	2	-	HISTORY	AND	THEORY	OF	HISTORY	
On the ends of History 
Think of Mano Brown and of Victor Jara, think of the 1933 Nazi book burnings and of the 
Degenerate Art Exhibition, think of Salman Rushdie and of Ai Weiwei, think of all that and it 
becomes crystal clear why there exists so widely subscribed a political attitude that “art is 
dangerous”. And, in a political sense, it is believed that History is even more dangerous than 
art. It is not for nothing, as Randeria remarks, that national liberation movements maintain a 
close relationship with the efforts to control the interpretation of their own History 
(Conrad/Randeria 2002: 35), and that History has established itself as a mandatory part of 
every national school curriculum. 
Art is politically dangerous; History even more so. Nonetheless, History of Art seems to be a 
quite inoffensive sort of knowledge. If it were a case of trying to judge the tenableness of this 
claim only on the basis of the many overtones that a phrase such as “The end of history” 
carries, it would be curious to note that outside of the art and academic world, little attention 
has been paid to Danto’s thesis on “the end of art”, which designates, in the manner of Hegel, 
an ontological end of the history of art as a developmental sequence (Danto [1986] 2005: 103). 
However, there has been recurring public uproar over Fukuyama’s thesis on “the end of 
history”, which, resting on identical Hegelian principles, makes a similar point concerning 
mankind's ideological evolution (Fukuyama 1989: 4; 1998: xi).  
To draw any further comparison between Danto and Fukuyama would be beside the point. 
For the purposes of this section, this brief remark shall suffice to introduce the question of 
whether Danto’s thesis on the end of the history (of art) might be considered as politically 
dangerous as Fukuyama’s one respecting ideology. 
Aware that the employment of the expression “the end of …” to refer to social phenomena is 
beset with far too many theoretical difficulties than would be possible to deal with within the 
scope of this dissertation, for what concerns the subsequent analysis, it will aim chiefly at 
making some critical remarks on the general subject under scrutiny, namely, time and 
temporality. These remarks will function as theoretical basis for the metaphorical model 
intended to be sketched in the conclusion of this dissertation. 
The following analysis consists of two parts. Firstly, a characterization, if only in summary 
fashion, of Danto’s thesis on “The End of Art” will be delivered as a preliminary discussion. 
Then, drawing on the way in which Danto conceives the relationship between art and 
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philosophy, a mirrored reflection on the relationship between History and Theory of History 
will be developed.  
 
Arthur Danto’s end of art 
In the “The End of Art: A Philosophical Defense” (1998), the article that closes an issue of 
History & Theory dedicated exclusively to his work, Danto takes great pains to reply to a series 
of sharp criticisms of his ideas. He admits that the kind of theses he put forward first in his 
famous essay “The End of Art” (1964), and subsequently refined in the books The 
Disenfranchisement of Art (1986) and After the End of Art– contemporary art and the pale of 
History (1997), were indeed extravagant. One of these theses reads that with Warhol’s Brillo 
Box “we have entered a period of post-historical art, where the need for constant self-
revolutionization of art is now past” (Danto [1986] 2005: xxix). Another one says that 
essentialism and historicism, widely regarded as antithetical notions, “are not only compatible 
but co-implicated with one another, at least in the case of art” (Danto 1998: 128).  
These theoretical extravagancies grow less eccentric if one considers three aspects of Danto’s 
work. Firstly, Danto’s general stance on philosophy. The aim of Danto’s philosophy, as he 
himself states, “has been essentialist—to find a definition of art everywhere and always true 
[…]. By essence, I mean a real definition, of the old-fashioned kind, laying out the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for something to fall under a concept.” (Danto 1998: 128-126). 
Secondly, one must consider the subject, according to Danto’s view, that philosophy is 
devoted to, i.e. the natural topics of philosophical inquiry. This would be the paradoxes of 
perceptual indiscernibility: philosophy is what enables one to distinguish that which could not 
be told apart without the aid of some theory (Carrier 1998: 5; Carrol 1998: 19). Thirdly, one 
considers the Hegelian premise to which Danto resorts to in the formulation of his thesis on 
the end of art. This premise reads that history has to come to an end and that this end has 
been reached when history as subject grasps its own essence as object. In Danto’s words: 
“when subject and object become one—a gap will have been closed and a period of internal 
development will have run its course.” (Danto [1986] 2005: xxvi). 
In this sense, Danto argues, Warhol’s Brillo Box marks the point of accomplishment of a 
process that Duchamp’s La Fountain had already radicalized: art’s search for self-
understanding, which began in the last quarter of the nineteenth-century, when the 
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emergence of the modernists drove the final nail in the coffin of the “paradigm of imitation” 
in art.  
Since for every relevant purpose Warhol’s Brillo Box was indiscernible from the Brillo Box of 
warehouses, it was clear that the differences between them could not account for the 
difference between art and reality. Art had in this way constituted itself as a perfect “paradox 
of indiscernibility”; it had turned itself into the proper world that it pretended to be an 
imitation or expression of; it had, to sum up using Hegelian vocabulary, accomplished the 
unification of subject and object. At this point, the task of understanding art “has been handed 
over to philosophy, because it lies beyond the limits of art to carry it any further” (Danto 1998: 
135). If history reaches its end with the advent of self-consciousness, so does art with the 
advent of its own philosophy.  
But “the end of art” does not at all mean that there will no longer be art. Actually, it means 
the logical “end of the possibility of any particular internal direction for art to take. It is the 
end of the possibility of progressive development […] it means the end of the tyranny of 
history—that in order to achieve success as an artist one must drive art history forward, 
colonizing the future novelty by novelty.” (Danto 1998: 140 - italics in the original).  
Danto sees rather a promising future for art. As in the Hegelian and Marxist utopias, after the 
end of (art) history lies the realm of true (artistic) freedom: artists can do whatever they want. 
And the history of such artistic features will sunder into a sequence of individual acts, one 
after another: “there will not be a single metanarrative for the future history of art”, which 
will have then reached its post-historical age (Danto 1998: 139–140; [1986] 2005: 103).  
Having briefly retraced Danto’s route from his stance on Philosophy over the Hegelian 
premises of his aesthetical reflections, and towards his conclusion heralding a new era of art 
history, now seems to be the right moment to say some words regarding the fact of having 
chosen Danto’s aesthetics as an analytical tool for thinking about History. 
To borrow a famous thought by Lévi-Strauss, Danto’s aesthetics was not chosen because it 
satisfies any precise theoretical criteria that should necessarily be taken into account in 
performing a competent analysis of the issues under inquiry in this chapter, but rather 
because it is “good to think” with59 (Lévi-Strauss [1962] 1991: 89).  																																																								59	To	be	sure,	Danto’s	ideas	become	“good	to	think”	with	if,	and	only	if,	one	levels	at	Danto’s	thesis	on	“the	end	 of	 art”	 the	weapons	 of	 his	 own	 analytical	 philosophy	 of	 history	 (about	 it,	 see	 the	 first	 part	 of	 this	chapter):	how	can	Danto	know	that	anything	out	of	the	huge	range	of	present	and	future	artistic	choices	
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Approaching History using aesthetics is furthermore far from being an uncommon analytical 
strategy. Quite the opposite: analyses of this nature are a constant in conceptual discussions 
on History, and have been characterized by what Hayden White once called Historians’ 
“Fabian tactic”. When criticized because of theoretical or methodological reasons, Historians 
reply that History has never claimed the status of pure science, remaining, due to its heuristic 
character, a kind of art; when fustigated by literary artists and critics because of aesthetical 
reasons, Historians respond that “historical data do not lend themselves to ‘free’ artistic 
manipulation, and that the form of (the Historian’s) narratives is not a matter of choice, but is 
required by the nature of historical materials themselves” (White 1966: 111). 
The kind of analysis that is about to be done here follows also a long tradition, a tradition that 
has taught that the best answer to the question whether History is a proto-art or a semi-
science is, perhaps, “neither/nor”. In any case, seeking for a hard definition of History is far 
from being among the aspirations of the following reflections, which consist chiefly of an 
analytical effort to spell out an ensemble of similarities and dissimilarities between History of 
Art and History of History. Rather, the aim, it is worth calling to mind once more, is to make 
some critical remarks on the issue of time and temporality in the writing of History. 
 
Postcolonial end of History 
A justified and widespread charge made against works inspired by poststructuralist and 
postmodernist theories is that they often deploy a highly specialized language, borrowed 
largely from linguistic philosophy and literary theory, which has rendered such works obscure 
and hermetic. According to this charge, instead of inflating the complexity of the matter under 
inquiry by creating expressions such as “the ontologizing of History”60, it would be perfectly 
possible, if expositive transparency were desirable, simply to say that Historians claim that 
what they write is a probable truth, which has been established by following “the rules of 
evidence and the facts on which they rest” (Evans 2000: 223).  
																																																								will	not	give	rise	to	an	entirely	new	developmental	kind	of	art	history	(Carrol	1998:	27)?	How	can	he	grant	that	 the	 future	 is	 not	 going	 to	 “falsify”	 his	 prediction?	Responding	 to	 these	questions	Danto	 says:	 “The	answer	is	that	I	cannot	know	this.”	And	he	continues,	justifying	his	position:	“Nor	can	I	imagine	this,	any	more	than	a	medieval	artist	could	have	imagined	the	spectacular	illusions	that	history	of	painting	was	to	provide.	One	has,	of	course,	to	be	open	–	the	end	of	art	theory	means	to	be	an	empirical	theory.	But	the	future	is	what	we	cannot	imagine	until	it	is	present.”	(Danto	1998:	140)	60	This	term	is	used	in	the	first	part	of	this	chapter	(Narrativity,	Ideology	and	Anachronism).	
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Which rules? Rules that “might include very basic precepts such as not altering documents, or 
not leaving or supressing material damaging to one’s argument or purpose. In this sense, the 
documents do have an integrity of their own, they do indeed ‘speak for themselves’” (Evans 
2000: 116). According to this view, sources do indeed establish historical facts, which were 
consequently not something that is constructed by means of interpretation and then accepted 
as such within the Historians’ community: “Facts thus precede interpretation conceptually, 
while interpretation precedes evidence.” (Evans 2000: 77). Judging by such statements, 
writing History seems to be a fairly simple task, everything in it being so transparent that there 
is practically no room for supposing that the practice entails some kind of hidden 
epistemological level that would require a particular theoretical effort in order to be unveiled. 
A symptom of this presumption, namely History’s epistemological transparency, can be found 
in the shelves of academic bookstores. Here, in the History area, it is almost certain that there 
will be no section on History Theory. Where to look for Bloch’s The Historian’s Craft, Carr’s 
What is History?, Droysen’s Grundriss der Historik, Elton’s The Practice of History, Mink’s 
Historical Understanding, Burckhadrt’s Weltgeschictliche Betrachtungen or Collingwood’s The 
Idea of History? Should they be there, they will be amongst either the thousands of thematic 
ordered History books (but, to which “theme” do they belong?) or more probably, in the 
Philosophy area. What about the writings on History by Certeau, Foucault, Barthes, Danto and 
Hayden White? It might be a good idea to check the section on Linguistics and Literary Theory 
too. Any hope to stumble across a fresh Ankersmit, Rüsen or Iggers? A very optimistic answer 
would read: probably not, but … 
It is not that the question about the problem of the foundations and limits of what can be 
“Historically” known became outmoded. A recent German book on the relation between 
History and theory speaks of a “torrent of literature” on the issue, and concludes: “Trotzdem 
bleibt bei dieser Flut der Literatur zum Thema ein Unbehagen. Nicht selten entsteht der 
Eindruck, dass der ‘Alltag des Historikers und die historische Theorie’ relativ unvermittelt 
nebeinander stehen […].” (Hacke/Pohlig 2008: 7). This is simply another way of phrasing what 
Evans calls the “dialogue of deaf”	 61 of Historians with theoreticians and philosophers of 
History (Evans 2000: 11).  																																																								61	Peter	Burke	uses	 this	 very	 same	expression	 for	describing	 the	 relation	of	History	 and	Social	Theory	(Burke	1992:	2–3).	The	 fact	 that	he	does	 it	 by	quoting	Fernand	Braudel	betrays	 the	 affinity	of	 thought	concerning	the	treatment	of	this	question	on	the	part	of	professional	Historians.	
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This state of affairs is, of course, not at all new, nor have its effects not been regularly 
addressed. Braudel’s aforementioned remark on the “unstructured” character of History as 
social science, Koselleck’s complaint about the “Theoriebedürftigtkeit der 
Geschichtswissenschaft” (Koselleck 2000: 298-316) or Jenkin’s emphasis on “history’s 
epistemological fragility” (Jenkins 2003: 13) are only three of many examples that could have 
be chosen to illustrate this point.  
The most interesting thing in this wrangle between professional Historians and theoreticians 
of History is that apparently there is no doubt about the separation between History and 
History Theory with regard to epistemological concerns: since, as is commonly argued, solely 
the latter is situated at “metatheoretical level” (Rüsen 1983: 13; Cardoso 2005: 152), no 
further discussion about the epistemological status of each field seems to be needed. 
As a mere theoretical exercise, one could imagine that the relationship of History to its theory 
is not as plain and uncomplicated as this idea of a clear epistemological distance and relative 
disciplinary autonomy may suggest. Indeed, can it not be, that this relationship is as intricate 
as that, for example, of art with philosophy? And, “since it is far from plain that we can 
separate art from philosophy, inasmuch as its substance is in part constituted by what it is 
philosophically believed to be” (Danto [1986] 2005: 5), might it not be also far from plain that 
History and History Theory can be neatly disjointed, inasmuch as the substance of historical 
accounts is in part constituted by what they are theoretically believed to be? 
Sometimes it is not only what they are “believed to be”, but what they conspicuously intend 
to be, for there are plenty of History books in which meta-theoretical questions are discussed 
openly and at length. Moreover, given that every historiographical work forcefully accounts 
for the Historiography of its common subject, it is hard to escape meta-theoretical issues 
completely, for this task consist at least partially in an assessment of different epistemological 
approaches to the same (or similar) subject-matter.  
Rather than a “dialogue of deaf”, is it not possible that the relationship between History and 
History Theory resembles much more a dialog in which all participants have been listening so 
attentively to each other that many historiographical works function as direct answers to 
questions posed at “pure” meta-theoretical level? If yes, from where does it come then, that 
certainty of sharp separation, which, by the way, both sides more often than not boast about? 
Those bookstores’ shelves, where the presumably best of the academic production ends up, 
provide the first clue about the reasons why History has been seen as a business that can be 
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alive and kicking without becoming significantly entangled in meta-theoretical matters: the 
absence of History Theory sections may be seen as a reflex of the fact that “History has been 
the most commonsensical of the human sciences, the most resistant to formalization, the 
most persistently committed to the simple task of telling what happened and telling it 
straight.” (Kellner 1995: 9) That is why “naïve realism”, in spite of the contradiction that it 
entails62, may be seen as an appropriate designation for the kind of necessary epistemological 
and moral stance on whatever event happens to be narrated as History.  
Yet even here, naïveness does not imply a deliberated renunciation or rejection of any means 
of presentation for the sake of protecting the authenticity of whatever is supposed to be 
represented; quite the contrary, it opens up the possibility of exploring any means - no matter 
how artificial or sophisticated they may be - meaningfully justified as useful for the task of 
giving an even straighter account of what actually happened. 
This unavoidably realistic premise of the construction of historical knowledge is what allows 
for the possibility of drawing a picture of History as a Bildungsroman, the plot of which being 
similar to that Hegelian story told by Danto about art.  
In this story, Theory of History instead of being considered, as customarily, as a field of 
knowledge relatively independent from History, will be taken as History’s consciousness in its 




Leopold von Ranke, credited with making the most decisive contributions to the process of 
establishing History as a separate academic discipline independent from philosophy and 
literature, marks with his famous “wie es eigentlich gewesen” the starting point of this story, 
the point that would correspond to the mimesis paradigm in art. Underlying this conception 
of History is the belief that the past can be scientifically reconstructed in such a way that the 
																																																								62	Kellner	argues	that	“in	historical	matters,	where	realism	is	taken	as	the	hallmark	of	responsible	judgment,	and	utopianism	a	dangerous	weakness,	the	expression	‘naïve	realist’	seems	not	only	patronizing,	but	also	self-contradictory.	To	be	a	realist	 is	not	to	be	naïve;	to	be	naïve	is	not	to	be	a	realist.	And	yet,	when	we	commit	 ourselves	 to	 historical	 labour,	 there	 it	 is,	 whether	 we	 are	 reporting	 on	 a	 holiday	 in	 Egypt	 or	describing	modern	historiographical	thought.	We	are	talking	about	something,	and	that	something	was	real.”	(Kellner	1995:	10	–	italics	in	the	original)	
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representation of it somehow matches an original: “it wants only to show what actually 
happened.” (Evans 2000: 17) 
As well as progress in art as mimesis was “generally appreciated in terms of an imperative to 
replace inference to perceptual reality wherever possible, with something equivalent to what 
perceptual reality itself would present” (Danto [1986] 2005: 88), progress in History as science 
was appreciated in terms of an imperative to replace inferential factual reality whenever 
possible with sources which stand for facts that, consequently, must no longer be inferred. 
Thus, the rules of perspective are, for the artist who wants to satisfy the eye eager for mimesis, 
analogous to the rule of the scientific method for the Historian who wants to meet the 
exigencies of the mimetic historical understanding.  
An early attempt to systematize the historical method that can be seen as marking the heyday 
of this kind of historical understanding in the French scholarship is the famous Introduction 
aux études historiques (1897) by Langlois and Seignobos, who remarked that “When all the 
documents are known, and have gone through the operations which fit them for use, the work 
of critical scholarship will be finished. In the case of some ancient periods, for which 
documents are rare, we can see that in a generation or two it will be time to stop.” (Evans 
2000: 21) 
Echoes of this understanding of History can still be heard today when the familiar idea of 
“filling the gap in historical knowledge” is given as a rationale for conducting a research on a 
small, or unexplored, subject. In spite of that, no Historian would nowadays dare to assert to 
have written, or to entertain the intention to write, the History that fills the final gap and, in 
this sense, that represents the definitive end point of any subject matter.  
This is so because there is no longer any doubt that the same document can be legitimately 
used as evidence for a variety of different histories; also, the History of the same general 
subject can be written on the basis of different sets of documental evidence. Finally, there is 
equally no doubt about the impossibility of stopping the proliferation of new historical 
interpretations, for “it is obvious that our way of reading a source derives principally from our 
present-day concerns and from the questions that present-day theories and ideas lead us to 
formulate” (Evans 2000: 84).  
To be sure, all that was already obvious since the very beginning of the institutionalization of 
Historiography as an academic discipline. Ranke and the many generations of Rankean 
Historians, who often used to be more Rankean than Ranke himself (Burke 1992: 5; Evans 
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2000: 23), simply believed it to be possible to bypass the epistemological difficulty posed by 
living in the present, so that their written representation of the past could be done on 
positivist principles similar to those of the natural sciences (Mandelbaum 1977: 47-49).  
In the first half of the 20th Century, having already digested developments such as Windelband 
and Rickert’s distinction between idiographic/individualizing sciences and 
nomothetic/generalizing ones, as well as Weber’s re-conceptualization of the notion of 
objectivity in social sciences (Jordan 2009: 74; Weber [1904] 1988: 146-214), the 
historiographical milieu would begin experiencing some serious scepticism about the 
possibilities of transforming History into a “hard science”. Symptomatically, the leading role 
in this new interpretation of History would be given to the present time: Marc Bloch, co-
founder of the Annales School, which was a direct reply to historiography a la Langlois & 
Seignobos, advances his “regressive method”; Croce coins the famous phrase: “All history is 
contemporary history”; Walter Benjamin speaks of “Jetztzeit”; Collingwood defines History in 
terms of a “re-enactment of the past”. In all these views, subjectivity was lurking behind the 
scientific objective pretentions of History.  
Evans reconstructs an episode that illustrates clearly the change of attitude that culminates in 
this “return to the present time”, characteristic of the works by Bloch, Croce, Benjamin and 
Collingwood.  
“In 1903, in a famous inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History in Cambridge, 
J.B. Bury declared: ‘History is a science, no less no more.” Twenty-six-year-old George 
Macaulay Trevelyan, who was to be appointed to the Regius Chair when Bury died in 1927, 
was one member of the audience at that lecture (Evans 2000: 23-25). In an essay written as a 
polemical answer to Bury, Trevelyan argues that 
“If History were merely a ‘chronicle of bare facts arranged on scientific principles’, then 
‘literature, emotion and speculative thought would be banished from the human’s race 
contemplation of its own past. […] History, said Trevelyan, was a mixture of the scientific 
(research), the imaginative or speculative (interpretation) and the literary (presentation).” 
(Evans 2000: 24; Stern 1973: 227-245) 
 
When, more than a half century later, E. H. Carr, also an ex-student of Cambridge, declares 
keen and peremptorily that “History means interpretation” (Carr [1961] 2001: 18), 
presumably, it could be expected that there were no longer reasons for big upheavals. A happy 
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illusion63. However, Carr’s provocative and witty play on words, according to which History is 
not a hard core facts surrounded by a pulp of disputable interpretations, but rather a hard 
core of interpretation, surrounded by a pulp of disputable facts (Carr [1961] 2001: 18), came 
to be taken more seriously than Carr himself perhaps desired. 
 
Expression 
In much the same way in which it was possible to draw a parallel between the Rankean 
understanding of History as upright science and the Mimesis Theory of Art, it is now possible 
to compare the subsequent idea of “History as interpretation” and the Expression Theory of 
Art.  
Danto points out that the great merit of the Expression Theory of Art was that it seemed to 
have maintained what has been a brooding question since Plato – namely, “What is Art?”- at 
the centre of attention. Every art movement raised this question afresh 
“And it began to seem as though the whole main point of art in our century was to pursue the 
question of its own identity while rejecting all available answers as insufficiently general. It 
was as though, to paraphrase a famous formula of Kant, art were something conceptuable 
without satisfying any specific concept.” (Danto [1986] 2005: 109) 
 
These two points concerning the notion of Art as Expression, namely, the potentially seminal 
and simultaneously non-conceptuable character of artworks can be recast in the discussion 
on History as interpretation.  
In regard to the first point, the gradual prominence of interpretation as being the core of 
historical knowledge enables every historical inquiry to raise afresh the question about the 
History of a particular subject64, no matter how many times this subject had been scholarly 
examined before. As a rule, the task to be performed by historiographical works that intend 
																																																								63	 On	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 status	 of	 History	 around	 the	 sixties	 see,	 for	 example,	 Popper’s	The	 poverty	 of	
Historicism	(Popper	[1957]	2002)	and	Isaiah	Berlin’s	The	concept	of	scientific	history	(Berlin	1966).		64	See,	for	example,	how	Sydney	Chalhoub	and	Jacob	Gorender,	relying	upon	the	same	documental	corpus	(the	writing	of	a	foreign	traveller),	speak	in	diametrical	opposing	terms	about	the	thesis	on	the	thingfication	of	slavery	 in	Brazil.	 (Chalhoub	[1990]	2011:	32-98);	Gorender	(1978:	65).	Another	example	 is	 the	quite	famous	book	“Montaillou”	by	the	French	Historian	Emmanuel	Le	Roy	Ladurie.	Evans	writes:	“Emmanuel	Le	Roy	Ladurie	read	inquisitorial	reports	for	different	evidence	and	in	many	cases	different	facts	than	those	quarried	from	them	by	previous	writers.	While	they	had	been	interested	in	the	inquisition	itself,	Le	Roy	Ladurie	was	interested	in	using	the	incidental	details	the	heretics	revealed	about	their	everyday	lives	to	construct	an	intimate	portrait	of	human	relationship	and	human	existence	in	a	medieval	village.”	(Evans	2000:	84)		
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to play a paradigmatic role in their specific fields is to do that as deeply and extensively as 
possible.  
Whereas the Expression Theory of Art, explaining all art in a uniform way—i.e as the 
expression of feelings (Danto [1986] 2005: 108)—was appropriate to expose the potential 
innovative and seminal character of every artwork in terms of an uniqueness emanated from 
the individual subjectivity, individual subjective uniqueness as a criteria of judging 
historiographical works would downgrade History from the realm of the idiographic to that of 
the idiosyncratic. And this signals a death penalty for any form of knowledge that intends to 
achieve some degree of scientific validity.  
Concerning the second point, the emphasis on interpretation highlights an old epistemological 
problem that History shares with art: while permeated by concepts, and in this sense 
conceptualized and conceptuable, as a whole History could badly be subsumed under a 
unifying analytical category.  
The reason of failure of the Expression Theory of art is also akin to that of History as 
interpretation. Based chiefly on the psychology of emotions, the language and the analytical 
tools used by the Expression Theory of art seemed to be less and less adequate to account for 
the profusion and succession of art styles, genres and movements that pullulate frenetically 
along the 20th century (Danto [1986] 2005: 108-109).  
By 1964, when Warhol shows his Brillo Box at the Stable Gallery, it was definitely time to 
replace the Expression Theory of art with a kind of theoretical understanding that explains 
why art happened to become such a concatenation of novelties. And the reason for this 
theoretical urgency was quite simple. Heretofore, philosophy had kept itself outside of the 
artworld, addressing it from an “alienating distance”. Or, in the words of Barnet Newman: 
“Aesthetics is for art what ornithology is for the birds.” (Danto [1986] 2005: xxiv). But now, 
when works of art had become exactly like the most ordinary objects of everyday life, sharing 
together all sensory qualities, so that no one could tell them apart on the basis of the senses 
alone, the question “What is art?” had been put in a form that necessarily requires 
philosophical explanation. It was as though art, being finished with its task, was desperately 
beckoning to philosophy to articulate its relationship to the world. As Danto concludes, 
repharasing Hegel: “Philosophy makes its appearance just when it is too late for anything but 
understanding.” (Danto [1986] 2005: xxiv-xxv; 17) 
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The proper philosophical understanding required by this artworld happened to be, as Danto 
jocosely states, his own postmodern philosophical view on art: a celebration of the openness 
that comes after the end of a long history of evolution. 
The conception of History as being fundamentally interpretation heralded postmodern 
positions, for the logical consequence of the former is to see the History of everything as an 
ensemble of Historical interpretations that are either mutually exclusive, due to the 
incommensurability of their respective approaches, or that can be neatly juxtaposed, if they 
cast light on different facets of a shared subject. As well as expression in art, interpretation in 
History left no room for a theoretical understanding that could account for such a diversity. 
Attempts to regain positivist terrain, as that made by the so-called “cliometricians”, were 
attacked immediately by their fellow-Historians for, among other reasons, “over-
interpretation” of sources (Evans 2000: 41). 
By the 1960s, what prevented the understanding of History as interpretation from being 
frankly postmodern was its way of conceiving causation. Carr, for example, who writes, also 
here keen and peremptorily, that “The study of history is a study of causes.” (Carr [1961] 2001: 
81), declares without any reluctance that these causes must be rational ones, because only 
from “that part which he [the Historian] recognizes as amenable to rational explanation and 
interpretation” can he “draw(s) conclusions which may serve as a guide to action.” (Carr 
[1961] 2001: 98) 
In order to illustrate how simple is to find reasons of this nature, he makes up a story:  
“Jones, returning from a party at which he has consumed more than his usual ration of alcohol, 
in a car whose brakes turn out to be defective, at a blind corner where visibility is notoriously 
poor, knocks down and killed Mr. Robinson, who was crossing the road to buy cigarettes at 
the shop on the corner. After the mess has been cleared up, we meet—say, at local police 
headquarters—to enquire into the causes of the occurrence. Was it due to the driver’s semi-
intoxicated condition—in which case there might be a criminal prosecution? Or was it due to 
the defective breaks—in which case something might be said to the garage which overhauled 
the car only a week before? Or was it due to the blind corner—in which case the road 
authorities might be invited to give the matter their attention?” (Carr [1961] 2001: 98) 
 
Carr argues that to say that “Mr Robinson was killed because the driver was drunk, or because 
the brakes did not work, or because there was a blind corner on the road […] will seem a 
perfectly sensible and rational explanation”. On the other hand, to say that he was killed 
because of his desire for cigarettes, while real, true and logical, would not be of “historical 
	 69	
significance”65. Why not? Because it makes no sense as a general proposition to say that 
“people get run over and killed on the roads because they smoke cigarettes”. That means: 
based on the variable “smoking cigarettes”, which is indeed an indisputable fact of the story, 
the relationship that can be established in order to explain the incident is so contingent that 
it cannot be used as a “guide to action” (Carr [1961] 2001: 81-102). 
This story has been revisited by other authors.66 Evans, wondering if Carr was really saying 
that accidental causes should be completely ruled out (or suppressed) just because they could 
not serve neither one’s purposes in the present nor interests of present-day ideology, 
answers:  
“It is hard to escape the conclusion that Carr did not really think his argument through. Nor, in 
the end, was the example of Mr Jones and Mr Robinson particularly well chosen. For historical 
explanation is not just about finding causes for discrete events like car crashes and world wars. 
Historians are just interested in what events or processes decide, and what they mean, as in 
what causes them. Consequences are often more important than causes.” (Evans 2000: 135) 
 
It is equally hard to escape the conclusion that Evans also did not really think his critic through. 
To begin with, to what extent “car crashes” and “world wars” can both be equalized as being 
“discrete events”? This approximation, as exposed by Evans, bare of any additional 
explanation, is disparate to a degree that dispenses further discussion. Moreover, in affirming 
that Historians are interested not only in causes, but also in what “events or processes decide, 
and what they mean”, he is only paraphrasing what Carr had previously said about the 
importance of History as a “guide”, as well as that historicizing “means” interpreting, i.e. to 
assign meanings to events. Finally, even if consequences often happen to be more important 
than their causes, the only way to ascertain that this is really the case is by revealing the 
cause(s) of whatever be under examination. For if the causes remain hidden, the 
consequences would logically not be seen as such. Thus, the decision to define whether the 
causes or the consequences are the most important element, may ultimately be, as Carr never 
tires of repeating, a matter of interpretation. 																																																								65	Carr	draws	his	idea	of	“historical	significance”	from	Talcott	Parsons:	“To	borrow	Talcott	Parsons’	phrase	once	more,	history	is	a	‘selective	system	‘	not	only	of	cognitive,	but	of	causal	orientations	to	reality.	Just	as	from	the	infinite	ocean	of	facts	the	Historian	selects	those	which	are	significant	for	his	purpose,	so	from	the	multiplicity	 of	 sequences	 of	 cause	 and	 effect	 he	 extracts	 those,	 and	 only	 those,	 which	 are	 historically	significant;	and	the	standard	of	historical	significance	is	his	ability	to	fit	them	into	his	pattern	of	rational	explanation	and	interpretation.”	(Carr	[1961]	2001;	99)	66	From	a	frankly	US-American	multiculturalist	perspective,	Appleby,	Hunt	and	Jacob	ask	whether	“doesn’t	any	analysis	of	this	case	depend	on	whether	Mr.	Robinson	and	Mr.	Jones	were	white	or	black,	homosexual	or	heterosexual	(perhaps	one	of	them	was	on	his	way	to	a	gay	bar	and	was	preoccupied),	or	even	accident-prone	or	rock-steady?”	(Appleby	et	al.	1994:	304)		
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In the end, the affinities between Evan’s Defense of History- a reply to postmodernist critique 
of academic historical knowledge-, and Carr’s What is History- an adumbration of the kind of 
relativistic stance on History that postmodernism would radicalize-, are as strong as the 
similarity between the table of contents of both works may suggest: Evans entitles four (of 
eight) chapters of his book with the very same titles that Carr had already used in What is 
History.  
This is, of course, not at all coincidence67, but, evidently, no more than a formal curiosity that 
solely says something substantial about what relates so intimately both authors. A brief 
analysis of two passages of Evans’ book shall help to make this point clearer.  
In the following two passages, Evans criticizes what he would perhaps characterize as 
postmodern epistemological excesses: in the first, his target is the sharp distinction between 
the subject of historical knowledge (the past) and the written academic representation 
thereof (History); in the second, the idea that time disappears in History. 
 Passage one:  
“Some writers have claimed that it is impossible for Historians to enable the past to ‘speak for 
itself’ because if the past were to express itself it would have to re-enact itself. This assertion 
would seem to depend on the belief that when you or I think we are expressing ourselves in 
speech or writing, we are not really doing so at all, but producing an arbitrary set of words 
with no determinate relationship to ourselves at all. However, even if we develop, perhaps 
even ‘re-invent’ our identity during our lifetime, and even if we have not an unitary self but an 
identity that is multifaceted […] We do in fact invest our words with meanings which have a 
real relationship to our own life and our own experience. Life would be very difficult for us 
indeed if we did not. 
Language and grammar are in fact not completely arbitrary signifiers, but have evolved 
through contact with the real world in an attempt to name real things. In a similar way, 
historical discourse or interpretation has also evolved through contact with the real world in 
an attempt to reconstruct it.” (Evans 2000: 112) 
  
Passage two: 
“In the end, therefore, time does pass, a fact we experience only too painfully in the process 
of human ageing to which we all are subject ourselves, and we cannot abolish it by simply 
declaring, as Ankersmit does, that there is no difference between the Fourteenth Century and 
the Twentieth, or that time is merely a collection of unrelated presents, or that textuality of 
the world abolishes the principle of cause and effect.” (Evans 2000: 157) 
 
The task now is not to assess whether or to what extent Evans is right in his critique of 
postmodernism. These passages were transcribed with the only purpose of giving two clear 
																																																								67	Evans	wrote	the	introduction	for	an	edition	of	Carr’s	“What	is	History?”	released	in	2001.	
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examples of a theoretical expedient that Evans frequently resorts to and which could be 
rightly denominated “anthropomorfization of History”. 
There is no doubt that people invest their words with meanings which have a real relationship 
to their life and their own experience. Equally indisputable is the fact that people age. The 
unassailability of these assertions rested evidently on two general properties: unity and 
continuity. Indeed, before becoming properly human every human being is certainly a 
material being, an organic body that naturally tends to remain living as long as possible.  
Among the many metaphors one can use to make sense of History, the biological ones are 
perhaps the most misleading. In diametrical opposition to what Evans says, the relation 
between “language” and “real things” and “historical discourse or interpretation” and “the 
real world” does not at all evolve in a “similar way”. On the contrary, they are, and have 
evolved, in fundamentally distinct ways because of the elementary fact that what Historians 
try to reconstruct is not the “real world”, but exactly the world that is, of course, no longer 
“real”, in the very sense that it not “actual”.  
In regard to the question concerning time (second passage), conceding that the 14th Century 
was quite different to the present day, and taking the principle of cause and effect as axiom, 
it is nonetheless to ask: to what extent do these assumptions allow one to think that historical 
processes “age” like human beings do? Do they die too? Do they have a childhood? “Time 
does pass”, but the awkwardness of these questions indicates again how misleading biological 
metaphors might be when used to explain what History is.  
Playing a little with the inappropriateness of such metaphors, one could say that to accept 
Evans’ approximations between History and his hypothetical “we” is the same as to believe 
that the relation of someone with a good old friend is “similar” to the relation of this same 
person with a good old dead friend! Life would be very difficult indeed if it were like that.  
Coming back to Carr now, he admits that what Historians do when they address their subjects 
based on evidential inferences of cause-effect relations  
“may shock philosophers, and even some Historians. But it is perfectly familiar to ordinary 
people going about the practical business of life. […] We had no difficulty in recognizing that 
some of the causes were rational and ‘real’ and that others were irrational and accidental. But 
by what criterion did we make the distinction? The faculty of reason is normally exercised for 
some purpose. Intellectuals may sometimes reason, or think that they reason, for fun. But, 
broadly speaking, human beings reason to an end.” (Carr [1961] 2001: 100) 
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Continuing his criticism of Carr, Evans disagrees that Historians operate this “kind of common-
sense approach to explanation”. He argues that such a claim does not really do justice to the 
amplitude and diversity of today´s historical scholarship, which explores many ways of 
accounting for their subject-matter, including those that rigorously refuse to put forward 
causal effects or any overarching thesis. (Evans 2000: 137) Evans surely has a point here. 
However, a more careful analysis evinces that there is not even a shadow of epistemological 
discordance between Evans and Carr. Evan’s whole idea of History rests on the belief that if 
Historians are “very scrupulous, and careful and self-critical” in their observation of the “rules 
of evidence” they may be able to write good History, which means a reconstruction of past 
reality that will not be objective in an absolute sense, but will be “objective enough in most 
normal senses of the world”, since it does not wilfully distort or manipulate the evidence. In 
this sense, such a historical reconstruction, certainly not being objective, would be 
nevertheless true. (Evans 2000: 224–253 – emphasis added) 
Paraphrasing Carr, this simplicity may shock philosophers or others social scientists, but is 
perfectly familiar to ordinary Historians going about the practical business of researching their 
sources. How far are Evans’ words from meaning that “true” Historical knowledge would seem 
to the “ordinary man” as “perfectly sensible and rational”? 
In the end, by means of that anthropomorfization of historical processes added to his 
confidence in a fair reason guided by evidential inference, Evans himself “operates a kind of 
common-sense approach to explanation” about the construction of historiographical 
knowledge that is very similar to that produced, according to Carr, by Historical accounts 
themselves.  
Meanwhile, the “reason” for this congruence between Evan’s and Carr’s thoughts is obvious: 
both author share a remarkable faith in the ultimate power of … reason. 
This faith is not undeserved. Reasoning on the basis of evidential inferences, which, generally 
speaking, implies to leap from clues that can be observed to a complex reality which directly 
can not, seems to be so quintessential that Ginzburg, underpinning what came to be known 
as “evidential paradigm”, puts it down as being originated by hunters in the dawn of 
civilization, in a process that would culminate in the very invention of writing:  
“Perhaps indeed the idea of a narrative sequence, as opposed to spell or exorcism or 
invocation, originated in a hunting society, from the experience of interpreting tracks. […] The 
hunter could have been the first ‘to tell a story’, because only hunters knew how to read a 
coherent sequence of events from the silent (though not imperceptible) signs left by their 
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prey. This ‘deciphering’ and ‘reading’ of the animals’ tracks is metaphorical. But it is worth 
trying to understand it literally, as the verbal distillation of a historical process leading, through 
across a very long time-span, towards the invention of writing.” (Ginzburg 1980: 13) 
 
Ginzburg’s aim in advancing this explanation was to approach the borderline between natural 
sciences and human sciences from a perspective that might help one to go “beyond the sterile 
contrast of ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’” by postulating a kind of universal form of knowledge, 
which “exists everywhere in the world, without geographic, historical, ethic, gender or class 
exception.” (Ginzburg 1980: 29) 
Ginzburg’s attempt to effect a friendly reconciliation between empiricism and narrative by 
grounding the latter in an ontological type of the former is praiseworthy and shrewd, but it 
cuts a poor figure next to the epistemological vigour of those approaches concerned with 
blurring sharp distinctions between subject and object of knowledge: in the guise of Foucault’s 
discourse analysis, Derrida’s deconstruction, Kuhn’s paradigm of scientific revolutions, 
Austin’s speech acts or Danto’s concept of narration, a broad range of highly influential works 
attack from many different fronts what could be denominated, thinking of Quine, as the 
“dogmas of empiricism” (Quine 1951: 20–43).  
These foundational concepts (and many others of a similar nature) have been modelling a so-
called postmodernism in History. Simplifying to the extreme, the postmodern perspective in 
History might be defined as advocating that historical texts are something to be looked at, not 
to be looked through; they shall be discussed primarily not in terms of the reality that they 
aim at representing, but in terms of the representation that they themselves are (Kellner 
1995: 1–17). This pre-eminence of the level of representation over the level of whatever might 
be represented entails the claim of a relatively high degree of autonomy of theory and 
language with regard to empirical evidence.  
One of the most influential theoretical offspring of postmodern thought argues that “the 
postmodern condition” is characterized by the “incredulity towards metanarratives”. 
Postmodern lenses are supposed to reveal the real face of modern History, to unmask it as 
being representations whose scientific validity has been grounded in evolutionist 
philosophical discourse that legitimate themselves appealing explicitly to some “grand 
narrative such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutic of meaning, the emancipation of the 
rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth.” (Lyotard 1984: xxiv). 
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In fact, postmodernism in art, which, embodied in Warhol’s Brillo Box, seemed to have marked 
the moment from which on there would still be histories to be told about art, yet without any 
single metanarrative to guide them: History of Art would then sunder into a sequence of 
individual acts, one after another (Danto 1998: 140; [1986] 2005: 103).  
Similarly, postmodernism in History, releasing historical knowledge not only from the 
empiricist creed, but also from the ontologically evolutionist reason of metanarratives, would 
usher in an era of radical historical openness, where a boundless juxtaposition of equally 
legitimate historical accounts would arise, and there would be no reason to rule out 
irrevocably any of them. 
A postmodern approach to art, like Danto’s one, glosses upon the theoretical consequences 
of considering the possibility of identity between the subject and object of artistic 
representation, and this at a stage in which art had became something “which depends more 
and more upon theory for its existence as art, so that theory is not something external to a 
world it seeks to understand, so that in understanding its object it has understood itself.” 
(Danto [1986] 2005: 111) 
Thus, it may be accepted that postmodern art and its corresponding theoretical explanation 
means the closing chapter of art’s Bildungsroman, a narrative that began with art’s first 
modern inquiries into its own nature, and evolved until it ended with the achievement of a 
kind of Hegelian self-realization through self-knowledge, for the object in which the artwork 
consists turns out to be “so irradiated by theoretical consciousness that the division between 
object and subject is all but overcome, and it little matters whether art is philosophy in action 
or philosophy is art in thought.” If “The End of History” coincides with the advent of Absolute 
Knowledge- a knowledge that admits no gap between knowledge and its object, or a 
knowledge as being its own object, hence subject and object at once- then art “ends with the 
advent of its own philosophy” (Danto [1986] 2005: 111–113).  
Postmodern theory in History, in turn, may be presented in precisely opposing terms: it 
glosses upon the theoretical consequences of ruling out the possibility of identity between 
represented subject and object of historical representation, and this at a stage in which 
History had remained something which does not at all depend upon such theories in order to 
be understood as History! In this sense, theory only accentuates its externality with regard to 
what it seeks to understand to a degree that it appears to be not an exercise in Hegelian self-
knowledge, but in self-alienation: the creation of a wider and wider gap between subject and 
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object of knowledge! If all that is true, then postmodernism cannot at all be the closing 
chapter of this History’s Hegelian Bildungsroman. 
The not especially surprising fact that the “crisis of metanarratives” turned out to be itself 
integral to the metanarrative it attempted to attack, was rather a consequence than a cause 
of the failure of postmodernism in guiding History to that Hegelian moment of self-knowledge. 
The most striking postmodern theoretical achievement was, in fact, to establish that 
concerning History there is no room for any meta-level that might escape from being promptly 
narrative. This means to make of narrativity some kind of transcendent condition of possibility 
of historical knowledge (Danto [1965] 2007: 389–392; Baumgartner 1997: 301–311).  
Thus, whereas, as Danto argues, art fulfills itself by gradually becoming philosophy, History 
does the same by remaining always narration, no matter how thick the layer of theory one 
coats it with may be.  
It is Hannah Arendt who remarks that “Theoria, or ‘contemplation’”, is the word given to the 
experience of the eternal, as distinguished from all other attitudes, which at most pertain to 
immortality.” And immortality, she continues, had originally been the spring and center of the 
vita activa, which was the standard translation of the bios politikos and, not at all by accident, 
the traditional theoretical counterpart of vita contemplativa (or theoria) (Arendt [1958] 1998: 
7–21).  
In Arendt’s sense, a Hegelian narration of any historical experience supposed to be so 
“irradiated by theoretical consciousness” that it could present itself as having actually 
happened theoretically should be considered a contradiction beyond the dialectic’s power of 
salvation. It would indeed mean somehow “the narration of the eternal” and, consequently, 
would not admit anything that might be designated either as historical or as political. 
It may appear implausible, but fact is that such a kind of “theoretical narration” has been 
practiced in History departments in most, if not all, universities around the world.  
 
Reflection 
Chakrabarty formulates this problematic of the “theoretical narration” as follows: 
“[I]nsofar as the academic discourse of history—that is, history as discourse produced at the 
institutional site of the university—is concerned, Europe remains the sovereign theoretical 
subject of all histories, including the ones we call ‘Indian’, ‘Chinese’ or ‘Kenyan’, and so on. 
There is a peculiar way in which all these other histories tend to become variations of a master 
narrative that could be called “the history of Europe”. […] Only Europe, the argument would 
appear to be, is theoretically (i.e. at the level of the fundamental categories that shape 
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historical thinking) knowable; all other stories are matters of empirical research that fleshes 
out a theoretical skeleton which is substantially Europe”. (Chakrabarty 1992: 1–3) 
 
Before continuing with this discussion, it is important to clarify in which way this postcolonial 
instance on History differs from the afore-discussed postmodern one.  
The most manifest feature of postcolonial thinking is its concern with articulating 
epistemologically subaltern subject-positions (no wonder then that one of the most-
celebrated postcolonial works bear the question-title “Can the Subaltern speak?”).  
Subalternity and power asymmetries are issues that have not been overlooked in postmodern 
discussions about History. In “Re-Thinking History”, a well-known introduction to postmodern 
History, Keith Jenkins contends that a proper definition of History requires one to grasp the 
question “What is History?”, thus entailing another unavoidable one: “Whom is history 
for?”(Jenkins 2003: 31). To some degree, it is essentially this last question that inspires 
postmodern approaches, for example, in Feminist, Black, and Queer History. What emerges 
as a result from such inquiries are histories of the guises of the oppression and the myriad 
strategies of resistance (Purkiss 1997: Love 2009; Lopes [2002] 2011).  
However, the postcolonial insistence on addressing the question of power relations from the 
perspective of an epistemological geopolitics of knowledge, which Said’s masterpiece 
Orientalism (1978) is a prototype of, means a major further development that helps to 
understand another key aspect of the postcolonial thought, namely, the deconstruction of 
essentialisms (Costa 2006: 117–118). 
Deconstructionist purposes demand that also postcolonial theory looks at instead of through 
the historical text. Differently from postmodern approaches, the postcolonial view does not 
invest too much energy in discussing whether “the past and history are different things” 
(Jenkins 2003: 7) or what sort of relativism or pluralism should follow from the fact that they 
[History and Past] happen to be justly the same, since representation (in all its forms) is 
ultimately the only possible form of the past.  
A proper understanding of the postcolonial epistemological contribution to Theory of History 
requires a more precise analysis of the way in which postcolonial theory “looks at the 
historical text”. The concept of translation, a topic to which postcolonial thinkers have been 
paid critical and unrelenting attention, will play a crucial role here. 
Writing may not offer room for the kind of transformation of representational possibilities 
that in visual art have been caused by technological advances of the media, but if there is 
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something capable of transforming texts without losing sight of the significance of its 
representational possibilities, this “something” is translation.  
Paul Veyne once remarked somehow roughly that Historians would never be capable of being 
positivists, even if they wanted to, for they cannot even pronounce words like “war” and “city” 
without founding them in some theory (Veyne 1983: 3). If it is true that Historians cannot 
bypass the theoretical-sociological content of everyday words such as “war” and “city”, then 
certainly they are also not able to avoid assigning this same kind of meaning to words like 
“citizenship”, “the state”, “the individual” or “the society” and “the political”, which are words 
even more conceptually loaded. 
“It goes without saying” that the social world is “unthinkable” without invoking these 
concepts, which operate together with innumerable other conceptual categories such as civil 
society, social justice, democracy, national/popular sovereignty, the distinction between 
private and public, the idea of subject/ subjectivity, of objectivity/science and scientific 
rationality, etc. “[T]hese and other related concepts found a climatic form in the course of the 
European Enlightenment […] and entail an unavoidable—and in a sense indispensable—
universal and secular vision of the human.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 4) 
The reader is presumably wondering for what reason “it goes without saying” and that 
“unthinkable” were written above in such a different form? “They must mean something 
else”, one is led to think, for the phrase is perfectly usual and would have probably gone 
unnoticed if it were normally written. But, what if there was no other hidden meaning thought 
to be hinted at by the writing difference? Further, assuming that this difference in writing does 
not intend to effect any change of the conventional understanding, which role may it then 
play? 
To solve this not too innocent riddle calls for an explanation that will clarify why it is justified 
to assert that the postcolonial uses of the concept of translation have far-reaching 
epistemological consequences in History.  
First, it shall be noted that, if postcolonial thinking aims at deconstructing the essentialism of 
the very binary opposition between, to borrow Hall’s terms, the “West” and the “Rest”, this 
task is supposed to be carried out not by attempting to divest the conceptual categories 
originally tailored in the writing of the Western History of their universal character and 
pretension, but quite the opposite, by taking it literally. With regard to the Marxism, 
Chakrabarty writes: 
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“Marx’s immanent critique of capital was enabled precisely by the universal characteristics he 
read into the category ‘capital’ itself. Without that reading, there can be only particular 
critiques of capital. But a particular critique cannot by definition be a critique of “capital”, for 
such could not take ‘capital’ as its object. Grasping the category ‘capital’ entails grasping its 
universal constitution.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 70)	 
 
Therefore, Chakrabarty concludes, his “reading of Marx does not in any way obviate that need 
for engagement with the universal.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 70) 
The question brought up by these words is quite evident: How to take up such a stance 
without by the same token performing ‘the universality of European History’, a gesture that 
would contradict the very intention to deconstruct Europe as implicit “subject of all histories”? 
The answer is no less evident: one must decouple “Europe” from the theoretical categories 
stemmed from its own historical narration; “by definition” an explanation applicable only to 
a particular case is not at all theoretical. 
Thus, the History of Europe, in what concerns its relationship to the universals, becomes 
simply “another particular”, as particular as the Indian or Brazilian ones. With this analytical 
gesture Chakrabarty paradoxically signals that the postcolonial historiographical project of 
“provincializing Europe” is not a “call for cultural relativism or for atavistic, nativist histories.” 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 45) 
As a matter of fact, with the help of a “logical fable” of the History of capitalism in Europe, 
which is told to illustrate what Chakrabarty calls the “Two Histories of Capital”, he intends to 
show how one may handle universals displacing precisely European History. The “logical fable” 
needs not to be transcribed here. The logic thereof does. 
The “capital”, he asserts, has (at least) two histories. The first one, which he names History 1, 
is the History of “a past posited by capital itself as its precondition”: for established by capital, 
History 1 lends itself to the reproduction of the logic of capital. The second one consists in the 
History of all those things that capital encounters as antecedents, “but not as antecedents 
established by itself, not as form of its own life-process”. Not belonging to capital’s life 
process, they do not contribute to the self-reproduction of capital”. This is the capital’s History 
2. (Chakrabarty 2000: 63–64) 
If one conceives History 2 as constituting the “dialectical Other of the necessary logical of 
History 1”, one would be forced to subsume History 2 to History 1, and in doing so, would 
write anything but another version of the usual narratives of transition to the capitalist mode 
	 79	
of production. “History 2 is better thought of as a category charged with the function of 
constantly interrupting the totalizing thrusts of History 1.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 66) 
According to Chakrabarty, in order to write History by making ordinary use of the explicatory 
power of the universal but neutralizing its homogenizing effects, they have to be conceived as 
a “place holder, its places always usurped by a historical particular seeking to present itself as 
the universal.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 70) 
In principle then, every Historical account—disregarding who has the agency in it—written in 
compliance with the rules reigning in this institution that not fortuitously carries the name 
“University”, is forcefully “usurping” that place. It follows that all Histories could be thought 
of as equal in what concerns their theoretical potentialities. 
If Chakrabarty’s argument restricted itself in making these claims, it would not be especially 
innovative. Indeed, one does not need to read postcolonial theory to learn that the internal 
force of every abstract category meant to bear a universal character emanates from its 
capacity to dissociate (not only) that which concretely cannot be dissociated, but substantiate 
itself from its original subject of inquiry. Due to this very property of hypostasizing itself by 
means of its capacity to split the wholeness of the concrete, every theory also presupposes its 
own degree of inadequateness, or rather, of adequateness measured according to its own 
criteria. Therefore, when Chakrabarty says that “European thought is at once both 
indispensable and inadequate in helping us to think through the experiences of political 
modernity in non-Western nations” (Chakrabarty 2000: 16), one may reply that European 
thought, when taken in the abstract sense that it arrogates to itself, intends to be anything 
but “indispensable and inadequate” regardless of where its subject matter happens to be 
found or placed. 
This is one of the main reasons why “the project of provincializing Europe must realize within 
itself its own impossibility.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 45) Another reason, which plays an even more 
crucial role in this failure, is what, following Walter Benjamin, Chakrabarty calls the empty 
time of History. 
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The time of History is empty  
“because it acts as a bottomless sack: any number of events can be put inside it; and it is 
homogeneous because it is not affected by any particular events; its existence is independent 
of such events and in a sense it exists prior to them. Events happen in time but time is not 
affected by them. The time of human history […] merges with the time of prehistory, of 
evolutionary and geological change that go back to then beginning of the universe. It is part of 
nature. […] The naturalism of historical time lies in the belief that everything can be 
historicized. So although the non-naturalness of the discipline of history is granted, the 
assumed universal applicability of its method entails the further assumption that it is always 
possible to assign people, places, and objects to naturally existing, continuous flow of historical 
time.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 73) 
 
But, to be sure, what is actually the big problem with the idea that “everything can be 
historicized”, and consequently, find its chronological location in the flow of a basically linear 
time?  
Evans remarks that such an understanding of time “continues to be used the world over by 
people both in the conduct of their everyday lives and in their preferences for, say, novels 
which narrate a story over novels which do not.” Historical time, he goes on, “is in essence a 
too powerful a principle to be dispensed with, even by those who reject it.” Evans is right. He 
is also right when he says that “any attempt to deny historical time necessarily presupposes 
the very thing it denies.” However, should all these correct observations allow him to conclude 
that “How we count the years—whether we use the Western calendar, or the Jewish, or the 
Chinese, or whatever—is completely irrelevant to this point?” Is Evans still right when he 
states that criticisms like Chakrabarty’s one “are confusing the Western hegemony implicit in 
the worldwide use of the Christian calendar with the culturally neutral, because universal, 
sequence of time which calendars are designed to count” (Evans 2000: 142)? 
What is at stake in the postcolonial critic of History’s time is evidently something far more 
complicated than the simple arithmetic task of calculating chronological correspondences 
between the Christian calendar and the Mayan or the Chinese ones. In any case, since Evans 
drops the matter, it seems to be fair to use it as a point of departure in order to contemplate 
the amplitude of the theoretical landscape in which this question is embedded.  
Calendars, Walter Benjamin stresses, “do not measure time as clocks; they are monuments of 
a historical consciousness” (Benjamin [1942] 2007: 262). And the very idea of historical 
consciousness constitutes, paraphrasing Habermas, the core of the philosophical discourse of 
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modernity68 (Habermas [1988] 2004: 9-34). This, namely, the “philosophical discourse of 
modernity” is what is at stake in the postmodern and postcolonial critic of History’s time. To 
reduce, as Evans does it, calendars (in general) to the task of counting time is an exemplary 
way of practicing this discourse, for employing this modern historical consciousness one can 
speak only of a world that, in Weber’s famous words, is already “disenchanted”. And the time 
of this disenchanted world strives to be the only one able to put into perspective not only all 
other possible conceptions of time, but truly everything.  
If it is like that, why not to say that this time is merely another one among the many universals 
that can be chosen from so-called Western thought? Actually, it is merely another universal. 
But no, it is not a simple one. It has a striking peculiarity.  
To see a category as universal is to see it as if it were completely separated from the content 
of concrete experience it was supposed to subsume. Universals are categories whose history 
was provisionally drained off, or, if you prefer a Foucauldian formulation, whose history “must 
remain in suspense”69. In Chakrabarty’s example, some Marxist concepts play this role as 
“History 1”. The problem with History’s time lies exactly in the apparent meaninglessness of 
the act of separating it from the events that it comprises. Time is there from the beginning, a 
perfect exteriority. 
In other words, and exploring further Chakrabarty’s exegesis of Marx’s work: whereas the 
evolutionism built into Marx’s analysis of capitalism can be weakened by means of the very 
process of taking its categories in the rigorously abstract sense Marx intended to give them, 
the same cannot be carried out with regard to the concept of time which these categories 
rested upon. Benjamin was pointing precisely at this problem when he observes that “the 
concept of the historical progress of mankind cannot be sundered from the concept of its 
progression through a homogenous, empty time. A critique of the concept of such a 
																																																								68	Symptomatically,	Jürgen	Osterhammel	stresses	that	his	“Die	Verwandlung	der	Welt	–	Eine	Geschichte	des	19.	Jahrhunderts”	(a	book	entitled	in	“calendric”	manner)	shares	the	same	general	attitude	of	Bayly’s	“The	Birth	of	the	Modern	World”.	As	such,	it	is	not	at	all	surprisingly	that	Osterhammel	admits	that	this	work	is	an	experiment	in	writing	a	“master	narrative”	(Osterhammel	2009:	13–22).	69	Foucault	speaks	of	“suspension”	as	a	way	“to	disconnect	unquestioned	continuities”	by	which	discourses	are	organized.	About	that,	he	writes	“These	pre-existing	forms	of	continuity,	all	these	syntheses	that	are	accepted	without	question,	must	remain	in	suspense.	They	must	not	be	rejected	definitively	of	course,	but	the	tranquillity	with	which	they	are	accepted	must	be	disturbed;	we	must	show	that	they	do	not	come	about	of	 themselves,	 but	 are	 always	 the	 result	 of	 a	 construction	 the	 rules	 of	which	must	 be	 known,	 and	 the	justifications	of	which	must	be	scrutinized:	we	must	define	in	what	conditions	and	in	view	of	which	analyses	certain	 of	 them	 are	 legitimate;	 and	 we	 must	 indicate	 which	 of	 them	 can	 never	 be	 accepted	 in	 any	circumstances.”	(Foucault	1972:	26)	
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progression must be the basis of any criticism of the concept of progress itself.” (Benjamin 
[1942] 2007: 261). In logical terms, the “empty time” functions here as a kind of most basic 
philosophical assumption, which must then be left undefined and untouched in order to hold 
the whole argument steady. 
Summarizing this analysis of Chakrabarty’s work so far: there is, on the one hand, the 
unavoidable universal role to be played by theoretical-sociological categories premised upon 
European History, and, on the other, among these categories, the pivotal role of one, namely, 
historical time. Together, they explain why the (postcolonial) project of provincializing Europe 
is unfeasible. 
One can imagine this epistemological postcolonial condition as posited on the other side of a 
mirror. Mirrors have that remarkable cognitive property of showing what people cannot see 
without them: themselves. They serve as instrument of self-revelation (Danto 1981: 9). As a 
mirror of the position from which universals have been constructed, postcolonial subjects of 
knowledge, by virtue of this mimetically mediated position, have a bit of an advantage in 
dealing with an age-old epistemological problem, namely: the impossibility of knowing that 
everything about a particular subject is known. That means, they are better equipped to bring 
out the existence of an unknown not amenable to be ruled out and to show that it is an 
important cog in the machine that starts knowledge’s moving. 
On the universal side of the mirror one thinks that even though absolute knowledge is 
unfeasible, that should not prevent one from pursuing it. On the other, the postcolonial one, 
and here rephrasing Chakrabarty’s aim, one thinks: “The project of provincializing Europe, that 
means, to disclose the unknown, is unfeasible, but that shall not only not prevent me from 
pursuing it, but also makes clear that that is exactly what drives the project forward.”  
The main epistemological operation one has to carry out in order to adopt this postcolonial 
standpoint is not as complex as the very impossibility of the “project of provincializing Europe” 
might suggest. It consists basically in thinking that universals exist only as such, but not at all 
in re, in particular things, for if they existed as forms inherent in things, as concrete universals, 
these universals must be regarded as the formal-final cause of things70.  
There are however plentiful ways of circumventing the metaphysical and teleological 
character of universals by denying that they exist in particular things. The specific one that 																																																								70	“The	formal	cause	consists	in	the	essence	or	nature	of	a	thing,	what	makes	it	the	thing	it	is,	and	the	final	cause	is	the	purpose	the	object	attempts	to	realize,	the	goal	of	its	development.”	(Ankersmit	2012:	23)	
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Chakrabarty resorts to is the concept of translation as theorized by Gayatri C. Spivak ([1993] 
2009) and by Vicente L. Rafael ([1988] 2005)71.  
In Chakrabarty’s hand this model of translation comprehends three moves: first, universals 
are conceived as the “third term expressing the measure of equivalence that makes 
generalized exchange possible” (Chakrabarty 2000: 71). “Capitalist production”, for example, 
serves as a “third term” that can subsume both the labor in Bihar in colonial India and in the 
Bolivian tin mines, as historicized respectively by Gyan Prakash and Michael Taussig 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 77–83). Here, the “universal” language of social science is that “third 
term” which different historical experiences are translated into. The second move comprises 
an “appeal to models of cross-cultural and cross-categorical translations that do not take a 
universal middle term for granted”. Here, the processes of translation contain a degree of 
opacity, for there is no overarching system of thought that neutralize and relegate differences 
to the margins. Thus, “the very obscurity of the translation process allows the incorporation 
of that which remains untranslatable” (Chakrabarty 2000: 83–86). The third move, which is 
the most important, depends on articulating the first and second ones. It is characterized by 
smuggling elements of that cross-categorical translation into a translation supposed to be 
made in the “universal language of social science”. Here, an ambiguity must mark the 
translation so that it becomes enough like the secular text to make sense, yet it must also 
make it “enough unlike to shock”. This shock is the “the shock of the uncanny, something that 
gives one’s self-recognition a jolt”. (Chakrabarty 2000: 89; 175) 
The way Chakrabarty inserts the uncanny in his own book is an exercise in this third type of 
translation, which, in turn, shows that he indeed draws the lessons he claims to have learned 
from Spivak’s “Politics of Translation”.  
In this essay, departing from the poststructuralist assumption about the staging of the agent 
within a three-tied notion of language (as rhetoric, logic and silence), Spivak defines the 
“uncanny” in terms of rhetorical silences staged by this agent in order to open the possibility 
that rhetoric disrupts the language’s logical sistematicity (Spivak [1993] 2009: 203). 
The experiences of the uncanny related to the “divine sight”, which Chakrabarty narrates with 
the purpose of discussing the self-evidentiality of the Western concept of “imagination”, are 
indeed seen as an effect of “practices sedimented into language itself” (Chakrabarty 2000: 
																																																								71	This	analysis	focuses	yet	only	on	Spivak’s	contribution.		
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177). This analytical procedure is exactly what enables his historical account to play that 
disruptive rhetorical role, for even amounting to a deliberated rejection of any sociology of 
religion72, it makes it nonetheless possible to speak of gods and spirits without automatically 
assuming a believer’s point of view. Thus, theoretically, Chakrabarty can say with regard to 
nationalism in India that “there was the age-old practice of darshan” (divine sight) as naturally 
as it has been said that “there were the newspaper and the novel”.  
Spivaks also points out that  
“The jagged relationship between rhetoric and logic, condition and effect of knowing, is a 
relationship by which a world is made for the agent, so that the agent can act in an ethical 
way, a political way, a day-to-day way; so that the agent can be alive, in a human way, in the 
world.” (Spivak [1993] 2009: 203) 
 
Thus, to state that in History the nature of postcolonial reason is rhetorical, should not be 
regarded neither as exaggeration nor as insult. Or at least not if one does not equate a 
rhetorical nature with a lack of meaningful content, but with an operation in which gaps are 
deliberately left open so that the act of supplying what is missing, and drawing conclusions, 
involves the creation of a common procedure of reason (Danto 1981:170). And this procedure 
necessarily entails an intentional handling of asymmetries of knowledge. Think, for example, 
of the common use of rhetorical questions. Think furthermore of those three hitherto 
rhetorical questions posed to formulate the “not too innocent riddle” presented earlier. The 
time to solve it has come: 
The riddle refers to the fact of having written that  
“´It goes without saying ´that the social world is ‘unthinkable’ without invoking these 
concepts, which operate together with innumerable other conceptual categories such as civil 
society, social justice, democracy, national/popular sovereignty, the distinction between 
private and public, the idea of subject/ subjectivity, of objectivity/science and scientific 
rationality, etc..” 
 
And the rhetorical questions read  
“The reader is presumably wondering for what reason that ‘it goes without saying’ and that 
‘unthinkable’ were written above in such a different form? ‘They must mean something else’, 
one is led to think, for the phrase is perfectly usual and would probably have gone unnoticed 
if it had been normally spelled. But, what if there was no another hidden meaning thought to 
be hinted at by the writing difference? Furthermore, assuming that this difference in writing 																																																								72	Chakrabarty	gives	also	a	philosophical	reason	 for	his	refuse	of	sociology	of	religion:	 “I	 take	gods	and	spirits	to	be	existentially	coeval	with	the	human,	and	think	from	the	assumption	that	the	question	of	being	human	involves	the	question	of	being	with	gods	and	spirits.	Being	human	means,	as	Ramachandra	Gandhi	puts	it,	‘discovering	the	possibility	of	calling	upon	God	[or	gods]	without	being	under	an	obligation	to	first	establish	his	[or	their]	reality’.	And	this	is	the	reason	why	I	deliberately	do	not	reproduce	any	sociology	of	religion	in	my	analysis.”	(Chakrabarty	2000:	16)	
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intended to effect any change of the conventional understanding, which role may it then 
play?” 
 
The riddle itself results from an overlapping of rhetorical effects: the expression “It goes 
without saying that …” is rhetorical at the level of its own enunciation because it announces 
that it will be said exactly what it states that needs not to be said (in this case, that the social 
world is “unthinkable” without invoking some conceptual categories rooted in the 
Enlightenment). The (typographically signalized) difference in writing that bounds the 
introductory rhetorical expression with what is characterized as “unthinkable” arouses the 
suspicion of another meaning. But there was an excess of visually perceptible difference: the 
words are in italic and bold type, and enclosed in inverted comas. When used separately, these 
typographical marks are more or less easy to interpret, but superposed they do not match any 
academic usage. Thus, the typographical expedient duplicated the sentence’s rhetorical 
nature by creating a difference that keeps expected particular meanings indefinable. This 
effect produces a disturbing intellectual uncertainty that is the very source of the riddle.  
In stating that the social world is “unthinkable” without invoking some universal categories 
rooted in the Enlightenment and, at the same time, drawing attention to the rhetorical 
condition under which this statement has been given, the sentence puts into question the 
relation between what is ‘thinkable’ and what is ‘say-able’ or, perhaps, between 
“unthinkability” and “rhetoricity”. One alternative configuration of this relation, achieved by 
a simple inversion of terms, would read that the social world be “thinkable” in a non-rhetorical 
situation in which what “goes without saying” remained, in fact, unsaid.  
The riddle’s rhetorical nature is amplified by the subsequent three interrelated questions, 
which have two common traits: first, they play with the writer’s and reader’s positions by 
staging a presumable asymmetry of knowledge of the subject at hand; second, they play down 
the meaningfulness of the (typographical) difference and, in this very act, betray that the 
meaningfulness of this difference does not result from any attempt to fix other meanings, but 
rather from a non-enunciative effect on “conventional understandings”. 
In the end, the whole riddle functions as a demonstration of how rhetoric may be mobilized 
in order to make that recognizable differences challenge acknowledged conventional 
understanding in writing. 
In Spivak’s words: 
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“Mere reasonableness will allow rhetoricity to be appropriated, put in its place, situated, seen 
as only nice. Rhetoricity is put in its place because it disrupts. […] The relationship between 
logic and rhetoric, between grammar and rhetoric, is also a relationship between social logical, 
social reasonableness, and the disruptiveness of figuration in social practice. These are the two 
parts of our three-part model. But then, rhetoric points at the possibility of randomness, of 
contingency as such, dissemination, the failing apart of language, the possibility that things 
might not always be semiotically organized.” (Spivak [1993] 2009: 209) 
 
“Randomness”, “contingency as such”, “dissemination” and “the failing apart of language” … 
Spivak’s desire for politically vigilant radical openness expressed in her conceptional 
vocabulary makes it difficult to overlook some kindred ties between her notion of rhetoricity 
and Bhabha’s “third space”. Exploring this kinship, one could suggest that “rhetoricity” is how 
subjects introduce newness into the world, when they are in the “empowering condition of 
hybridity” that creates that “third space” where “incommensurable differences” are 
negotiated (Bhabha 1994: 312).  
With regard to the writing of History, it might be more fruitful to merge Spivak’s and Bhabha’s 
approaches and speak about an empowering condition of rhetoricity as a pre-requisite for 
performing History as the staging of translated historical difference73.  
Now, speaking again in Arendt’s idiom, it is to say that in restoring the rhetorical to the 
theoretical, one moves theory back from the realm of the eternal and re-introduces it in the 
realm of the immortal, i.e., the realm of the political.  
In this sense, to look at the historical text from a postcolonial perspective means to irradiated 
History with a translational/rhetorical consciousness that, without refraining from theorizing 
historical representation, does not aim at being a “narration of the eternal” and, 
consequently, does not “lack the revelatory character of action as well as the ability to 
produce stories and become historical, which together form the very source from which 
meaningfulness springs into human existence.” (Arendt [1958] 1998: 324) 
 
Postcolonial ends of History 
In exploring the disrupting capabilities of the concept of translation, postcolonial theory puts 
difference at the service of the construction of subaltern subject-positions in the writing of 
History. This theoretical event has far-reaching epistemological consequences in History, for 
																																																								73	Chakrabarty	writes	simply:	“Our	historical	differences	actually	make	a	difference.”	(Chakrabarty	2000:	xii)	
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it addresses historical knowledge effecting a transfiguration of that very milestone of the 
modern Historiography crystallized in that old Ranke’s saying with which this story began.  
Instead of “what actually happened”, a more appropriate translation of Ranke’s famous 
phrase “Wie es eigentlich gewesen” might be “how it essentially was”, “for Ranke meant not 
that he just wanted to collect facts, but that he sought to understand the inner being of the 
past” (Evans 2000: 17; Novick 1988: 28).  
The postcolonial transfiguration admits that “essentially” means, actually, what happened 
theoretically, so that “the inner being of the past” conflates with that “theoretical narration” 
within which a “hyperreal Europe” remains the implicit but nevertheless sovereign subject of 
all histories, for the language of social science has been forging a hypostasized inscription of 
Europe’s History.  
Ranke’s idea of an “inner being of the past” was a way to face the age-old problem of the 
relationship between continuity and unity in historical change. About this topic, Ankersmit 
writes:  
“Generally speaking, objects in the world will be unproblematic subjects of change as long as 
we can reasonably claim them to be the same object before and after the change. But if change 
is radicalized in the way envisioned by historicism, what can then still count as its unchanging 
subject? [...] But this problem was solved with the notion of the ‘historical idea’, as proposed 
by Ranke and Humboldt: each historical ‘thing’ (a nation, epoch, civilization, etc) is argued to 
posses a historical idea, an entelechy, so to speak—wholly specific to that thing alone, which 
is not in turn subject to change. [Thus] The historical idea is, basically, a claim about how 
nation’s or an epochs most important features hang together.” (Ankersmit 2012: 11) 
 
Postcolonial theory demonstrates in which way, in the contemporary writing of History, the 
old “historical idea” has been replaced with a “hyperreal Europe” that plays precisely the role 
of hanging things together. However, this Europe, differently than her oldest sister, the 
“historical idea”, has never been regard as what does not change, but, contrarily, as what 
changes essentially74.  
This feature raises the evident question about how to know that something is changing 
essentially without already knowing from the beginning in which consists the essence, which 
these changes happen to be ascribed to. Here is where contemporary Historiography merges 
Ranke with Hegel75.  																																																								74	 From	 this	 advantage	 point	 changes	 elsewhere	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 better	 explained.	 The	 intrinsic	evolutionism	of	Eurocentrism	stems	from	this	source.	75	On	this	curious	blend	of	Hegel	and	Ranke,	Novick	writes:	“He	[Ranke]	was	thoroughgoing	philosophical	idealist,	at	one	with	Hegel	in	believing	the	world	divinely	ordered,	differing	with	him	only	in	his	insistence	
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If one considers that the writing of History involves a process in which thinking is “thinking-
with-the-thing which is the object of thought.”(Ankersmit 2012: 19), that means, if one 
employs Hegelian dialectics, then there is no contradiction in the act of intending to abolish 
the gap between subject and object of knowledge.  
Yet, probably, no contemporary Historian would be prepared to admit full accordance neither 
with Ranke’s and Humbold’s “historical idea”, nor with Hegel’s dialectics. Rather, distancing 
themselves from such old-fashioned ideas, Historians usually agree that what they provide are 
plausible and verisimilar representations of the past, which could be perfectly given in a 
completely different way. In this sense, History, to use Foucault’s words, like every other 
human science “(has) been unable to find a way around the primacy of representation” 
(Foucault 1970: 363), and thus operates within an epistemological world/language regime 
that all dialectics begin by abandoning.  
Reformulating in abstract terms: what postcolonial theory then demonstrates is the 
theoretical role of the presence of a monist element of speculative philosophy of History, 
contradictorily animating the dual representationalism which Historiography is supposed to 
rest upon. An element that is extremely powerful because it operates through the very 
empiricism76 which should free History from speculative assumptions. 
If it is no mistake to believe that the enchantment of theoretically “disenchanted” Historical 
accounts resides in the fact that it is as though no longer mattered neither who has the agency 
in nor what is the actual content of them, then it seems to be reasonable to assert that 
postcolonial thinking brought History to that Dantonian final moment of “self-enlightenment, 
where the enlightenment consists in itself”; where History’s consciousness in its search for 
self-understanding has found its end in the figure of a “hyperreal Europe”. (Danto [1986] 2005: 
111) 
Here, the end of History happens. Yet, like Brillo Box does not mean that “there will be no 
stories to tell after the end of art, only that there will be not a single metanarrative for the 																																																								on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 that	 order	 was	 clearly	 manifested	 in	 existing	 reality”	 (Novick	 1988:	 27).	 Too	Ankersmit	notes	“how	close	Hegel	and	historicists	actually	were.	For	we	cannot	 fail	 to	be	struck	by	 the	similarities	between	their	respective	uses	of	the	notion	of	idea.	In	both	cases	the	idea	is	a	quasi-Aristotelian	entelechy	operative	in	a	vague	limbo	between	language	and	the	world	but	whose	nature	the	speculative	philosopher	or	the	Historian	has	to	grasp	in	order	to	understand	the	past.	(Ankersmit	2012:	23)	76	The	idea	that	“documents	speak	for	themselves”	is	the	best	proof	of	this	power:	more	than	“thinking-with-the-thing”	here	is	as	if	the	thing	thought	itself!	Richard	Evans,	for	example,	insists	that	“the	documents	do	have	an	integrity	of	their	own,	they	do	indeed	‘speak	for	themselves’”.	This	happens,	in	his	opinion,	when	Historians	follow	“the	usual	rules	of	evidence”	(Evans	2000:	116;	219).	
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future of history of art”; it is not a part of a postcolonial purpose to claim that there will be no 
stories to tell after the end of History. What postcolonial theory envisions is the end of 
possibility of presenting History as a progressive development bestowed with any particular 
internal direction77, which also means the end of the possibility that Europe colonizes the 
future of all other presents. (Danto [1986] 2005: 139)  
 
Epilog: after the end of the story 
It is worth reminding the reader that such a happy ending was achievable only because of the 
rhetorically Hegelian framework of the story you were reading. Paradoxically, outside, “in the 
teaching machine” (Spivak [1993] 2009: ix-x; 58-85)—where History has, more often than is 
desirable, been held captive, not only in the Hegelian variant, but also in other kindred sorts 
of evolutionist teleologies inherited from the European Enlightenment—that story goes on as 
history.  
There are good reasons to believe that in spite of the dexterity of postcolonial theory in 
dealing with epistemological issues, the hegemony of Historical Western thinking within the 
academic world will not be especially shaken, for it is embedded in structures of political 
power, which a consistent postcolonial epistemological politics begins by trying not to replace, 
but rather to displace. Exactly this, nothing else, has been done here so far. It was integral to 
this task to spell out two aspects of academic Historical knowledge.  
First, that where there was an implicit dialectical monism conflating a particular History— 
Europe’s one—with the essence of history, postcolonial theory reinstates a truly and explicit 
dualism of the language/world regime by taking universals as the “third term” of a process of 
translation. The aim of this analytical operation is to explore the tremendous explanatory 
potential of universals without hypostasizing any History, for it remains a “place holder” of 
those universal categories, and without losing sight that universals, due to their very 
constitution in the practice of language, are both subject to, and an effect of, politics.  
Second, to show that where there was an implicit dualism separating Historical account from 
Historical time, which remained always the same, empty and homogenous, disregarding the 
events which it happens to be constituted of, postcolonial theory instates a dialectical monism 
																																																								77	 Randeria’s	 concept	 of	 “entangled	 histories”	 is	 a	 perfect	 example	 of	 such	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 History	(Conrad/Randeria	2002:	17–22).	
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(in Chakrabarty’s case78, one of messianic strain, exemplified by Benjamin’s Jetztzeit), whose 
aim is to abolish time as the unchanging element that grants the unintended recurrence of 
the Same (the hyperreal Europe) and to put in its place another time, a time that advocates a 
purportedly dissemination of differences. 
And this is the very reason why Dantos “End of History” is politically as dangerous as 
Fukuyama’s one: it enables one to articulate a story where that “history of the Same”79, which 
reproduces preconditions of subalternity, “rests in piece(s)” after having reached its final 
destination, and where the dissemination of differences, which widen the possibilities of 
resistance and social change, begins its journey. 	  




The configuration of time 
Imagine that the opening shot of a film is of a space where everything stands completely still. 
No movement, no sound, no kind of change at all, except that of the camera angle, panning 
around irregularly, without cuts. So it remains until the end scene, three hours later. In a satire 
à la Loriot80 (Loriot [1992] 2010: 104–105), a refined film critic might raise this eccentric movie 
to the level of a cinematographic masterpiece about time by remarking: “absolutely nothing 
happens, time just passes!” Lesser mortals, ordinary consumers of culture industry 
productions, who, besides, had to pay a surcharge because of the long duration of the film, 
may be forgiven if they do not understand the film critic’s words properly. Guided by their 
own perception, they are rather more likely to complain that “because nothing happens, time 
simply does not pass!”  
While the spectators’ reasons for being disappointed with the film seem perfectly 
understandable, the enthusiasm of the Loriotian critic is instead only puzzling. How can the 
latter know for sure that the film was about time? If asked the simple question, how long was 
the time span covered in the film, what could possibly be his answer? The exact three hours 
that the film ran? Maybe five minutes or one year? Does the film not rather suggest that when 
nothing happens, time indeed does not pass?  
Nothing is more wonderful than commonsense language. Or at least that is the conclusion 
one might arrive at after having wondered how it is possible that an expression like “nothing 
happens” just so happens to be usual and usually understood without arousing any wonder. 
Everyone grasps, without need of great philosophical digressions, that “nothing” refers to the 
absence of an expected something. And something similar takes place with regard to the 
expression “time does not pass!” Everyone also grasps that “time does pass the whole time”, 
but possesses different paces, which are related to what is then happening.  
Furthermore, not only commonsense, but language also generally shows plenty of 
manifestations of the mutual conditioning between “happening” and “time passing”.  
Marx, the Groucho one, had cynically perverted the virtue of having principles by saying 
mirthfully: “Those are my principles, and if you don't like them...well I have others.” Following 
his example, there are many people who like boasting jocosely that their favorite pastime is 
																																																								80	For	an	audiovisual	version	see	“Loriot	–	Schöngeistige	Literatur”	(http://youtu.be/NEZtmUxCTO4).	
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doing nothing. Some of them may become filmmakers or film critics. However, the fact is that 
a “pastime” is always “something”, an activity, and one that, according to the Cambridge 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, “is done for enjoyment”.  
“Zeitvertreib”, the German word for “pastime”, has an enthralling characteristic: this 
compound noun includes the verb “vertreiben”, which has four main meanings: 1) “to drive 
somebody out” or “to drive an animal away”; 2) “to banish something”; 3) to fight off 
something or someone”; 4) to sell or distribute something. In all these senses the verb 
connotes, speaking again commonsensically, “to get rid of”. In order to get rid of time, one 
must perform some activity, must effect something, one must in fact cause something to 
happen.  
No wonder then that in History, an activity devoted to asserting at every moment “this 
happened” (Barthes 1970: 154), time is supposed to disappear. To be sure, it is not that time 
happened to disappear; rather, it is simply thought as what separates the present from the 
past, as a “practical barrier, so to speak, but of no theoretical significance” (Mink 1987: 98). 
Paradoxically, the time as “practical barrier” resembles Wittgenstein’s “field of sight” as a 
“metaphysical subject”:  
“Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether 
like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye. And from nothing 
in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.” (Wittgenstein [1922] 2014: 
87–88) 
 
As Ankersmit penetratingly notes, “it seems to be just like this with time in Historical writing: 
(…) everything is regarded from the perspective of time – but apparently it is precisely this 
which makes it impossible to speak about time itself.” (Ankersmit 2012: 30) 
A field where revealing insights into this “question of time in History” can be gained is that of 
teaching History, for there time frequently shows itself insistently in the unwelcome guise of 
chronology. From anonymous school teachers to acclaimed scholars, those who are in charge 
of teaching History unanimously stress that historical events as lists of “dates, places and 
names” is of no great significance. Much more important than learning such lists is to grasp 
the “historical process”. It is as though there were a force hanging all ‘happenings’ together, 
and the task of the schoolchildren (or of the apprentice Historian) who wants to understand 
History is to look chiefly at this aforementioned force, not at “whens” and “whats”.  
The problem with this way of discrediting chronology begins when it is equally taught that 
what one calls “historical process” shall also be seen as the way in which Historians interpret 
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the past. The historical force that hangs ‘happenings’ together becomes then as manifold as 
the different versions of History that have been written through the ages. By now at the latest, 
the apprentice Historian (or the schoolchildren) get the impression that the only thing one 
may know for certain in History are places, dates and names, all the rest being “just 
interpretation”! 
Marx, the Karl one, not without some cynicism as well, observes in the famous opening 
sentence of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon: “Hegel bemerkt irgendwo, daß alle 
großen weltgeschichtlichen Thatsachen und Personen sich so zu sagen zweimal ereignen. Er 
hat vergessen hinzuzufügen: das eine Mal als große Tragödie, das andre Mal als lumpige 
Farce.” (Marx [1852] 2007: 9)  
This passage is instigating because it compels one to wonder why the logic of historical 
process—which according to Marx is determined essentially by sheer economic forces— 
should concern itself with such theatrically oriented aesthetical caprices? Taking cue from 
Marx’s words on Hegel but following more closely a Wittgensteinian approach81, one could 
ask how Historical explanations, which are generally based on a historicist82 notion of 
development, might also be related to a form of connecting events which could be called a 
“logic of resemblance”. 
At this point, that satiric film critic inspired by Loriot may have the word again. His point was 
perhaps to convince the spectators that at every change of the camera angle not the same, 
but a different scene was shown. If they look exactly alike, this is because the film aims at 
drawing attention to the very fact that the most important thing to be noted is not “how” (as 
farce or as tragedy) events come into being, but “what” they are always disregarding their 																																																								81	 The	 recognition	 of	 Historical	 resemblances	 produces	 what	 Wittgenstein	 calls	 “übersichtlichen	Darstellung“	[perspicuous	representation]:	“Der	Begriff	der	übersichtlichen	Darstellung	[...]	bezeichnet	unsere	Darstellungsform,	die	Art,	wie	wir	die	Dinge	sehen.	(Eine	Art	der	‚Weltanschauung’,	wie	sie	scheinbar	für	unsere	Zeit	typisch	ist.	Spengler.)	Diese	 übersichtliche	 Darstellung	 vermittelt	 das	 Verständnis,	 welches	 eben	 darin	 besteht,	 daß	 wir	 die	‚Zusammenhänge	sehen’.	Daher	die	Wichtigkeit	des	Findens	von	Zwischengliedern.		Ein	 hypothetisches	 Zwischenglied	 aber	 soll	 in	 diesem	 Falle	 nichts	 tun,	 als	 die	 Aufmerksamkeit	 auf	 die	Änhlichkeit,	den	Zusammenhang,	der	Tatsachen	lenken.	Wie	man	eine	interne	Beziehung	der	Kreisform	zur	Ellipse	dadurch	 illustrierte,	 daß	man	eine	Ellipse	 allmählich	 in	 einen	Kreis	überführt;	aber	nicht	 um	zu	
behaupten,	 daß	 eine	 gewisse	 Ellipse	 tatsächlich,	 historisch,	 aus	 einem	 Kreis	 entstanden	 wäre	(Entwicklungshypothese),	sondern	nur	um	unser	Auge	für	einen	formalen	Zusammenhang	zu	schärfen.		Aber	auch	die	Entwicklungshypothese	kann	ich	als	weiter	nichts	sehen,	als	eine	Einkleidung	eines	formalen	Zusammenhangs.“	(Wittgenstein	1993:	132	–	emphasis	in	the	original)	82	 “Historicism	 is	 the	 belief	 that	 an	 adequate	 understanding	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 any	 phenomenon	 and	 an	adequate	assessment	of	 its	value	are	 to	be	gained	 through	considering	 it	 in	 terms	of	 the	place	which	 it	occupied	and	the	role	which	it	played	within	a	process	of	development.”	(Mandelbaum	1977:	42)	
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semblance. If the apparent repetition conveys a sense of a time that passes extremely slowly, 
almost stops, this should be taken as a signal of some intrinsic relationship between similarity 
and long duration. Hence the film be about time. 
If there were such a film, one would hardly take seriously the masterpiece label conferred to 
it. Notwithstanding, the words of that hypothetical Loriotian critic are not at all senseless. In 
the following section, two examples will be given in support of this claim. 
 
Long-term Historical continuity and the “logic of resemblance” 
Stefan Rinke begins his article “‘El velo rasgado’: revoluciones de independencia en América 
Latina desde una perspectiva entre-espacios” speaking about recent events that surrounded 
the bicentenary of the independence of some Latin American countries. Closing the 
introductory paragraph, he points out: “Las discusiones sobre un nuevo posicionamento de 
Latinoamérica en el contexto global, de las cuales estamos siendo testigos en el umbral del 
tercer siglo postcolonial, vienen ya, sin embargo, de lejos.” (Rinke 2013: 35 – emphasis added). 
These words prepare the stage for the entrance of an even older past, that enters the text in 
the form of the Peruvian Juan Pablo Vizcardo, who played a leading role in the uprisings that 
had led into the revolutionary processes of independence. Rinke resorts to a letter written by 
Vizcardo in 1799 in order to point out one of the factors that allows for denominating the Latin 
American independence movements as “revolutions”. In Rinke’s words: “Este posicionamento 
renovado [Vizcardo’s one] del propio espacio [Latin America], en un mundo que se percibe 
como estretramente entretejido, fue uno de los factores que nos permiten llamar revoluciones 
a los movimientos independentistas.” (Rinke 2013: 35 – emphasis added). 
Evidently, the textual similarity of both passages is no accidental. Rather, it is what invites the 
reader to see not only a parallelism in the text, but also in history. It is, indeed, that which 
begins to put together events that are chronologically separated by more than two hundred 
years. It produces, in a word, continuity. Should two centuries be regarded as long enough, it 
might be then said: it produces long-term continuity. Still, which, exactly, is the event (or 
process) that is supposed to have continued over this whole time? 
Although meaningful in the way in which it is here articulated, this question grows somehow 
suspicious and awkward if one interprets it as an attempt to unveil an apparently indistinct 
and undefined long-term event concealed in “El velo rasgado”. However, this is not the case. 
Would it not be silly if the article had addressed its subject by making no reference at all to 
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recent events related to the bicentenary of independences in Latin America, as though 
pretending its content were not rooted in the present time? On the other hand, in exposing 
such connections with the present-time, Historians are in no way committing themselves to 
writing any kind of long-term History, even though they deliberately create a sense of long-
term Historical continuity.  
The second example is drawn from “Atlantic Enlightenment”, the first chapter of the book 
Race in Translation by Robert Stam and Ella Shoat. Addressing the question of intellectual 
property rights, they write: 
“The word ‘patents’ referred in 16th-century Europe to the official royal letters (litterae 
patents) by which sovereigns conferred privileges, rights, and land title on various members 
of the nobility, for example, the capitanias in Brazil granted by the Portuguese king. In the ‘Age 
of Discoveries’, these ‘letters’ became associated with the literal conquest of territory; five 
hundred years later, they are associated with transnational corporations’ updated version of 
the conquest of economic rights in the Global South, whose biodiversity is very much linked to 
the cultural knowledges of indigenous people. […] Five centuries after the Conquest, the World 
Trade Organization rules concerning copyrights constitute reformatted versions of the papal 
bulls and regal edicts that legalized the Conquest.” (Stam/Shoat 2012: 10) 
 
“Historical morphing” is the term used by Stam/Shohat to name this process. The subject of 
this “morphing” is the “freedom of action”, as the authors remark, quoting Vandana Shiva: 
“The freedom of action which transnational corporations demand today is the same freedom 
of action that European colonies demanded, after 1492, as a natural right over the territory 
and riches of non-European people.” (Stam/Shoat 2012: 10) Here, the construction of long-
term continuity by underlining the sameness between present and past events is openly 
expressed and constitutes indeed the entire substance of the argument, it is not an effect83 
of the “perspicuous Historical representation”, as it is in the case of “El velo rasgado”. 																																																								83	According	to	Barthes,	“in	‘objective’	history	[that	is,	the	conception	of	history	within	which	the	very	idea	that	 history	 can	 have	 a	meaning	 other	 than	 referential	 is	 rejected]	 ‘reality’	 is	 always	 an	 unformulated	meaning	sheltering	behind	the	apparent	omnipotence	of	the	referent.	This	situation	defines	what	we	may	call	 the	 reality	 effect.	Elimination	 of	meaning	 from	 ‘objective’	 discourse	 only	 produces	 a	 new	meaning;	confirming	once	again	 that	 the	absence	of	an	element	 in	a	 system	 is	 just	as	 significant	as	 its	presence.”	(Barthes	1970:	154	–	italics	in	the	original)	Long-term	Historical	continuity	is	in	“El	velo	rasgado”	a	“reality”	analogous	to	Barthe’s:	it	is	not	formulated	but	 nevertheless	 emerges	 as	 an	 effect	 of	 statements	 whose	 referents	 are	 those	 events	 chronologically	separated	from	each	other	by	some	centuries.	One	can	explain	this	Barthesian	“effect”,	 in	turn,	by	resorting	to	that	Wittgenstein’s	idea	of	“perspicuous	representation”:	events	are	reported	in	a	way	that	sharpens	one’s	eye	for	the	connections	between	them	without	 directly	 asserting	 that	 the	 later	 event	 [the	 discussions	 surrounding	 the	 bicentenary	 of	 the	declaration	of	independence	of	some	Latin	American	countries]	empirically	originated	from	the	earlier	[the	stance	re-presented	by	Viscardo’s	letter].				
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A rash comparison between the ways by which both works textually produce long-term 
continuity would probably give the reason for their difference the fact that the first, “El velo 
rasgado”, is a historiographical one, whereas the second, “The Atlantic Enlightenment”, is 
rather sociological.  
In the latter text, historiography was very much used as a source of particular illustrations to 
support the construction of abstract categories such as “freedom of action”. Rinke’s text, in 
turn, historiographically attentive to the particularity of every event, does not proceed in the 
same manner, neither with the introductory subject “posicionamiento de America Latina en 
el context global” nor with the core of the article, namely, the analysis of Latin American 
independence processes. These processes are described as “revolutionary” without this fact 
having been used as grounds for erecting another abstract definition of the category 
“revolution”.  
The shortcomings of opposing History in this way as idiographic knowledge, in relation to 
Sociology, which in turn is classified as nomothetic, are relatively well known and have been 
spelled out by Paul Veyne. Basically, he suggests that instead of establishing this dichotomy 
between sciences of the particular and sciences of the general, one should try to replace it by 
a classification according to levels, since in its own domain every science holds simultaneously 
both principles: to explain generally and to explain every particular case of this generality. A 
“funny” consequence of this fact, Veyne adds, it is that is relatively easy to distinguish History 
and Sociology, but it is frequently impossible to distinguish a sociological book from a 
Historical one. (Veyne 1983: 58) 
Indeed, if one reads Rinke’s and Stam/Shoat’s texts with, so to speak, “theoretically unaided 
eyes”, they appear to share more similarities than dissimilarities in what concerns the 
construction of long-term continuity. 
Also Fernand Braudel emphasizes that “as far as the history of the longue durée is concerned, 
history and sociology can hardly be said to meet, even to rub shoulders. This would be saying 
too little. What they do is to mingle.” Both, he assumes, are essentially concerned with 
structures, and structures, he explains by using a suggestive physical metaphor, “is a body 
removed from gravity, removed from the acceleration of history.” (Braudel [1969] 1982: 75–
76) 
The purpose of revisiting these epistemological comparisons between History and Sociology 
is not to resuscitate a debate that, more than old-fashioned, seems to be preHistoric in times 
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in which “interdisciplinarity” and “transdisciplinarity” are watchwords. Bringing back this 
discussion is just a way to put into relief a quite obvious but nonetheless intriguing theoretical 
consequence: the conspicuous relation of dependence between long-term continuity and the 
attribution of sameness to particular events, that, in this way, become 
illustrations/expressions of abstract categories usually re-denominated as “structures”84. Yet, 
is the nature of “structures” identical to that of the events described as being of long-term? 
Or are these events themselves “structures”? 
This way of phrasing the question is altogether uncommon. Traditionally, in the Brazilian 
historiographical milieu, not least due to the considerable influence of French scholarship, 
“structure” has been regarded as opposing to “event”85. Yet, reflecting on this usage, one 
could wonder: would it make any sense to speak about “long-term events”? 
Grammatically and semantically, the expression does not seem to be problematic at all. One 
cannot help the impression of having already heard it somewhere before.  
Possibly this impression is derived from the fact that  
“Even when they avoid all reference to history, the human sciences (and history may be 
included among them) never do anything but relate one cultural episode to another (that to 
which they apply themselves as their object, and that in which their existence, their mode of 
being, their methods, and their concepts have their roots); and though they apply themselves 
to their own synchronology, they relate the cultural episode from which they emerged to itself. 
Man, therefore, never appears in his positivity and that positivity is not immediately limited 
by the limitlessness of History. “ (Foucault 1970: 371)86 
 
History establishes this operation of relating an episode to another in such a way that the 
result thereof, that is, the historiographical account as whole, claims to be true in the sense 
																																																								84	An	illustrative	example	of	the	semantic	power	of	the	word	“structure”	was	given	by	Paul	Veyne,	who	prefers	the	term	“constant”,	but	nonetheless	remarks:	“Chamemos	essas	constantes	de	estruturas,	se	não	pudermos	viver	sem	essa	palavra.”	(Veyne	1983:	30)	85	Fernand	Braudel	and	Lévi-Strauss	are	academic	celebrities	famous	for	a	polarizing	theorization	of	the	notions	 of	 “event”	 and	 “structure”.	 Both	 were	 members	 of	 the	 so-called	 “missão	 francesa”	 which	 is	considered	the	initial	milestone	of	the	foundation,	in	1934,	of	the	Faculdade	de	Filosofia,	Letras	e	Ciências	Humanas	da	Universidade	de	São	Paulo.	This	very	thesis	can	be	seen	as	witnessing	the	lasting	and	decisive	influence	of	the	“pensamento	francês”	on	the	formation	of	successive	generations	of	scholars	uspianos.		86	Foucault	works	with	a	notion	of	culture,	whose	problematic	character	can	be	somehow	guessed	from	the	passage	quoted	above.	About	this	problem,	he	writes	later	in	Archaeology	of	Knowledge:	“	in	The	Order	of	
Things	the	absence	of	methodological	signposting	may	have	given	the	impression	that	my	analyses	were	being	conducted	in	terms	of	cultural	totality.	 It	 is	mortifying	that	I	was	unable	to	avoid	these	dangers:	I	console	myself	with	the	thought	that	they	were	intrinsic	to	the	enterprise	itself,	since,	in	order	to	carry	out	its	task,	it	had	first	to	free	itself	from	these	various	methods	and	forms	of	history;	moreover,	without	the	questions	that	I	was	asked,	without	the	difficulties	that	arose,	without	the	objections	that	were	made,	I	may	never	have	gained	so	clear	a	view	of	the	enterprise	to	which	I	am	now	inextricably	linked)”	(Foucault	1972:	16–17)		
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that its particular statements can be confirmed by empirical evidence (Mink 1987: 180). In 
doing so, History constitutes itself as such and creates time as a function of this relation of 
events. 
Following this simplifying idea of History as “relating events”, one could say that the only 
difference between a historiographical biography and a historiographical account with 
“structural” pretentions would be of degree, not of type. On this issue, Louis Mink, analyzing 
Peter Munz’s distinction between “ordinary” History and speculative philosophy of History, 
remarks:  
“What Historians ordinarily do is to assemble sub-events into events, and events into larger 
events. So the characteristic historiographical act is a construction, and it is brought about by 
introducing generalizations. […] Now there is no reason why events cannot be assembled into 
larger events, and those into still larger, and so indefinitely, so long as plausible generalizations 
can be found to connect them. So for Munz, speculative philosophies of history differ from 
ordinary historical narratives only in scale – and, one might add, in boldness. Because they 
deal with very large-scale events (not perceptible as single wholes to the people living through 
them), they depend more on interpretation than on explanation87. Also because they deal with 
very large-scale events, their generalizations may be misperceived (but only misperceived) as 
developmental laws. (Mink 1987: 155–156) 
 
The difficulty inherent to this idea becomes clear when one considers an observation which 
Mink makes thereupon: “Historians do think of events as made up out of smaller events and 
as parts of larges events (as in battle – campaign – war) and are as incapable of stating criteria 
for a largest event as they are for a smallest one” (Mink 1987: 156).  
This remark is interesting for two reasons. First, it raises the question about how to know for 
sure where “generalizations” are supposed to be placed “between” the events in order to 
produce them as particular unities. The second point has to do with the example given by 
Mink, namely, the sequence “battle – campaign – war”. Even though one can conceive this 
sequence as a developmental and diachronic one, it stresses rather the formal and synchronic 
aspect of the relationship between its components: battle and campaigns are smaller parts of 
a larger whole called war, and the fact that a battle cannot be considered as having lasted 
“longer” than the war of which it is a part is the logical consequence of the formal relationship. 
Not for nothing, wars are “declared”88, but not “battles” or “campaigns”. 																																																								87	According	to	Munz,	Historians	“explain”	when	they	use	generalizations	familiar	to	the	people	they	are	talking	about.	Such	“explanations”	would	be	intelligible	to	the	latter.	In	contrast	to	it,	“interpretations”	are	generalizations	unknown	to	and	even	unintelligible	to	the	people	whom	Historians	are	talking	about.	(Mink	1987:	155)	88	One	may	dare	 to	say	 that	much	more	 than	a	kind	of	event,	 “war”	plays	 this	generalizing	role	exactly	because,	 from	the	outset,	 it	must	be	 thought	as	a	concept.	Veyne,	 for	example,	observes	 that	Historians	
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Mink’s example is in some sense misleading, for, when Munz speaks about assembling 
subevents into events, and events into larger events, drawing the attention here to the fact 
that this operation might be “misperceived” as a developmental law, he is clearly much more 
concerned with the “chronological scale” rather than with the “formal scale” of the “large 
events”. Munz’s large events are, to be precise, “long events”.  
It seems to be defensible to infer from Munz’s theorization that the source of the 
“misperception” of long events as developmental laws lies on the importance that must be 
attached to generalizations, since these latter are exactly the elements that transforms series 
of events into a “long event”. The very need of generalization evinces the relative impossibility 
of connecting all parts of the “long event” via empirical evidence. The Gordian knot is then 
how to decide whether a generalization is or is not “plausible” when applied to put together 
“small-short events” in order to make of them a single “large-long one”. 
 
Historical continuity of long-term, “logic of resemblance” and empirical proof 
In Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches' Sabbath, Carlo Ginzburg delivers an analysis, whose 
theoretical profundity and documental richness leaves no doubt about the reasons why this 
book becomes a key work for Historians interested in reflecting on the thorny issue of 
conciliating long-term diachronic perspective and methodological rigor (Ginzburg 1991: 19). 
The guiding questions of the book are presented as follows: 
“How and why did the image of the Sabbath crystallize? What did it conceal? From these two 
questions (which, as we shall see, have taken me down totally unforeseen paths) my inquiry 
was born. On the one hand, I wanted to reconstruct the ideological mechanisms that 
facilitated persecution of witchcraft in Europe; on the other, the beliefs of the men and women 
accused of witchcraft. (Ginzburg 1991: 1) 
 
Ginzburg’s main difficulty in this enterprise was to elaborate “plausible generalizations” for 
assembling a monumental quantity of manifold empirical sources which, geographically 
dispersed all over the Eurasia and chronologically located in a time span that covers many 
centuries, constituted the “small events” which possibly might be transfigured into a “long 
event”.  
The sophisticated solution Ginzburg comes up with for this very familiar historiographical 
problem can be summarized in two steps. First, Ginzburg works out a way from morphology 																																																								should	not	open	their	mouth	to	pronounce	the	word	“war”	without	grounding	it	in	a	theory	(Veyne	1983:	9).	 Foucault,	 in	 turn,	 uses	 “war”	 as	 a	ubiquitous	metaphorical	model	 that	 structures	his	 analysis	 of	 the	problem	of	power	relations	(Foucault	1980:	123).	
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to diachrony by resorting to that already discussed Wittgensteinian idea of “übersichtliche 
Darstellung” [perspicuous representation]. According to Ginzburg, Wittgenstein was 
convinced that thinking of Historical representation in those terms concerned with formal 
connections was “not simply an alternative way of presenting the data, but, implicitly, 
superior to an historical exposition because a) less arbitrary and b) immune to 
undemonstrated developmental hypotheses.” In the end, Wittgenstein’s argument seems to 
Ginzbung “too convincing”. (Ginzburg 1991: 15–16) 
Thus, he decides that the morphologic inquiry should be used in Ecstasies “as a probe, to 
explore a deep, otherwise unattainable stratum.” (Ginzburg 1991: 16) Nevertheless, that 
Wittgensteinian insight must be inverted89 in the case of History for, as Ginzburg emphatically 
points out, he was not dealing with circles and ellipses, i.e., with a-temporal entities, but with 
human beings. Had he written his historical description in purely formal terms (as a form 
growing from circle to ellipsis), he might have neglected the variegated forms of violence 
exercised by inquisitors, which was a decisive element of the context he was analyzing. Had 
he done so, he concludes, “the entire story would have proved to be absolutely transparent, 
but also absolutely incomprehensible. If in a study of human events we bracket the temporal 
dimension, we obtain a datum which is inevitably distorted because it has been cleansed of 
all power relationships.” (Ginzburg 1991: 16 - emphasis added) 
The second step consists of applying the cladistics of Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism to the analysis 
of his sources. Cladistics, explains Ginzburg, “establishes a plurality of orders (or cladograms) 
based on homologies that do not necessarily refer to genealogical relationship”. Ginzburg 
seems to be convinced that this method would enable him to avoid the danger of evolutionism 
and, at the same time, to open up “an intermediary path between the level of the structure 
and that of the event.” (Ginzburg 1991: 22 - emphasis added) 
Both procedures show how much Ginzburg is concerned with a single problem: finding 
intermediary connections between, to use his own words, “the abstract depth of the structure 
and the superficial concreteness of the event.” (Ginzburg 1991: 22 emphasis added) 
And Ginzburg’s contribution to the historiographical reflection of this question may not 
merely be circumscribed to having successfully demonstrated the utility of his theoretical and 																																																								89	 By	 inverting	 Ginzburg	 means	 that	 “in	 the	 sphere	 of	 history	 (as	 opposed	 to	 geometry)	 the	 formal	connection	 can	be	 considered	 a	 developmental	 or	 rather	 genetics	 hypothesis,	 formulated	 in	 a	 different	manner.”	(Ginzburg	1991:	16)	
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methodological choices; additionally, he has clearly acknowledged that in doing so he was not 
simply operationalizing historiographical research, but that he was also reflecting on the limits 
of Historical knowledge concerning the possibility of experimentally demonstrating the 
existence of human nature.  
What may be thought of as “human nature from an Historical standpoint”, a quite paradoxical 
statement, becomes clear in the astonishing main finding of Ecstasies. Underlining the 
indubitable existence of a deep resemblance binding the myths that later merged in the 
witches’ Sabbath, Ginzburg closes his book as follows: 
“All of them [the myths] work a common theme: going into the beyond, returning from the 
beyond. This elementary narrative nucleus has accompanied humanity for thousand of years. 
The countless variations introduced by utterly different societies, based on hunting, on pasture 
or on agriculture, have not modified its basic structure. Why this permanence? The answer is 
probably very simple. To narrate means to speak here and now with an authority that derives 
from having been (literally or metaphorically) there and then90. In participation in the world 
of the living and of the dead, in the sphere of the visible and of the invisible, we have already 
recognized a distinctive trait of the human species. What we have tried to analyze here is not 
one narrative among many, but the matrix of all possible narratives.” (Ginzburg 1991: 307 – 
emphasis added; footnote integral to the passage) 
 
These words have far-reaching consequences. As “the matrix of all possible narratives”, that 
common theme of “going into beyond and returning from the beyond” necessarily comprises 
History too. Ginzburg is fully aware of this fact; if he were not, he would not have stated 
already in the introduction of the book, that as well as the experiences expressed for millennia 
through myths and fables he was about to analyze, “the attempt to attain knowledge of the 
past is also a journey into the world of the dead.” (Ginzburg 1991: 24) 
When, in the concluding passage quoted above, a Benjaminian notion of “to narrate” is 
combined with structuralism in order to argue that what had been hitherto analyzed was no 
more no less than a sort of anthropological constant of mankind, two things happen. Ginzburg 
not only evinces the absolutely crucial role that generalizing theoretical categories play in 
guaranteeing the “methodological rigor” of historiographical representations of “long 





Another convincing argument in favor of this assertion can be put forward on the basis of an 
analysis of A Negregada Instituição, a prominet work in the research of capoeira in Brazil. Its 
author, the Historian Carlos Eugênio Líbano Soares, professor of the Universidade Federal da 
Bahia, acknowledges his methodological debt to Ginzburg’s “evidential paradigm” in the 
formulation of the hypothesis that the Nagoas and the Guaiamuns, the main “maltas de 
capoeiristas”91 of Rio de Janeiro, had different origins. The Nagoas, Soares explains, were 
related to Africans and “Baianos”, worshipper of the Orishas, or at least close to this religion, 
whereas the Guaiamuns had stemmed from a native creole tradition, in this respect being 
then related to the slaves born in Brazil (Soares 1994: 39–87). 
Soares thinks that the way of ascertaining whether these affiliations are right or not were to 
be found, as it was the case in Deciphering the Witches' Sabbath, “no universo da simbologia 
e do imaginário, onde um grupo herda os emblemas de outro, sem deixar vestígios dessa 
passagem. Temos assim indícios, sinais de uma transição cultural subterrânea, que se opera 
imperceptivelmente.” (Soares 1994: 48) 
One of the sources in which Soares looks for theses clues is the picture entitled “A Capoeira”92, 
published in the magazine Kosmos in 1906.  
																																																								91	“Malta”	was	the	name	given	to	the	different	group	of	capoeiristas	in	the	nineteenth-century	Rio	de	Janeiro.	92	The	illustration	was	published	accompanied	by	the	following	caption:	“Tipos	e	uniformes	dos	antigos	nagoas	 e	 guaiamuns,	 sendo	 os	 principais	 distintivos	 dos	 primeiros	 a	 cinta	 com	 cores	 brancas	 sobre	 a	encarnada	e	chapéu	de	aba	batida	para	a	frente	e	dos	segundos	com	cores	encarnadas	sobre	a	branca	e	chapéu	de	aba	elevada	na	frente.”	(Soares	1994:	49)	
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Revista Kosmos (1906) - Rio de Janeiro 
 
About this image, Soares writes: “É interessante que a única gravura que encontramos, onde 
se coloca frente a frente um nagoa e um guaiamu mostra claramente um negro para aquele e 
um mulato ou mestiço para esse.” (Soares 1994: 49) The fact that the “Nagoa” was depicted 
as “negro” and the Guaiamu as “mulato ou mestiço” should be taken as supporting his 
hypothesis on the “African origin” of the former, and the “native origin” of the later. 
Still, is the picture really as unequivocal as Soares suggests it to be? Looking at it, is one not 
tempted to ask: who is the “black man” and who is the “mulatto”? Who was the black, who 
was the mulatto in 1906? Who could have been the black, who could have been the mulatto 
in the time to which the caricature refers? Should the image be circumscribed to these two 
poles, black and mulatto, or might it give room for other ethnical ascriptions? To sum up, how 
to deal with the question of ethnical identity and time overlapping? 
This matter is quite complex. Ethnicity, perhaps in a way even more accentuated than many 
other forms of belonging, is characterized by a dynamics of contingencies. Certain bodily 
characteristics may be activated or deactivated, used or ignored as elements of distinction in 
different situations, depending on the mutual position of the actors in a determined context. 
In this sense, Poutignat and Streiff-Fernart argue that it is “ingenuidade acreditar que se possa 
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definir uma unidade étnica (quaisquer que sejam os critérios utilizados para defini-la) por uma 
lista de traços” (Poutignat/Streiff-Fernart 1997: 61). 
Quite intriguing is to note that Soares does not ignore this point completely. He reports the 
case of José Eça, who, having been arrested successive times in a short period, was always 
identified differently: as “branco” (white) in February 1881, as “pardo” (mulatto) in April 1881 
and as “moreno” (dark-skinned) in September 1881. There was, the author remarks, some 
“instability in the pattern of ethnical classification” during that time (Soares 1994: 124). Only 
in that time, one could ask? Or still today, in the here and now? 
Soares turns a blind eye to the serious consequences of this “instability” within his argument 
and simply goes on linking geographical data with demographic statistics, until he draws a sort 
of ethnical map of the capoeira in Rio de Janeiro. And he does it by indiscriminately using not 
only terms referring to ethnical belonging (negro, mestiço, mulato, moreno, etc.), but also 
sometimes to legal status (slave, freedman, non-slave), sometimes to political-geographical 
origin (African, Brazilian). In the end, one has a mishmash that makes his classificatory 
enterprising an especially pointless effort. 
The question these commentaries just insinuated may be made explicit as follows: if Ginzburg 
and Soares employ the same methodology in order to approach a problem historiographically 
constructed in a very similar manner and whose primary sources in principle allow for the kind 
of reading proposed, why then was the former remarkably successful in his undertaking, 
whereas the latter fails? 
By this time, the answer is probably clear: Ginzburg focuses on a non-contingent element. In 
his reasoning, from a defined array of morphological similitudes identified in the sources, a 
constant was extracted [the common narrative theme of going into the beyond and returning 
from the beyond] that should be valid to every group, to which those sources are related to. 
Soares, in turn, makes the same methodological operation, with the purpose of performing 
the ascription of ethnical identities, a contingent relation whose nature is especially ill suited 
to be reconstructed on the basis of fixed morphological clues.  
Furthermore, Ginzburg finds in Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism and in the linguistic reflections by 
Wittgenstein the theoretical justification of his methodological procedure. Soares forgoes this 
step, perhaps imagining that what was prior theoretically elaborated in Ecstasies would also 
apply to the particular problems he has formulated with regard to the capoeira in Rio de 
Janeiro. However, the relation between subject, theory and method is not (always) 
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interchangeable. In attempting to define “ethnical identities” based chiefly on the “evidential 
paradigm”, Soares sets, so to speak, the method against the theory. This came about by virtue 
of not having grasped that he had also confined his analysis to a kind of anthropological 
constant of mankind93 [the common act of identification], one that even if susceptible to be 
explored by having recourse to Ginzburg’s evidential paradigm, would require a completely 
different theoretical underpinning. 
*    *    * 
The important thing to be noted in these two examples is the fact that in the moment in which 
both Historians intend to extend the scope of their historical representation to events which 
had presumably happened long before the chronological limits set to their studies, they resort 
to a morphological search of resemblances based on abstract generalizing categories that, in 
turn, would Historically assemble the events under inquiry as a unified subject, even though 
no direct empirical relation between the events could be established.  
 
The time of the event 
At this point, some analytical attention must be paid to a word that has been so far treated 
merely as a word: “event”.  
In Event, Slavoj Žižek, exploring his peculiar style of philosophical writing, introduces the 
reader into the topic by saying that “event” is “an amphibious notion with even more than 
fifty shades of grey” (Žižek 2014: 1).  
The way Žižek solves this initial problem is trivial: he takes the risk of choosing an approximate 
definition, namely, the one which specifies an event as “the effect that seems to exceed its 
causes – and the space of an event is that which opens up by the gap that separates an effect 
from its causes.” (Žižek 2014: 3 – italics in the original) 
Žižek soon notes that this definition based on a relation of causality brings him back to an 
inconsistent multiplicity of phenomena. He then realizes that “the only appropriate solution 
is thus to approach events in a evental way – to pass one to another notion of event by way 
of bringing out the pervading deadlocks of each […].” (Žižek 2014: 6 – emphasis added) 
Curious here is the fact that even confessing that he had no appropriate definition of event, 
Žižek uses the adjective “evental” to predicate the way he is going to proceed. This move 																																																								93	As	well	as	Ginzburg,	also	Veyne	stresses	that	“Todo	historiador	é	implicitamente	um	filósofo,	já	que	decide	o	que	reterá	como	antropologicamente	interessante.”	(Veyne	1983:	6)	
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betrays that even before explaining what an event is Žižek is already operating with a notion 
of event, namely, one which reads that “an event is never explained, if at all, as an event 
merely, but always under a description.” (Mink 1987: 143) 
If even a philosophical enterprise like Žižek’s begins by implicitly acknowledging that there is 
no possible explication of such a thing like “an event” in general, but only of “an event under 
a description”, one can easily grasp how true this philosophical proposition may be concerning 
History, a field where events only “happen” insofar as they are in some way or another 
“described”. 
Reflecting on this problem, Louis Mink characterizes five particular types of descriptions that 
may be made about the past. 
1. Contemporary descriptions of events, i.e., actual descriptions of events as recorded by 
observers. 
2. Possible contemporary descriptions, i.e., those not actually formulated or reported because 
no one was in a position to observe or in a mood to record. It is often thought that the main 
task of Historians is to arrive at such descriptions by inference from extant evidence, and thus 
to fill the gaps in the record of actual descriptions. 
3. Descriptions possible only after the event, because they refer to and thus depend on 
knowledge about later events: these are Danto’s narrative sentences. 
4. Descriptions possible only after the event because they depend on subsequently developed 
techniques of acquiring knowledge, e.g., “Richard III died of coronary embolism.” 
5. Descriptions possible only after the event because they depend on later conceptual modes 
of interpretation and analysis, e.g., “The unpropertied citizens of Rome constituted the first 
urban proletariat.” (Mink 1987: 140 – emphasis added) 
 
Mink considers this last kind of description (in italics) “by far the most interesting and 
problematic”, for it serves “to connect analytic philosophy of history with actual questions of 
historical methodology.” (Mink 1987: 140)  
Indeed, Mink, a professed philosopher of History, works here on exactly the same problem 
that Carlo Ginzburg, a professional Historian, addresses in detail in Deciphering the Witches' 
Sabbath. This fact could be taken as a further argument in favor of what has been argued in 
the prior section, that is, in favor of a non-strict separation between meta-theoretical and 
non-meta-theoretical issues in historiographical writing.  
At any rate, interesting is not only that they are working on the same problem, but also that 
they both arrive at similar conclusions. Ginzburg finds in Wittgenstein’s idea of “übersichtliche 
Darstellung” a key for transfiguring a series of events in a “general image that does not have 
the form of a chronological development.” (Ginzburg 1991: 15) Mink, in turn, suggests that 
“the distinctive characteristic of historical understanding consists of comprehending a 
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complex event by “seeing things together” in a total and synoptic judgment which cannot be 
replaced by any analytic technique”. One of the consequences which results from accepting 
this view that is that  
“[T]emporal order is not of the essence of historical judgment. […] That events occur 
sequentially in time means not that the Historian must ‘relive’ them—by reproducing a 
determinate serial order in his own thought—to understand them, but that he must in an act 
of judgment hold together in thought events which no one could experience together.” (Mink 
1987: 84 – emphasis added) 
 
This “historical-synoptic judgment” is the core of a mode of comprehension that Mink 
denominates “configurational”. Configurational comprehension, he explains, focusing on “the 
relations that may hold between particulars and particulars” (Mink 1987: 39)	94.  
Interestingly, Mink stresses that the recognition of resemblances is integral to the “synoptic 
judgment” characteristic of this “configurational mode of comprehension”. By way of 
illustration, he argues that “when one observes that two people ‘look alike’, one does not 
ordinarily compare a series of physiognomic details and then infer a similarity; the recognition 
of resemblance is immediate and total.” Mink does not refuse the possibility of carrying out 
an analysis of resemblances on the basis of, so to speak, objective measurements, but remarks 
that by looking at these physical measurements one could never predict whether the people 
they describe resemble each other or not. (Mink 1987: 81–82) Commenting on Mink’s work, 
Ankersmit summarizes the “configurational mode of comprehension” as that which “enables 
us to detect a certain pattern or structure in a complex and incoherent set of data.” (Danto 
[1965] 2007: 385) 
Historiographical researches, however meticulous in what concerns methodology, would only 
increase the amount and precision of factual events, but never exhaust the possible 
descriptions which transform these events into History. No historiographical study aims 
indeed at demonstrating the necessity of the events that it accounts for. Rather it makes these 
events intelligible by unfolding them in terms of the interrelationship of their constituent 
parts. Generalizing from this perspective, one can say that “the events comprehended by a 
historiographical account as a whole are connected by a network of overlapping descriptions”, 
																																																								94	Mink	defines	two	other	“modes	of	comprehension”:	the	“theoretical	mode”	and	“the	categoreal	mode”.	“Speaking	roughly,	one	might	say	that	theoretical	comprehension	emphasizes	the	relations	that	may	hold	between	universals	and	particulars,	[…]	and	categoreal	comprehension	the	relations	that	may	hold	between	universals	and	universals.”	(Mink	1987:	39)		
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but the overlap of descriptions may not be a part of what has been represented, but only of 
the comprehension of it as a whole. (Mink 1987: 58)  
 
Long event and long duration 
If one intends to grasp long term continuity in History by using Mink’s idea of comprehension, 
a “long event” would not necessarily be a “structure”, in the sense that it is a sort of social 
phenomenon that due to its extremely slow rhythm of transformation remains in the present 
relatively unchanged, as it had been in the distant past.  
Rather, a “long event” would be the kind of historiographical description of an event that 
connects other events chronologically distant in time by ascribing to them resemblances 
identified by means of a “synoptic judgment” necessarily based on explicit abstract-
conceptual categories.  
A striking peculiarity of these “long events” is that they do not properly happen over time in 
the same way as most events whose relation can be empirically verified. On the contrary, it is 
out of the connection from which they stem that the very comprehension of time as an 
immediate long temporal whole emerges. To imagine time means, in this sense, as in an 
analogy Mink suggests, “to think of it in both directions at once, and then time is no longer 
the river which bears us along but the river in aerial view, upstream and downstream seen in 
a single survey.” (Mink 1987: 57) 
An even better (aquatic) analogy can be found in Escher’s “Waterfall” (1961). In this 
lithography one sees - without having to look at it from afar like in an aerial view - a water 
stream flowing at the same time upward and downward! Although, the image itself makes 
evident that in reality this “river” must flow only in the latter direction. The interesting point 
here is that one realizes promptly what is happening, even if one is unable to explain the 
whole geometry involved in constructing the optic illusion. By the same token, one easily 
grasps that to inquire into the reality, i.e., gain some knowledge of how a real aqueduct works, 
would help little in explaining how the picture achieves its unreal effect.  
In History, before a “long event”, one also promptly recognizes, by virtue of the very temporal 
whole which is instantaneously created, that time must have been seen in both directions, 
even if one is unable to explain the whole role of the conceptual categories which allow for 
this operation. By the same token, one also easily grasps that any attempt to inquire into the 
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reality of which History is accepted as a representation), i.e., to touch the “real long event”, 
would be entirely in vain.  
When one comes to understand that a “long event” happens as this kind of unifying abstract 
relation among events, the consequence is that chronology, span and pace, elements central 
in an ordinary understanding of time95, become marginal. This gives a hint of where the 
impression comes from, that History constitutes itself not by exposing, but by concealing time; 
it also explains, to some degree, why Historical time may also be thought of as the result of a 
logical production of resemblances within which sameness and long duration stand, as in the 




In the first part of this dissertation, some main ideas by Arthur Danto, Louis Mink and Frank 
Ankersmit, authors representative of the “linguistic turn” in theory of History, were mobilized 
in order to, using Spivak’s words, fray the textile of History into frayages96 or facilitations that 
breach open97 a way for post-colonial thinking (Spivak [1993] 2009: 202). The general 
analytical strategy has been fairly simple: widespread disciplinary understandings of some 
concepts were submitted to a “commentative98 analysis”, whose aim was to confer them 
another meaning. There was no ambition to endow them with new meanings. If something at 
all may be considered new in this operation, this could not be the meanings themselves, but 
the particular context within which they have been attributed.  
Still, the three pairs of concepts, namely, ideology/anachronism, historiography/theory of 
History, time/event, which were subjected to what has been here called “theoretically 
oriented semantic exploration”, shall fulfil the function they have been designed to only after 
they are considered with regard to a “problem” that will lead they directly to the question of 
Historical time within Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic. What this “problem” consists of will be 





frayage	in	French.”	(Spivak	[1993]	2009:	352)	97	 The	 idea	 of	 “breaching”	 may	 appear	 awkward	 when	 related	 to	 “facilitation”.	 Yet,	 as	 Alan	 Bass,	 the	translator	 of	 Derrida’s	 L’écriture	 et	 la	 différence,	 remarks	 concerning	 Derrida’s	 translation	 of	 Freud’s	
Bahnung	into	frayage:	“’Breaching’	is	clumsy,	but	it	is	crucial	to	maintain	the	sense	of	the	force	that	breaks	open	a	pathway,	and	the	space	opened	by	this	force.”	(Derrida	1978:	329)	98	The	“commentary”	 is	 thought	here	as	one	of	 those	“internal	rules,	where	discourse	exercises	 its	own	control;	rules	concerned	with	the	principles	of	classification,	ordering	and	distribution.”	It	is,	according	to	Foucault,	a	procedure	involved	in	the	mastery	of	a	precise	dimension	of	discourse:	that	of	events	and	chance.	(Foucault	1972:	220)	“Whatever	 the	 techniques	 employed,	 commentary's	 only	 role	 is	 to	 say	 finally,	 what	 has	 silently	 been	articulated	deep	down.	It	must—and	the	paradox	is	ever-changing	yet	inescapable—say,	for	the	first	time,	what	has	already	been	said,	and	repeat	tirelessly	what	was,	nevertheless,	never	said.	The	infinite	rippling	of	commentary	is	agitated	from	within	by	the	dream	of	masked	repetition:	in	the	distance	there	is,	perhaps,	nothing	other	 than	what	was	 there	at	 the	point	of	departure:	 simple	recitation.	Commentary	averts	 the	chance	element	of	discourse	by	giving	it	its	due:	it	gives	us	the	opportunity	to	say	something	other	than	the	text	itself,	but	on	condition	that	it	is	the	text	itself	which	is	uttered	and,	in	some	ways,	finalised.	The	open	multiplicity,	the	fortuitousness,	is	transferred,	by	the	principle	of	commentary,	from	what	is	liable	to	be	said	to	the	number,	the	form,	the	masks	and	the	circumstances	of	repetition.	The	novelty	lies	no	longer	in	what	is	said,	but	in	its	reappearance.”	(Foucault	1972:	221)		
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The Aufhebung of the subaltern’s consciousness 
The three pairs of concepts spelled out throughout the adventurous theoretical exploration 
of the last chapter would not fulfill the function they are designed to if one remains in 
ignorance of the relation they bear to the problem of the consciousness. And the function 
they are designed for, it would do no harm to repeat, is to serve as an analytical tool by means 
of which the sketch of a model of temporality inspired by the idea of fractal spatiality as 
exposed by Paul Gilroy shall be drafted. Expectedly, this model may be of some relevance for 
those interested in exercising Historical writing from a postcolonial perspective. 
The problem of consciousness is constitutive of this task for three inextricably intertwined 
reasons. Firstly, as Foucault explains:  
“On the horizon of any human science, there is the project of bringing man’s consciousness 
back to its real conditions, of restoring it to the contents and forms that brought it into being, 
and elude us within it; this is why the problem of the unconscious—its possibility, status, mode 
of existence, the means of knowing it and of bringing it to light—is not simply a problem within 
the human sciences which they can be thought of as encountering by chance in their steps; it 
is a problem that is ultimately coextensive with their very existence. A transcendental raising 
of level that is, on the other side, an unveiling of the non-conscious is constitutive of all the 
sciences of man. (Foucault 1970: 364–36) 
 
In other words: the human sciences are unable to circumvent the obstacle posed by the 
primacy of representation. Nonetheless, they aim at being a kind of representation distinctly 
conscious of the true and truthful character of their own consciousness of whatever they 
choose to be scientifically represented. As such, the problem of consciousness as well as, 
consequently, the problem of truth can only be, repeating Foucault’s words, “ultimately 
coextensive with” the very existence of the human sciences. 
History, the “science of man” whose epistemological constitution has been scrutinized in this 
dissertation, occupies a special position within the human sciences due to the fact that it 
endows these sciences with the concreteness needed to fulfil their positivity, while, by the 
same token, “surrounds them with a frontier that limits them and destroys, from the outset, 
their claim to validity within the element of universality.” (Foucault 1970: 371)  
History then constitutes itself by inwardly accomplishing a movement analogue to that of its 
own appearance, for the human sciences are thought to have stemmed from the emergence 
of a “historical consciousness” that, towards the whole of history, possessed the very same 
reflexive and normative character that the human science claim to have towards any object 
they subject to “scientific” representation. This particular kind of “historical consciousness” is 
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no more no less than the major characteristic of what came to be known as modernity. 
According to Habermas, Hegel was the first philosopher who develops a clear concept of 
modernity, hence the need to go back to his work if one wants to understand it (Habermas 
[1988] 2004: 13).  
At this point, the second reason why the problem of consciousness is so crucial here can be 
announced: in dealing with this question one dashes straight into the heart of Gilroy’s The 
Black Atlantic, which, as its subtitle makes indelibly clear, beats in the rhythm dictated by a 
critical examination of the relation between “Modernity and Double Consciousness”.  
In fact, Gilroy goes back exactly to Habermas’ reading of Hegel in order to counteract it with 
an approach that, based on Du Bois’ notion of “double consciousness”, takes the dialectic of 
master and slave, the allegory in which Hegel‘s relation of consciousness and freedom is 
rooted, as a point of departure for putting forward a view which, first, “sees the intimate 
association of modernity and slavery as a fundamental conceptual issue”, and second, 
“foregrounds the issues of brutality and terror which are so frequently ignored” in discussions 
on Enlightenment’s heritage (Gilroy 1993: 46–58). These two points constitutes the backbone 
of what Gilroy calls “antinomies” of modernity, to which, he then suggests, the “Black Atlantic” 
may be seen as a form of counterculture. 
Now, those who want to understand “the problem of consciousness” in Hegel’s work must be 
willing to deal with the concept of Aufhebung. On this subject: 
“The negation characteristic of consciousness, which cancels in such a way that it preserves 
and maintains what is sublated (Die Negation des Bewusstseins welches so aufhebt, dass es 
das Aufgehobene aufbewahrt und erhält), and thereby survives its being sublated (und hiermit 
seif Aufgehobenenwerden überlebt). In this experience self-consciousness becomes aware 
that life is essential to it as pure self-consciousness”. (Derrida 1978: 254 – emphasis in the 
original) 
 
This is an excerpt of Hegel’s dialectic between master and slave, in which Derrida stresses 
doubly the importance of the concept of Aufhebung: first, by providing a transcription of the 
original passages in which the concept appears; second, by typographically drawing attention 
to it. And the dialectic of master and slave, Derrida states by reproducing Bataille’s words, “is 
the center of Hegelianism” (Derrida 1978: 254).  
It is not time yet to go deeply into this fairly abstruse point. For the moment, what little that 
has been said about the issue should suffice to indicate, thirdly, that the “problem of 
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consciousness” encompasses the very way in which the concept of consciousness has been 
deployed in this dissertation, whence the suggestive title above99.  
 
The “problem of consciousness” will be the guiding thread but not the proper subject of 
discourse in this transitional chapter. Rather, Gilroy’s use of Du Bois’ concept of “double 
consciousness” will be analysed with the purpose of discussing its relation with the notion of 
sovereignty of the subject and the question of subalternity.  
To be economical with words, the relevance of taking this step right before the analysis 
advances towards its vital nucleus may be felt if one considers this clear-cut and penetrating 
thought by Foucault: “Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making 
human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action are the 
two sides of the same system of thought” (Foucault 1972: 12). To behave towards this “system 
of thought” as if it could be seen from the perspective of a subaltern and “doubly conscious” 
subject is then the task set to be performed here.  
The whole argument will be developed on the basis of a “commentative analysis” focused on 
three important historiographical works about colonial slavery in Brazil, namely, Kátia 
Mattoso’s Ser Escravo no Brasil (1982), Sydney Chalhoub’s Visões da Liberdade (1990), and 
Maria Cristina C. Wissenbach’s Sonhos Africanos, Vivências Ladinas (1998). 	  
																																																								99	Actually,	it	would	have	been	academically	more	appropriate	to	add	this	footnote	on	“Aufhebung	“	as	this	term	appears	for	the	first	time	in	this	text,	that	is,	in	its	title.	The	very	fact	of	deferring	the	explanation	up	until	this	point	belongs	to	the	way	in	which	“consciousness”	has	here	been	spatially	deployed	in	writing	on	the	“problem	of	consciousness”.	This	very	explanation	expresses	how	much	it	owes	to	Derrida’s	ideas	of	“spatialization”	and	“temporization”	in	“Différance”.	(Derrida	1982:	1–27)	
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The Heart of Blackness 
 
Mas olhe dentro dos meus olhos 
E me diga quem eu sou 
Sou a semente plantada 
Que ainda não brotou 
Capoeira song 
 
Nos braços da inspiração 
A vida transformei 
De escravo pra rei 
E o samba que criei 
Tão divino ficou 




A bondman of his time 
What an irony of fate that in one of the most influential and most beautifully entitled works 
on modernity, namely, Marshall Berman’s All That is Solid Melts into Air, Hegel, the 
philosopher regarded as the first one to develop a clear concept of nothing less than 
modernity itself (Habermas [1988] 2004: 13), ended up listed among those who had grasped 
it through an “instinctive feeling” (Berman [1982] 2010: 132). Departing from Berman, Paul 
Gilroy characterizes Hegel as an “intuitive modernist” (Gilroy 1993: 46).  
Well, when, in the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel asserts “I am pure intuition” (Hegel [1807] 
2014: 246) he refers to the state of mind designated in his philosophical system as “sensuous 
certainty”, which is the very first and the most crude stage of development of the spirit. There, 
he formulates meticulously, one is dealing with the “richest kind of knowledge”, but the 
“poorest kind of truth” (Hegel [1807] 2014: 229). At this stage, the essence of consciousness, 
using Hegel’s own terminology, is not “for itself” yet, but rather “for another”.  
The irony is that “the life or existence for another” is anything else than the mode of 
consciousness of Hegel’s bondsman.100 In attempting to produce a systematic exposition of 
the master’s Absolute Knowledge, Hegel made himself susceptible to be turned into the 
																																																								100	Hegel	synthetizes	the	definition	of	the	self-consciousness	of	the	master	and	of	the	bondman	as	follows:	“[…]	they	stand	as	two	opposed	forms	or	modes	of	consciousness.	The	one	is	independent,	and	its	essential	nature	is	to	be	for	itself;	the	other	is	dependent,	and	its	essence	is	life	or	existence	for	another.	The	former	is	the	Master,	or	Lord,	the	latter	the	Bondsman.”(	Hegel	[1807]	2014:	459)	
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bondsman: a bondsman of his time101… A time that showed, if one is going to give credence 
to one of its latest master-narratives102, an unparalleled “reflexivity” as one of its major 
features (Osterhammel 2009: 26).  
A “more directly social reading of Hegel’s texts”, Gilroy points out, has been of great interest 
for those interested in evincing questions related to manifold forms of violence, with special 
attention to the epistemic variant, as it is the case, for example, of feminist, and postcolonial 
theories which draw intensively on postmodernist and poststructuralist philosophies (Spivak 
1988: Harding 1987; Flax 1990; Braidotti 1991).  
This kind of reading is not only legitimate, but also seems to be indispensable in face of Hegel’s 
Weltanschauung, which was unmistakably expressed in his lectures on Philosophy of History, 
where he conducts an exam the purpose of which is to demonstrate that the spirit, or the 
reason, in the history of the world, “appears as a series of external forms, each one of which 
manifests itself as an actually existing people.” Therefore, Hegels calls these people “world-
historical people” who embody special principles that are also their natural characteristic: 
“Spirit, thus clothing itself in naturalness in this manner, suffers its particular phases to assume 
separate existence. For separateness is the form of naturalness.” (Hegel [1837] 2013: 223) 
So in North America under the colonisation of the “world-historical European people”: 
 
“Bald trat eine allgemeine Richtung auf die Arbeit ein, und die Substanz des Ganzen waren die 
Bedürfnisse, die Ruge, die bürgerliche Gerechtigkeit, Sicherheit und ein Gemeinwesen, das von 
Atomen der Individuen ausging, so dass der Staat nun ein Äußerliches zum Schutz des 
Eigentums war.” (Hegel [1837] 2015a: 111–112) 
 
South America´s “world-historical native American people” are described by Hegel as follows: 
  																																																								101	To	use	this	expression	is	obviously	to	mimic	this	famous	passage	of	the	preface	of	Hegel’s	Elements	of	
the	Philosophy	of	Right:	“Was	da	Individuum	betrifft,	so	ist	ohnehin	jedes	ein	Sohn	seiner	Zeit;	so	ist	auch	die	Philosophie	ihre	Zeit	in	Gedanken	erfaßt.	Es	ist	ebenso	töricht	zu	wähnen,	irgendeine	Philosophie	gehe	über	ihre	gegenwärtige	Welt	hinaus,	als,	eine	Individuum	überpringe	seine	Zeit,	springe	über	Rhodus	hinaus.	Geht	seine	Theorie	in	der	Tat	drüber	hinaus,	baut	er	sich	eine	Welt,	wie	sie	sein	soll,	so	existiert	sie	wohl,	aber	nur	seinem	Meinen	´einen	weichem	Elemente,	dem	sich	alles	Beliebig	einbilden	läßt.“	(Hegel	[1832–1845]	2015b:	28	–	emphasis	added)	The	expression	“ein	Sohn	seiner	Zeit”	has	been	usually	translated	as	“a	child	[instead	of	‘a	son’]	of	its	time”	(Hegel	 [1832–1845]	 2011:	 11;	 Ware	 1999:	 7–11).	 Of	 course,	 the	 prevailing	 English	 translation	 alters	substantially	 the	 gendered	 character	of	 the	 construction.	The	words	 “child”	 and	 “son”	may	also	 convey	slightly	 different	 meanings	 respecting	 the	 notion	 of	 adulthood	 as	 metaphor	 for	 a	 certain	 attitude	 of	consciousness.	102	 This	 is	 not	 an	 ascription.	 As	 already	 mentioned,	 Jürgen	 Osterhammel	 defines	 his	 work	 as	 a	“Meistererzählung“:	“Ich	experimentiere	mit	einer	anderen	Lösung:	Meistererzählungen	sind	legitim.	Die	postmoderne	Kritik	an	 ihnen	hat	sie	nicht	obsolet,	 sondern	bewusst	erzählbar	gemacht.“	 (Osterhammel	2009:	19)	
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“Demut und kriechende Unterwürfigkeit gegen einen Kreolen und mehr noch gegen einen 
Europäer sind dort der Hauptcharakter der Amerikaner, und es wird noch lange dauern, bis 
die Europäer dahin kommen, einiges Selbstgefühl in sie zu bringen. Die Inferiorität dieser 
Individuen in jeder Rücksicht, selbst in Hinsicht der Größe, gibt sich alle zu erkennen.” (Hegel 
[1837] 2015a: 108) 
 
Finally, with regard to the “world-historical black people” of Africa: 
 
“Neger stellt [...] den natürlichen Menschen in seiner ganzen Wildheit und Unbändigkeit dar; 
vor aller Ehrfurcht und Sittlichkeit, von dem, was Gefühl heißt, muss man abstrahieren, wenn 
man ihn richtig auffassen will: es ist nichts an das Menschliche Anklingende in diesem 
Charakter zu finden. [...] Es ist die Unbändigkeit, welche den Charakter den Neger bezeichnet. 
Dieser Zustand ist keiner Entwicklung und Bildung fähig, wie wir sie heute sehen, so sind sie 
immer gewesen. (Hegel [1837] 2015a: 122; 128) 
 
And since the History of Slavery is in the centre of this section, it is worth briefly exposing the 
view Hegel held on the topic: 
  
“Der einzige wesentliche Zusammenhang, den die Neger mit den Europäern gehabt haben und 
noch haben, ist der der Sklaverei. In diesen sehen die Neger nichts ihnen Unangemessenes, 
und gerade die Engländer, welche das meiste zur Abschaffung des Sklavenhandels und der 
Sklaverei getan haben,werden von ihnen selbst als Feinde behandelt. Denn es ist ein 
Hauptmoment für die Könige, ihre gefangenen Feinde oder auch ihre eigenen Untertanen zu 
verkaufen, und die Sklaverei hat insofern mehr Menschliches unter den Negern geweckt.” 
(Hegel [1837] 2015a: 128–129) 
 
All these quotations would be dispensable if there were no desire to re-write the above, and 
in doing so, add to adjectives that are now sufficiently justified: that kind of [more social] 
reading [of Hegel] is not only legitimate, but also seems to be indispensable in face of the 
historicizing racist Weltanschauung103 that permeates Hegel’s oeuvre and which was 
unmistakably expressed in his lectures on Philosophy of History. 
At any rate, even if one refrains from “a more directly social reading” and interprets Hegel’s 
“master” and “bondsman” neither as concrete individuals nor as social groups, but just as the 
abstract antithetical forms of the self-consciousness within the same person, one should not 
overlook, under penalty of misunderstanding the whole argument, three points of Hegel’s 
“Dialectic of Lordship and Bondage”: first, in qualifying the different states of consciousness 
as “a life-and-death struggle”, it makes of naked violence the metaphorical essence of what 
																																																								103	Hegel’s	passage	 translated	 into	English	as	 “I	am	pure	 intuition”	 reads	 in	 the	original	 “Ich	bin	reines	Anschauen”	(Hegel	[1807]	2010:	84).	Being	“anschauen”	the	substantive	form	of	the	verb	that	integrates	the	compound	noun	“Weltanschauung”,	it	seems	fairly	correct	to	say	that	Hegel	held	a	racist	intuition	about	the	world.	
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mediates the relation of reason and freedom; second, by naming the antagonists as it does, it 
conspicuously emphasises the meaningfulness of seeing this relation as dramatically 
asymmetric in what concerns the kind of knowledge necessary in order to take and hold the 
power of establishing the truth104; and finally, by introducing a new subject, which Hegel calls 
“the process of recognition”, it argues that the recognition of self-consciousness of the Other 
is constituted in and by this violent and asymmetrical power relation105.  
If one does not lose sight of any of these three interrelated dimensions, it becomes clear why 
any discussion about the recognition of one’s autonomy always implies a movement towards 
the conquest of self-consciousness, which, in turn, traverses the issues of violence and power 
asymmetry. Thus, it is not at all an irony of fate that this problematic becomes pungent when 
History of Slavery is at stake106. 
 	
The slave’s “doubleness” in the Brazilian History of slavery 
Ser Escravo no Brasil 
When the words “master” and “bondman” are no longer metaphors thought to condense 
philosophical meanings, but have to be read in a rather literal sense, the question of self-
consciousness becomes an extremely delicate matter. As delicate as imperative. The Brazilian 
																																																								104	In	Plato’s	“Allegory	of	the	Cave”	those	who	cannot	see	the	truth	of	the	world	are	also	captives,	in	the	sense	that	they	are	chained	prisoners.	The	chains	may	be	interpreted	as	standing	for	the	deceptiveness	of	sensorial	perception,	which	prevent	them	from	coming	out	of	the	cave,	where	all	they	see	are	artificially	created	shadows,	against	the	sun-enlightened	reality	of	truly	knowledge.	Power	becomes	a	central	issue	in	Hegel	because	he	somehow	unchained	Plato’s	godforsaken	prisoners,	but	only	to	then	properly	transform	them	 into	 creatures	who	must	 then	 be	 kept	 subservient,	 doing	 their	work,	 so	 as	 to	 grant	 the	master’s	achievement	of	true,	that	is,	absolute	knowledge.	(Platão	[380	BC?)	2000:	39–42)	105	 	Hegel’s	 emphasis	on	 the	 intrinsically	 conflicting	 character	of	human	affairs	brings	him	close	 to	 the	Hobbesian	side	of	Western	philosophy.	Concerning	this	question,	Paul	Ricoeur	advances	the	hypothesis	that	“a	Anerkennung	hegeliana	se	dá	a	compreender	como	resposta	a	um	desafio	maior,	o	que	Hobbes	lançou	ao	pensamento	do	Ocidente	no	plano	politico.	A	reconstrução	do	tema	da	Anerkennung,	tal	como	foi	articulada	por	Hegel	na	época	de	Iena,	sera	guiada	pela	resposta	ao	desafio	de	Hobbes,	resposta	na	qual	o	desejo	de	ser	reconhecido	ocupa	o	lugar	do	medo	da	morte	violenta	na	concepção	hobbesiana	do	estado	de	natureza.”	(Ricoeur	2006:	165)	106	 Analyzing	 the	 difference	 of	 sense	 between	 lordship	 and	 sovereignty	 in	 Bataille’s	 interpretation	 of	Hegel’s	philosophy,	Derrida	remarks	that	the	operation	of	lordship	consists	“in	putting	at	stake	the	entirety	of	one’s	own	life.	[…]	Lordship	has	a	meaning.	The	putting	at	stake	of	life	is	a	moment	in	the	constitution	of	meaning,	 in	 the	 presentation	 of	 essence	 and	 truth.	 It	 is	 an	 obligatory	 stage	 in	 the	 history	 of	 self-consciousness	 and	 phenomenality,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 in	 the	 presentation	 of	meaning.	 For	 history	 –	 that	 is,	
meaning	–	to	form	a	continuous	chain,	to	be	woven,	the	master	must	experience	his	truth.	This	is	possible	only	under	two	conditions	which	cannot	be	separated:	the	master	must	stay	alive	in	order	to	enjoy	what	he	has	won	by	risking	his	life;	and,	at	the	end	of	the	progression	[…]	the	‘truth	of	the	independent	consciousness	is	accordingly	the	consciousness	of	the	bondsman’”.	(Derrida	1978:	254	–	emphasis	added).	
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historiography of slavery produced from the 80s on exemplifies instructively both the crucial 
relevance and the difficulties involved in dealing with this issue.  
Katia Mattoso’s 1982 Ser Escravo no Brasil, synthetises in its very title that which would 
become a major theme on the Brazilian agenda of historiographical research on slavery in the 
following decades. Commenting the title she gave to her book, Mattoso unabashedly writes: 
“Seu título, na voz passiva, não é uma figura de estilo: implica o desejo de adotar o próprio 
ponto de vista do escravo.” (Mattoso [1982] 2003: 12) 
Ciro Flamarion Cardoso, the reputed Brazilian Historian who, with his influential thesis on the 
“brecha camponesa”107, contributed to develop the interpretation of the “escravismo 
colonial” as a particular mode of production, prefaced the first edition of Ser Escravo no Brasil 
by foretelling that the book was destined to open a new era in the academic production on 
Brazilian slavery. In fact, Mattoso’s ideas became highly influential and echoe sonorously in 
later historiographical works, which are an indisputable part of the mainstream of the subfield 
History of Slavery nowadays. One of the sources of this profound and persistent influence is 
the emphasis she puts on the slave’s “double life”.  
“Na realidade, parece-nos que o escravo não permanece por muito tempo como o rato que o 
gato se diverte, pois tem certeza da vitória final. Logo que sai do estado de prostração em que 
o cativeiro o lança, o escravo torna a ser o homem sensível e digno que não se amolda a todos 
os padrões de vida e a todos os princípios governadores da sociedade branca. É preciso relegar 
às prateleiras do esquecimento da História a imagem ridícula do escravo passivo, indolente e 
sem caráter, descrito por pessoas apressadas demais em desagravar o sistema escravista: seus 
argumentos são mal escolhidos. Na verdade, o escravo reserva-se a liberdade de contestar ou 
de recusar-se às exigências do senhor que lhe pareçam ofensivas à sua dignidade; já falamos 
dos atos de rebelião individual e coletiva e sua importância como refúgios remotos, em geral 
ineficazes. [...] Pressionado pela necessidade, constrangido pela força, o escravo move-se no 
mundo dos brancos observando um mínimo de regras necessárias à sua sobrevivência. E são 
as regras de um grande jogo, que cumpre assimilar bem, mas que em nada diminuem sua 
personalidade profunda, que se pode desenvolver na comunidade negra, cujas estruturas – 
paralelas às da comunidade dos brancos, como foi dito – oferecem-lhe compensações, 
satisfações não encontráveis no campo, na mina, na casa do senhor ou nos serviços externos. 
Para o escravo, submissão e aceitação são táticas, fazem parte de toda uma dialética na qual 
o cativo encontra sua própria resposta aos problemas de sua vida dupla, a dupla estrutura em 
que se insere.” (Mattoso [1982] 2003: 214–215 emphasis added) 
 
																																																								107	 The	 “brecha	 camponesa”	 is	 an	 expression	 attributed	 to	 the	 polish	Historian	 Tadeusz	 Lepkowski.	 It	designates	the	economic	activities	that,	while	taken	place	within	the	colonial	slavery,	could	not	be	subsumed	under	 the	plantation	 system.	Ciro	Flamarion	Cardoso	used	 Sydney	Mintz’s	 variant	 of	 the	notion,	which	distinguish	 the	 colonial	 peasantry	 in	 four	 categories:	 1)	 owner	 peasants	 2)	 non-owner	 peasants;	 3)	quilombolas;	 4)	 slave	proto-peasantry.	 The	 last	 category	 is	 the	 only	 one	Cardoso	 tried	 to	develop	with	regard	to	the	Brazilian	case.	(Cardoso	1987:	55)	
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Among many passages in which Mattoso develops the idea of the slave’s double life, this long 
one was chosen because here, where she stresses that the “double life” was forged by the 
slaves themselves as an answer to the challenges of slavery, she also points out the source of 
this doubleness, as well as giving a hint of her possible interlocutors.  
Mattoso’s view is ambiguous for, even though she admits that the slaves were “pressionados 
pela necessidade” and “constrangidos pela força”, the act of offering resistance is 
paradoxically characterized as a “liberty” that the slaves could take with their masters, if they 
felt their dignity were wounded.  
The problem with this formulation is not that it passes over the consideration that dishonour 
may be thought of as a constituent element of slavery in general108 rather than a contingent 
consequence of particular arrangements within it. Much more problematic is the fact that 
rebellions or other forms of offering open resistance become “refúgios remotos, em geral 
ineficazes.”  
If open contestation and rebellions were ineffective, what could have been an effective way 
of resisting? Mattoso’s answer: obedience, for, in her version of the slaves’ view, submission 
and the acceptance of the master’s “rules of the game” was no more than a “tactic” deployed 
by the slaves in order to widen their degree of freedom. 
Mattoso underpins this thesis by appealing to a notion that has been a commonplace way of 
talking about the specificity of the Brazilian national formation109: 
																																																								108	Arguing	that	“slaves	were	always	persons	who	had	been	dishonoured	in	a	generalized	way”,	Orlando	Patterson	qualifies	dishonour	as	the	“third	constituent	element	of	slavery”.	The	other	two	elements	being:	1)	intrinsic	submission	by	violence,	since	slavery	originated	as	a	substitute	for	death;	2)	natal	alienation.	Thus,	 on	 the	 level	 of	 personal	 relations,	 he	 concludes	 synthetically:	 “slavery	 is	 the	 permanent,	 violent	domination	of	natally	alienated	and	generally	dishonoured	persons.”	(Patterson	1982;	1–14)	109	 Roberto	DaMatta’s	work	 provides	 perhaps	 the	most	 prominent	 interpretation	 of	 Brazil	 as	 a	 nation	whose	peculiarity	is	attributed	on	the	basis	of	the	notion	of	“jeitinho”.	In	a	nutshell,	the	“jeitinho”	would	be	the	defining	feature	of	a	dual	model	of	society	whose	functioning	evinces	a	decisive	preponderance	of	the	sphere	of	the	personal	and	private	over	the	rule	of	law	and	the	public	interest.		In	a	very	instructive	article,	Jessé	Souza	argues	that	the	dual	character	-	that	is,	the	sharp	division	between	a	personal/private	and	a	public	sphere,	which	in	DaMatta	appears	in	the	form	of	the	binary	pairs	“pessoa	x	indivíduo”	and	“casa	x	rua”	-	is	not	a	“peculiarity”	of	Brazilian	society,	but	a	common	feature	shared	by	all	modern(ized)	societies.	The	“jeito”	(or	“jeitinho”)	is	like	a	nickname	for	corruption	which,	as	such,	is	integral	to	the	system	as	a	whole	and	in	fact	one	of	the	ways	of	relieving	the	permanent	tension	between	those	two	spheres,	not	only	in	Brazil	but	everywhere	where	modernity	arrives.	In	this	sense,	instead	of	unveiling	the	“profound	grammar”	(“gramática	profunda”)	of	the	Brazilian	formation,	DaMatta’s	work	offers	a	“superficial	dualism”	which	was	a	product	of	his	very	own	concept	of	“dual	sociology”.		In	the	end,	what	DaMatta	accomplishes	is	just	a	“sistematização	da	imagem	do	senso	comum,	da	“ideologia”	do	 brasileiro	 médio	 acerca	 de	 si	 próprio”	 (Souza	 2001:	 55).	 A	 systematization	 that,	 as	 Souza	 sharply	criticizes,	by	systematically	bypassing	the	issues	of	social	stratification	and	power	asymmetries	ends	up	downplaying	the	problem	of	systemic	oppression	and	subordination.		
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“O português possui uma palavra intraduzível, que talvez seja uma das chaves desta adaptação 
mais ou menos feliz do homem negro à sua condição, a seu ambiente, a seu destino: jeito – 
astúcia, arte, destreza. A sociedade e que vive o nosso escravo, como quer que seja, é uma 
sociedade em que a igualdade não existe, ou é muito pouca, mesmo para o homem livre. O 
escravo vai abrir nela um lugar próprio, graças ao seu ‘jeito’, ao seu dom de fazer as coisas, à 
conquista de um equilíbrio, habilidade para sobreviver, aceitação respeitosa de si próprio e 
dos outros. Para o escravo, o jeito é a adaptação ou a inadaptação assumidas, a astúcia que o 
faz viver, a esperteza nascida da experiência e forjada na adversidade, que vai marcar toda a 
vida brasileira, a dos homens escravos como a dos homens libertados e a ainda a dos homens 
livres. Graças a seu jeito de saber viver, o escravo empenha-se em apressar a passagem que 
leva do passado mítico, perdido, através do presente difícil, a um futuro de liberdade 
idealizada. No dia-a-dia, o jeito permite, pois, ligar passado e futuro, é o saber sobreviver. É 
ele quem libera seus tesouros imaginários, riqueza da vida escrava. Comprado, vendido, 
mandado, o escravo sabe preservar sua parcela de autonomia, de humor, de ternura e de 
sonho.” (Mattoso [1982] 2003: 175) – emphasis added) 
 
By resorting to this presumably untranslatable “jeito”, Mattoso then transforms the quotidian 
of the slave’s life, which, according to her, had been seen so far as the passivity that made 
possible the very functioning of the whole system, into small acts of resistance. Open forms 
of opposition to slavery such as uprisings and flights are at the same time downgraded to a 
marginal position, not only in terms of their relevance within the slave system110, which may 
be seen as a rash, but an anyway defensible thesis, but also at a conceptual level. 
																																																								Katia	Mattoso	transfers	to	the	slave	world/personality	this	 ideological	germ	of	the	Brazilian	nationality.	Like	 in	 Damatta’s	 interpretation,	 the	 force	 of	 her	 argument	 lies	 precisely	 in	 the	 act	 of	 constituting	 the	autonomy	 of	 the	 slaves	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 positive	 figuration	 of	 a	 commonsensical	 self-image	 of	 Brazil.	Ironically,	a	self-image	that,	as	Souza	stresses	and	is	worth	repeating,	downplays	the	problem	of	systemic	oppression	and	subordination.	Is	it	not	truly	incredible	that	an	idea	of	such	a	nature	could	have	indeed	been	included	as	an	essential	part	of	an	explanation	of	slavery?	As	a	 last	word	on	this	topic	it	shall	be	observed	that	Jessé	de	Souza’s	critique	shares	some	fundamental	shortcomings	 that	are	 fundamental	 to	 the	problems	correctly	pointed	out	 in	DaMatta’s	work.	The	most	evident	 one	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 modernity	 as	 intrinsically	 extraneous,	 as	 something	 transplanted	 to	 Brazil,	namely,	together	with	the	Portugal’s	royal	household	in	1808.	With	the	arrival	of	the	House	of	Braganza	in	Brazil,	 according	 to	Souza,	 arrived	also	 the	 two	most	 important	 institutions	of	modern	society:	 “Estado	racional	e	mercado	capitalista”.	Prior	to	that,	he,	following	Gilberto	Freyre,	remarks	enigmatically,	Brazil	was	“a	espécie	de	‘China	tropical’”.	(Souza	2001:	61)		Another	 point	 that	 deserves	 remark	 is	 that	while	 Jessé	 Souza	 rightly	 accuses	DaMatta	 of	 superficiality,	arguing	that	the	latter	just	systematizes	the	commonsensical	self-image	of	Brazil	in	his	attempt	to	find	(or	to	found?)	what	might	be	“peculiar”	to	its	social	formation,	Souza	himself	projects	onto	Brazil	a	“peculiarity”	that	he	derives	from	another	main	source	of	commonsensical	self-image	of	Brazil,	namely,	Gilberto	Freyre’s	controversial	interpretation	of	Brazilian	slavery.	Highly	problematic	ideas	such	as	“escravidão	muçulmana”	and	 “o	mulato	como	 tipo	social”	have	 free	analytical	 transit	 in	Souza’s	argumentation,	a	procedure	 that	makes	his	text	almost	as	untenable	as	DaMatta’s.	110	About	the	slaves’	form	of	organization	that	offered	open	resistance	to	slavery,	Mattoso	writes:	“Todos	esses	grupos	que	repelem	o	sistema	escravista	brasileiro,	quilombo	pacífico	ou	associação	secreta	criada	para	 fomentar	 uma	 insurreição,	 jamais	 conseguem,	 pois,	 sensibilizar	 todo	 o	 corpo	 social	 dos	 escravos.	Permanecem	marginais	e	muito	frequentemente	são	precários.	Para	o	escravo	insatisfeito,	eles	são	o	local	quase	mítico	de	possíveis	refúgios;	mas	este	escravo	é	incapaz	de	unir-se	a	todos	os	seus	irmãos	para	dar	força	e	vida	a	seu	sonho.	(Mattoso	[1982]	2003:	166)	
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The 1835 uprising in Salvador (Bahia), so-called Malê Revolt, for example, provoked the 
outbreak of a wave of panic among the Brazilian elites (Batista 2003). The slaveholding upper 
class saw shades of Saint-Domingue being projected over the capital of the empire, Rio de 
Janeiro, where slaves made up more than 50% of the population111. A new word appeared in 
the police jargon: haitianismo.112 Also a new law was promulgated, the Lei Exceptional de 
1835113, which determines the death penalty for slaves involved in rebellions or in murders of 
masters or overseers. Correctly, João José Reis consider the Malê Revolt the most significant 
urban slave rebellion in Brazil (Reis 1986).  
Nonetheless, Mattoso qualifies this movement as “pre-political”, a category that she extends 
to all other prior slave insurrections: “O movimento de 1835, como de resto todos os 
precedentes, mantém-se pré-político. Somente é politico na medida em que houve tentativa 
de tomada de poder para redistribuí-lo.” (Mattoso [1982] 2003: 166 – emphasis added). First 
of all, it is fairly difficult to grasp what she understands under the category of “pre-political”. 
Even more difficult is to put aside the manifest evolutionist tone of this characterization. Still, 
if just momentarily and for the sake of argument, one makes the effort and, following 
Mattoso’s thesis, confines oneself to remark that rebellions were nothing else than a radical 
negation of that “double life” slaves were forced to live, one has then to conclude that outside 
of this “doubleness” there was no proper politics … yet. Outside “doubleness” there was only 
that idealized mythic place, where the slaves could dreamily run for shelter. Now, bringing the 
evolutionist content of Mattoso’s statement fully into this interpretation, it was to say that 
this place was the “black pre-political” counterpart of the “already political” world of the white 
master. 
In fact, the presence of a “black world” clearly separated from a “white world” is patent in 
Mattoso’s argumentation. In doing so, she is more or less just unfolding Roger Bastide’s old 
																																																								111	“Segundo	as	estimativas	de	Mary	Karasch,	os	escravos	chegaram	a	constituir	mais	de	50%	da	população	da	cidade	[do	Rio	de	Janeiro]	durante	a	década	de	1830”.	(Chalhoub	[1990]	2011:	233)	112	Chalhoub	detects	the	use	of	this	word	in	the	police	correspondence	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	1836.	He	explains	that	“a	palavra	haitianismo	[…]	é	uma	referência	ao	fantasma	do	Haiti,	com	seu	exemplo	asssustador	de	uma	rebelião	negra	que	resultara	na	tomada	do	poder.	Essa	palavra,	porém,	assumiu	no	século	XIX	um	sentido	mais	geral,	significando	a	ameaça	de	movimentos	populares	com	a	participação	de	negros	escravos	e	forros.	(Chalhoub	[1990]	2011:	240)	113	However,	Ricardo	Figueiredo	Pirola	remarks	that	this	law	had	been	the	subject	of	parliamentary	debates	since	1833.	The	project	for	the	promulgation	of	the	law	had	been	an	answer	to	the	Carranca’s	insurrection	occurred	in	that	same	year	in	Minas	Gerais	as	well	as	to	movements	of	slave	rebelliousness	which	took	place	in	Bahia	and	São	Paulo	at	that	time	(Pirola	2012:	49–50).		
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idea about the “princípio de corte”114. There is no problem in making the point that the way 
in which the white slaveholder class experienced the world was substantially different from 
the way slaves did. So different that one can metaphorically say that they lived in distinct 
worlds.  
The problem begins when one entirely overlooks that the conceptualization of these 
“worlds”—for example, in the form of the ascension from the “pre-political” to the 
“political”—is the core of what produces and reproduces the act of filibustering the exposition 
of the slave’s point of view that Mattoso, paradoxically, wants to represent.  
In exploring the “doubleness” of the slaves’ lives split into those two worlds, Mattoso creates 
a binary construction that is the very source of the “duplicity” of her discourse: with one hand 
she endows the slaves with a self-conscious agency, which she, either by means of qualifying 
it as “pre-political” or as springing from an innate capacity of adaptation (the “jeito”), 
immediately takes away with the other! 
The most harmful and not completely unexpected effect of this operation can be clearly seen 
in the way Mattoso deals with the issue of direct violence in the Brazilian slavery system: 
Os castigos corporais também servem para manter a ordem através do exemplo. Mas sua 
aplicação não fazia absolutamente parte da vida diária do escravo. Ninguém nega que tenha 
havido senhores ou senhoras sádicos. Contudo, de um modo geral, nem o senhor nem o feitor 
passeiam entre os escravos, chicote na mão, para repreender qualquer pecadilho. Os meios 
utilizados para assegurar a obediência no trabalho e a humildade nas relações com os senhores 
são muito mais sutis. O senhores procura fazer os escravos ligarem-se a eles por laços afetivos, 
tenta, em primeiro lugar, inspirar-lhes consideração e quando o trabalho é bem feito termina 
por gerar um respeito mútuo. O chicote, o tronco, a máscara de ferro, ou o pelourinho são o 
último recurso dos senhores incapazes de manter a disciplina. (Mattoso [1982] 2003: 117) 
  
The point Mattoso intends to make here is that direct violence in the form of corporal 
punishment was the last means Brazilian masters would resort to in order to exact obedience 
of their slaves. Compare this stance to the treatment of the same topic in Emilia Viotti da 
Costa’s 1966 Da Colônia à Senzala: 
“No regime da escravidão, em que o trabalho desmoraliza e é resultante de uma imposição, o 
grupo dominante se vê frequentemente obrigado a recorrer à violência física, quando queira 
alcançar seus desígnios.  
Para manter o ritmo de trabalho, impedir atitudes de indisciplina ou reprimir revoltas, para 
atemorizar os escravos, mantê-los humildes e submissos, evitar e punir fugas, os senhores 
recorriam aos mais variados tipos de castigo, pois os acordos e reprimendas valiam pouco. 																																																								114	Roger	Bastide	refers	to	this	notion	as	 follows:	“Aquilo	a	que	chamamos	“princípio	de	corte”	 lhe	[the	slaves]	faculta	sem	dúvida	viverem	em	dois	mundos	diferentes,	evitando	tensões	e	choques:	o	choque	de	valores	bem	como	as	exigências,	no	entanto	contraditórias,	das	duas	sociedades.”	(Bastide	1971:	517)			
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Não se concebia outra maneira de regular a prestação de serviços e a disciplina do escravo. O 
que se podia condenar era o excesso, os abusos cometidos por alguns senhores ou seus 
mandatários: feitores ou ‘cabras’. O castigo físico impunha-se, na opinião do tempo, como 
única medida coercitiva eficaz.” (Costa [1966] 1997: 337) 
 
Such a diametrical opposition of views arouses the justified suspicion that Emilia Viotti da 
Costa is among those interlocutors, who Mattoso does not call by name, but accuses of having 
chosen the “wrong arguments” for attacking Brazilian slavery. Wrong because, instead of 
looking at the empirical reality emanated from the sources, these arguments depart from an 
abstract understanding that defines physical violence as foundational and constituent to the 
sustainment of slavery in general. As a consequence thereof, they had provided a black and 
white picture of the Brazilian variant, putting too much emphasis on a systemic brutality that 
had not been operative in practical life. The side effect of this approach had been, Mattoso 
sustains, the presentation of slaves as completely passive victims.  
Mattoso’s slaves are in no way a victim. They are well-nourished creatures, whose alimentary 
regime was better than that of the poor free men115 and whose love for freedom was less 
intense than the fear of losing the circle of protection furnished by the master116 and his 
family, to which, by the way, the slaves partially belonged117. If Mattoso’s slaves died at an 
extremely high rate when compared to other social groups, this is not due to the excess of 
work, but just to the general local infra-structure and climatic conditions, since the masters 
would not deliberately devalue the capital indispensable to the prosperity of their own 
business118. Being a slave in Brazil was to have masters who were open to develop a 
																																																								115	“Sabemos	que	o	regime	alimentar	do	escravo	era	muito	mais	rico	em	calorias,	proteínas	e	hidratos	de	carbono	do	que	o	da	população	pobre	do	Brasil	do	 século	XIX:	o	 trivial	do	escravo	continha	 farinha	de	mandioca,	milho,	carne	seca,	caça,	frutas	locais	(banana,	laranja,	limão,	mamão)	e	melaço.	Próximo	à	costa	ou	aos	rios	os	escravos	pescavam	peixes	e	crustáceos.	Na	cidade	o	escravo	que	tinha	o	direito	de	ganhar	um	pouco	de	dinheiro	para	si	de	abastecer-se	no	mercado	onde	outros	escravos	vendem	muitos	pratos	prontos,	de	cheiro	apetitoso	e	preço	convidativo.	(Mattoso	[1982]	2003:	118)	116	“O	escravo	maduro	ou	já	velho,	que	passou	a	vida	inteira	a	ver	os	outros	decidirem	por	ele,	agir	em	seu	nome,	que	obedeceu	 sempre,	 terá	muita	dificuldade	em	obter	 liberdade	 real.	 Isto	não	quer	dizer	que	o	escravo	fosse	passivo,	sem	coragem,	sem	autonomia	relativa	no	círculo	de	segurança	criado	pelo	senhor.”	(Mattoso	[1982]	2003:	209)	117	“Em	geral,	o	senhor	prefere	a	persuasão	à	imposição.	No	Nordeste,	os	senhores	de	engenho	substituem	a	violência	e	as	ameaças	por	uma	verdadeira	manipulação	de	caráter	patriarcal	e	paternalista.	Buscam	fazer	do	escravo	um	servidor,	membro	da	grande	família,	num	modus	vivendi	que	economiza	aos	proprietários	os	custos	da	vigilância,	os	 riscos	de	ver	atacados	 seus	bens	ou	 suas	esposas.	O	escravo	adquire	uma	certa	identidade	 social	 e	 vê	 que	 lhe	 são	 dados	 certos	 papéis	 sociais	 e	 até	 certa	 importância	 social,	 um	 peso	específico	face	o	homem	livre,	resultado	da	garantia	protetora	da	família	do	senhor.”	(Mattoso	[1982]	2003:	103)	118	“[O]	proprietário	de	escravos	é	um	empresário	que	não	deixará	deliberadamente	desvalorizar-se	esse	capital	indispensável	à	prosperidade	de	seu	empreendimento.”	(Mattoso	[1982]	2003:	118)	
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relationship of mutual respect119, it was to be able to sometimes even dictate the “rules of 
the game”!120 Being a slave in Brazil was, to sum up translating Mattoso’s unhappy words, a 
“more or less happy adaptation” of the black men to the condition they were destined to live 
under (Mattoso [1982] 2003: 175). 
In the light of this picture of Brazilian slavery, it is perfectly tenable to draw the conclusion 
that Katia Mattoso, taken by the desire to adopt the point of view of the slave, ends up 
producing an interpretation that does justice to the epithet Gorender gave to it: 
neopatriarchalism121. In her eager anxiety to rehabilitate the slaves she paradoxically 
rehabilitates slavery. 
 
Visões da Liberdade 
A constant revisiting of Ser Escravo no Brasil, which is both proof and consequence of its very 
influence within Brazilian historiography, has led to a redress of many issues discussed 
above122. Still, the question of “doubleness” has remained more or less untouched. 																																																								119	 “O	 senhor	 procura	 fazer	 os	 escravos	 ligarem-se	 a	 ele	 por	 laços	 afetivos,	 tenta,	 em	 primeiro	 lugar,	inspirar-lhes	consideração	e	quando	o	trabalho	é	bem	feito	termina	por	gerar	um	respeito	mútuo.	“(Mattoso	[1982]	2003:	117)	120	Concerning	the	slavery	in	the	mining	regions	of	Minas	Gerais:	“O	escravo	trabalhador,	engenhoso	ou	abençoado	 dos	 céus,	 que	 descobria	 a	 pepita	 suplementar	 ou	 o	 diamante	 precioso,	 podia	 muito	 bem	conseguir	acumular	pecúlio	pessoal:	o	senhor	tinha	o	direito	de	exigir-lhe	um	mínimo,	do	qual	ele	próprio	devia	prestar	contas	ao	governo,	que	em	troca	lhe	outorgara	a	concessão.	Quanto	ao	excedente,	o	escravo	
passa	a	ditar	as	 regras	do	 jogo	 e	encontra	proteção	até	da	organização	administrativa.	 (Mattoso	 [1982]	2003:	109	–	emphasis	added)	121	Jacob	Gorender	defines	“neopatriarcalistas”	as	a	set	of	historiographical	approaches	that	reaffirm	the	two	main	theses	that	guided	Giberto	Freyre’s	thinking,	namely:	1)	on	the	exceptionally	benign	character	of	the	Brazilian	slavery	system;	2)	that	a	“racial	democracy”	rules	the	social	relations	in	Brazil.	In	this	sense,	he	writes	on	Ser	Escravo	no	Brasil:	 “Com	efeito,	é	 indiscutível	o	conhecimento	de	Kátia	Mattoso	sobre	a	escravidão	em	Salvador,	como	é	inegável	sua	contribuição	inovadora	ao	estudo	da	questão	da	alforria	[...].	O	que	sucede	é	que	Ser	Escravo	no	Brasil	não	se	tornou	obra	de	referência	nas	teses	acadêmicas	por	motivo	de	tais	méritos,	porém,	pela	enfática	reafirmação	do	sistema	patriarcal	na	escravidão	brasileira,	em	termos	remontados	a	Gilberto	Freyre.”	(Gorender	1990:	12–18	-	emphasis	added)	122	 For	 instance,	 the	 characterization	 of	 the	 Malê	 Revolt	 as	 “pre-political”	 was	 critically	 addressed	 by	Eduardo	 Silva	 in	 “O	 Levante	 dos	 Malês:	 Uma	 Interpretação	 Política”.	 He	 wrotes:	 “A	 política	 tem	 sido	considerada	 o	 universo	 dos	 homens	 livres	 das	 sociedades	 modernas.	 Os	 rebeldes	 que	 fizeram	 seus	movimentos	 em	 contextos	 pré-industriais	 ou	 pré-capitalistas	 ganharam	 a	 denominação	 de	 rebeldes	primitivos	 e	 seus	 movimentos	 foram	 chamados	 de	 pré-políticos.	 Essa	 terminologia	 de	 inspiração	evolucionista	[…]	 já	 foi	habilmente	criticada	por	nossos	antropólogos	e	historiadores.	Eles	colocaram	as	peças	no	 lugar	certo:	não	se	 trata	de	uma	questão	de	“pré”	ou	“pós”,	 trata-se	do	diferente.	Os	“rebeldes	primitivos”	faziam	a	política	que	podiam	fazer	face	aos	recursos	com	que	contavam,	a	sociedade	em	que	viviam	e	as	limitações	estruturais	que	enfrentavam”	(Reis/Silva	[1989]	2009:	99).	Manolo	 Florentino,	 in	 turn,	 analysing	 the	 demographic	 question	 of	 slaves’	 mortality	 rate	 from	 the	perspective	of	Economic	History,	argues	that	for	a	long	time	the	Brazilian	slavery	enterprise	profited	highly	from	the	low	prices	paid	for	enslaved	people	in	Africa.	This	allowed	for	centring	its	strategy	of	economic	reproduction	 in	 the	 shortening	 of	 the	 interval	 between	 the	 outlay	 on	 purchase	 of	 slaves	 and	 the	amortization.	Only	after	1850,	due	the	general	increase	of	slave	prices	provoked	by	the	abolishment	of	the	slave	trade,	the	Brazilian	slaveholding	class	would	effectively	invest	in	the	prolongation	of	the	slaves’	life	
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Following the path opened by Mattoso, Sydney Chalhoub’s Visões da Liberdade also aims at 
looking at Brazilian slavery from the perspective of the slaves with the conspicuous purpose 
of restoring their autonomous agency. Thus, he sets up as the target of his criticisms both the 
“theory of the slave as thing”	and its logical and compensatory counterpart, namely, the idea 
of the slave as inherently rebel.123 (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 49) 
Basically, what Chalhoub wants to demonstrate is that the slaves generally remained faithful 
to the master, but they did that according to their own logic or rationality, which, firmly rooted 
in particular and original experiences and traditions, were not a reflex or mirror of the 
slaveholding’s Weltanschauung (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 38). In other words, slaves were 
indeed humble and obedient, although not for the reasons their master believed, but for their 
own interest. It sounds quite banal. It ceases perhaps to be so, if one tries to understand in 
which way obedience happened to be the essence of resistance against slavery. 
Obviously, Chalhoub is unfolding the very same argument that Mattoso put forward earlier. 
He is also seeking for signals of the slaves’ autonomy where they are less evident to be found. 
However, differently from Mattoso, he neither addresses the issue of adaptation, be it happy 
or unhappy, nor appeals to the rhetoric of the as untranslatable as inscrutable slaves’ “jeito”. 
Rather, one finds Chalhoub’s slaves consciously engaged in attempting to widen their degree 
of freedom by presenting themselves not only as what they juridically were, slaves, but also 
as “workers” (operários). (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 275) 
The place where this “double role” as “slave” and “worker” could be played at best was the 
nineteenth-century’s Rio de Janeiro, which Chalhoub calls “the black city”.  
“A cidade negra é o engendramento de um tecido de significados e de práticas sociais que 
politiza o cotidiano dos sujeitos históricos num sentido específico – isto é no sentido da 
transformação de eventos aparentemente corriqueiros no cotidiano das relações sociais na 
escravidão em acontecimentos políticos que fazem desmoronar os pilares da instituição do 
trabalho forçado. Castigos, alforrias, atos de compra e venda, licenças para que negros vivam 
‘sobre si’, e outras ações comuns na escravidão se configuram então como momentos de crise, 
como atos que são percebidos pelas personagens históricas como potencialmente 
transformadores de suas vidas e da sociedade na qual participam. Em suma, a formação da 
cidade negra é o processo de luta dos negros no sentido de instituir a política – ou seja, a busca 
de liberdade – onde antes havia fundamentalmente a rotina. (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 232 – 
emphasis in the original) 																																																								(Florentino	 [1997]	 2010:	 50–60).	 In	 this	 respect,	 Florentino	 just	 corroborates	 the	 thesis	 Gorender	 had	advanced	in	his	classic	Escravismo	Colonial	(Gorender	1978).	123	 Chalhoub	 focuses	 his	 critique	 on	 Jacob	 Gorender’s	 Escravismo	 Colonial	 and	 Fernando	 Henrique	Cardoso’s	 Capitalismo	 e	 Escravidão	 no	 Brasil	 Meridional,	 two	major	 works	 of	 the	 Economic	 History	 of	Slavery.		
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It is difficult to understand why the routine character of manumissions and authorizations to 
become an “autonomous slave” (viver sobre si) should give any reason for conceiving them as 
“non-political” issues. Such events, having been the legal and customary form of granting 
freedom, were essentially political at any time throughout the course of slavery, for they 
regulated the linchpin of the whole system. Manumissions or, for the case, also the sanction 
to “viver sobre si”, by providing a powerful incentives for slaves, functioned as the most 
important means of mediating the master-slave relationship, reason why it forcefully became 
an intrinsically political element of every slaveholding society (Patterson 1982: 341). In 
Chalhoub’s perspective the Brazilian case was an exception to this rule. 
In order to defend his thesis that some quotidian events took on such an importance that they 
began to bear unexpected political meanings, Chalhoub explores, along with the example of 
the manumissions, three biographical accounts. The first of these biographies is about 
Francelina, a teenage black slave who was prosecuted for the murder of her mistress. The 
second one is about Margarida, a black slave beaten to death by her masters, who, with the 
purpose of occulting the fact, buried her as if she were another person, providing even a 
falsified death certificate. The third one is about the freedmen Romão, who killed the son of 
the ex-master of his girlfriend, the slave Maria.  
Three murder cases: the “life and death struggle” involving slaves and masters. Chalhoubs 
calls them “histórias pífias”. The adjective “pífio” meaning “ordinary”, in the sense of being 
usual, typical, expected, as well as “unimportant”. 
This characterization is, on the one hand, extremely contradictory, for if the violence against 
slaves in the “black city” was indeed regulated by a sort of Thompsonian moral economy 
(Thompson 1971) that the masters did not dare ignore for fear of risking their own necks124, 
how then to explain the “quotidian” character attributed to such histories?  
On the other hand, it is indeed coherent, for Chalhoub believes that in order to access the 
blacks’ feelings and thinking, one has to put aside momentarily the unease provoked by 
contemplating a society where the selling and buying of black people, as well as other kind of 																																																								124	Discussing	the	question	of	bodily	punishment,	Chalhoub	says:	“Não	encontrei	sequer	vestígio	de	negros	que	colocassem	em	questão	o	castigo	físico	enquanto	tal.	Parecia	ponto	pacífico	que	o	chicote	e	a	palmatória	eram	instrumentos	legítimos	para	a	“correção”	dos	escravos	recalcitrantes.	Todas	as	lutas	e	contradições	se	davam	em	torno	do	motive	e	da	intensidade	da	punição	aplicada.	Parafraseando	um	autor	razoavelmente	conhecido,	havia	uma	espécie	de	‘economia	moral’	da	escravaria	que	os	senhores	não	ousavam	ignorar	sob	penas	de	verem	rolarem	as	próprias	têmporas.”	(Chalhoub	[1990]	2011:	188)	
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violence against them, were a normal practice. Slaves, he argues, were permanently 
confronted with that. It was not a big deal. It was ordinary. Historians must try to see from 
this perspective too, if they really want to understand how slaves thought and acted 
(Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 50). 
From this vantage point Chalhoub then takes an instance that seems to be an anti-evolutionist 
critique of the idea of progress: 
“A ideia de que ‘progredimos’ de cem anos pra cá é, no mínimo, angelical e sádica: ela supõe 
ingenuidade e cegueira diante de tanta injustiça social, e parte também da estranha crença de 
que sofrimentos humanos intensos podem ser de alguma forma pesados ou medidos.” 
(Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 48) 
 
Still, Chalhoub’s words can well be regarded as promoting a compelling argument in favour of 
the banalization of contemporary “social barbarisms”. If atrocities of past times may be 
regarded as “pífias” when seen from the perspective of that time, on what grounds should 
one rebuke the present-time for insisting on its right to practise its own iniquities without 
great preoccupation?  
As soon as this question arises, one realizes that Chalhoub’s critique is a way of driving out the 
menace of having his vantage point turned into a potential ad hoc legitimation of whatever 
happened in any given time (the present one included!) To be sure, he does not at all criticize 
the idea of progress, he just dislocates it to the future. In this sense, his critique rather 
amounts to a sort of accusation that some practices of the present truly belong to the past. 
Anyone willing to make the effort of seeing the past from his vantage point would be able to 
acknowledge it. The book he is then writing is supposed to enable one to perform this task. 
In addition to that, Chalhoub faces his critique with an atemporal moral dimension by 
emphasizing that intense human sufferings cannot be “measured” or “weighted”. However, 
the contradiction between this statement and the categorization of slave biographies—which 
he himself wrote—as “histórias pífias”, is blatant.  
These biographies must be, on the contrary, thought of as rather “significant histories”, for if 
they are not, if they were conceived as just “pífias”, Chalhoub could hardly have used them to 
make his point. Should they even be designated as “especially significant histories”, why does 
Chalhoub nevertheless call them as he does? The way Chalhoub denominates those histories 
denotes his second stance on the idea of progress. A stance that brings his Visões da Liberdade 
dangerously near to Mattoso’s Ser Escravo no Brasil. 
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While in Mattoso’s view there were slave movements that are “pre-political”, in Chalhoub’s 
there are moments and places where central questions related to the sustainment of slavery 
are supposed not to have been “political” … yet. The Rio de Janeiro of the second half of the 
19th century was undoubtedly “political”. Was the Rio de Janeiro in periods prior to this, say, 
seventeenth-century Rio de Janeiro, “pre-political”? In this respect, what could be said about 
São Paulo, where slaves at that time125 made up a minority of the population and which, 
consequently, is not liable to be demographically described as a “black city”? Shall one assume 
that there are times and places within Brazilian slavery where manumissions or murders of 
slaves by their masters—as well as the other way round—were just “routine”? In other words, 
yet preserving Chalhoub’s vocabulary, would it be a coarse analytical error to consider such 
issues as equally “political issues”, even in the absence of the urban dynamic characteristic of 
the so-called “black city”?  
Chalhoub’s Visões da Liberdade is an affirmative answer to all these questions. In his 
explanation the “black city” works at once as a condition of the possibility of the political per 
se as well as of the slave doubleness, which is the performed expression of their “double 
consciousness”.  
In this double movement, Chalhoub constructs the city as the moment of emergence of the 
political126, that is, as the moment in which the tireless exercise of quotidian small and big 
acts of violence, which the Brazilian slavery system reposed upon, ceased to be the mere and 
ordinary course of life and became extraordinary events potentially rich in political 
consequences. However, while doing that, he also discursively underplays the meaning of this 
very violence by qualifying those life-and-death struggles of masters and slaves as “pífios”.127 
Once again, the effort to present slaves endowed with autonomous self-consciousness results 
in (or from?) a debasement of brutality within the Historical representation of slavery. 																																																								125	In	1872,	for	example,	São	Paulo	had	a	population	of	about	31.385	habitants,	of	which	just	3.828	were	slaves	(Wissenbach	1998:	33).	126	Every	similitude	between	this	History	of	the	“black	city”	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	the	master-narrative	of	the	Greek	polis	as	birth	place	of	the	political	is	not	mere	coincidence!	127	Far	from	being	named	in	this	way,	such	events,	by	virtue	of	the	legitimate	and	naturalized	character	that	Chalhoub’s	adjective	lends	to	them,	should	be	regarded	as	truly	“limit	events”.	Dominick	La	Capra	remarks	that	especially	in	the	light	of	their	relation	to	trauma,	“limit	events	such	as	the	Holocaust,	other	genocides,	terrorism,	slavery,	aspects	of	colonialism,	and	so	forth,	one	would	think	trauma	and	its	aftermath	would	be	of	 marked	 interest	 to	 Historians.”	 Nevertheless,	 he	 argues	 further,	 with	 some	 exceptions	 (himself,	 for	example),	“the	interest	in	trauma	and,	perhaps	even	more	so,	in	dimensions	of	the	posttraumatic	has	thus	far	not	been	pronounced	in	the	work	of	Historians,	and	there	has	even	been	some	suspicion	of	attempts	to	conceptualize	trauma	and	its	aftermath.”	(LaCapra	2004:	106–107)	
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In conclusion, it is known that along with the analysis of literary texts, a resource that Sydney 
Chalhoub recurrently resorts to, he has also been publicly acclaimed and awarded for his artful 
writing128. Perhaps by virtue of this distinguished skill, he allows himself some liberties of style 
- such as, it is worth repeating, to qualify murder cases involving slaves and masters as 
“histórias pífias”. If it is so, such liberties, paraphrasing his own remark about the existence of 
a “moral economy of violence in the Brazilian slavery”, would call for an examination of the 
“moral economy of discursive violence within the Brazilian Historiography of Slavery.” 
 
Sonhos Africanos, Vivências Ladinas 
Is there a way out of this relationship of inverse proportionality between the construction of 
the slaves’ self-conscious agency and the underestimation of systemic violence, be it 
presented as an “empirical fact”, as in Mattoso’s case, or be it effected on the level of the 
discursive construction of meaning, as Chalhoub does it? 
An alternative view can be found in Sonhos Africanos, Vivências Ladinas by Maria Cristina C. 
Wissenbach. The author is also concerned with a possible slaves’ point of view. She is also 
clearly influenced by Katia Mattoso’s work.129 But instead of daring to present herself as 
seeing from the slaves’ perspective, she chooses a more careful approach. She defines her 
work as an attempt to Historically rescue some aspects of the slave’s life, a task whose aim is 
to lift them from the Historical anonymity they have been relegated to by a historiography 
that, excessively concerned with slavery as a political and economic system, had considered 
the human in terms external to that which socially defined the slave (Wissenbach 1998: 68).  
																																																								128	For	his	Cidade	febril	–	Cortiços	e	epidemias	na	Corte	Imperial	(1997),	Sidney	Chalhoub	was	awarded	the	“Prêmio	 Jabuti”,	 the	most	 important	Brazilian	 literary	prize.	 Interestingly,	he	won	 it	not	 in	 the	category	“Social	Sciences”,	but	in	the	category	“Essay”.	(Soihet	1999:	183–187)	129	Wissenbach	explores	largely	the	notion	of	“aprendizado	social	adquirido”	(Wissenbach1998:	149;	162;	188).	Kátia	Mattoso	had	treated	the	question	as	follows:	“[É]	simples	o	dilema	do	homem	preto,	escravo	vindo	da	África:	ou	bem	não	se	consegue	adaptar,	não	passa	de	refugo,	e	só	lhe	resta	a	luta	sem	quartel,	o	suicídio,	a	fuga,	a	revolta;	ou	então,	consegue	integrar-se	mais	ou	menos	bem,	mais	ou	menos	rapidamente	nesta	sociedade	que	o	acolhe,	e	vai	encontrar	nova	identidade,	resultado	de	dupla	adaptação:	ajustamento	tático	ao	modelo	branco	e	ao	que	seus	senhores	exigem	dele	em	obediência,	fidelidade	e	adaptação	sincera	aos	modos	de	vida	e	pensamento	criados	por	um	grupo	escravo	heterogêneo,	numa	dupla	tensão	que	busca,	ao	 mesmo	 tempo,	 imitar	 o	 branco	 e	 manter	 a	 tradição	 africana.	 Na	 verdade,	 a	 maioria	 dos	 escravos	terminam	por	aprender	a	rezar,	a	obedecer,	a	trabalhar,	para	serem	aceitos	por	seus	senhores.	Enquanto	isso,	conseguem	a	delicada	adaptação	à	nova	cultura	criado	pelo	grupo	dos	antigos	e	dos	crioulos.	Esse	duplo	
aprendizado	é	condição	indispensável	de	sobrevivência	e	a	chave	de	sua	identidade	nova.”	(Mattoso	[1982]	2003:	107	-	emphasis	added)	
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Tracing back to that which “socially defined” the slave, Wissenbach cannot help becoming 
entangled in the problematic of “doubleness” in direct connection both to self-conscious 
action and direct exercise of physical violence.  
She observes that the slaves, guided by a “distorted logic” (lógica enviesada), premeditatedly 
committed homicides with the deliberate purpose of being delivered to the impersonal power 
of justice. In this way, they escaped the narrow limits imposed by the master’s sovereignty 
and, submitted now to the codes of the wider community, transforming themselves, 
enthrallingly, into citizens! (Wissenbach 1998: 128) 
Still, among the murderes the slaves were the only ones who were liable to be sentenced 
either to death or to the “galés perpétuas” (lifelong imprisonment with forced labour in public 
works), the latter penalty being much more frequently imposed than the former.  
Thus, even if one takes into account that for several reasons slaves might have committed 
crimes with the deliberate purpose of being delivered to the justice system, it is difficult to 
understand how, in doing so, they enabled themselves to usufruct any benefit of whatever 
may be conceived as being “citizenship” back then. When slaves pushed themselves into the 
sphere of the public administration of law, in no way did they cease being treated as slaves 
who would then be punished in accord with this status.  
However, if, just momentarily and for the sake of argument, one makes the effort of following 
Wissenbach’s thinking, one would see those “slave citizens” performing their “double role” 
either as those who, kept in chains and indefinitely deprived from the very possibility of 
becoming legally free, work on the construction of roads, bridges and railways, or as dead 
citizens. 
This latter one was indeed the “citizenship status” conceded to the slave Joaquim, executed 
in São Paulo in 1866 for the murder of his mistress. According to his testimony, the mistress 
was to blame for the fact of having had his three children sold, as well as for the excess of 
work to which he had been submitted (Wissenbach 1998: 249–250). 
Differently from Chalhoub, Wissenbach neither characterizes such a History as “pífia”, nor 
forgets to reiterate that the use of physical violence directly against the masters (or their 
surrogates) was intrinsic to the very slave condition, being an extreme measure they might 
take in order to fight slavery. Intelligently, she further remarks that the small number of police 
and judicial processes involving violence of masters against slaves shall be taken as telling 
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negative evidence both of the legitimate character of this type of violence and of the probable 
frequency of its occurrence.  
Actually, regardless of the subject Wissenbach deals with, she is steadily attentive to the 
immanent violence, which takes variegated forms, present in many dimensions of the slaves’ 
life. For instance, writing about female slaves, Wissenbach does not overlook that they are 
subjected to a double (political/economical and gendered) regime of oppression. In the same 
direction, she does not fail to see that, if freedwomen happened to be a permanent target of 
physical aggression by their partners, this was due to the fact that they had managed to free 
themselves (at least officially) from only one of those types of domination (Wissenbach 1998: 
145–147). 
Maria Cristina Wissenbach does not convey the impression of having made a herculean effort 
when she, not only without underplaying the role played by different types of violence, but 
even carefully underscoring this aspect, presents the slaves as subjects guided by an 
autonomous self-consciousness. Her historiographical writing is characterized by a sensitive 
political correctness combined with sociological accuracy. Joined, these two characteristics 
make of Sonhos Africanos, Vivências Ladinas a book that describes Brazilian slavery (in São 
Paulo) as irremediably and extremely violent, and, at the same time, shows how, by virtue of 
this very feature, slaves were forced to counteract this violence by developing ways of life that 
opened spaces of negotiation which, following the exigencies of the system, were not 
expected even to exist, let alone to play any decisive role. It is in this sense that Wissenbach’s 
slaves did not exactly live through slavery but survived it.  
Nonetheless, it shall be pointed out that her attempt to “rescue” the viewpoint of those 
“survivors” is jeopardized by this very redemptive rhetoric, by the whole conceptual apparatus 
she must use in order to carry out this task as well as by the political-institutional sphere of 
legitimation of the work she wrote. Not losing of sight of the articulation of these aspects, it 
is right to classify Sonhos Africanos, Vivências Ladinas as a work that meets the formal and 
epistemological standards required by History’s scholarship and, despite that, manages to 
display the sensitivity and moral responsibility that the issue of colonial slavery demands130.  																																																								130	Alternatively,	one	might	say	that	Maria	Cristina	C.	Wissenbach	was	capable	of	putting	into	practice	what	Dominick	 LaCapra	 termed	 “empathic	 unsettlement”.	 Under	 this	 concept	 he	 understands	 an	 empathic	response	that	“requires	the	recognition	of	others	as	other	rather	than	mere	objects	of	research	unable	to	question	one	or	place	one	in	question.	And	it	does	not	substitute	for,	but	on	the	contrary	must	be	articulated	with,	normative	judgement	and	socio-political	response.”	(LaCapra	2004:	135)	
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The burden of modernity 
These three books carry out a re-examination of the simplifying equation that presents the 
relation of violence to self-consciousness as always inversely proportional: the more intense 
the violence exercised upon a subject, the less room available for the subject’s self-
consciousness. The clear purpose of the historiographical operation of focusing on the slaves’ 
self-consciousness is making them self-conscious subjects of their own history rather than 
passive victims. An extreme case of the effect of this operation on the way of conceiving power 
asymmetries is inescapable and sufficiently clear if one considers Mattoso’s thesis on the 
“happy adaptation” of the enslaved Africans to slavery. 
The constitution of the slave’s self-consciousness is a process of developing a double 
consciousness repeatedly expressed in statements about a “double life”, “double role”, 
“double learning”. This results from the historiographical presentation of slaves’ lives 
consumed in the pursuit of a type of social recognition different from the one supposedly 
deserved.  
In the vocabulary used to mark this difference, the patent evolutionist character expressed by 
the prefix “pre” in the pair “pre-political → political” (Kátia Mattoso) tends to reproduce itself 
implicitly in “slave → worker” (Sydney Chalhoub), where the second term of the pair stands 
for the discipline, assiduity, punctuality and efficiency that guides the rationality of capitalism. 
The same happens again in regards to the pair “slave → citizen” (Maria C. Wissenbach), where 
“citizenship” means to enter into a broad community of persons freely subjected to the 
impersonal power of the state. This mode of explanation brings about a discursive context 
within which the slaves’ identity ended up engendered in a History that is a corollary to a 
subliminal master-narrative of transition to capitalism and modernity.  
“Double consciousness” emerges thus as an expedient sprung from dealing with the burden 
of having to become modern. A burden that black slaves and their descendants have carried 




Blacks, those who do not (even) speak131 
Ai ai ai ai 
São Bento me chama 
Capoeira song 
 
Paul Gilroy sees The Black Atlantic “as complementing and extending the work of feminist 
philosophers who have opposed the figuration of woman as sign for the repressed or irrational 
other […] of the system that reproduces the dominance of bonded whiteness, masculinity and 
rationality” (Gilroy 1993: 45–46). 
Feminist thinkers engaged in this task do not fail to point out that the ensemble of 
philosophical assumptions that underlies the Eurocentrism of the dualistic system upon which 
the binaries of modernity are premised may be traced back, certainly not by accident, to the 
																																																								131	“Socrates,	he	who	does	not	write.”	With	this	quote	from	Nietzsche’s	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	Derrida	begins	the	first	chapter	of	his	Of	Grammatology	(Derrida	[1967]	1997:	6).	It	is	a	gesture	with	which	he	indicates	that	 the	 amplitude	 of	what	 he	 calls	 the	 “problem	 of	 language”	 comes	 back	 to	 the	 traditional	 inaugural	moment	of	Western	philosophy	as	well	as	draws	attention	to	three	decisive	moments	in	its	development:	Socrates,	Nietzsche	and,	of	course,	himself.		According	to	Frank	Ankersmit,	in	The	Birth	of	Tragedy,	Nietzsche	deeply	regretted	that	“rational	reflection	–	 that	 is,	 Socrates	 –	 destroyed	 the	 Greek’s	 previous	 susceptibility	 to	 the	 profound	 truths	 expresses	 by	tragedy”	(Ankersmit	2012:	171).	Socrates	had	done	that	by	insisting	that	life	should	be	grounded	in	rational	understanding	 and	 justified	 by	 “knowledge”	 (Cooper	 2005:	 980).	 Derrida	 subscribes	 to	 Nietzsche’s	interpretation	when	he	argues	that	“the	system	of	“hearing	(understanding)-oneself	speaking	through	the	phonic	substance	–	which	presents	itself	as	the	non-exterior,	non-mundane,	therefore,	non-empirical	or	non-contingent	signifier	–	has	dominated	the	history	of	the	world	during	an	entire	epoch,	and	has	even	produced	the	 idea	of	 the	world,	 the	 idea	of	world-origin,	 that	 arises	 from	 the	difference	between	 the	wordly,	 the	outside	and	the	inside,	ideality	and	non-ideality,	universal	and	non-universal,	transcendental	and	empirical,	etc.”	The	Socratic	non-written	moment	of	philosophical	discourse	is	also	at	the	bottom	of	the	antinomies	of	the	Western	philosophical	tradition,	which	Derrida,	in	turn,	wants	to	deconstruct.	Frank	Ankersmit	also	remarks	that	The	Birth	of	Tragedy	undoubtedly	is	“the	locus	classicus	of	the	notion	of	representation.”	(Ankersmit	2012:	165)	In	fact,	Derrida	comes	back	to	Socrates	through	Nietzsche	in	order	to	point	 to	a	movement	 that,	 in	his	own	words,	 “would	apparently	have	 tended,	as	 towards	 its	 telos,	 to	confine	writing	to	a	secondary	and	instrumental	function:	translator	of	full	speech	that	was	fully	present	(present	 to	 itself,	 to	 its	 signified,	 to	 the	other,	 the	 very	 condition	of	 the	 theme	of	 presence	 in	 general),	technics	 in	 the	 service	 of	 language,	 spokesman,	 interpreter	 of	 an	 originary	 speech	 itself	 shielded	 from	interpretation.”(Derrida	[1967]	1997:8)	Nietzsche’s	work,	he	emphasized,	has	contributed	a	great	deal	to	the	liberation	of	writing	from	its	dependence	or	derivation	from	the	logos	and	the	related	concept	of	truth	or	primary	 signified	 in	 whatever	 sense	 that	 is	 understood.	Playing	 on	 words,	 Derrida	 then	 pontifically	writes:	“Nietzsche	has	written	what	he	has	written.’’	(Derrida	[1967]	1997:	19)	In	this	manner,	and	relating	himself	 to	 Socrates	 through	 Nietzsche,	 Derrida	 stages	 a	 development	 of	 Western	 philosophy	 as	a	“metaphysics	or	presence"	that,	so	to	speak,	comprises	a	lineage	that	comes	from	the	full	presence	of	the	Socratic	phonic	substance	to	the	full	presence	of	his	own	writing.	In	evoking	Spivak	in	order	to	relate	itself	to	Socrates	through	Derrida’s	quotation	from	Nietzsche,	the	title	of	this	section	enacts	the	mediations	and	difficulties	of	writing	about	the	issue	of	black	peoples’	presence	and	representation	in	a	way	appropriated	to	the	epistemological	and	institutional	exigencies	guided	by	the	assumptions	 premised	 upon	 the	 Western	 philosophical	 discourse.	 This	 very	 title	 shall	 help	 one	 to	understand	 why,	 as	 will	 be	 shown	 in	 the	 next	 pages,	 the	 concept	 which	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	construction	of	Paul	Gilroy’s	Black	Atlantic	is—not	quite	surprisingly—that	of	“structure	of	feelings”.	
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founding “fathers” of antique Greece. In the work of these theoreticians one finds references 
to “Aristotle’s theory of generation, in which the biological conception of a female sexed being 
becomes an accident of nature (since the only ‘natural’ form of human life is the male)” 
(Braidotti 1991: 253), or to the fact that already in Plato women has been seen as “the 
dionysian force outside or beyond time”, as “the Real, the disorder men have sought to both 
to subdue and possess in the course of constructing rationality, truth and culture.” (Flax 1990: 
215).  
Interestingly, a common trait shared by feminist theories concerned with the foundation of 
“standpoint epistemologies” has been a tenacious return to Hegel’s work, especially to the 
passage about the master and the slave (Harding 1987: 158). Here, hand in hand with feminist 
philosophical endeavours to think in term of unity—unity of hand, brain and heart in Hilary 
Rose’s work, and of the sensuous, the concrete and the relational in Nancy Hartsock’s writing 
(Harding 1987: 141–151)—a rhetoric of “doubleness” also crops up expressed in terms such 
as “bifurcated consciousness” or in the question about whether the feminine may be seen as 
a very “double” of the philosophical (Braidotti 1991: 45).  
In a spatialized guise the same argument takes the form of the in-betweeness of the relation 
inside/outside. So De Lauretis argues that women “cannot resolve or dispel the uncomfortable 
condition of being at once inside and outside gender” (Braidotti 1991: 272), and, from the 
front of the American black feminism, Patricia Hill Collins speaks about the black women’s 
“outsider within status” (Collins 1986). 
Feminist theoreticians are not the only ones who have been working up conceptual 
frameworks within which the amalgam of whiteness, masculinity and rationality become 
stripped of their dominant role. In Feeling Backward – Loss and the Politics of Queer History, 
Heather Love stresses that  
“the idea of modernity—with its suggestions of progress, rationality and technological 
advance—is intimately bound up with backwardness. The association of progress and regress 
is a function not only of the failure of so many modernity’s key projects but also of the reliance 
of the concept of modernity on excluded, denigrated, or superseded others. If modernization 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century aimed at to move humanity forward, it did 
so in party by perfecting techniques for mapping and disciplining subjects considered to be 
lagging behind—and so seriously compromised the ability of these others ever to catch up. […] 
Whether understood as throwbacks to an earlier stage of human development or as children 
who refuse to grow up, queers have been seen across the twentieth century as a backward 
race. Perverse, immature, sterile, and melancholic: even when they provoke fears about the 
future, they somehow also recall the past. […] Narratives of gay and lesbian progress inevitably 
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recall the painful history of homosexual’s birth as one of modernity’s backward children.” 
(Love 2009: 5–7) 
 
Temporalisation, or rather, a temporal splitting is here the form that provides the double 
character of sexual and gender deviants’ self-consciousness. 
At this point, Love’s analysis was chosen less due to the discussion about this temporalized 
mode of creating “doubles”, an issue that has been extensively explored by postcolonial 
critiques of History132. Rather, it was chosen due to the fact that the discussion draws explicit 
attention to a notion that has been a recurrent theoretical point of junction in the discussion 
on the problem of self-consciousness with that one of long-term History: the notion of feeling. 
Love states that she, as many other recent critics, is deeply influenced by Raymond Williams’ 
concept of “structure of feelings”. Williams uses this concept as a way of refining what he calls 
“epochal analysis” of the interrelations of cultural processes, which, according to his 
terminology, may be designated “dominant”, “residual” or “emergent”. These three forms are 
yet more or less evident forms of cultural processes. There is yet a state of pre-emergence, 
when they are “active and pressing but not yet fully articulated”, and the changes that take 
place in this moment are those that he defines as changes in the “structure of feeling”: “We 
are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint and tone; specifically affective 
elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt 
and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating 
continuity.” (Williams [1977] 2009: 133 - emphasis added) 
William’s concept is a sort of conceptual tool designed to grasp culture’s historical movement 
in the moment in which its dislocation is not a matter of consolidated and immediate practice 
yet, but already a matter of practiced consciousness. Thus, he points out that “structures of 
feeling can be defined as social experiences in solution, as distinct from other social semantic 
formations, which have been precipitated and are more evidently and more immediately 
available.” Yet this specific solution, he warns, “is never mere flux”, but a “structured 
formation, which, because it is at the very edge of semantic availability, has many of the 
																																																								132	Shalini	Randeria’s	programmatic	text	“Geteilte	Geschichte	und	verworbene	Moderne”	offers	an	as	clear	and	eloquent	as	biting	synthesis	of	this	problematic:	“Visionen	einer	gemeinsamen	Zukunft	müssen	von	der	Erkenntnis	 ausgehen,	 dass	 alle	 heutigen	 Gesellschaften	 und	 Kulturen	 eine	 gemeinsame	 Gegenwart	miteinander	 teilen.	 Weder	 lässt	 sich	 die	 Gegenwart	 nichtwestlicher	 Gesellschaften	 als	 Vergangenheit	westlicher	 Gesellschaften,	 noch	 die	 Gegenwart	 des	 Westens	 als	 Zukunft	 aller	 anderen	 verstehen	 [...]“	(Randeria	1999:	87).	
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characteristics of a pre-formation, until specific articulations—new semantic figures—are 
discovered in material practice.” (Williams [1977] 2009: 134) 
Methodologically, “a ‘structure of feeling’ is a cultural hypothesis, actually derived from 
attempts to understand elements in their connection in a generation or period, and needing 
always to be returned, interactively, to such evidence.” (Williams [1977] 2009: 132)  
William’s words speak for themselves in what concerns their appropriateness for the purpose 
of establishing Historical linkages. The feature within his "structure of feeling" that makes it 
especially suitable for the purpose of underpinning long-term Histories thought to undermine 
hegemonic conception of Modernity lies, on the one hand, in the suggestive empiricism one 
may glimpse in this remark on methodology, and on the other, in the fact that it allows for a 
theoretical disclosing of a specific mode of social formation that “is distinguishable from other 
social and semantic formations by its articulation of presence. (Williams [1977] 2009: 135)133 
In fact, it is with William’s “articulation of presence” that Paul Gilroy counteracts the post-
structuralist critique of the “metaphysics of presence”, which, in his view, had evacuated the 
problem of human agency by moving “beyond citing language as the fundamental analogy for 
comprehending all signifying practices to a position where textuality (especially when 
wrenched open through the concept of difference) expands and merges with totality” (Gilroy 
1993: 77)134.  
The idea of “practical consciousness” comprised in William’s concept of “structure of feeling” 
with its consequent emphasis on human agency functions as a way of “resuscitating the 
subject” assassinated by the post-structuralist critique. So, it is by “paying careful attention to 
the structures of feeling which underpin black expressive cultures” (Gilroy 1993: 77) that Paul 
Gilroy suggests the construction of a long-term Black Atlantic History as counterculture of that 
modernity conceived as exclusive heritage of the Enlightenment. 
Ella Shohat, who is also deeply concerned with the long-term character of what she calls 
contemporary “culture wars”, amplifies William’s concept by talking about an “analogical 																																																								133	To	articulate	the	presence	of	something	is	not	the	same	as	to	represent	something	the	existence	of	which	is	supposed	be	empirically	demonstrated.	Put	in	other	words,	that	which	becomes	present	by	means	of	an	articulation	 based	 empirical	 clues	 does	 not	 aim	 at	 corresponding	 to	 anything	 that	 had	 existed	 in	 the	represented	 form.	 In	 this	 sense,	William	 seems	 to	 have	 opened	 an	 analytical	 avenue	 that	would	 allow	Historians	to	remain	“naïve	realists”	(see	Chapter	1)	who	are	yet	deeply	mistrustful	of	empiricism.	134	Stuart	Hall	makes	quite	the	same	point	in	his	assessment	of	the	theoretical	legacies	of	Cultural	Studies.	He	says:	“I’m	trying	to	return	the	project	of	cultural	studies	from	the	clean	air	of	meaning	and	textuality	and	theory	to	the	something	nasty	down	below.	This	involves	the	difficult	exercise	of	examining	some	of	the	key	theoretical	turns	or	moments	in	cultural	studies.”	(Hall	1996a:	263)	
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structure of feelings” as a “product of the intersubjective flow of affect among the 
marginalized” (Shohat/Stam 1994: 351; Stam/Shohat 2012: 17).  
It seems it would not be conceptual imprudence to argue that the notion of “structure of 
feelings” provides a fundamental theoretical bedrock upon which a subaltern consciousness 
has been diachronically unfolded in long-term Histories shaped by an array of different 
modalities of double consciousness.  
In this sense, the opening sentence in Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic “Striving to be both European 
and black requires some specific forms of double consciousness” (Gilroy 1993: 1), may be seen 
not only as a direct tribute to W.E.B. Du Bois135, but also as a key that allows for the envisioning 
of other constellations of double conscious subjects: “Striving to be both feminine and 
philosophical requires some specific forms of double consciousness”. “Striving to be both 
homosexual and modern requires some specific forms of double consciousness”. 
Gilroy does not ignore that in theorizing black identity in the way he does in The Black Atlantic, 
that is, by pursuing a sort of unifying dynamics that may assemble contemporary black 
cultures dispersed around the world, he runs the risk of having his work dismissed as another 
variant of essentialism or idealism or both (Gilroy 1993: 80). He explains therefore that his 
“unstable standpoint is to be understood in a different way from the clarion calls for 
epistemological narcissism and the absolute sovereignty of unmediated experience.” (Gilroy 
1993: 80) 
In order to clarify what he means by this statement, Gilroy added a bibliographical reference 
to Joan W. Scott’s famous essay “The Evidence of Experience”. In this text, Scott argues that 
in taking as self-evident the identities of those whose experience is being historiographically 
documented, “the evidence of experience then becomes evidence for the fact of difference, 
rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, how it operates, how and in what 
ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world” (Scott 2005: 202). According to 
Scott’s view, the task of History, if it really wants to overcome its usual foundationalist 
character, is to eschew the foundational authority of experience and, by avoiding the 
attribution of indisputable authenticity to any subject, put effectively into practice a way of 
																																																								135	Du	Bois’	The	Souls	of	the	Black	Folk	begins	with	a	chapter	called	“Of	Our	Spiritual	Strivings”.	This	strife,	which	is	the	history	of	the	American	Negro,	is	the	strife	“to	make	it	possible	for	a	man	to	be	both	a	Negro	and	an	American	[…].”	This	strife	is	also	“the	longing	to	attain	self-conscious	manhood,	to	merge	his	double	self	into	a	better	and	truer	self.”	(Du	Bois	[1903]	1994:	2–3)	
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historicizing within which individuals become not those “who have experience, but subjects 
who are constituted through experience” (Scott 2005: 203). This anti-essentialist position 
defended by Scott takes in Gilroy’s hands the form of the creative exploration of the homonym 
“roots/routes”.136  
Even though the Foucaudian category of discourse stands in the centre of Scott’s analysis, she 
highlights that the fact of regarding the emergence of a new identity as a discursive event 
does not amount to introducing a sort of linguistic determinism that would deprive subjects 
of agency. Rather, “it is to refuse a separation between “experience” and language137 and to 
insist instead on the productive quality of discourse.” The modality of History that would result 
from following these theoretical precepts, she concludes, is what Foucault meant by 
genealogy. (Scott 2005: 212–213) 
“One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to say, 
to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical 
framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account 
for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to 
make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or 
runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.” (Foucault 1980: 117) 
 
Foucault’s genealogy is taken here as a possible answer to the question that, in a broader 
sense, Jane Flax formulates as follows: “How to understand and constitute self, gender, 
knowledge, social relations, and cultural change without resorting to linear, teleological, 
hierarchical, holistic, or binary ways of thinking and being?” (Flax 1990: 15). 
The difficulty with Foucault’s genealogy is that it emphatically dismisses the notion of 
ideology.138 In doing so, it reproduces that slip that Spivak criticizes in “Can the Subaltern 
Speak”, i.e., it leads to an overlooking of the distinction between two senses of the term 
representation: representation as “re-presentation” or “presenting again” and representation 																																																								136	“Marked	by	its	European	origins,	modern	black	political	culture	has	always	been	more	interested	in	the	relationship	 of	 identity	 to	 root	 and	 rootedness	 than	 in	 seeing	 identity	 as	 a	 process	 of	 movement	 and	mediation	that	is	more	appropriately	approached	via	the	homonym	routes.”	(Gilroy	1993:	19)	137	The	same	separation	is	avoided	in	Raymond	Williams	“structure	of	feelings”	by	conceiving	language	as	“practical	consciousness”.	138	Foucault	explains	his	reluctance	towards	the	concept	of	 ideology	as	follows:	“The	notion	of	 ideology	appears	to	me	to	be	difficult	to	make	for	three	reasons.	The	first	is	that,	like	it	or	not,	it	always	stands	in	virtual	opposition	to	something	else	which	is	supposed	to	count	as	truth.	Now	I	believe	that	the	problem	does	 not	 consist	 in	 drawing	 the	 line	 between	 that	 in	 a	 discourse	 which	 falls	 under	 the	 category	 of	scientificity	or	truth,	but	in	seeing	historically	how	effects	of	truth	are	produced	within	discourses	which	are	neither	true	nor	false.	The	second	drawback	is	that	the	concept	of	ideology	refers,	I	think	necessarily,	to	something	of	the	order	of	a	subject.	Thirdly,	ideology	stands	in	a	secondary	position	relative	to	something	which	functions	as	its	infrastructure,	as	its	material,	economic,	determinant,	etc.	For	these	three	reasons,	I	think	that	this	is	a	notion	that	cannot	be	used	without	circumspection.”	(Foucault	1980:	118)	
	 139	
as “speaking for” (Spivak 1988: 275–277). Concerning History, this means: 1) Historical 
representation in the sense related to the historiographical “re-presentation” of what shall be 
thought of as once having been “full presence”; 2) Historical representation in the sense of 
“who is ‘speaking for’ whom” or, in exactly the same manner: who is going to construct the 
historical self-consciousness—or double consciousness—of whom? 
The act of deliberately conflating these related but irreducibly discontinuous senses of 
historical representation entails the danger of facilitating the production of transparent 
Histories, that is, Histories in which the partly opaque relationship called “difference” can 
hardly be mobilized (Chakrabarty 2000: 17–18). In History, in fact, each time that one thought 
to be transparent by refusing to consider ideology as an ineluctable problem, borrowing here 
a metaphor by Spivak, one is at risk of setting in motion a heliocentric discourse that fills the 
place of the agent with a historical sun whose rays irradiate either that dominance of bonded 
whiteness, masculinity and rationality or another of the kindred combinations that nourishes 
Eurocentrism. (Spivak 1988: 274) 
This might well be the reason why Gilroy, even if drawing heavily on Foucault’s thinking139, 
does not commit himself to the Foucauldian genealogy. If The Black Atlantic is indeed an 
attempt of bringing about a “critical ontology” [of the black people], it is one that, in what 
concerns History, is much more oriented towards an understanding inspired by Walter 
Benjamin’s thoughts.140 In this understanding of History, instead of running the risk of 
becoming transparent by avoiding the notion of ideology, one seeks “to appropriate the 
distorted and distorting power of ideological transposition to ideologically disruptive ends” 
(Cohen 1989: 103). And the source of The Black Atlantic’s disruptiveness must be what Gilroy 
																																																								139	Gilroy	says	that	his	own	standpoint	“can	be	summed	up	in	Foucault’s	tentative	extension	of	the	idea	of	critical	 self-inventory	 into	 the	 political	 field.	 This	 is	 made	 significantly	 in	 a	 commentary	 upon	 the	Enlightenment.”	 Gilroy’s	 The	 Black	 Atlantic	 is	 indeed,	 in	 many	 senses,	 a	 commentary	 upon	 the	Enlightenment.	140	 In	 “Not	 a	 Story	 to	 Pass	On	 –	 Living	Memory	 and	 the	 Slave	 Sublime”	 (the	 last	 chapter	 of	The	 Black	
Atlantic),	Paul	Gilroy	tackles	the	problem	of	how	to	deal	with	the	fact	of	having	to	pass	on	the	experience	of	slavery	and	its	aftermath,	or,	in	Gilroy	word’s,	the	“necessity	of	socialised	historical	memory,	and	with	the	desire	to	forget	the	terrors	of	slavery	and	the	simultaneous	impossibility	of	forgetting.”	(Gilroy	1993:	222)	Gilroy	puts	as	epigraph	of	this	chapter	Benjamin’s	famous	sixth	thesis	on	the	Philosophy	of	History,	namely,	the	thesis	that	begins	by	reproaching	Ranke’s	view	on	History	and	ends	by	warning	that	“even	the	dead	will	not	be	safe	from	the	enemy	if	he	wins.”	(Benjamin	[1942]	2007:	255)	In	addition,	he	explains	that	he	wants	“to	 proceed	 by	 asking	 the	 tradition	 of	 black	 expressive	 culture	 a	 series	 of	 questions	 derived	 from	 the	standpoint	Benjamin	occupied	when	he	argued	that	social	memory	creates	the	chain	of	“ethnic”	tradition.”	(Gilroy	1993:	212)		
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calls the “slave’s standpoint—forever dissociated from the psychological and epistemic 
correlates of racial subordination.” (Gilroy 1993: 56)  
The analysis carried out above, focused on well-known works of the Brazilian historiography 
of slavery, may have although evinced that the mere act of speaking from the slave’s 
standpoint is no guarantee that such a disruptiveness would occupy the foreground so as to 
provide shelter from the Eurocentric ideal of modernity by serving as the battering ram of 
those who do not want to enter the enemy’s fortress, but to escape from it. 
Consider, for instance, appearing towards the end of this section, this astonishing comment 
by Sydney Chalhoub in Visões da Liberdade 
 “O fundamental, de qualquer forma, é enfatizar que, para os negros, a liberdade significava, 
entre outras coisas, o fim de uma vida constantemente sujeita às vicissitudes das transações 
de compra e venda. As feridas dos açoites provavelmente cicatrizavam com o tempo; as 
separações afetivas, ou a constante ameaça de separação, eram as chagas eternamente 
abertas no cativeiro.” (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 307 – emphasis added) 
 
How should Chalhoub’s comment be understood? Let it be granted that he does indeed think 
that physical violence against slaves must be considered abhorrent. But not so much, since 
there were psychic martyrdoms that hurt even more. To make this distinction, he emphasizes, 
is fundamental! Why, actually? Is this not the same kind of surreptitious understatement of 
naked physic violence that underlies that worn lusotropicalist image of Brazilian slavery? 
Should this be the case, it is notwithstanding an (almost) minor problem when one takes into 
account that, according to Chalhoub, this is the “slave’s point of view”! 
Obviously, the major problem is how to tell apart speaking from a slave’s standpoint from the 
claim that one is speaking from there. Or rather, and more precisely, how to legitimate the 
claim that one is writing historiographically from a slave’s standpoint? A little more History 
may help to delve deeper into this question.  
The twelve-year old slave Catarina had said, according to the testimony she gave to the police 
authorities after having surrendered herself: 
“Respondeu que a três dias mais ou menos estando em casa de sua senhora, tendo esta 
mandado aquentar o café para levar a seu marido, ao mesmo tempo mandou a respondente 
varrer a casa e como fervesse o café e derramasse deu a senhora com um ferro de fogão até 
deixa-la sem sentidos e depois despejou café fervente na cara, pescoço e palitos [...] fugiu com 
o intento de ir morrer no mato e livrar-se de sua senhora, mas apresentou-se à autoridade por 
que assim lhe ensinaram. (Wissenbach 1998: 57) 
 
The slave Joaquim, arrested for having killed his mistress, stated in his questioning that: 
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“[M]atou por ter raiva dela [the mistress] pois veio a desmanchar a casa de seu senhor, isto é, 
de Manuel Rodrigues Jordão, vendendo três seus filhos e sobrecarregando ele de trabalho. […] 
Então esta mulher sendo de gênio exaltado pôs a casa de seu senhor em desarmornia que fez 
com que seus filhos bem como outros seus parceiros fossem vendidos. (Wissenbach 1998: 
250) 
 
On what grounds can these Histories be compared? Which scholar compendium about 
History, or, for the matter, about Sociology or Anthropology or whatever, could help one 
decide whether the suffering experienced by Catarina is more (or less) intense or longer 
lasting than the one experienced by Joaquim? 
A pertinent, and perhaps even urgent approach to the issue of the slave’s point of view should 
begin by decidedly refusing to make such comparisons between corporal and psychic violence 
the fundamental point of emphasis in what concerns the brutality of colonial slavery. The very 
establishment of such gradations of suffering entails a perfidious degree of condescension.  
If one wants to stick to the metaphor of a scar, a good alternative would consist of trying to 
explore its metaphorical-narrative potentialities. Scar involves a logical reference to earlier 
events which stand, respecting the subject described as scarred, in some obvious causal 
relation associated with being injured, wounded, marked, dissected. Scars141 are, in fact, signs 
that evoke stories of being injured, wounded, marked, dissected. But, of course, they do not 
tell any story for themselves and therefore cannot be used to fix any meaning. What scars 
patently do is function as a telling trigger of different types of reference to past events, in 
respect of which the scars are the empirical signs of presence. Whatever may have happened, 
these scarred beings were a part of it and had inflicted upon their bodies a sign of this 
experience, now to be worn as an inseparable part of themselves.  
Unfolded in this direction, the metaphor of the scar seems to be a powerful one for speaking 
from the slaves’ point of view. It opens indeed a field of signifiers that may bring about what 
Paul Gilroy calls the “unhappy consciousness”142, that is, the state of mind which demands a 																																																								141	Arthur	Danto	defines	the	predicates	“is	a	scar”	as	temporally	unambiguous,	that	is,	it	makes	an	obvious	reference	 to	 a	 past	 event,	 and	had	 there	 been	no	 such	past	 event,	 the	 description	 itself	would	be	 false	[…].”(Danto	[1965]	2007:	72–73)	142	In	strict	Hegelian	sense,	the	“unhappy	consciousness”	is	the	stage	in	which	the	consciousness,	moving	through	Stoicism	and	Scepticism,	reaches	the	unification	of	that	which	was	previously	divided	between	the	lord	and	the	slave.	Albeit	“unified”,	this	consciousness	is	not	a	“unity”	of	both	yet:	“Hierdurch	[through	the	experience	of	Stoicism	and	Scepticism]	ist	die	Verdoppelung,	welche	früher	an	zwei	Einzelne,	an	den	Herrn	und	den	Knecht,	sich	verteilte,	ins	Eines	eingekehrt;	die	Verdoppelung	des	Selbstbewusstseins	in	sich	selbst,	welche	im	Begriffe	des	Geistes	wesentlich	ist,	ist	hiermit	vorhanden,	aber	noch	nicht	ihrer	Einheit	und	das	
unglückliche	Bewusstsein	 ist	das	Bewusstsein	seiner	als	des	gedoppelten	nur	widersprechenden	Wesen.“	(Hegel	[1807]	2010:	160–161).	
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rethinking of the “meanings of rationality, autonomy, reflection, subjectivity, and power in 
the light of an extended meditation both on the condition of the slaves and on the suggestion 
that the racial terror is not merely compatible with occidental rationality but cheerfully 
complicit with it” (Gilroy 1993: 56). Performing this task may help to fix some of modernity’s 
fixations, for example, the fixing of being black.143 
It is in this sense that Chalhoub’s passage brings to mind Chinua Achebe’s analysis of Joseph 
Conrad’s classic book The Heart of Darkness. The point Achebe wants to make is that Conrad’s 
work “projects the image of Africa as ‘the other world’, the antithesis of Europe and therefore 
of civilization, a place where man's vaunted intelligence and refinement are finally mocked by 
triumphant bestiality” (Achebe 1988: 2). One of the main means Conrad uses to construct this 
image is by withholding language from the “rudimentary souls” of Africa. In place of speech 
they made "a violent babble of uncouth sounds. They ‘exchanged short grunting phrases’ even 
among themselves.” (Achebe 1988: 6) 
In only two occasions Conrad confers speech, “even English speech, on the savages”. The first 
occurs when cannibalism gets the better of them, providing irresistible consistency to the 
portrayal of those who are presented as dumb brutes. The second occasion is the famous 
announcement: “Mistah Kurtz—he dead.” On this sentence, Achebe writes:  
“What better or more appropriate finis could be written to the horror story of that wayward 
child of civilization who wilfully had given his soul to the powers of darkness and ‘taken a high 
seat amongst the devils of the land’ than the proclamation of his physical death by the forces 
he had joined?” (Achebe 1988: 6) 
 
Obviously, Chalhoub shares neither the thoroughgoing racism nor the openly Eurocentric view 
that Achebe attributes to Joseph Conrad. What connects them is the way their works relate 
to something that may be thought as the “voice before the speech.”144 
Derrida draws attention to the role of the voice in ontological arguments about the logos in 
Western philosophy. Logocentrism, he argues, “is also phonocentrism: absolute proximity of 
voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning” 
(Derrida [1967] 1997: 11–12). He remarks, for example, that in Hegel the sound of the voice 																																																								143	Mind	Franz	Fanon’s	biting	words:	“I	arrived	slowly	in	the	world;	sudden	emergence	are	no	longer	my	habit.	I	crawl	along.	The	white	gaze,	the	only	valid	one,	is	already	dissecting	me.	I	am	fixed.”	(Fanon	[1952]	2008:	95)	144	The	whole	argument	that	follows	is	a	still	raw	formulation	inspired	by	the	idea	of	the	“Writing	before	the	Letter”,	which	is	the	first	chapter	of	Derrida’s	Of	Grammatology.	The	two	openings	sections,	namely,	“Exergue”	 and	 “The	 End	 of	 the	 Book	 and	 the	 Beginning	 of	Writing”,	 are	 the	 point	 of	 departure	 of	 the	reflections	presented	here.	
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is the way by which “the subject affects itself and is related to itself in the element of ideality”; 
in Heidegger the “logos of being” is “Thought obeying the Voice of Being”. But the voice, both 
in Hegel and in Heidegger, is taken as the phonè, that is, as the spoken word, which, being the 
producer of the first symbols, had a relationship of essential and immediate proximity with 
the mind. Expressing immediately and naturally the feelings of the mind, the spoken word 
constituted a sort of stage of transparency, which brought about a moment of full presence. 
(Derrida [1967] 1997: 12; 20) 
The exhalation of voice deprived of words, that is, “the voice before the speech”, as reaction 
to pain caused by being injured, wounded, marked, dissected may also be interpreted as the 
“absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being”. It is the synchronic 
and vocalized answer to (or the sound track of) that which will become a scar. But it also 
sounds like the sonorous expression of orgasmic pleasure and of the terror-struck state 
provoked by the danger of death. It is the way in which the instinctive as well as the intuitive 
makes itself humanely audible. It is, in short, the score of the counterpart of the Western 
logos. 
Joseph Conrad’s Africans represent uniquely this counterpart. This is the reason why Mr. Kurz 
hears the black people “grunting” to each other in that Heart of Darkness, a place that had 
not yet been penetrated by the virile voice of the logocentric light. Now, one understands 
even better what Franz Fanon intends to point out when he speaks about the Weltanschauung 
that prohibits any ontological explanation of colonized people in general, and blacks in 
particular145.  
Still, the articulation of the voice deprived of words may also be music. The expressive cultures 
of the Black Atlantic have been able to speak through the doubleness of this “voice before the 
speech” in order to tell their stories, especially the one of colonial black slavery. Appreciators 
of soul music or capoeira songs may immediately grasp what the talk is here. The cries and 
groans that the protagonist of James Weldon Johnson’s The Autobiography of An Ex-Coloured 
Man146 (1912) shall always hear, have the same nature. 																																																								145	“Ontology	does	not	allow	us	to	understand	the	black	man,	since	it	ignores	the	lived	experience.	For	not	only	must	the	black	man	be	black;	he	must	be	black	in	relation	to	the	white	man.	Some	people	would	argue	that	this	situation	has	a	double	meaning.	Not	at	all.	The	black	man	has	no	ontological	resistance	in	the	eyes	of	the	white	man.	(Fanon	[1952]	2008:	90)	146	This	 is	 the	episode	 in	which	 Johnson’s	white-looking	black	protagonist	witnesses	 the	 lynching	of	an	unknown	black	man	somewhere	in	the	Deep	South	of	the	United	States.	Burned	alive,	the	man	“squirmed,	he	writhed,	strained	at	his	chains,	then	gave	out	cries	and	groans	that	I	shall	always	hear.”	It	is	after	this	
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Paul Gilroy argues that these expressive cultures “provocatively suggest […] that the critique 
of modernity cannot be satisfactorily completed from within its own philosophical and 
political norms, that is, immanently.” (Gilroy 1993: 56)  
Sydney Chalhoub’s Visões da Liberdade is an exemplary instance of such an immanent critical 
attitude.147 The way he deals with slavery in this work—most of all when he speaks directly 
for the slaves, as in the latest passage quoted above—indulges in a complacent rationalism 
tempered with a self-conscious humanism that trivializes the potency of the negative (Gilroy 
1993: 55). He can do anything with the [negativeness of the] “voice before the speech” 
[materialized metaphorically in the idea of the slaves’ scars] with the exception of making it 
speak the words of the master.  
The construction of a non-immanent critical position, which would possibly represent that 
“slave’s standpoint—forever dissociated from the psychological and epistemic correlates of 
racial subordination” (Gilroy 1993: 56), begins by recognizing its both ontological and 
unavoidably aporetic character. In fact, the act of presenting oneself as forever dissociated 
from whatever may have been the conditions of one’s own existence as such presupposes the 
very dissociation of one’s self.  
A writing of History which accomplishes itself by hearing, or rather, by articulating the 
presence of that “voice before the speech”, is an ontological enterprise which is fastened to 
the metaphysical tradition of Western philosophy to the extent that this “voice before the 
speech” is conceived as an “absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning 
of being”. And it is critical148 thereof inasmuch as this voice is no longer possessed neither by 
																																																								event	that	he	makes	up	his	mind	and	decides	to	become	an	ex-colored	man	(Johnson	[1912]	1970:	187–188).		Paul	 Gilroy	 explores	 Johnson’s	 debts	 to	 Du	 Bois’	 thinking	 in	 order	 to	 elaborate	 what	 he	 denominates	“Politics	of	(Dis)placement”	(Gilroy	1993:	130–133).	147	To	different	degrees,	the	same	is	valid	in	the	two	other	works	analysed	in	this	section,	namely,	Kátia	Mattoso’s	Ser	Escravo	no	Brasil	and	Maria	C.	Wissenbach’s	Sonhos	Africanos,	Vivências	Ladinas.	The	former	is	more	complacent	and	less	self-conscious	than	Sydney	Chalhoub’s	Visões	da	Liberdade;	the	latter	the	other	way	round.	148	Departing	from	Kant’s	thinking,	Foucault	defines	the	relationship	between	Enlightenment	and	critical	attitude	 as	 follows:	 “Was	 Kant	 als	 Aufklärung	 beschrieben	 hat,	 ist	 eben	 das,	 was	 ich	 als	 Kritik	charakterisiere:	 als	 die	 kritische	 Haltung,	 die	 man	 im	 Abendland	 als	 besondere	 Haltung	 neben	 dem	historischen	 Prozess	 der	 Regierbarmachung	 der	 Gesellschaft	 auftaucht	 sieht.	 [...]	 Im	 Verhältnis	 zur	Aufklärung	ist	die	Kritik	für	Kant	das,	was	er	zum	Wissen	sagt:	Weißt	du	auch,	wie	weit	du	wissen	kannst?	Räsonniere	so	viel	du	willst	–	aber	weißt	du	denn,	bis	wohin	du	ohne	Gefahr	räsonnieren	kannst?	[...]	[Es]	bleibt	war,	dass	Kant	dem	kritischem	Unternehmen	der	Entunterwerfung	gegenüber	dem	Spiel	der	Macht	und	 der	Wahrheit	 als	 vorgängige	 Aufgabe	 –	 als	 Prolegomenon	 zur	 jeden	 gegenwärtigen	 und	 künftigen	Aufklärung	–	die	Erkenntnis	der	Erkenntnis	aufbürdet“	(Foucault	1992:	17–18).	In	line	with	this	view,	the	
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the naturalness nor by the instinctiveness that it enjoys within the Western logos. Naturalness 
and instinctiveness must still be there as important issues, but not to have the black people 
“rehabilitated, ‘standing before the bar’, ruling the world with his intuition”, not to hold them 
serving as “insurance policy on humanness”, but as aspect of a “double consciousness” 
struggling for “ontological resistance” (Fanon [1952] 2008: 127–129). 
A historiographical writing conducted in this way asserts itself precisely because its 
attachment to the aftermath of colonial slavery is what brings about a slave’s point of view 
willing to put at stake its own condition of possibility149 [of articulating spoken speech], that 
is, the philosophically grounded phono-logocentric ideal of modernity.  
Within the disciplinary boundaries of History, a social science which is a “child of the modern 
times” that also gave birth to colonial slavery, to deploy the articulateness of the slaves’ “voice 
before the speech” amounts to enact the “double consciousness” that goes through the heart 
of blackness.150 	  
																																																								articulation	of	 the	 “voice	before	 the	 speech”	 is	 another	 commentary	on	 the	Enlightenment	 in	 the	 sense	pointed	out	by	Gilroy	(see	footnote	139).	149	By	doing	so,	it	makes	clear	as	daylight	the	mendacious	character	of	the	Hegelian	master’s	speech	that	declares	slaves	all	those	who	are	incapable	of	putting	their	lives	at	stake:	slaves	never	have	to	put	at	stake	their	lives,	for	they	are	necessarily	at	stake	from	the	beginning.		150	If	you	prefer	a	conceptual	metaphor,	instead	of	“the	heart”	please	read	“the	structure	of	feelings”.	
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PART	TWO	–	HISTORICAL	TIME	AND	FRACTAL	SPATIALITY	
Chapter 1 - Ideology and Anachronism 
 No	princípio	era	trevas	Malcom	foi	Lampião	Lâmpadas	para	os	pés	Negros	do	dois	mil	e	dez	Fãs	de	Mumia	Abu-Jamal	Osama,	Sadam	Iraque,	Vietnam	Contra	os	boy,	contra	o	GOE	Contra	a	Ku	Klux	Klan	(Brown	2011)151	
 
In the first chapter, the issues of ideology and anachronism were addressed separately. 
Departing from Spivak’s assessment of the question discussed in “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, 
ideology was considered as that which a work cannot say, as a “sort of journey to silence” 
(Spivak 1988: 286). Anachronism, in turn, was differentiated into three different types152 
ranked according to the degree of its epistemological consequences when regarded with 
respect to History. Then, the argument was advanced that the writing of historiographical 
accounts is the true practice of a specific mode of “controlled anachronism”. In the following 
section, taking these preliminary reflections into account, ideology and anachronism will be 
analyzed together.  
Regardless of their current of thought, Historians generally agree that History springs from 
present concerns and that these concerns play a decisive role in shaping historiographical 




If it were possible to free this question from its thick overlay of scholarly bibliography so that 
one could approach it in a prosaic manner, one would nevertheless see that the whole concern 
with this matter is neither odd nor disproportionate, for it is indeed extremely difficult to 
answer why the act of springing from the present should be especially distinctive of History. 
Is it not that absolutely everything is (in) the present? Does the present not exercises this 
power over all other human sciences as well? 
The problem of the ‘present’ in History consists of the comprehensible uneasiness provoked 
by the suspicion that everywhere where the contemporary shines through the 
historiographical account, it ends up contributing to an obliteration of what should be made 
visible. On the other hand, disregarding what Historians may explicitly or implicitly assume 
concerning the role of the present in their work, History seems to be an essentially situated 
knowledge whose partiality that would here matter, i.e., the partiality that had been instilled 
into it by the very act of constituting itself in the present, can never be demonstrated by the 
Historians themselves. It is always something that will happen a posteriori. 
Therefore, nowhere more than in the academic landscape of History the trivial compliment 
“This work remains actual!” is so appreciated. The older the praised work the greater the 
wonder of its actuality. 
At the opposing extreme of the Histories that remain “actual”, thus continuing to remain 
Histories of whatever they were supposed to be about, are posited the Histories which begin 
to increasingly cast more light on themselves rather than on their subjects, as though they 
had completely lost the capacity of representing that which they aimed to be about. When 
this happens, such Histories are relieved of the post ”History” and are downgraded to that of 
“Historical source”.  
And so one sees clearly the point of juncture where the issue of anachronism meets the issue 
of ideology: when the present becomes, so to speak, too present, History runs the risk of 
ceasing to be taken seriously as such, of losing its legitimacy … and is deported to the realm 
of ideology. 
Euclides da Cunha’s Os Sertões (1902) is a perfect example of such a process. For a long time 
Os Sertões enjoyed the status of a History of the Canudos War. Nowadays, since no Historian 
can afford to overlook the essential role played in it by nineteenth-century scientific racism, 
this work is now regarded as irremediably ideological and has hence became a source for 
historiographical research on Canudos instead. 
	 148	
The example of Os Sertões is perfect only because it is susceptible of being formulated in this 
overly unproblematic manner, which relieves the tension between social science and 
ideology, by giving the latter the form of a system of beliefs of a particular place and time that, 
incidentally, happens to be one in which the social sciences have not yet divorced themselves 
from ideology.  
Things become knottier in the case of Hugh Trevor-Hoper’s The Rise of Christian Europe 
(1965). In this book, the then Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Oxford 
declared that Africa had no History, merely ‘the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in 
picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe” (Evans 2000: 178; Shohat/Stam 1994: 1). Still, 
Trevor-Hoper makes this statement a decade after Cheikh Anta Diop, his fellow Historian at 
the Sorbonne University, had published his influential work Negro Nations and Cultures (1955) 
and five years after the Cambridge University Press began to release the peer-reviewed 
academic journal The Journal of African History (Barbosa 2012: 8). To which extent should 
Trevor-Hoper’s understanding of History expressed in his statement on Africa lead one to ask 
whether his historiographical writings on Europe should not be seen as ideological pieces of 
the same nature as Os Sertões?  
In pondering this question one must first and foremost be on guard against the temptation of 
regarding Trevor-Hoper’s view as ideological because it amounted to nothing less than a 
cynical commitment to the defense of the political interests of a particular group. That is, one 
should avoid thinking of ideology in terms of an opposition between a particularistic use of 
science, or even the production of a pseudo-science, as opposed to a fair and well-intentioned 
search for truth characteristic of a genuine scientific spirit. Trevor-Hoper’s distinction between 
the place (Europe) where there has been History and the place (Africa) where there has been 
no History is faithfully made in the name of a well-established social science: History. One can 
barely help naming his Historical approach “scientific racism” as well. 
 
The demands of our time – two approaches to History of slavery 
The research group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens” 
Culturalizing colonial slavery: Eduardo França Paiva 
The ideological character of Trevor-Hoper’s position can also, but of course not exclusively, be 
understood in terms of a too close relation to the moment of its emergence:  
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“Foi-se o tempo em que as histórias nacionais pautavam, necessariamente, o pensar e o fazer 
dos historiadores, e que os resultados daí surgidos deviam buscar estabelecer as 
peculiaridades, os ineditismos, as exclusividades de cada região, construindo identidades 
herméticas, singulares e, ao mesmo tempo, simplistas. Isso, que foi tão importante em época 
não muito distante, não o é mais no início do século XXI, ou, pelo menos, em nossa perspectiva, 
não o deveria ser.” (Paiva/Ivo 2008: 10) 
 
When Historians say that, they are distancing themselves from a point of view of the type that 
entails the risk of ending up sustaining a position that, ultimately, would amount to the 
venomous essentialism of Trevor-Hoper.  
These lines quoted above were written by Eduardo França Paiva and Isnara Ivo Pereira as a 
programmatic introduction of Escravidão, mestiçagem e histórias comparadas (2008), a 
collective volume edited by them. In “Histórias Comparadas, Histórias Conectadas: Escravidão 
e Mestiçagem no Mundo Ibérico”, the article of his own authorship published in the volume, 
França Paiva deepens the criticism outlined in the introduction by arguing that, even though 
the focus of his analysis is considerably wide ranging, as the title well indicates, he intends to 
conduct it: 
“sem correr o risco de grandes generalizações e de invenção de contextos históricos 
inexistentes, práticas que uma antiga história comparativa acabou executando, instituindo-se, 
inclusive, como modelo científico absolutamente confiável. Nesse caso, e em última instância, 
uma linha evolutiva da História, lastreada em crenças civilizacionais e em rígidas hierarquias 
sociais e culturais, que estabelecia modelos históricos ideais a serem perseguidos pela 
humanidade, condicionava toda a trajetória histórica e, portanto, permitia as grandes 
comparações entre o que não era comparável, pelo menos não o era dessa forma.” (Paiva 
2008: 13) 
 
Coherently and correctly, he then remarks that this “old comparative History” were fraught 
with “armadilhas intelectuais, culturais e ideológicas que marcaram o pensamento 
históriográfico (e das ciências humanas, de um modo geral).” (Paiva 2008: 13) Not to be caught 
in such “traps”, he writes, depends very much on the method of research and on the key-
concepts one chooses. To begin with, he stresses, the concept of culture: 
“A começar, o próprio conceito e cultura aqui empregado, por mais difícil e arriscado que isso 
seja, […] parte de um pressuposto histórico antropológico que relativiza as experiências 
históricas dos povos, comparando-as ou não, e que desacredita procedimentos que, de 
alguma forma, hierarquizem as práticas culturais de diferentes sociedades, partindo de 
modelos ideais.” (Paiva 2008: 14) 
 
Two further key-concepts complete the backbone of Paiva’s theoretical apparatus: a “revised” 
concept of comparison and the concept of connection of contexts. This triad formed by 
culture, comparison and connection are joined by two others concepts: permanence and 
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transit, which were also key-concepts, for they explain about the way of comparing and 
connecting histories (Paiva 2008: 14). He closes his theoretical observations with a remark on 
the notions of “mestiçagem” and “hibridismo”: 
“Desde já, creio, se faz importante esclarecer que mestiçagem e hibridação não têm aqui, um 
contrário que seria o natural, isto é, não tem a correspondência de culturas puras, íntegras e 
estanques no tempo, a não ser no domínio das representações e dos discursos, onde, 
historicamente eles existem e persistem. Entretanto, o pressuposto adotado é o de que, a não 
ser nessas duas dimensões da realidade histórica, elas não existem. Não estou, portanto, de 
acordo em atribuir-lhes uma existência natural.” (Paiva 2008: 15) 
 
Oddly, Paiva does not include “mestiçagem” and “hibridismo” in his class of “key-concepts”. 
Nonetheless, these two notions are of utmost importance for his intellectual enterprise. In 
order to understand why it is so, one has to take one step back and have a brief look at the 
research group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens”, that published the volume which Paiva’s 
contribution is part of.  
The research group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens” originated from the symposium “Escravidão: 
sociedades, culturas, economia e trabalho”, which took place as part of the 23º ANPUH 
National Meeting in 2005. Eduardo França Paiva and Douglas Cole Libby, both professors at 
the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), were in charge of the this symposium and 
they are presently coordinators of the group, which, working together with other academic 
institutions, has been organizing several meetings on its subject matter and already published 
three books: Escravidão, Mestiçagem e Histórias Comparadas (2008), Escravidão, 
Mestiçagens, Populações e Identidades Culturais (2010) and Escravidão, Mestiçagens, 
Ambientes, Paisagens e Espaços (2011). 
Evidently, the very name of the group hints at the centrality of the notion “mestiçagem”. All 
the more so, when one considers that the term functions as a way of compressing into one 
word those four broad fields of research (societies, cultures, economy and labour) comprised 
by the original symposium. The three collective volumes so far published represent an effort 
to draw attention to the importance of the notion of “mestiçagem” for thinking about the 
History of Slavery.  
Coming back now to Paiva’s article, the role played by “mestiçagem” in it is not less noticeable. 
He presents his subject as follows: 
“A vida de negros e mestiços – escravos, libertos e nascidos livres – na América portuguesa, 
na América espanhola, bem como em áreas francesas e holandesas do continente, em cidades 
europeias e em regiões africanas, é o foco central desse texto. O período a ser examinado 
estende-se o século XVI ao XVIII e, às vezes, entra pelo século XIX.” (Paiva 2008: 13) 
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It is salient that Paiva conceives his long-term History of slavery in the Iberian world as 
imbedded in an even longer History of what has been broadly called the Black Atlantic World. 
Although, he excludes from it the whole Anglophone area, which comprises important slave 
systems such as that of Jamaica and the United States South. 
This exclusion involuntarily reinforces the widespread historiographical image of the 
segregationist Deep South of the United States as a place where “mestiçagem” had played an 
insignificant role. Moreover, it leaves untouched one of the most important elements used by 
an “old comparative History” to draw that widely known distinction between slavery in the 
Iberian world, especially in Brazil, and in the United States. In addition to that, it contributes 
to keep the Anglophone Caribbean a void in the Brazilian historiography of slavery.  
These deficiencies, if one may name them in this way, are yet in a certain sense secondary, 
for no one can give a single reason why Paiva should forcefully include the Anglophone Black 
Atlantic in his comparative analysis. Or, thinking the other way round, his argument cannot be 
fairly criticized only for that which he left out of his analysis. It is then time to take a closer 
look at Paiva’s own picture of the “mestiçagem” in the Iberian Black Atlantic. 
Paiva’s article is richly illustrated with sixteen pictures (15 paintings and one photograph). 
Crossing them with primary written sources and a mass of historiographical works, he 
manages to provide an array of similitudes between variegated slave societies in different 
places and times within the Black Atlantic. After having done that, towards the end of his text, 
he states that:  
“Nesse universo a ser comparativamente desvelado, negros e mestiços – tanto os escravos, 
quanto os libertos e os nascidos livres -, evidentemente, não são interlocutores exclusivos, 
mas, aqui, são interlocutores privilegiados. Por meio deles é que se pretende compreender 
como hibridismos e impermeabilidades se processaram intensamente [...].” (Paiva 2008: 24 – 
emphasis added) 
 
“Negros e mestiços” are then the “privileged interlocutors” in Paiva’s historiographical 
account. Well, all the fifteen paintings that richly illustrated his paper stem either from official 
institutions or were painted by white foreign travellers such as François Desiré Roulin, Jean-
Baptiste Debret or Johan Moritz Rugendas. Most of these paintings (twelve) depict either non-
white or black people. Further, the sole primary source Paiva transcribes, which is about 
architectural similitudes between Rio de Janeiro and Africa, was written by John Mawe, the 
British mineralogist author of Travels in the Interior of Brazil (1812). There is nothing wrong 
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with this documental corpus. Its composition is, in fact, very expected. But, to use Paiva’s own 
metaphor of the dialogue between Historian and eyewitnesses: Whom is he here speaking to 
or, rather, who is talking to him about the “mestiçagem” he wants to unveil? 
These questions are not insinuations that were untenable to constitute historiographically 
“negros e mestiços” as privileged interlocutors. Rather, they are an attempt to makes two 
points plain: first, that the very act of being historicized on the basis of such sources puts these 
“negros e mestiços” in the particular position of those who only speak inasmuch as they 
having been spoken about by someone else. The second point it that if one loses of sight that 
these “negros e mestiços” occupy said position, the penalty is a misrepresentation whose 
counterpart is not what actually happened to them, that is, the actual possible content of the 
past, but what is happening in the very act of re-presenting them in History: the actual content 
of the present. One question is still open: what is, actually, the “privilege” of “negros e 
mestiços” as interlocutors? 
Paiva’s words are precise in this respect: “por meio deles” [negros e mestiços], that is, “by 
means of them” he intends to enter into the dialog with other social groups so as to 
comprehend the “mestiçagens coloniais”. His conclusion is then fairly cogent then, where, 
along the lines of Historians concerned with overcoming both methodological nationalism and 
ethnical essentialisms, amongst whom he naturally includes himself, “negros e mestiços” 
become “cultural mediators”: 
“Por isso mesmo [because of the effort to overcome methodological nationalism and ethnical 
essentialisms] é que muitos negros se transformam, sob a pluma de historiadores mais 
preocupados em entender esses movimentos plantários, nesses mediadores culturais, uma 
categoria conceitual que facilita a compreensão deles a partir do que sempre foram 
historicamente: homens e mulheres que transitaram entre mundos, do locus ao orbis poder-
se-ia dizer, aproximando-os, fomentando-os e, também, distanciando-os, mesmo que 
artificialmente, ao fortalecerem impermeabilidades.” (Paiva 2008: 25) 
 
Articulating then the conceptual category of a cultural mediation, which had been carried out 
by “negros e mestiços”, Paiva speaks indistinctly of Mexico City, Salvador, Venice or Bordeaux 
in terms of a process of “mestiçagem” that had taken place in these cities from the 16th 
century on. Equally, he does not make any effort to define more accurately what he calls 
“africanização”, “europeização”, “americanização”. These processes seem to have a prima 
facie value expressed by their own suffix “ção”, which would then refer to a self-evident action 
indicated by the name attached to it. Thus, “mestiçagem” in Bourdeaux and in Salvador, as 
well as (using now the verbs) “africanizar” and “europeizar” happen to presented in such a 
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horizontal way that one may wonder whether slavery (and colonialism) had played any role in 
the development of these processes and in the historiographical representation of them. Put 
as a normative question: should “mestiçagem”, as the fruit of slavery and colonialism, be 
regarded just as any other phenomena of cultural hybridization? This is a question that, as 
surprisingly as it may be, Paiva simply bypasses! 
The main thing to be stressed, according to him, is that in carrying out historiographical 
analyses that avoid the nation state as unity of analysis by the same token in which they adopt 
a relativistic view on culture, Historians may arrive at a deeper understanding of their subjects. 
And, by the way of conclusion, he makes a symptomatic call: 
 “Já que essas comparações urgem e tardam, fica então, para todos nós, o convite e o desafio 
de não mais postergá-las, sob o risco de perdermos a grande oportunidade de realizá-las em 
consonância com as demandas de nosso tempo.” (Paiva 2008: 25) 
 
Patriarchalizing colonial slavery 
A similar self-positioning towards the “demandas de nosso tempo” is also crucial in the thesis 
advanced by Douglas Cole Libby, who, as mentioned before, is also coordinator of the research 
group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens”.  
His article “Repensando o Conceito do Paternalismo Escravista nas Américas” focuses on 
slavery systems in Brazil and in the Southern United States in order to make some remarks on 
the relation master/slave, and especially on the concept of paternalism. The main thesis he 
advances is that the concept of paternalism most widespread in the Brazilian historiography 
of slavery, namely, that based on Gilberto Freyre’s as well as on Eugene Genoveses’ works, 
must be revised.  
Such a revision is needed because the domain of slaveholder idealized in these works is that 
of the plantation. Huge plantations, Libby asserts, were the exception rather than the rule in 
Brazil. The majority of the slaves lived either in small or middle rural properties or in the cities, 
where every master rarely possessed more than a dozen slaves. A consequence of the 
inappropriateness of this conceptualization for the Brazilian case is the lack of systematic 
analysis on paternalism from the perspective of the ownership of slaves by persons of African 
descent (Libby 2008: 37–39).  
In carrying out his analysis, Libby provides an exceptional review of the American literature 
on this topic. However, he disregards the increasing US-American historiographical production 
that he calls “neo-revisionista”. Libby’s fully explanation for this exclusion runs as follows:  
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“Resolvi deixar de fora tais interpretações neo-revisionistas por várias razões. Elas têm tido 
quase nenhuma ressonância entre os estudiosos do escravismo brasileiro, talvez porque estes 
não se disponham a renunciar tão facilmente às conquistas teórico-metodológicas que deram 
vida e agência aos milhões de cativos que, no passado, representavam a própria força vital da 
Colônia e do Império brasileiros. E, de fato, é preciso dizer que o neo-revisionismo da academia 
ianque anda no fio da navalha, pois, ao insistir enfaticamente nos aspectos negativos da vida 
escrava impostos por uma sociedade dominada por senhores brancos, corre o risco de obviar 
a participação do escravo na sua própria história. Em outras palavras, parece-me que, ao 
buscar explicações para um racismo doentio, virulento e persistente – objetivo este, sem 
dúvida algum, assaz laudatório – os revisionistas, às vezes, podem estar jogando o bebê junto 
com a água do banho. Trata-se de um processo perfeitamente compreensível: as 
preocupações da sociedade norte-americana da virada do milênio se voltam para um 
recorrente problema social que exige um constante repensar da história nacional. Cá, nos 
trópicos brasílicos, as preocupações do momento são outras, donde a relevância da produção 
historiográfica lá de cima vai se tornando cada vez menos clara. Finalmente, como considero 
que, em última análise, o paternalismo escravista acaba se revelando um jogo no qual o senhor 
nunca sairá vitorioso, não vejo por que me deter nos aspectos negativos da vida cativa, o que, 
nem de longe, equivale a negar a existência deles.” (Libby 2008: 31 – emphasis added) 
 
This whole passage is so puzzling that one hardly knows where to begin. Since Libby chooses 
to work with the evaluative vocabulary of “positive-negative” and “loser-winner”, one could 
well start by asking him two questions: 1) Mr. Libby, which were, in your opinion, the 
“positive” or at least “neutral” aspects of a life in bondage? 2) Mr. Libby, you assert that the 
slave paternalism is a game that the master will never win. Does that means that the slave 
ended up always winning it?  
Should these questions sound somehow ironic, one could wonder whether they are 
formulated in this manner with the express purpose of making plain that even more ironic (as 
well as callous) is the suggestion of considering paternalism without paying too much 
attention to “negative aspects” of the slave lives. 
Libby correctly remarks that the neo-revisionist approach has had little acceptance within the 
Brazilian Historiography of Slavery. But, of course, this is not automatically a reason for 
ignoring it. Quite the opposite: it might be exactly the reason for supporting a more careful 
appreciation of the potential of this approach for thinking about slavery in Brazil.  
Moreover, if only for the sake of argument one accepted without further questioning Libby’s 
warning that an emphatic insistence on “negative aspects” of slavery may jeopardize 
theoretical-methodological achievements that have been raising the agency of slaves, it would 
suffice to point to a work such as Wissenbach’s Sonhos Africanos, Vivências Ladinas, which 
shows that it is perfectly possible to emphasize the slaves’ agency without pushing a ‘negative 
aspect’ like the ubiquitous violence of the slavery system to the background. 
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However, what shall be strongly stressed is the fact that Libby refuses to consider US-
American neo-revisionism because its relevance were not quite clear to “present concerns” in 
the “trópicos brasílicos”. Whence one must infer that he surely thinks that his own “anti-neo-
revisionist” way of re-thinking the concept of paternalism is clearly relevant to these “present 
concerns” whatever they might be, since Libby does not take pains to enumerate them even 
succinctly. 
An interesting picture can be drawn from a brief comparison of Paiva’s with Libby’s article. 
While doing so, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that these contributions have a 
manifest programmatic character, not only opening the very first book published by the 
research group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens”, but also having been written by its two 
coordinators. 
Eduardo França Paiva left, without further explanation, the United States out of his 
comparative analysis, whose aim is to unveil the “mestiçagens” originated at the time of 
colonial slavery. Furthermore, he hardly addresses the issues surrounding slavery’s role in 
bringing about these “mestiçagens”. Douglas Cole Libby, in turn, focuses precisely on the 
United States and deliberately excludes the whole continental Hispanic America, for there, he 
says, “o escravismo não emergiu, a não ser temporariamente ou em regiões territorialmente 
muito reduzidas” (Libby 2008: 28). So, neither moves Paiva an inch from the common view, 
according to which, when one is interested in talking about “mestiçagem”, this implies an 
unhesitating exclusion the United States; nor Libby from the one that, focusing on “slavery” 
itself, contrasts Brazilian and American slave systems in that familiar way that excludes all 
countries surrounding Brazil. 
Another point, perhaps more important: departing from a strongly culturalist perspective, 
Paiva criticizes sharply so-called methodological nationalism, whereas Libby puts it fully into 
practice by grounding his exclusion of “American neo-revisionism” on the basis that this 
approach met present concerns relevant to the national History of the United States, but not 
to the Brazilian one. 
There is no need to decide here whether these substantial disagreements shall be seen as 
plurality or as contradiction. What must be stressed is that both Historians highlight that in 
writing History as they do, they are struggling to confront the problems posed by their own 
time. In this respect, they agree fully. 
 
	 156	
Critical racial studies and History of slavery 
In 2004, the year after the symposium that originated the research group “Escravidão e 
Mestiçagens” took place, Uma História não Contada: Negro, racismo e branqueamento em 
São Paulo no pós-abolição was published. Its author, the Historian Petrônio Domingues, 
advances a relatively audacious thesis. He contends that the racism in São Paulo, which he 
somehow ironically calls “racismo à paulista”, was essentially different from the “racismo 
cordial”, which has been conventionally considered the characteristic Brazilian variant of 
putting racial discrimination into practice. The “racismo à paulista” was “segregacionista e 
costumeiro” and carried out a process that 
“primeiro, privou o negro de direitos fundamentais no exercício da cidadania no campo da 
educação, saúde, política, lazer; segundo, eliminou as chances do trabalhador negro de 
concorrer em condições de igualdade com o branco nas velhas e novas oportunidades de 
emprego. Uma política de preferência racial e favorecimento do trabalhador branco no pós-
abolição causou danos ainda hoje irreparáveis aos descendentes de escravos. Um regime de 
segregação racial, alternadamente de fato e de direito, cindiu, em linhas gerais, a cidade de 
São Paulo em dois pólos: o “mundo branco” e o “mundo negro”. (Domingues 2004: 382) 
 
In fact, Domingues investigates the worlds of labour, leisure, education, he scrutinizes police 
reports, and asylum’s records, he provides insides into the public health system, the family’s 
organization, the demographical and geographical distribution of the population as well as 
into practices of social appropriation of public spaces, both in the capital and in the interior of 
São Paulo. In a word: throughout his book Domingues gathers evidence from everywhere in 
support of that main thesis. The primary sources on which he draws on most painstakingly in 
the performing of this task are the newspapers of the “imprensa negra”154 and the testimonies 
of first- and second-generation descendants of slaves. The findings presented in Uma História 
Não Contada are, to be sure, not properly unheard of, but unusually stressed in 
historiographical analyses on slavery in Brazil. 
For instance, against the prevailing idea that there has never been any kind of segregationist 
laws in Brazil, he offers the case of the “Guarda Civil Metropolitana de São Paulo”, where until 
1928 the admission of black people was statutorily forbidden. The reluctant racism of this 
corporation, Domingues argues, “provavelmente estava ligado ao fato de o branco não aceitar 																																																								154	Petrônio	Domingues	explains	that	“’imprensa	negra’	é	o	nome	dado	ao	conjunto	de	jornais	produzidos	por	negros	e	para	negros,	publicados	no	início	do	século	XX	em	São	Paulo.	[...]	Muitas	vezes,	utilizamos	o	termo	‘imprensa	branca’	em	oposição	à	imprensa	negra.	Trata-se	de	uma	referencia	aos	jornais	regulares	da	grande	imprensa,	de	ampla	circulação,	produzidos	por	brancos	e	voltados,	via	de	regra,	para	o	público	não-negro.”	(Domingues	2004:	25)	
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que negros assumissem cargos com poder de mando – era inimaginável obedecer 
publicamente à autoridade de um policial negro” (Domingues 2004: 136). In non-state 
institutions of public interest, such as private schools, religious orders or recreational clubs, 
the official existence of segregationism was, according to Domingues, fairly more common. A 
document of the catholic order Pia União das Filhas de Maria São reads that “muitas moças 
desejam ingressar na Pia União e […] algumas devem ser rejeitadas; especialmente, conforme 
o costume dos jesuítas, as negras devem ser afastadas.” Institutional racism pervaded also the 
educational branch of the Catholic orders: based on their statutes, the Our Lady of Sion School 
as well as the College Sacre Coeur did not allow black students (Domingues 2004: 148). Among 
the clubs that adopted segregationist ethnic criteria in the admission of their members 
Domingues lists the Espéria, Germania, Tietê, Homes e Paulistano (Domingues 2004: 173).  
The existence of “black territories” in Brazilian cities, be they neighbourhoods, streets or bars, 
has been discussed for some decades already155. Still, rarely has it been argued that there 
were also spatial barriers used with the purpose of separating a “white area” from a “black 
area” within the same public space. Against this established view, Domingues reports on a 
public place in Tietê, where a grid demarcated the side of the place destined for white people: 
there, where there was a garden. Blacks should keep themselves outside of this garden area. 
Domingues does not brush aside the fact that there were no signs indicating it. Though, how 
to treat it as a mere unwritten social convention when black people who did not behave in 
conformity with it were sometimes even arrested (Domingues 2004: 159)? 
Sometimes black men were also lynched. Lynchings had occurred, for example, in Campinas 
during the conjuncture immediately subsequent to the Abolition of Slavery, when there 
emerged a climate of persecution towards blacks. In Rio Claro, another city of São Paulo’s 
countryside, “a violência contra libertos era coisa diária, e, quando suspeitos de estupro de 
mulher branca, eram linchados.” These are statements that Domingues extracted from the 
works by Florestan Fernandes, regarding Campinas, and Warren Dean, respecting Rio Claro 
(Domingues 2004: 158; 186).  
Still, he does not limit himself to making these bibliographical remarks, but adds to them 
related findings from his own archival researches. In February 1888, he narrates, members of 
an ultra-racist organization assassinated Joaquim Firmino de Aráujo Cunha, the head of São 																																																								155	See,	for	example,	Raquel	Rolnik’s	“Territórios	Negros	nas	Cidades	Brasileiras	-	Etnicidade	e	Cidade	em	São	Paulo	e	Rio	de	Janeiro”	(1989).	
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Paulos’ police department, who was supposedly sympathetic to the abolitionist cause. The 
same group ransacked the houses of two others abolitionists, the businessmen Bento Cláudio 
de Almeida e Pedro da Rocha Campos. These men, according to an excerpt of a primary source 
transcribed by Domingues, only escaped death because they had been warned early enough 
(Domingues 2004: 74). So, against the common belief that such excesses of violence had never 
been committed in Brazil, Domingues went back to earlier academic work, bringing back issues 
that had been hitherto dormant as well as contributing to amplifying the discussion by coming 
up with new evidence based on primary sources. 
Uma História não Contada leaves no doubt about who its interlocutors are, namely, the so-
called “escola sociológica paulista”, in particular Florestan Fernandes and Octavio Ianni. The 
charge Domingues levels against them is that they had, so to speak, mistaken the consequence 
for the cause of the marginal integration of blacks into capitalist class society. In São Paulo, at 
least, he argues, the exclusion of blacks from the labor market, also a central argument in 
Florestan Fernandes’ famous thesis, was not due to any kind of incapacity resulting from the 
condition of having lived for more than three centuries under a regime of slavery. Rather, the 
implacable racism that reigned in social relations had been that which not only produced the 
image of the descendants of slaves as ignorant, unskilled and generally incapable of 
performing any task that required even a minimal degree of intellectual ability, but also used 
this same image as justification for their very exclusion.  
Florestan Fernandes and Octavio Ianni’s explanation about the transition to the free labor 
market in São Paulo were feeble for having premised upon three fallacies.  
The first fallacy assumed the general lack of human resources in São Paulo after the Abolition 
of slavery. Resorting to recent demographical studies, Domingues argues that the thesis on 
the deficit of workers in São Paulo is highly disputable. There were also opinions expressed by 
contemporaries that support this thesis. The councilor Paula Sousa, for instance, points out in 
1888, just about once month before the Abolition of Slavery, that “Trabalhadores não faltam 
a quem os sabe procurar. Primeiramente temos os próprios escravos, que não derretem nem 
mesmo desaparecem e que precisam de viver e alimentar-se, e, portanto, de trabalhar, coisa 
que compreendem em breve prazo.” (Domingues 2004: 89) 
The second fallacy concerned the idea of the cultural superiority of white Europeans 
immigrants. Domingues’ thesis is that the image of white European immigrant as educated, 
skilled, experienced in several types of planting and cultivation as well as able to work in 
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complex factory machines, was nothing but a product of the very “ideologia do 
branqueamento”, which played an ineludible role in the political decision of promoting the 
mass immigration of white Europeans to Brazil. That the majority of the Italian immigrants 
who came to São Paulo were poor peasants, whose life conditions in no way correspond to 
that idealized picture is only one among many arguments that he enrolls in support of his 
thesis (Domingues 2004: 60–66; 89–92).  
The third and final fallacy regarded the idea of the general unwillingness of ex-slaves to work 
in their former roles, as well as their presumable incapacity to take over new productive 
activities. This is another set of ideas that, Domingues stressed, has been repeatedly refuted 
by a large amount of historiographical studies. As early as the 1970s Warren Dean had already 
demonstrated that, at least in Rio Claro (SP), farms with productivity above average employed 
more Brazilian than immigrant workers (Domingues 2004: 92–102; Dean 1971). 
Thus, when Florestan Fernandes affirms that “o ex-escravo não estava em condições de 
competir com os imigrantes sequer na lavoura” or when Octavio Ianni remarks that “o 
horizonte mental do negro recém-egresso na senzala não era suficientemente amplo para 
possibilitar um rápido e eficiente aprendizado na lida com instrumentos e máquinas cujo 
funcionamento lhe era estranho”, they are not properly explaining the marginal integration 
of black people into class society in São Paulo, but explaining it by reproducing racism 
sociologically156. (Domingues 2004: 93; 100) 																																																								156	The	same	critique	 is	valid	 to	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso	and	all	 the	more	 to	Celso	Furtado,	whose	economicist	approach	to	the	problem	of	colonial	slavery	is	so	glaringly	blind	to	the	presence	of	racism	that	it	deserves—together	with	Furtado’s	sociological	presentation	of	the	ex-slaves	themselves—to	be	quoted	at	some	length.		The	difficulty	begins	already	with	the	comparison	he	makes	in	order	to	explain	the	matter:		“A	abolição	da	escravatura,	 à	semelhança	de	uma	"reforma	agrária",	não	constitui	per	se	nem	destruição	nem	 criação	 de	 riqueza.	 Constitui	 simplesmente	 uma	 redistribuição	 da	 propriedade	 dentro	 de	 uma	coletividade.	A	aparente	complexidade	desse	problema	deriva	de	que	a	propriedade	da	força	de	trabalho,	ao	passar	do	senhor	de	escravos	para	o	indivı́duo,	deixa	de	ser	um	ativo	que	figura	numa	contabilidade	para	constituir-se	em	simples	virtualidade.”	(Furtado	[1959]	2003:	143	–	emphasis	added)	Once	stated	that	the	complexity	of	the	“problem	of	slavery”	is	just	“apparent”,	Furtado	then	speaks	-	with	the	same	nonchalant	social-scientific	self-confidence	-	about	the	ex-slaves	as	follows:	“As	vantagens	que	apresentava	o	trabalhador	europeu	com	respeito	ao	ex-escravo	são	demasiado	óbvias	para	insistir	sobre	elas.		O	 homem	 formado	 dentro	 desse	 sistema	 social	 está	 totalmente	 desaparelhado	 para	 responder	 aos	estímulos	econômicos.	Quase	não	possuindo	hábitos	de	vida	familiar,	a	ideia	de	acumulação	de	riqueza	é	praticamente	 estranha.	 Demais,	 seu	 rudimentar	 desenvolvimento	 mental	 limita	 extremamente	 suas	"necessidades".	Sendo	o	trabalho	para	o	escravo	uma	maldição	e	o	ócio	o	bem	inalcançável,	a	elevação	de	seu	salário	acima	de	suas	necessidades	-	que	estão	definidas	pelo	nível	de	subsistência	de	um	escravo	-	determina	de	imediato	uma	forte	preferência	pelo	ócio.		Podendo	satisfazer	seus	gastos	de	subsistência	com	dois	ou	três	dias	de	trabalho	por	semana,	ao	antigo	escravo	parecia	muito	mais	atrativo	"comprar"	o	ócio	que	seguir	trabalhando	quando	já	tinha	o	suficiente	
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Careful attention to the many possible guises of racism is undoubtedly the most distinctive 
feature of Uma História não Contada. In fact, Domingues explains that the concept of racism 
constitutes the very methodological axis of his work (Domingues 2004: 22). This feature bears 
a special relation to the fact that even though Uma História não Contada goes back to the 
decades prior to the 13th of May 1888, the book focuses clearly on the post-Abolition years, 
the so-called “Primeira República” (1889–1930). Therefore, it is not what one would promptly 
name ”History of Slavery”. 
The question of naming is far from being a minor one in what concerns the interrelation 
between periodization and the designation of History’s subjects. This problem will 
nonetheless be momentarily put aside, so that attention can be fully drawn to an aspect which 
Historians have to deal with when they get down to work on the post-Abolition period in 
Brazil: a considerable corpus of written primary sources in which blacks, presenting 
themselves as such, address the issue of slavery. The newspapers of the “imprensa negra” 
made up the bulk of this documentation. 
To have such sources does not imply that the identity of these subjects would no longer be a 
Historian’s construction. Rather, by making statements grounded on what blacks directly 
wrote or told about slavery, the Historian effects the constitution of a point of view that 
displays the distinctive quality of introducing the possibility of constructing the speech of 
those who have so far been always only spoken about.  
In this sense, when Domingues elects the newspapers of the “imprensa negra” as well as the 
interviews with first- and second-generation descendent of slaves as his main sources, he does 
that with the conspicuous purpose of privileging  
“[O] ‘gritar’ do negro neste movimento de produção do conhecimento histórico. Nessa tarefa, 
modificando-se a ordem do ‘olhar racial’, altera-se o produto. As explicações centradas no 																																																								"para	 viver".	 Dessa	 forma,	 uma	 das	 consequências	 diretas	 da	 abolição,	 nas	 regiões	 em	 mais	 rápido	desenvolvimento,	foi	reduzir-se	o	grau	de	utilização	da	força	de	trabalho.	Esse	problema	terá	repercussões	sociais	amplas	que	não	compete	aqui	refletir.		
Cabe	 tão-somente	 lembrar	 que	 o	 reduzido	 desenvolvimento	mental	 da	 população	 submetida	 à	 escravidão	
provocará	 a	 segregação	 parcial	 desta	 após	 a	 abolição,	 retardando	 sua	 assimilação	 e	 entorpecendo	 o	
desenvolvimento	 econômico	 do	 país.	 Por	 toda	 a	 primeira	 metade	 do	 século	 XX,	 a	 grande	 massa	 dos	descendentes	 da	 antiga	 população	 escrava	 continuará	 vivendo	 dentro	 de	 seu	 limitado	 sistema	 de	"necessidades",	 cabendo-lhe	 um	 papel	 puramente	 passivo	 nas	 transformações	 econômicas	 do	 país.”	(Furtado	[1959]	2003:	146–147	–	emphasis	added).	Indeed,	the	problem	of	slavery	is	(still)	“apparent”,	but	in	the	sense	of	being	clearly	visible	or	understood,	of	 being,	 in	 fact,	 “obvious”.	 The	 great	 influence	 that	 ideas	 widespread	 by	 books	 like	 Celso	 Furtado’s	
Formação	Econômica	do	Brasil	(still)	exerts	on	the	Brazilian	academic	production	is	a	substantial	part	of	the	problem.		 		
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branco – que sempre cumpriu o papel de dominação e vem legitimando o status quo da 
desigualdade racial no país – foram questionadas. Afinal, essas explicações não dão conta do 
‘outro’; não aceitam a diversidade; e, geralmente, não realizam a travessia à outra margem da 
história. Por isso enfatizamos: à luz de um pensamento critico, este livro tenta restituir ao 
vencido o direito inalienável de (re)construção do seu passado.” (Domingues 2004: 382) 
 
Like Eduardo França and Douglas Cole Libby, Petrônio Domigues also stresses that, by writing 
Uma História Não Contada, he meets particular demands of his own time. The most important 
one was to challenge the commonsense idea that conflates the historical trajectory of blacks 
in Brazil with the History of Slavery.  
“Com o fim da escravidão, fecham-se as cortinas do cenário historiográfico para os ex-
escravos. Neste instante, suas experiências e vivências ficam diluídas na categoria povo ou 
classe social, chegando ao ponto de alguns desavisados pensarem que os negros abandonaram 
a condição de produtores de uma história específica. 
Abolindo-se a escravidão, o foco das atenções desloca-se diametralmente. Em vez do negro, 
os novos personagens privilegiados pela historiografia paulista são imigrantes, operários, 
anarquistas, ou temas como industrialização, urbanização, modernização, oligarquia cafeeira. 
[...] 
A eliminação, no pós-13 de Maio de 1888, da “mancha negra” das áreas de pesquisa 
provavelmente esteja no bojo de uma linha ideológica de construção do conhecimento 
histórico eurocentrista, paulista e por que não dizer movida por um certo preconceito racial, 
ainda que silenciado.” (Domingues 2004: 21). 
 
On the occasion of the publication of the book, Domingues added another point that, while 
circumstantial, is presented as being of paramount importance: 
“[E]ste livro é o registro de uma importante fase de minha vida intelectual, sendo publicado 
em momento oportuno. Quando a sociedade civil brasileira se debruça para discutir 
reparações para a população negra – pelas ações afirmativas e pelas cotas -, é de fundamental 
importância voltar no tempo para entender como, afinal, foi produzido (e reproduzido) o atual 
sistema promotor de desigualdades raciais, pelo menos em São Paulo.” (Domingues 2004: 18 
– emphasis added) 
 
He is thus, like his contemporary fellows-Historians França Paiva and Cole Libby, explicitly 
concerned with meeting the demands of his time. 
 
Unthinking ideology and anachronism 
Eduardo França, Douglas Cole Libby, Petrônio Domigues, the three authors analyzed in this 
section, expectedly admit, and in a much similar fashion, that present issues play a crucial role 
in their works. At the same time, they struggle to ascertain that what they are 
historiographically presenting is true to the actual past. This effort to keep the presence of the 
present within a certain degree, so that it does not immediately jeopardize the truthfulness 
of the Historical account, is what has been here called the “controlled anachronism”, which 
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the practice of History necessarily entails. Presumably, the more successfully one did that, the 
longer would one’s work remain actual. 
Ideology has been hitherto defined as that which a work cannot say. And what a work cannot 
say is important “because there the elaboration of the utterance is acted out, in a sort of 
journey to silence.” When Spivak resorts to this idea by Macherey, she is particularly 
interested in the silence produced by “what a work cannot say” because it refuses to say it 
(Spivak 1988: 286).  
In the case of Foucault & Deleuze, the “two activist philosophers of history” whose “friendly 
exchange” Spivak analyzes in Can the Subaltern Speak, what they refuse to say is that they 
enjoy properly imperial157 privileges of power (Spivak 1988: 272 – emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, it is exactly this refusal that enables them to conflate “desire” and “interest” so 
as to make themselves transparent, while, by leveling a “radical criticism” premised upon the 
critique of the sovereign subject, they produce a monolithic and essentialized “subaltern 
subject” by the same token as they restore the epistemological sovereignty of “the subject of 
the West, or the West as Subject” (Spivak 1988: 271). 
If encouraged by Spivak’s reflections, the matter concerning the works of Paiva, Libby and 
Domingues, can be systematized by asking three questions. First: Which could their refusals 
possible consist of? Second: Do they also produce “silences” that utter something particularly 
important? Third: in which way were this acting out of silent utterances related to that 
“controlled anachronism”? 
Concerning the first question, Eduardo França Paiva refuses the “old comparative History” in 
historiographical approaches to the issue of “Escravidão e Mestiçagens”; Douglas Cole Libby 
refuses to consider the “American neo-revisionism” in re-thinking the concept of slave 
paternalism with respect to the Brazilian and the American slave systems; and, finally, 
Petrônio Domingues refuses the “olhar branco” on the History of Brazil.  
There is no need of especially designed glasses to create a three-dimensional effect of 
theoretical depth to see that such acts of refusing are performed at that point in which an 
explanation about “how the work is made” coincides with another about “why the work is 
made”. But, if one insisted in wearing such glasses, one would see that these two concomitant 
explanations, instead of putting themselves mutually in perspective so as to form a unitary 																																																								157	From	Spivak’s	viewpoint	the	social	sciences	have	been	an	integral	part	of	the	“social	text	of	imperialism”	or,	in	a	more	pregnant	formulation,	of	the	“codifying	legal	practice	of	imperialism.”	(Spivak	1988:	286)	
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image endowed with lulling Historical profundity, would instead be seen as separate and 
blurred. 
This means that the theoretical analysis you are reading right now, regardless of wearing 
special glasses or without them, shall be regarded as incapable of disclosing a more truthful 
image of what has been seen in those historiographical texts. Rather, such an analysis is 
supposed not to restore a presumed true appearance hidden somehow behind what comes 
into sight, but to present the same image disruptively, so as to cast doubt on the eye’s 
particular ability to recognize a specific measurement of the distance between the elements 
of a picture as the perfect perspective which accounted for the true disposition of things in 
reality. 
The act of confluence by means of which Historians lay bare what their work is made of and 
how their work is made, as well as the reasons why a historiographical text should follow some 
specific guidelines at a particular time, could also be rightly called “synchronization” for, in 
fact, Historians are here adjusting their conceptual apparatus so that it operates in two times 
periods at the same time: the past and the present.  
Using another cinematic metaphor, it would be analytically seductive instead of 
“synchronization”, to translate it into “Synchronisierung”, for in German common parlance 
this word bears a meaning which is absent in English: it also stands for the process of replacing 
the voice of the actors shown on the screen with those of different performers speaking 
another language158.  
“Synchronisierung” would then not only be the process of making theoretical-methodological 
adjustments so as to correlate the subject (of the past) with the demands (of the present). It 
would also be the very act of silencing the other’s voice by paradoxically uttering what it had 
said in a way that ideally granted its full meaningfulness: the translation. 
The silence [of an other] is here, as it generally is, the very condition of possibility of [one’s] 
speech at all (Macherey [1966] 2006: 97). But who were the [silenced] Other(s) in the texts of 
Paiva, of Libby and of Domingues? The answer to that also answers that second question. 
Paiva justifies his refusal of “the old comparative History” by stating that it does not allow for 
privileging “negros e mestiços” as interlocutors. He claims to engage his elected “privileged 
interlocutors” (negros e mestiços) and the other social groups in a “dialogue’ whose aim is to 
																																																								158	In	English,	“dubbing”,	a	word	that	does	not	convey	the	idea	of	temporalisation.		
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understand the very “mestiçagem”. Assuming that he is right in presenting his work in this 
fashion, one must also immediately notice something truly strange: since all voices taking part 
in this “dialogue” come from sources produced by “the other social groups”, with special 
prominence to that of European travellers, and none from the “negros e mestiços” 
themselves, when they speak, even if as “privileged interlocutors’, they must speak as a third 
person, as if seeing themselves from a synchronic outside. However, this relation is presented 
completely invertedly when Paiva states that it is “by means of” the “negros e mestiços” that 
he is attempting to comprehend “mestiçagem” (Paiva 2008: 24). At every point of Paiva’s 
historiographical account “negros e mestiços” are just those who have been talked about, 
who have been represented and re-presented, but not those who speak for themselves as 
autonomous interlocutor in a fair dialogue.  
Given that Paiva does not problematize the act of silencing entailed in his careless election of 
“negros e mestiços” as “privileged interlocutors”, he sets himself on a collision course not with 
the “old comparative History”, which, indeed, he criticizes for having done the very same, that 
is, for having silenced “negros e mestiços”. Rather, he collides violently with the perspective 
provided by Petrônio Domingues! So does Libby, for while he refuses the “American ne-
revisionism” due to its emphasis on the “negative aspects” of slavery, Domingues puts racism, 
(which is surely not a “positive aspect” of slavery) into the center of attention.  
In this sense, it is evident that those “losers of history” (vencidos), to whom Petrônio 
Domingues refers to (Domingues 2004: 382), are not those masters, who, according to 
Douglas Cole Libby, never won the game of slave paternalism159. Neither are they the 
descendant and heirs of these masters. Equally evident is that when Petrônio Domingues 
speaks conspicuously just of “negros” and “brancos” he intends to marginalize the notion of 
“mestiçagem”, a concept that, seen from the point of view defended by Eduardo França Paiva, 
is indispensable in approaching slavery and, consequently, its aftermaths, in the Black Atlantic 
World.  
																																																								159	The	passage	quoted	above	 is	not	 the	only	one	 in	which	Libby	uses	 the	 “loser-winner-metaphor”	 for	explaining	that	the	paternalism	is	a	game	that	the	“pater”	actually	always	loses.	At	another	moment	of	the	text,	after	having	listed	some	strategies	of	slave	resistance	in	every-day	life,	he	insists	on	the	point:		“É	neste	sentido	que	sugeri	antes	que	o	paternalismo	foi	um	jogo	nunca	vencido	pelos	senhores,	pela	simples	razão	de	que	os	cativos	nunca	cessaram	na	sua	luta	pela	conquista	de	espaços	adicionais.	Apenas	lembraria	que	nenhum	senhor	jamais	admitia	reconhecer	publicamente	que,	no	fundo,	era	ele	o	vencido.”	(Libby	2008:	34)	
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The picture that slowly gains contour here is, so to speak, a return of the same: on the one 
hand, those who brandishing the (theoretical) force of (the concept) of “mestiçagem” 
articulates a discourse that ends up downplaying power asymmetries by, for example, talking 
about slavery and colonialism in terms of a horizontal process of “africanização-europeização-
americanização” (Eduardo França Paiva) or by outrageously suggesting that slave paternalism 
may be divested of its “negative side” (Douglas Cole Libby). These are untimely followers of 
Gilberto Frey.  
On the other hand, there are those who, like Petrônio Domingues, calling for a deeper 
appreciation of the theoretical-methodological power of a conceptualization of racism, 
construct a clear distinction between “white” and “blacks” with the purpose of making plain 
that the very talk about “mestiçagem” may camouflage what should be at stake in addressing 
the issue of slavery nowadays, that is, racism itself and many other forms of oppression 
related to it. 
 
In arranging these works in such an opposing ideological disposition one attends a kind of 
interplay of refusals by means of which the task of tracing ideology becomes indeed the 
“measuring of distances” created by that “hollow speech”160 which separates and fixes the 
meaning of what historiographical works utter (Macherey [1966] 2006: 88).  
Such an analysis, while cogent in some sense, does not leave sufficient room for properly 
developing that idea of Synchronisierung, which, as asserted before, in considering the act of 
silent eloquence occurring as a result from the adjustment of theoretical tools to the 
concreteness emanated both from the Historical sources and from the demands of the 
present, characterized a more appropriate account of the conjoint interaction of ideology and 
anachronism. A further step must be then taken. 
Eduardo França Paiva resorts to Serge Gruzinski’s concept of cultural mediation in order to 
present “negros e mestiços” as “mediadores culturais”. In doing that, he is trying to break the 
habit of assuming that everything had an exclusive origin. This habit, he remarks, had been a 																																																								160	For	Macherey,	a	proper	investigation	of	the	meaning	of	literary	works	“takes	as	its	subject	that	hollow	
speech	that	the	works	utters	so	discreetly;	it	measures	the	distance	which	separates	the	various	meanings.	The	literary	work	gives	the	measure	of	a	difference,	reveals	a	determinate	absence,	resorts	to	an	eloquent	silence	[…]	it	reveals	the	inscription	of	an	otherness	in	the	work,	through	which	it	maintains	a	relationship	with	that	which	 it	 is	not,	 that	which	happens	at	 its	margins.”	(Macherey	[1966]	2006	–	emphasis	 in	the	original).	Spivak	resorts	to	these	ideas	to	measure	ideological	meanings	of	the	“social	text	of	imperialism”	in	the	guise	of	Foucault’s	and	Deleuze	philosophical	discourse	about	history.		
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“marca importante de uma cultura ocidental e ocidentalizante, que parece ter triunfado, 
sobretudo a partir do século XV.” (Paiva 2008: 14). The approach he puts forward, guided by 
a relativistic concept of culture as well as by the notion of “conexão of contextos”, meant to 
opt for the “história da diversidade e da alteridade; a releitura de nossas certezas 
historiográficas e, ainda, o emprego de um novo aparato metodológico-conceitual”, which 
would allow for bringing about the changes required by the present time. (Paiva 2008: 25).  
Douglas Cole Libby confesses that he belongs to the class of radical empiricists who stick to 
the concreteness of the particular, being therefore not at all fond of generalizing theoretical-
methodological thinking (Libby 2008: 27). When he leaves his comfort zone in order to 
comparatively theorize slave paternalism, he is also trying to break the habit of assuming that 
the “masters” were always the “winners of history” as well as the idea that they had invariably 
been white people. Like Paiva, he is suggesting a re-reading of some historiographical 
certainties, which have been playing a key role in fixing historical identities within the Black 
Atlantic. 
The research group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens” is thus, judging from this viewpoint, deeply 
committed to a critical attitude towards Eurocentric, evolutionist and reductive views within 
the Brazilian History of Slavery. 
Nothing could be more kindred to the project of Uma História Não Contada, which fiercely 
criticizes a “linha ideológica de construção conhecimento histórico eurocentrista” (Domingues 
2004: 21) that, according to Petrônio Domingues, creates a persistent absence of black 
people’s History in Brazilian academia. 
The picture was now turned upside-down: instead of being “antagonists”, Paiva and Libby and 
Domingues are now comrade-in-arms! The target of their common refusal is Eurocentrism. In 
unison, they claim to have written works that, premised upon ideas of diversity and otherness, 
brought into question historiographical certainties constructed eurocentrically. 
 
If one takes into account that Eurocentrism consists of a grey zone endowed with (at least) 
fifteen shades161, and that History may be about as many things as there are supposed to have 
existed on Earth, one easily arrives at the conclusion that the silences produced by 																																																								161	Expanding	on	their	analysis	in	Unthinking	Eurocentrism,	Ella	Shohat	and	Robert	Stam	subdivided	their	presentation	 of	 the	 patterns	 in	 fifteen	 topics	 that	 an	 “ideal	 portrait”	 of	 Eurocentrism	 might	 posit.	(Stam/Shohat	2012:	65–68)	
	 167	
historiographical refusals of Eurocentrism must be incommensurable, for irreducibly 
differential.  
From this conclusion, one could equally easily infer that in order to address colonial slavery in 
an anti-Eurocentric way, an approach conceptually based on “mestiçagem” (Paiva and Libby) 
may be as good as one based on racism (Domingues). As a matter of fact, it could be further 
argued, that there is no conceptual impasse between either approaches. Neither Domingues’ 
focus on racism negates that it might have been “mestiçagem” à la Paiva or slave paternalism 
à la Libby, nor do Paiva’s “mestiçagem” and Libby’s paternalism negate that there might have 
been segregationist racism in Brazil, as pointed out by Domingues. A step forward in this 
direction and instead of silencing each other, it could be said that both perspectives could be 
combined in such a manner that one might extract the best from both of them.  
It is not only that the opposition between the two positions effaces in this light but also that 
their effectiveness in underpinning a critical attitude towards Eurocentrism must be seen as 
ultimately contingent.  
Such a relativistic conclusion is not wrong. Rather, it is an indispensable step towards 
recognizing that the ubiquity of Eurocentrism is not what precludes the possibility of regarding 
ideology as the task of measuring the silences of what a historiographical work “refuses to 
say” in order to fight it; rather, the Eurocentric is what allows for performing such a task, for 
“the Eurocentric” always appears as providing the ideal from which the critical work wants to 
constitute a deviation (Spivak 1988: 285–286). 
It is a truly strange situation. Here, the ideal is not what one strives for, but what becomes 
everyone’s starting point. Exactly for this reason the idea of translation as Synchronisierung 
makes sense. The deviation from the ubiquitous ideal is made up by that which happened to 
be successfully translated by the process of Synchronisierung, that is, by the act of adjusting 
one’s conceptual apparatus so that it captures the subject under inquiry and, at the same 
time, meets whatever one considers to be the particular demands of the present. 
Yet, how to know whether, what and how the (Eurocentric) ideal was “successfully” translated 
in a historiographical work? Put concretely: is it possible to take the step that leads from that 
initial relativistic acknowledgement of an anti-Eurocentric potential and apply it to both 
Paiva’s and Libby’s approach, as well as Domingues’, to reach a more qualified stance? So that 
by “investigating, identifying, and measuring … the deviation’ from an ideal that is irreducibly 
differential” (Spivak 1988: 286–287), might one be able to decide which of them translates 
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Eurocentrism more successfully? Which of them is ideologically less inclined to a Eurocentric 
view? 
A proper answer to these questions presupposes a careful analysis of the relationship 
between History and Theory of History, which is the focus of the next section. From what has 
been so far discussed, the following should be kept in mind: the silences produced by the 
refusals one states in attempting to control the immanent anachronism of History is what 
constitutes the ideological dimension of a historiographical work. Thus, ideology and 
controlled anachronism bear a relation of mutual conditioning. However, at this point, every 
ideological position may be as good as any other, for it legitimates itself in its own terms.  
The paralyzing effect of such a relativistic view may be avoided by having recourse to the idea 
of Synchronisierung. This is the name given to the specific translational process of deviation 
(from an ubiquitous and mutant Eurocentric ideal) which produces eloquent silences by 
adjusting conceptual tools so that they meet the demands of the present without pushing the 
truthfulness of the historiographical subject to the background. In doing that, a 
historiographical work, so to speak, sets the stage of its representation so as to delimitate the 
particular positions from which the work might be legitimately seen as ideological. But 
ideological in such a way that, presently, the measure of their deviations would not allow to 
lump them together with Euclides da Cunha or Trevor-Hoper, that is, they would not cease to 




Oooô negra mina, Anastácia não se deixou escravizar  
Oooô Clementina, o pagode é o partido popular 
O sacerdote ergue a taça 
Convocando toda a massa 
Neste evento que congraça 
Gente de todas as raças 
Numa mesma emoção 
Essa kizomba é nossa constituição 
[...] 
Vem a lua de Luanda 
Para iluminar a rua 
Nossa sede é nossa sede 
De que o apartheid se destrua 
(Vila 1988 – emphasis added)162 
 
 
The whole discussion about the relationship between History and Theory of History conducted 
in the section entitled “On the Ends of History” can be summarized in three main propositions.  
The first one, based on Danto’s aesthetics, reads that History should not be thought to 
comprise an epistemological domain separable from Theory of History, for historical accounts 
are substantially constituted by what they are theoretically believed to be. The second 
proposition establishes that this indivisible theoretical substance of History consists of what 
Chakrabarty calls the “hyperreal Europe”, an abstract entity that has remained the implicit but 
nevertheless sovereign subject of all histories. Finally, the third one, which also draws on 
Chakrabarty’s theorization of History, refers to the idea that this “hyperreal Europe” should 
be subjected to a “politics of translation”, which, oriented towards translucence stead of 
transparency, may produce historical difference (instead of lack of incommensurability). 
What Chakrabarty calls “translucence’ corresponds to Spivak’s “measuring the deviation” 
(from an irreducibly differential Eurocentric ideal), which the discussion in the last chapter 
was about. In fact, the way Spivak relates the Western intellectual to the representation of 
third-world subjects is very much like the way in which Historians in general have been related 
towards their subject of knowledge. 
																																																								162	A	passage	from	“Kizomba,	a	festa	da	raça,”	samba-enredo	with	which	the	samba	school	Unidos	de	Vila	Isabel	won	Rio	de	Janeiro’s	Carnival	Parade	in	1988,	the	year	of	the	centenary	of	the	Abolition	of	Slavery	and	of	the	promulgation	of	the	Constitution	that	marked	the	definitive	end	of	the	military	dictatorship	in	Brazil.			
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The sharpest criticism Spivak levels at Foucault & Deleuze’s critique of the sovereign subject 
concerns the fact that they render the “Third World” (or the Others) “transparent” in what 
they make themselves “transparent”. She provides several examples of the rhetorical blows 
that these two intellectuals deliver against ideology, thereby producing their own 
“transparency”. The point she makes most painstakingly concerns Deleuze’s argument that 
“There is no more representation; there’s nothing but action.” Deleuze’s articulation of this 
argument was problematic because it conflates two senses of the word “representation”: 
“representation as ‘speaking for’ (Vertreten), as in politics, and representation as ‘re-
presentation’ (Darstellung), as in art or philosophy. ” (Spivak 1988: 275) 
So, when Deleuze says that “Reality is what actually happens in a factory, in a school, in 
barracks, in a prison, in a police station” he argues for a self-affirmation of representation in 
the first sense (vertreten) by means of a negation of representation in the second sense 
(darstellen). 
The first act, the self-affirmative one, represented, in Deleuze’s own terms, that type of 
“theoretical action” whose aim is “to create conditions where the prisoners [or any others 
oppressed subject] themselves would be able to speak” (Foucault 1980: 206–207). However, 
there follows a second act, the negative one, which represents Deleuze’s accomplishment of 
what Spivak qualifies as the limits of a “representationalist realism” that “has helped positivist 
empiricism—the justifying foundation of advanced capitalist neo-colonialism—to define its 
own arena as ‘concrete experience’, ‘what actually happens.’” (Spivak 1988: 275) 
It is constitutive of the Historian’s craft to deal with this precise set of questions, namely, to 
establish the conditions where one may speak of “what actually happened”. This means to 
say that Historians are steadily confronted with the possibility of conflating ‘representing’ and 
‘re-presenting’, or, they are susceptible of rendering themselves transparent as part of the 
effort to make their subject matter perfectly visible. Further still, they might play the role of 
Synchronsprecher who were simply repeating what had supposedly been told by an original 
voice. 
In the next few pages, the “deviations” detected in the texts by Paiva, Libby and Petrônio 
Domigues will be “measured”, where they each, respectively, deal with the issue of Historical 
“representation/re-presentation”.  
Then, after having performed this task, which shall result in a distinction between two 
epistemological approaches endowed with an uneven capacity of refraining themselves from 
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Historicism, another two historiographical works will be analysed so as to spell out their 
ideological consequences: firstly, A Força da Escravidão by Sydney Chalhoub’s; secondly, 
Kelmer Mathias’ article “O Braço armado do Senhor”, each one exemplifying one of those 
epistemological approaches. 
  
On the issue of representation: synchronizing History and theory of History  
The “unadventurous many”  
Eduardo França Paiva and Douglas Cole Libby practice a sort of historiographical writing that 
effects a “representationalist realism”, elsewhere here called “naïve realism”, corollary of a 
positivist empiricism of the most crude stock. What differs Paiva from Libby is merely the fact 
that the latter openly admits the structuring force of his empiricist belief, while the former 
exposes it in the form of eluding theoretical remarks.  
So, Libby simply says that 
“Adentrar o terreno da História Comparativa provavelmente representa o mais perigoso de 
todos os exercícios aos quais o historiador pode dedicar-se. Tal afirmativa é ainda mais 
verdadeira quando o historiador em questão pertence à classe dos empiricistas radicais: 
daqueles que preferem pacientemente esperar longos meses e anos para ver o que as fontes 
têm a dizer às reflexões teórico-metodológicas – acerca daquilo que as fontes deveriam dizer. 
O problema, é claro, é que a comparação forçosamente conduz a generalizações, as quais, por 
sua vez, quase sempre podem ser questionadas por pesquisas que enfocam o específico. Por 
mais que eu me agarre ao específico, reconheço que, de vez em quando, é preciso refletir 
sobre o quadro geral.” (Libby 2008: 27) 
 
Had Libby stringently followed what he preconized in this passage, he probably would not 
have written a single historiographical book in his entire life. Even stubborn empiricists would 
agree that if History entails a dialogue, this conversation is pretty much like an interview: 
sources “say” what is substantial and in this sense they somehow speak for themselves, but 
they do not speak alone. Rather, they follow a conversational flow which is guided by the 
Historians; sources may answer a multitude of questions themselves, but, as Marc Bloch 
would say, nothing which they have not been asked about (Bloch [1940] 1963: 64).  
And the selection of “who” is going to be interviewed, the questions that are posed to them, 
the editing of which “answers” can be discarded and the choice of what and how the general 
content will be directly or indirectly used in the confection of a particular historiographical 
account, each one of these steps presupposes theoretical-methodological decisions. During 
such an elaborative process, when Historians keep listen patiently to whatever the sources 
“have to say”, this by no means implies that they are not incessantly engaged in theoretical-
	 172	
methodological reflections163, for if they were, they would make themselves unable, firstly, 
to assess, secondly, to express the meaningfulness of what the sources have been saying.  
Libby’s words sound almost like an accusation that Historians who have a propensity for 
theoretical elaboration are at best impatient and at worst underhanded.  
In the first case, they are precipitate and infer theoretically what the sources would probably 
say one day, if they managed to wait until then. Of course, there is in this remark a veiled 
insinuation of disciplinary laziness, for those Historians who spend months and years 
“listen(ing) to the sources” are not just “waiting”, but working hard on their research, 
obstinately seeking to find something; meanwhile, the ones who prefer to theorize the 
matter, can spare themselves such trouble by taking time-saving theoretical detours. 
In the second case, which, by the way, denotes more accurately what Libby says, Historians 
infer theoretically that which they think the sources should say. Of course, there is in this 
remark an unvarnished insinuation of intellectual dishonesty, for it is as though such 
Historians had no concerns about that which the sources “have to say” and would effectively 
do if no “theoretical detour” had taken their place.  
The reification of the sources entailed by Libby’s radical empiricism makes what Historians say 
congruent with what the sources have to say. Theoretical and methodological concerns just 
jeopardize this harmony that the Historians enjoy together with their cherished sources in the 
historiographically protected “realm of the idiographic”. Comparison, Libby goes on arguing, 
is a problem because it is a type of theoretical-methodological procedure that forcefully leads 
to generalizations. Comparative History is, therefore, the most dangerous terrain a Historian 
could ever enter into. 
It is as though Libby ignored not only that every History is in some sense comparative 
History164, but also that not every theoretical generalization results primarily from a 
comparison between particular Historical contexts. But he does not ignore it. In another work 
of his authorship (together with Zephyr Frank), namely, the article “Voltando aos registros 
																																																								163	The	word	has	here	the	double	meaning	both	of	“thinking	about”	and	of	“representing	a	way	of	thinking	about”.	164	As	Paul	Veyne	notes,	historicizing	presupposes	a	search	for	the	“originality	of	things”.	A	Historian	can	decide	to	take	a	legal	system	as	subject.	Still,	nothing	is	more	similar	to	a	“legal	system”	than	another	“legal	system”.	 To	 speak,	 for	 example,	 about	 the	 Roman	 Law	 System,	 Historians	 must	 individualize	 it,	 must	circumscribe	some	particularities	that	will	make	of	it	a	proper	Historical	subject.	Therefore,	every	History,	even	if	not	deliberately,	turns	out	to	be	comparative	History.	(Veyne	1983:	44–46)	
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coloniais de Minas colonial: etnicidade em São José do Rio das Morte, 1780-1810”, after 
having presenting his findings about slave-marriage, they conclude: 
“Esses achados contrastam, de maneira bem distinta, com aqueles que se referem ao 
Recôncavo Baiano no final do século XVIII, pois lá, casais formados por africanos e nativos 
representavam pouco mais que 15% de todos os casamentos. Também contrastam com a 
situação no interior do Rio de Janeiro, onde a frequência dos casamentos ‘mistos’ decaiu de 
23% em 1790 para 11% em 1830, e com as práticas encontradas para o município cafeeiro 
paulista de Bananal na virada do século, quando as uniões formais entre africanos e nativos 
perfaziam meros 14,6% de todos os casamentos escravos. O comportamento exógeno dos 
mancípios de São José, sem dúvida, coloca em xeque as interpretações historiográficas que 
insistem não apenas em que os africanos se dividiam, de maneira irreparável, entre seus 
agrupamentos ‘tribais’, mas também que não se davam bem com os escravos nativos do 
Brasil.” (Libby/Frank 2009: 400 – emphasis added) 
 
Even though Libby/Frank’s account focuses exclusively on Rio das Mortes betwenn 1780-
1810, comparison plays a central role here, to wit the role of calling other historiographical 
interpretations into question.  
In the same article, they add a footnote to explain that their use the terms “etnicidade, etnia 
e étnico(a)” is not fortuitous, but  
 “se referem, da maneira mais abrangente possível dentro das discussões do momento atual, 
à noção de uma grande diversidade de rótulos ou de representações identitárias utilizados no 
passado escravista para designar africanos e seus descendentes. Embora os termos 
empregados para rotular tais descendentes não constituam etnias propriamente ditas, não 
encontramos outro termo de abrangência satisfatória.” (Libby/2009: 408 – emphasis added) 
 
Libby is aware that he cannot make his point without resorting to some general category 
refering to the process of identity’s constitution that he is interested in presenting 
historiographically. He opts for “ethnicity”, which then refers to the abstract way in which past 
identity representations will be re-presented in the analysis. Evidently, a “generalization” of 
this nature does not precipitate him into the type of comparative History he is afraid of.   
In defense of Libby one could say, first, that when he compares different “historical 
interpretations”, he does it on the basis of statistical relationships, that is, on the basis of 
supposedly “hard empirical data”, not on a “theoretical basis”; second, that when he 
generalizes by using a conceptual term like “ethnicity”, he confines it to a referential role, that 
is, he does not draw from it any conclusion that could give the general physiognomy of his 
Historical representation. Thus, although he compares and generalizes, he remains a coherent 
“radical empiricist”. As such, Libby’s History was already “somewhere”, explicit in whatever 
happens to become a historiographical source, just waiting to be discovered by Historians who 
are meticulous and patient enough to do that. His understanding of History suggests that 
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sources are as transparent as the viewpoint of the Historian who do not cover them with a 
coat of theoretical dye in order to make them say anything other than what they “have to 
say”.  
The issue Libby must ignore entirely, and which ultimately accounts for his epistemological 
stance, is that of representation. Indeed, he shows himself to be aware that what Historians 
primarily do is to analyse “representations of the past” (sources) in order to produce other 
representations that by virtue of their own nature must be called, as he so does, “historical 
interpretations”. Even though he shows himself to be aware of all that, the general problem 
of representation, or, applying Spivak’s distinction, the problem of “re-presentation” in 
History as well as of “Historical representation”, are non-issues in his programmatic review of 
slave paternalism.  
The consequences of Libby’s supreme indifference towards this problem will be assessed after 
an analysis of the treatment that Eduardo França Paiva, his fellow in the head of the research 
group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens”, gives to the question. 
 
Eduardo França Paiva, unlike Douglas Cole Libby, expressly addresses the issue of 
representation, namely, when he explains how the concept of “mestiçagem e hibridação” 
should be understood in his work: 
“Desde já, creio, se faz importante esclarecer que mestiçagem e hibridação não têm, aqui, um 
contrário que seria o natural, isto é, não tem correspondência de culturas puras, íntegras e 
estanques no tempo, a não ser no domínio das representações e dos discursos, onde, 
historicamente, elas existem e persistem. Entretanto, o pressuposto adotado é o de que, a não 
ser nestas duas últimas dimensões da realidade histórica, elas não existem. Não estou 
portanto de acordo em atribuir-lhes uma existência ‘natural’”. (Paiva 2008: 15 – emphasis 
added) 
 
Some pages later, he practically paraphrases himself: 
“Por meio deles [negros e mestiços] é que se pretende dialogar com outros grupos sociais, 
buscando-se compreender como hibridismos e impermeabilidades se processaram 
intensamente, demonstrando como culturas e histórias nunca são estáticas no tempo e no 
espaço, não obstante se processarem e ritmos marcados pelas descontinuidades, mas, 
também, pelas permanências, bem como por via de representações e de discursos que, por 
vezes, inventaram purezas e imutabilidades. Entretanto, o conceito de hibridismo não 
encontra, aqui, quero insistir, um pressuposto conceitual fundando nas ideias de pureza e de 
genuinidade étnicas e culturais, a não ser, exatamente, na dimensão do imaginário.” (Paiva 
2008: 25 – emphasis added) 
 
When within a few pages a Historian emphatically repeats twice that a certain social 
phenomenon is not static in time and space, but has a changing character, one has the right 
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to suppose that something is rotten in the state of Denmark. In which other social science 
might the assumption that human affairs change over time be regarded as a matter of course 
rather than in History? Which kind of Historian must be reminded that cultural and identity 
formations are not “natural phenomena”? 
Had those remarks not been published in a programmatic article that opens an academic book 
supposed to make a specialized public acquainted with the production of a scholarly research 
group, they could perhaps be regarded as bordering on the asininity and, therefore, lightly 
discarded. Given that this is not the case, one has then better take them seriously into 
account, for they must be there for a very good reason. 
Indeed, reconstructing Paiva’s argument one sees that the idea of “the natural” plays a 
decisive role in his treatment of the question of representation. His concept of 
“mestiçagem/hibridismo” does not have a counterpart in what was “the natural”, that is, 
cultures that were “puras, íntegras e estanque no tempo.” Cultures of this nature, he warns, 
did not exist anywhere apart from two dimensions of historical reality: in the domain of 
representations and of discourse.  
The trouble with Paiva’s argument is that it negatively suggests the existence of cultures in a 
“dimension of historical reality” located ’somewhere else’, rather than in the “domain of 
representations and discourse”. Not by accident, this ‘somewhere’ is not only the dimension 
that his historiographical representation accounts for, but also the domain within which 
cultures are not pure, full and static in time, but rather, mixed, fragmentary and changing over 
time instead.  
There is a moment in Paiva’s text in which he shows exemplarily how one may arrive at this 
quite mysterious “dimension of reality”. Discoursing on his sources, in the case, paintings 
executed by foreign travellers, he says: 
“Um outro aspecto a ser destacado é o relativo aos modelos usados por viajantes, artistas e 
cientistas para elaboração das imagens desse universo [da escravidão no período colonial], 
muitas vezes realizadas sem que os autores conhecessem pessoalmente as áreas, os costumes 
e a população retratada. Se, por um lado, isso poderia comprometer o resultado e, ainda mais, 
o uso desses registros hoje, sem o devido cuidado, por outro, vários elementos que se repetem 
existiam concretamente, não sendo, portanto, uma invenção improcedente. Isso fez com que 
muitas imagens produzidas por agentes que não se conheceram, sobre realidades muito 
distintas e, até mesmo, em períodos diferentes, resultassem em formas muito parecidas e 
retratassem expressões, hábitos, costumes e agentes em atitudes bem semelhantes. Esse 
aspecto, claro, acaba por fomentar comparações e conexões possíveis, que, longe de serem 
fruto artificial de modelos artísticos acadêmicos empregados ou de cópias realizadas umas 
sobre as outras, resultam também do registro de elementos similares que realmente 
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constituíam as sociedades escravistas e as mestiçagens coloniais, tanto no período de 
produção das imagens, quanto em tempos anteriores a elas.” (Paiva 2008: 23 – emphasis 
added) 
 
Central to this passage is the acknowledgement that painters and drawers used “artistic-
academic models” in the execution of their works. About this issue, Rodrigo Naves, in a 
brilliant analysis of Debret’s work, discusses the difficulty encountered by the painter to apply 
a pre-established formal system, the French neoclassicism, to the representation of Brazilian 
reality:  
“Decididamente, a existência da escravidão impedia de vez qualquer tentativa de transpor 
com verdade a forma neoclássica para o Brasil. [...] Nem reis nem ricos, pobres, pretos ou 
brancos ofereciam uma base em que apoiar o formalismo moralizador do movimento 
neoclássico. Onde encontrar virtudes exemplares numa sociedade toda assentada no trabalho 
escravo, a não ser por um inaceitável falseamento?” (Naves 1996: 71) 
 
Nave’s analysis evinces how much the colonial iconography produced by foreign artists came 
about as a fruit of a relationship comprised of the reproduction of a “model” of re-presenting 
(darstellen) that derives inextricably from an act of representing (vertreten) a particular 
aesthetic and moral view on subjects that, in turn, offer resistance to such a representation. 
If one takes this tension into consideration, it makes not much sense to say, as Paiva does, 
that the “model” could “endanger” the “result” of the work. Rather, the aesthetical model 
plays the role of that which enables one to achieve at least partially the expected result of the 
representation. 
From such a point of view, the use Historians could make of whatever may have resulted of 
those paintings would be much more complex than Paiva’s one, which, as the passage above 
shows, is quite simple: based on similitudes of “forms” and “attitudes” he separates the 
“actual content”165 of the paintings from what could possibly be an “invention” or the 
“artificial fruit” of the “artistic-academic model”. The “actual content” he elects then as the 
elements that, of course, actually constituted the slave societies and the “mestiçagens 
coloniais”. You might be wondering: What about “the rest”, the, so to speak, “non-actual 																																																								165	Rodrigo	Naves	observes	that	one	of	the	reasons	obstructing	a	more	effective	understanding	of	Debret’s	work	is	the	fact	that	he	as	well	as	virtually	all	others	foreign	artists	who	depicted	colonial	Brazil	have	been	regarded	as	documentarians.	So	“a	análise	do	aspecto	propriamente	estético	de	suas	obras	acabou	ficando	à	 margem,	 e	 a	 ênfase	 nas	 cenas	 e	 objetos	 representados	 colocou-os	 num	 pé	 de	 igualdade	 pouco	esclarecedor.	Serviram	de	material	para	etnólogos,	historiadores	e	antropólogos,	sem	que	seus	próprios	trabalhos	merecesse	uma	análise	adequada.”	(Naves	1996:	44–45)	A	complement	 to	Nave’s	correct	 remark	would	read	 that	what	has	been	obstructed	by	 the	reduction	of	colonial	iconography	to	their	“documental”	character	is	not	only	a	more	effective	understanding	of	Debret’s	work	but	also	of	the	very	History	written	on	the	base	of	these	sources.	
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content”? Paiva does not report on the destiny he gives it. But he does underline that many 
times nineteenth-century images, when compared to each other and combined with written 
sources, become “faithful and revealing” portraits of the “universo mestiço”166.  
The problem here is not exactly the circularity of the argument, that is, the fact that the 
“universo mestiço” which happens to be “revealed” by the “faithful portrait” is already 
implied in the very conceptual premise that guides the historiographical inquiry from the 
outset. Neither would it make sense to question the validity of ascribing empirical similitudes 
on the basis of inferences made by comparing and crossing different types of sources; from a 
historiographical viewpoint, this procedure is both perfectly feasible and legitimate.  
What is troublesome in Paiva’s approach is that it aims at getting the iconographic sources 
purified from the “deceptive effects” of the “aesthetical models” either until these images no 
longer show “non-actual content” or until whatever may be “non-actual” within them 
becomes strictly irrelevant. Ultimately, what is assumedly a (visual) representation becomes 
even liable to be paradoxically presented as possessing only “actual content”! Through such 
an approach, the Historian pushes the interpretation to the point at which it becomes entirely 
transparent: the historical representation then becomes something through which one sees 
the past without seeing that which one is seeing through. It is, in fact, as if the Historian had 
arrived at the “actual content of the past”. Here lies the empiricist trap that conflates re-
presentation and representation.167 
At this point, Eduardo França Paiva meets Douglas Cole Libby in the practice of a 
“representationalist realism”, the main consequence of which is doing away with the issue of 
representation in History. Interestingly enough, both authors do that in programmatic texts 
concerned with theoretical questions. This ought to put those on their guard who believe that 
theorization is a waterproof that can perfectly protect History against positivist-empiricist 
																																																								166	“As	imagens	do	século	XIX,	saliente-se	novamente,	trazem	muitas	informações	sobre	as	permanências,	antigos	gostos,	costumes,	práticas	e	formas	de	viver,	o	que	as	transformam	em	fontes	imprescindíveis	para	trabalhos	comparativos.	Muitas	vezes,	aliadas	à	documentação	ou	a	relatos	de	viajantes	do	período,	elas	se	
transformam	em	retratos	 fidedignos	e	reveladores	daquele	universo	mestiço.”	(Paiva	2008:	21	–	emphasis	added)	167	Borrowing	Frank	Ankersmit’s	 formulation,	one	could	rephrase	 this	same	 idea	by	saying	 that	Paiva’s	approach	amounts	to	represent	that	the	colonial	slave	societies	were	“mestiçagens	coloniais”,	rather	than	to	re-present	the	colonial	slave	society	as	“mestiçagens	coloniais”.	Ankersmit	recommends	distinguishing	between	“representing	that”	and	“representing	as”.	In	the	first	case	the	accent	lies	on	qualities	of	what	is	represented	and	in	the	second	case	on	those	of	the	representation	itself.	(Ankersmit	1995:	229)	
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storms that lend validity to it [History] on grounds that are beyond its own power of 
legitimatising itself as representation. 
Frank Ankersmit comments with a mixture of satisfaction and grief: 
“Generally speaking, the writing of history has no avant-garde. On the contrary, the fate of 
historical writing is decided by the unadventurous many. Its disciplinary boundaries were 
drawn quite clearly by Leopold von Ranke—and have remained fundamentally the same since 
then. Contemporary Historians reading Ranke will have their legitimate doubts about several 
aspects of his texts and may dispute many of his claims about the past, but they will be ready 
to grant that he presented the results of his research in much the same way as they do 
themselves. […] One can be a Historian of genius without redrawing the disciplinary 
boundaries of historical writing by an inch.” (Ankersmit 2012: 178–179 – emphasis added) 
 
Eduardo França Paiva and Douglas Cole Libby are two of these Ankersmit’s “unadventurous 
many” who, keeping in mind their institutional duties, decide the fate of Historical writing. 
They are devotees of a Rankean-style History supposed to represent the past that “actually 
happened”, rather than of a History that represents the past as an actual representation of 
what happened.  
In this sense, accepting that, in analogy to the Eurocentrism that establishes England as the 
regulating centre of temporal measurement168, the Rankean Historicism functions as a kind 
of Greenwich Mean Time yardstick against which the degree of deviation from History’s 
regulating epistemological centre might be measured in temporal terms, one could then 
conclude that both Paiva’s and Libby’s historiographical accounts are synchronized with 
London’s time. 
 
The “adventurous few” 
Much more than keeping a safe distance from the “fetishism of the documents” which 
characterizes Paiva’s and Libby’s approach, Petrônio Domingues sets the stage for telling his 
Uma História Não Contada so as to prevent this topic from occupying the centre of the 
discussion on what the Historian’s business primarily consist of.  
Departing from a Marxist point of view, Domingues draws attention, first and foremost, to the 
essential role of ideology in academic historiographical production. By quoting Adam Schaff, 
																																																								168	“Eurocentrism,	like	Renaissance,	perspectives	in	painting,	envisions	the	world	from	a	single	privileged	point.	It	maps	the	world	in	a	cartography	that	centralizes	and	augments	Europe	while	literally	“belittling”	Africa.	The	“East”	is	divided	into	“Near”,	“Middle”,	and	“Far”,	making	Europe	the	arbiter	of	spatial	evaluation,	just	as	 the	establishment	of	Greenwich	Mean	Time	produces	England	as	 the	regulating	centre	of	 temporal	
measurement.”	(Shohat/Stam	1994:	2	–	emphasis	added)	
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he argues that, in so far as Historians, as everyone else, are the product of social relations 
under which they live, they are also prone to reproduce the hegemonic set of ideological 
beliefs that meet both the structural social determinations of their own time and society, as 
well as the specific conditionings of their particular social position.  
Judging from Domingues’ words, Schaff’s view follows a variant of Marxism that reduces all 
that, which may comprise a “social position”, to the category of “social class”. Domingues then 
remarks that “A questão é mais ampla e complexa. Além do recorte de classe, a atividade de 
pesquisa é influenciada, de forma combinada, pelos interesses de gênero, raça, orientação 
sexual.” (Domingues 2004: 22).  
At first sight, it seems as if Domingues is going to amend the fatal deterministic shortcomings 
that may stem from the economic determinism of the Marxist approach he chooses. This 
impression becomes even stronger when he puts across his point by articulating a discourse 
of equal rights of Historical representation: 
“Um país multirracial e poliétnico não pode aceitar que se escreva apenas a história dos 
vencedores, ou seja, dos considerados brancos. Embora negada, a história do negro não é 
irrelevante. Pelo contrário, é tão importante quanto a de qualquer outro segmento da 
população. Uma história plural pressupõe o registro da diferença, o acolhimento da 
diversidade e o reconhecimento do ‘outro’.” (Domingues 2004: 22) 
 
Nevertheless, the more he develops his analysis, the more he gets caught up in another 
variant of determinism, namely, one of cultural nature, in which the category “race” takes the 
place of “social class” and, consequently, “racism” plays the role of that which determines 
social relations in the last instance. “Racism” becomes, in Domingue’s favourite formulation, 
the hidden “essence” which explains why the History he tells had been so far untold. 
This assumption is, for instance, at the bottom of one of the main achievements of Uma 
História Não Contada: the histographically founded critique of the theses put forward by the 
“escola sociológica paulista” on the marginal integration of black people into capitalist class 
society. Florestan Fernandes, Octavio Ianni and their followers, Domingues pontificates, 
“trocam a essência pela aparência do processo” (Domingues 2004: 84).  
These two categories, “essence” and “appearance”, are even more operative when 
Domingues deals with primary sources. Discussing São Paulo’s state program of immigration 
in the 19th century, a program that Domingues ironically and provocatively calls “políticas 
públicas de ‘ação afirmativa’ a favor dos trabalhadores imigrantes europeus”, he says: 
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“Aparentemente, esta política era desprovida de qualquer orientação racial, mas, na essência, 
quando os representantes da elite agrária e a máquina estatal – que eles controlavam – 
optaram por investir milhões na atração de trabalhadores brancos e se recursaram a empregar 
recursos públicos comparáveis no aproveitamento dos negros, tornaram explícito seu 
verdadeiro desígnio racial.” (Domingues 2004: 68 – emphasis added) 
 
Domingues is right when he points to the ethnocentric blind spot of the “escola sociológica 
paulista”. He argues that it presents, firstly, an idealized image of the European immigrants as 
high-skilled workers as well as, secondly, an idealized image of the members of Paulista 
agrarian elite as forerunners of capitalism. While both these groups are endowed with a 
progressive entrepreneurial mentality, by the same token, it obnubilates the force of racism 
both in the discrimination against black people and in the shaping of social scientific 
explanations. He is equally right in emphasizing the pivotal role that racism played in the 
nineteenth century’s policy of immigration in São Paulo. 
However, in dressing up central statements of his analysis in a Marxist language that somehow 
presumptuously claims to be able to separate sharply what belonged to the “realm of 
appearances” from what belonged to the “essence” of historical processes, he opens a 
window through which a crude form of positivist-empiricism, in whose face he had shut the 
front door by foregrounding the question of ideology in Historical representation, not only 
enters into but also makes itself confortable within his representation of black people’s history 
in the nineteenth-century’s São Paulo. 
So, in order to refute the stigma of alcoholism associated with black people, a topic that has 
been explored by Pierre Denis in his O Brasil no Século XX, Domingues provides a table with 
statistic data about the numbers of inmates (classified according to ethnic criteria), who had 
be interned because of alcoholism in the asylum Juqueri. The statistic covers just six years 
(1894-1900) and comprises 96 patients altogether, of which 68 were white people. Domingues 
then correlates these numbers with general demographic data about the population, and 
concludes: 
“Embora o percentual de brancos fosse de 63%, o percentual de internados por alcoolismo no 
hospício de São Paulo entre 1894 e 1900 era de 70,83%. Portanto, proporcionalmente, um 
número maior de brancos era alcoólatra ante os negros.  
Obliterando dados da realidade, Pierre Denis podia sentenciar que o consumo de álcool era 
mais um vício inveterado da raça negra. Resultado: o estado de ‘anomia’ dessa população era 




The feebleness of this way of adducing statistical evidence is more or less obvious and ranges 
from the relevance of the statistic survey, through the way of ascribing ethnic belonging in 
both sources, to the proper mathematical problems related to the form of the correlation. But 
that is not really the point. Much more important is the way Domingues discursively uses the 
precision emanating from statistical numbers to attest the racism of Pierre Denis’ work: 
“Obliterating data of the reality” Pierre Denis had become able to echo the racist idea that 
black people had an inborn susceptibility to alcoholism. Instead of casting this ill-grounded 
shadow of intellectual dishonesty directly on Pierre Denis, it would have been perhaps wiser 
to treat him as an exemplar case of the casuist nature that characterizes the search for 
empirical evidence of black people’s inferiority in racist discourses in general. Since 
Domingues is the one who comes up with statistical data supposed to be an empirical 
refutation of racist ascriptions, he runs the risk of having this casuistic character imputed to 
his own argument. 
Unfortunately, Pierre Denis is not the only one who awakes in Petrônio Domingues the 
posivitist-empiricist Mr. Hyde asleep within the astute Dr. Jekyll, who is always attentive to 
the ubiquity of representation in History. The same kind of reasoning used in the analysis of 
Pierre Denis’ work is applied to several other questions in Uma Historia Não Contada. 
Therefore, the book abounds with sentences such as: 
“Reiteramos: a assertiva de uma abissal superioridade cultural do imigrante europeu não tem 
respaldo empírico na realidade histórica. Supomos que esta foi uma visão fabricada 
artificialmente, a qual serviu para justificar a substituição racial na força de trabalho do estado 
de São Paulo.” (Domingues 2004: 91) 
 
 “O discurso patronal da época, acusando os negros de vagabundos e despreocupados em 
procurar emprego, era um sofisma, já que não correspondia aos fatos.” (Domingues 2004: 
114) 
 
“Esse artigo é interessante [...] porque mostra, de formal cabal, a segregação a que ficava 
sujeito o negro na vida pública da cidade de São Paulo.” (Domingues 2004: 161) 
 
The first passage is particularly elucidative. It shows how in using the pair essence/appearance 
Domingues reproduces almost literally the same opposition between actual content/artificial 
content or invention that was present in Paiva’s analysis of the iconography of 19th Century 
Brazilian slavery.  
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But given that, differently from Paiva, Domingues does not assume that Historians can provide 
a “faithful portrait of reality”, but rather a portrait faithful to their own ideological beliefs 
about what reality is, such an opposition produces a vigorous tension in the heart of his work.  
A tension that Domingues eases against the grain of his own argument by premising many 
central statements he makes on the racist essence of historical processes on hard empirical 
data, which he then presents as nude “historical reality”. 
Had Domingues formulated the “determinant” character of his concept of racism not as the 
“essence” [of the historical process] opposed to the “appearance” [of its representation], but 
in terms of “the setting of limits” [of his own Historical account], then his “cultural 
determinism” could no longer have been historiographically re-presented as a kind of hidden 
power that controls or decides the outcome of an action or process irrespective of its historical 
representation. When conceived in the fashion here suggested, determination comprises “a 
complex and interrelated process of limits and pressures” that “is in the whole social process 
itself and nowhere else: not in an abstract mode of production nor in an abstract 
‘psychology’”. (Williams [1977] 2009: 83–89) 
In other words, that commonplace remark on the many different types of “determination” 
(gender, race, social class, etc.), that is, the “overdetermination” of historical processes, rather 
than being merely saluted and put methodically aside, had to be put on the methodological 
center of Historical representations. This procedure ought not yet to imply one must give up 
to accentuate particular types of social constraint. Quite the opposite:  
“The concept of ‘overdetermination’ is an attempt to avoid the isolation of autonomous 
categories but at the same time to emphasize relatively autonomous yet of course interactive 
practices. In its most positive forms […] the concept of ‘overdetermination’ is more useful than 
any other as a way of understanding historically lived situations and the authentic complexity 
of practice.” (Williams [1977] 2009: 88) 
 
An untold History of racism in Brazil, if it were to be written by taking these Marxist theoretical 
remarks fully into account, would certainly be a book in which “empirical research [still] 
fleshes out a theoretical skeleton which is substantially Europe” (Chakrabarty 1992: 1–3). 
However, it would also be a book in which the historiographical embodiment of Chakrabarty’s 
“hyperreal Europe” could not materialize itself as follows: 
“Como assevera Karl Marx em A Ideologia Alemã, ‘toda classe que aspira à dominação [...] 
deve conquistar primeiro o poder político para apresentar por sua vez seu interesse próprio 
como sendo o interesse geral.’ Baseado neste mecanismo de dominação descrito por Marx, é 
plausível afirmar que os cafeicultores do Oeste paulista colocaram o Estado a serviço de seus 
interesses privados, ou melhor, de classe, implementando um programa discriminatório. O 
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governo, como resultado deste processo, assumiu em forma de política pública o que os 
apologistas do branqueamento apregoavam em teoria.” (Domingues 2004: 64) 
 
This passage shows the extent to which Domingues does not “attempt to dethrone Marxism 
from its guarantees” (Hall 1988: 72). Instead he uses it for grounding another guarantee that 
thrives off the Marxist meta-narrative of history, replacing economy with culture as the driving 
force endowed with substantial degree of autonomy. Marxism functions in a highly 
ideologically manner in Domingues’ work because, as Stuart Hall would say, it “is not a 
framework for scientific analysis only but also a way of helping [Domingues] sleep well at 
night” (Hall 1988: 72). Furthermore, it offers him not only the guarantee that History has an 
essence that can be revealed but also the field of discursive authority to claim that, with 
respect to his particular subject matter, this essence is racism. Thus, Domingues’ work is 
incredibly coherent: it ends up corroborating its theoretical point of departure, which reads 
that Historical representation is essentially ideological. 
In spite of his effort to criticize Eurocentric ethnocentrism, the way in which Petrônio 
Domingues employs Marxism makes of his Uma História Não Contada an astounding example 
of the kind of History that reassures “the dominance of Europe as the subject of all histories” 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 27). However, one should not forget that in making plain that the dispute 
over “what actually happened” is waged in a field where what opposes History’s complete 
fulfilment is the “ideological” rather than the “natural” or “non-actual”, he concedes to the 
issue of representation a place of indelible importance that entirely prevents him from 
becoming transparent.  
In this sense, coming back to Shohat/Stam’s analogy between Greenwich Mean Time and 
Eurocentrism, one can conclude that even though Domingues’ work is profoundly Eurocentric, 
one can judiciously greet it with a gesture symbolically sympathetic to its Marxist inclination 
and say that Uma História Não Contada is synchronized with Trier’s (see footnote 32) time. 
That is, in temporal terms its degree of deviation amounts to one grade in time away from the 
line that separates the “West” from the “Rest”, sitting a mark closer to the Orient. 
 
The issue of “representation” in Kelmer Mathias and Sydney Chalhoub 
The ideas advanced by Douglas Cole Libby and Eduardo França, with their emphasis on the 
importance of concepts such as “mestiçagem/hibridismo” in approaching colonial slavery, 
conflicts directly with the perspective offered by Petrônio Domingues, who stresses the 
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necessity of exploring the methodological power of the concept of racism in order to 
demonstrate that what colonial slavery had primarily produced, far from being cultural 
“mestiçagens coloniais”, were cultural mechanisms of exclusion, discrimination and 
segregation. 
On the other hand, despite this diametrical opposition, both approaches share a positivist-
empiricist belief which, however, enables the members of the research group “Escravidão e 
Mestiçagens” to unearth the past as it “actually happened” by burying the issue of 
representation, while, at the same time, makes Uma História Não Contada to disinter this 
latter issue in unearthing the past as it “actually happened”. Putting it in Spivak’s idiom: Libby 
and Paiva seek fundamentally for the correspondence between Historical representation and 
what it re-presents (darstellen), while Domingues pursues the same aim concerning the 
correspondence between Historical representation and whom it represents (vertreten).  
With respect to the differential ideal against which they measure themselves, as argued 
above, there is not a great discrepancy between the plead for “mestiçagem” and “hibridismo” 
patronized by Libby and Paiva and the cry for radical ethnic otherness raised by Petrônio 
Domingues: both may be seen as a deeply Eurocentric attempt to defend History against 
Eurocentrism. Yet that small degree of deviation attributed to Uma História Não Contada is 
not at all indifferent. It is tantamount to the slight difference of angle between the fatal and 
clumsy backwards move, that precipitates one into an even more vulnerable position, and the 
smart defensive manoeuvre, that opens up the possibility of a prompt counterattack. What 
follows from the consecution of each of these two movements is not only absolutely distinct, 
but also potentially decisive in the course of what happens thereafter. 
The two texts that are going to be analysed in this section are like “case studies” of what kind 
of History may result from the programmatic approach preconized by the group “Escravidão 
e Mestiçagens”, in the case of Kelmer Mathias’ article “O Braço armado do Senhor”, as well 
as from the one adopted by Petrônio Domingues, in the case Sydney Chalhoub’s book A Força 
da Escravidão. 
 
The master’s armed arm 
“O Braço Armado do Senhor: Recursos e Orientações Valorativas nas Relações Sociais 
Escravistas em Minas Gerais na Primeira Metade do Século XVIII” (2008): a long and detailed 
title, academic in style, that would sound as appropriate as monotonous if it had not smartly 
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announced almost everything that follows, apart from who “the master’s armed arm” (o braço 
armado do senhor) is. And so, by keeping in the dark the presumed protagonists of his 
account, Carlos Leonardo Kelmer Mathias manages to arouse some curiosity about it. 
Kelmer Mathias’ article is an inebriant blend of the horizontality proper culturalist approaches 
(such as that deployed by Eduardo França Paiva when developing his idea of “mestiçagens 
coloniais”) and the deceptiveness that characterizes Douglas Cole Libby’s recommendation to 
think about paternalism without paying too much attention to “negative aspects” of the 
slaves’ lives, since, please note again Libby’s words, paternalism is a game that the masters 
never win anyway. 
Kelmer Mathias’ culturalist horizontality draws on a concept of society borrowed from João 
Fragoso’s use of Fredrik Barth’s ideas: “Conforme apontado por João Fragoso, em Barth a 
sociedade é considerada ao mesmo tempo aberta e fragmentada” (Mathias 2008: 90). 
’Fragmented’ because the actors involved in social interaction were different people, who 
acted in conformity with their own means and value orientations; ‘open’ because peoples’ 
actions were guided by values of distinct worlds. The central concept for understanding such 
a society is that of “strategy”: 
“De tais considerações, a noção de estratégia, tal qual trabalhada por Barth, invoca uma série 
de incoerências. Logo, o comportamento deixa de ser visto como uma ‘consequência 
mecânica’, passando a fazer parte de um processo dinâmico de transformações sociais. [...] 
Desse modo, Fredrik Barth ‘faz do indivíduo um ator’, capaz de realizar escolhas e de tomar 
decisões segundo seus recursos. Essas escolhas dependem, dentre outras coisas, das previsões 
das ações e reações de outros atores sociais dentro de uma ‘margem de manobra’ que delimita 
um ‘universo de possíveis’.” (Mathias 2008: 90–91) 
 
To complement this exposition, that he calls his “proposta teórico-metodológica”, Kelmer 
Mathias then adds two points: First, that Barth’s idea of strategy “está profundamente 
relacionada à idea de racionalidade”. Second, that the groups identified by João Fragoso, with 
the help of Barth’s ideas, as comprising the society of the sixteenth-century’s Rio de Janeiro 
are pretty much the same ones which form the colonial society of Vila Rica (in the state Minas 
Gerais), the city he analyses. These groups were: “1) a nobreza da terra – influenciada pelo 
antigo Regime e sua concepção corporativa de sociedade; 2) os negros, pardos e forros – 
“segmentos sociais portadores de visões sobre parentesco e religiosidade, vindos dos reinos 
do Golfo da Guiné e da África Centro-Ocidental”; 3) demais grupos (Fragoso, 2005: 25).” 
(Mathias 2008: 91) 
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So far is everything fine. All the more when one finds out that those who form the “master’s 
armed arm”, whom the title kept deliberately incognito, are the slaves. They are going to be 
the “individuals” regarded as “actors” who act “strategically”. The question Kelmer Mathias 
wants to address by using this conceptual apparatus is quite an interesting one. Even more 
interesting is the way he formulates it.  
First he argues that masters had been unable to exercise their power without the “support” 
of their slaves. From this assumption, he then infers, speaking about the Vila Rica Revolt, that 
when a master revolts against the authorities, so do his slaves. Consequently, were a master 
defeated, so were his slaves. For this reason, he continues, he understands that in fighting the 
royal government together with their masters, the slaves were somehow struggling for their 
own lives. Nonetheless, since the slaves’ lives were not quite in danger before the master’s 
disparate decision to become an insurgent, the author then deduces that the slaves must have 
obtained something else, they must have received some kind of benefit that had ultimately 
moved them to risk their lives for the sake of the master. The point Kelmer Mathias wants to 
make concerns especially this last question. By analysing it, he aims at expounding the 
“recursos e orientações valorativas” of the slaves. So, he preliminarily explains: 
“Parte-se do pressuposto de que por detrás de relações sociais como a acima relatada havia, 
na grande maioria das vezes, uma sutil e refinada negociação entre senhor e escravo – 
negociação essa que, por via de regra, regia os rumos dessas mesmas relações. Aqui, percebo 
os cativos como sujeitos dotados de um conjunto de valores e orientações ao qual se voltavam 
quando por tomar esta ou aquela decisão.” (Mathias 2008: 90 – emphasis added) 
 
The formulation of the whole problem is extremely awkward. Actually, to qualify it as 
awkward is to say too little: it is outrageous. Step by step, it will become clear why. 
To begin with, is a theory of how individuals and societies work really needed in order simply 
to state that the slaves will be perceived as subjects endowed with an assemble of values and 
norms which they resort to in order to take decisions?  
Such a preliminary theoretical clarification might be needed if one supposes that, 
theoretically, slaves could have been perceived as a bizarre kind of human being who did not 
possess such attributes. There is no pedantry in this accusation, for such a supposition is 
precisely what Kelmer Mathias negatively states when he “forgets” to remark that he 
perceives the other “group” as well, that is, the slaveholders, as subjects of the same nature. 
The reader is here silently told that it is not necessary to make such an obvious statement 
about the “masters”. 
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Such a slippage that consists of forgetting to qualify how the master is approached, one may 
think, is perfectly excusable in a text chiefly concerned with an exposition of the “recursos e 
orientações valorativas” of the slaves. Less excusable surely is to forget the slaves themselves 
in claiming to talk about them! Yet this is exactly what Kelmer Mathias does in the section 
entitled “A percepção prática”, which immediately follows the theoretical-methodological 
exposition that opens his article.  
He begins this section by remarking that “Na busca pela obtenção e manutenção de sua 
posição de mando dentro da sociedade, a elite, inevitavelmente, deveria adquirir legitimidade 
social. Nesse ponto, as negociações com a escravaria exerciam uma função primeira. (Mathias 
2008: 91 – emphasis added).  
The slaves, the author emphasises strongly, were “agentes essenciais nos jogos politicos.” The 
next few pages are then devoted to providing a considerable number of examples in which 
the slaves, as “braço armado do senhor”, played an essential role in the political game of the 
slaveholder class.  
The examples Kelmer Mathias gives are extremely convincing. He speaks at length about nine 
slaveholders, namely, Pascoal da Silva Guimarães, D. Antônio de Albuquerque, Pedro da Rocha 
Gandavo, Rafael da Silva Souza, José Luís Borges Pinto, Antônio Correa Sardinha, Domingues 
Nunes Neto, Luiz Tenório Molina and Manuel da Costa Pinheiro, who employed their slaves 
as an “armed force” in many different situations between 1711 and 1722. There is no lack of 
details in the account. Apart from where, when and how exactly the “master’s armed arm” is 
involved, one is informed of the noble or military title borne by every one of these 
slaveholders, how many “armed slaves” they had mobilised as well as the kind of political 
and/or pecuniary recompense they had received. Everything perfectly evidenced by primary 
sources and detailed footnotes. A great archival job, indeed. 
Such meticulous work enables him to write a Historical reconstruction that allows one to gain 
significant insights into the relationship both among the local elites and between them and 
the royal authorities. In the end, it is pretty clear the way in which these “individuals” may be 
regarded as “actors” who acted “strategically”. The author forgets just a little detail: it was 
the slaves who were announced as the subject matter of the analysis. 
In what concern the slaves, they appear literally just as a quantified “master’s armed arm”, as 
in the examples that follow: 
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“Dois meses depois de ter recebido a patente de mestre-de-campo, Pascoal da Silva mandou 
trinta escravos armados à sua custa em companhia de D. Antônio de Albuquerque quando 
esse marchou para o Rio de Janeiro pela feita da invasão francesa de 1711, remetendo, em 
seguida outros tantos cativos seus.” (Mathias 2008: 93 – emphasis added) 
 
“Rafael da Silva Souza [...] apresentou-se ao governador com duzentos escravos armados e 
pagos às suas custas.” (Mathias 2008: 93–94 – emphasis added) 
 
“Tenório de Molina enviou dezoito escravos seus armados e mais o alferes de ordenança 
Francisco Ferreira Izidro à residência de Ferreira de Queirós para cobrar uma dívida.” (Mathias 
2008: 96 – emphasisa added) 
 
What about that question respecting the “recursos e orientações valorativas” of the slaves? 
Kelmer Mathias’ answer to this can be seen in the description of the affair involving the 
slaveholder José Luís Borges Pinto.  
Voluntarily, José Luís Borges Pinto puts himself and his “armed arm” at the government’s 
disposal for carrying out the confiscation of a certain amount of gold that belonged to the 
royal exchequer. He had then set off a campaign that lasted eighteen days and went through 
many adversities and logistic difficulties. Borges Pinto had borne all expenses of the small 
military enterprise. Kelmer Mathias analyses the case as follows: 
“Parece-me bastante descabida a ideia de que José Luís [Borges Pinto] e seus escravos sujeitar-
se-iam a passar dezoito dias de perrengue – às custas de sua fazenda e vida – somente para 
servir aos interesses de El-Rei sem, mesmo que extra-oficialmente, nada obter em troca. Ao 
se oferecer voluntariamente para o confisco dos comboios e fazendas que passavam pela 
estrada da Bahia, José Luís estabelecia uma estratégia de ação esperando que o valor a ser 
ganho fosse superior ao a ser perdido. Malgrado o fato de não me ter sido possível encontrar 
nenhum documento que tratasse abertamente de tal diligência – que me permitisse, portanto, 
obter algum vestígio de um possível ganho material aferido por José Luís, ou por seus escravos 
-, José Luís obteve a patente de coronel das tropas da cavalaria de ordenança, posto que lhe 
conferia, literalmente, prerrogativas de mando e, consecutivamente, contribuía para reforçar 
seu estatuto de nobreza. 
Contudo, a questão torna-se mais sofisticada se nos perguntarmos o porquê dos escravos de 
José Luís não terem se rebelado e fugido com as “trinta mil oitavas de ouro” volvidas à Fazenda 
Real, uma vez que, oficialmente, somente José Luís foi recompensado [...]. Tal problema 
matiza, acredito, dois pontos complementares, quais sejam: 1) não foi apreendida somente a 
quantia de trinta mil oitavas de ouro; antes, esse montante foi apenas a parte que coube à 
Real Fazenda; 2) os escravos de José Luís tiveram ou alguma participação no restante do valor 
apreendido, ou algum outro tipo de ganho, o qual, quando medido a um possível ação contra 
José Luís, fosse por ele tido como mais vantajoso. Não cabe aqui ficar especulando sobre o que 
se passou nos dezoito dias de diligência, apenas ressaltar o refinado grau de negociação que 
envolvia não apenas as relações entre as autoridades régias e a elite local, mas também entre 
a elite e aqueles que contribuíam para que a mesma fosse reconhecida como tal. Para além 
disso, sugere recursos e orientações valorativas de tais cativos no tomar desta ou aquela 
decisão.” (Mathias 2008: 95 – emphasis added) 
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Indeed, the passage is rather long. But it was nonetheless quoted integrally so as to serve as 
an example that leaves no doubt about the overwhelming flaws which inform Kelmer Mathias’ 
historiographical account as a whole. The cleverest way of dealing with such a bewildering 
piece of Historical writing is perhaps to agree fully with whatever it claims.  
So, let it be unconditionally accepted that, first, the slaves had either received their share of 
the confiscated gold or at least obtained another kind of benefit from taking part in the 
campaign; second, that they made a calculation which showed that it would be more 
advantageous to take whatever this “benefit” may have been than to rebel against their 
master. From this supposition, Kelmer Mathias then infers that this process involved a 
“refinado grau de negociação” between Borges Pinto and his “armed arm”. And he gives 
emphasis exactly to this feature.  
Well, what would have been the general terms of this negotiation? What would have been 
the specific demands of the slaves? What did they perhaps refuse (or concede) in this process? 
To sum up by borrowing Kelmer Mathias’ own words, what would have been the leeway that 
delimitates the slave’s universe of possibilities?169 The author does not address these 
questions in any respect. Without having done that, what does it mean then to “emphasize” 
that subtle degrees of negotiation mediates the relationship between masters and slaves? 
The fact is that while a lot of ink and paper is used for writing about the masters’ deeds, the 
author seems not to find room for a single line about the slaves.  
What Kelmer Mathias takes from João Fragoso is not a big deal170, but if he had paid some 
attention at least to it, his analysis would probably have been less disastrous. Fragoso 
																																																								169	“Frederick	Barth	‘faz	do	indivíduo	um	ator’,	capaz	de	realizar	escolhas	e	de	tomar	decisões	segundo	seus	recursos.	Essas	escolhas	dependem,	dentre	outras	coisas,	das	previsões	das	ações	e	reações	de	outros	atores	sociais	dentro	de	uma	‘margem	de	manobra’	que	delimita	um	‘universo	de	possíveis’”.	(Mathias	2008:	91	–	emphasis	added)	170	By	quoting	João	Fragoso,	Kelmer	Mathias	divides	the	colonial	society	in	two	main	social	groups.	The	first	group	 is	 the	 “nobreza	 da	 terra”,	 which	 were	 influenced	 by	 the	 Portuguese	 Ancient	 Regime	 and	 its	corporative	conception	of	society;	the	second	one	is	that	formed	by	the	“negros,	pardos	e	forros”,	who	held	
views	on	kinship	and	religiosity	which	came	from	Guinea	Gulf	and	Central	and	Oriental	Africa	(Mathias	2008:	91).	Note,	yet,	that	even	though	Fragoso	characterizes	each	group	distinctly,	this	characterization	does	not	allow	for	drawing	any	distinction	between	them.	This	happens	because	the	characterization	of	the	former	group	(a	nobreza	da	 terra)	 is	 just	a	particular	case	of	 the	general	 characterization	provided	 for	 the	 latter	one	(negros,	pardos	e	forros).	In	fact,	if	it	is	right	to	characterize	the	Portuguese	Ancient	Regime	as	a	Catholic	(and	hereditary)	Monarchy	on	the	head	of	a	rigidly	stratified	society	(“sociedae	estamental”),	whose	system	of	power	was	guided	by	moral	 and	 religious	values,	 then	 it	 is	 correct	 to	 conclude	 that	 this	 regime	was	anything	 other	 than	 one	 of	 the	 particular	 European	 arrangements	 of	 a	 view	 on	 kinship	 and	 religiosity	(Monarchy,	Catholicism	and	pious	family	values).	
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comments on the importance of religiosity and kinship, as well as of the geographical origin 
of the slaves. Kelmer Mathias, in turn, refers to the “armed slaves” generally as an indistinct 
mass: no word about where they came from, how old they were on average, whether they 
shared ties of kinship or not, which of them had possibly been “malungos”, under which 
conditions they lived, etc. Nor does he mention anything else that may give them any form of 
identity. No names are revealed either, obviously. Not even to the division of labour among 
slaves, a topic relatively well explored in the discipline of the History of Slavery, is there a 
single reference. 
In the end, Kelmer Mathias’ text does not care for the slaves in any respect, they are re-
presented only as a mere co-extension of their masters. Any similarity with a paternalist 
slaveholder’s viewpoint is not mere coincidence. The consequence of that can be (again) 
literally read in (at least) two moments in the quoted passage.  
First, given that Kelmer Mathias does not deal with the slaves lives at all, he is consequently 
unable to present any kind of evidence of what could possibly be the norms and values that 
guide those enslaved “individuals” who should have been regarded as “actors” who acted 
“strategically”. For this reason, he must then conclude that what he calls “a refinada 
negociação” just “sugere recursos e orientações valorativas de tais cativos no tomar esta ou 
aquela decisão.” 
Here, what had been so far a theoretical presupposition that allowed the author to perceive 
the slaves as “sujeitos dotados de valores e de orientações” becomes suddenly a “suggestion”. 
When confronted with the empirical, again the Historian begins negatively raising the 
suspicion that slaves might have been bizarre creatures who did not possess elementary 
Human attributes. The empiric, so to speak, practically denies what has been theoretically 
taken for granted. Remembering the titles he gives to both sections, one may say that Kelmer 
Mathias’ “percepção prática” works against his “proposta teórico-metodológica.” 
The second point has to do with another “slippage” that consists of a missing plural possessive 
pronoun with its fitting substantive. Please, read again these lines: “Parece-me bastante 
descabida a ideia de que José Luís [Borges Pinto] e seus escravos sujeitar-se-iam a passar 
dezoito dias de perrengue – às custas de sua fazenda e vida – somete para servir aos 
interesses de El-Rei [...].” (Mathias 2008:95 – emphasis added) 
This passage must necessarily have been written as follows: “às custas de sua fazenda e de 
suas vidas”. According to Kelmer Mathias’ own argument, while the master might have been 
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the only one who had financial expenditures, he was not the only one who was risking his neck 
in that campaign: his “armed slaves” too. This time, in writing about who had suffered 
particularly hard in such a dire situation, the author symptomatically forgets the slaves! A 
“language slippage” of this nature is not only inexcusable. It is outrageous. Moreover, it 
denounces the general point of view that such a Historical account ends up shaping. 
Kelmer Mathias seems to be quite aware that his account of the “braço armado do senhor” 
was leading him to a cul-de-sac. Thus, he suddenly drops the matter and moves on to the “(…) 
percepção das alforrias, quer como elemento de negociação entre senhor e escravo, quer 
enquanto parte integrante do conjunto valorativo dos cativos” (Mathias 2008: 98). Actually, 
he writes proportionally more about this issue than about that interesting question involving 
those presumably empowered slaves who bore firearms and fought shoulder to shoulder with 
their masters. 
In dealing with this new subject, Kelmer Mathias exhibits again his tremendous capacity to 
conduct a meticulous archival survey. An archival survey that again enables him to write a 
Historical reconstruction that allows for gaining significant insights into what he calls, by 
quoting Lígia Bellini, “micropolitica da vida diária”. The master-slave relationship within the 
micro-politics of everyday-life, he remarks, “se davam em proporções desiguais, sendo que, 
evidentemente, o escravo estava em condições menos favoráveis do que seu senhor.” 
(Mathias 2008: 102 – emphasis added)  
Addressing now the issue of manumissions, Kelmer Mathias must necessarily deal with the 
question of women in slavery, for, as Maria Odila L. S. Dias envisioned decades ago in her 
“Quotidano e Poder”, a path-breaking historiographical work on Women’s History in Brazil, 
the majority of the manumitted slaves were women who were either master’s concubines 
and/or worked principally as housekeepers, street vendors or in prostitution171.  
Differently from what had been his treatment of the “armed male slaves”, Kelmer Mathias 
does report on the names and life stories of these women and even chooses one of them, 
Joana, to occupy a prominent position. His analysis of Joana’s case as well as his view on the 
question of women in slavery runs as follows: 																																																								171	“Resta	ainda	por	fazer	uma	história	mais	sistemática	dos	processos	de	alforria	na	cidade	de	São	Paulo:	os	 vislumbres	 de	 documentação	 acessíveis	 parecem	 confirmar	 outros	 levantamentos,	 que	 vêm	 sendo	levados	a	cabo	em	Salvador,	na	Bahia,	em	Campos,	no	Rio	de	Janeiro	e	nas	cidades	mineiras:	em	São	Paulo	também	predominavam	as	alforrias	de	mulheres,	principalmente	de	vendedoras,	mas	também	do	serviço	doméstico,	concubinas	e	prostitutas.”	(Dias	[1984]	2001:	167)	
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“Paulatinamente, descortina-se o cotidiano daqueles inseridos nas relações de manumissão. 
Em um contexto no qual homens e mulheres mandavam em outros homens e mulheres, o sexo 
feminino levava vantagem (1). Não propositadamente todos os exemplos acima alçaram o 
fêmeo no rol dos libertos. Que se confira o devido valor à importância do homem na produção 
do ouro e dos gêneros de abastecimento, assim como ao seu valor enquanto braço armado 
senhoril, as mulheres parecem ter sido mais versadas nos trâmites da liberdade (2). Conforme 
se verá, na lida com seu senhor, seus filhos eram os mais beneficiados. 
Para que não restem dúvidas sobre a versatilidade da mulher no trato om seu senhor em prol 
da liberdade própria ou de seus filhos, cito o caso passado com Joana. Em 28 de maio de 1719, 
João de Brito alforriou, de uma tacada só, Joana e seus cinco filhos. Moça iniciada cedo na vida 
sexual, Joana – agraciada com a manumissão em função de seus serviços prestados (3) – deu 
a luz ao menino crioulo Caetano com 15 anos. Cerca de dois anos depois, nasceu Roberto. 
Decorridos mais dois anos, veio Gertrudes. Félix esperou um pouco mais, três anos. Voltando 
à média, Maria, a caçula, deu suas caras ao mundo decorridos outros dois anos. Não obstante 
Joana ter obtido sua liberdade por serviço, Caetano, Roberto e Gertrudes foram alforriados 
gratuitamente. Segundo João de Brito, além dele os haver criado “como se fossem seus filhos” 
e ter por eles “muito amor”, os alforriava por “desencargo de consciência”. Quem sabia o que 
se dava na consciência de João de Brito já passou dessa pra melhor – ou pior! Vai ver bateu o 
arrependimento de alguma ação desferida por João aos três guris, ou talvez se tratasse de uma 
expressão da época com significado específico. O que realmente importa é o meio pelo qual 
Félix e Maria alçaram à liberdade (4). Suas alforrias foram concedidas mediante pagamento. 
A coisa fica ainda mais interessante quando se observa não ter sido Joana a responsável pelo 
pagamento. Para a liberdade de Félix concorreu seu padrinho, José Pereira de Almeida, com 
os 88$800 réis necessários. O benfeitor de Maria, novamente um padrinho, foi Jacinto 
Sanches, figura que desembolsou 60$000 mil-réis. 
Pode-se argumentar o fato de terem sido Caetano, Roberto e Getrudes filhos de João com 
Joana, caso não válido para Félix e Maria. Em função de seus serviços prestados, Joana obteve 
sua liberdade sem pagar por ela no momento da manumissão. Por amor a seus filhos 
ilegítimos, João os alforriou também gratuitamente. Por castigo à pulada de cerca de Joana, 
João somente conferiu a manumissão a Félix e Maria mediante pagamento, cena da qual 
participam os respectivos padrinhos – talvez os verdadeiros pais (5). Especulações à parte, 
incontestável foi a capacidade de Joana de negociar com seu senhor e com os padrinhos de 
seus rebentos, além da própria alforria, a liberdade de seus cinco filhos, três gratuitas e duas 
pagas. Ou seja, de uma única vez, a mulher cativa passou pelas três mais difundidas formas de 
se obter manumissão. Notam-se as várias estratégias empreendidas por Joana, assim como 
seu universo de orientações valorativas (Barth, 1981).” (6) (Mathias 2008: 104–105 –bold and 
italics added) 
 
Again a very long passage entirely transcribed. Again with the express purpose of showing 
conspicuously the sort of dreadful shortcomings, which historiographically nourish “O Braço 
Armado do Senhor”.  
Although, in the case of this excerpt, the nonsense reaches such a degree of thoughtlessness 
that anybody possessing even a small amount of intellectual decency would feel ashamed 
even to pretend—even just for the sake of argument—to agree with it. Therefore, instead of 
exploring the rhetorical strategy presented before, the analysis that follows will consist of 
brief comments on the most problematic sentences, which are highlighted and numbered in 
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the transcription. This is a time-saving way of analysing a text comprised of so many serious 
faults that it is practically impossible to account for all of them without having to write pages 
and pages. 
1) Em um contexto no qual homens e mulheres mandavam em outros homens e mulheres, o sexo 
feminino levava vantagem. 
A perfect way of entirely losing sight of the specificity of slavery in general and of colonial 
slavery in particular! How can he claim in all seriousness that female slaves had an advantage 
over male ones when one considers that these women were, for example, in the weakest 
position in what concerns vulnerability to sexual abuse and rape, which was anyway an 
integral threat in women’s lives in general? In addition to that, it was broadly widespread to 
force enslaved black women to serve as wet-nurse, to breastfeed master’s children while their 
own children suffered from hunger (Machado 2010). 
 
2) Que se confira o devido valor à importância do homem na produção do ouro e dos gêneros de 
abastecimento, assim como ao seu valor enquanto braço armado senhoril, as mulheres parecem ter 
sido mais versadas nos trâmites da liberdade. 
Who, if not the master himself, would so pompously praise the “value” of those [enslaved] 
men, not intrinsically, but specifically “as” his own “working arm” (on the one hand) and 
“armed arm” (on the one other)? Reading such solemn words, if one forgets that the speech 
is about colonial slavery, one may feel almost proud of those “men” who worked so hard and 
had been so brave in protecting the lives of others! 
 
3) Moça iniciada cedo na vida sexual, Joana – agraciada com a manumissão em função de seus serviços 
prestados - deu à luz ao menino crioulo Caetano com 15 anos. 
How wonderful it would be, if Kelmer Mathias had had the intention of being ironic here. If 
he had put together these three elements, namely, to be “initiated” into sexual life, to be at 
the master’s “service” and to give birth to other “slaves”, just in order to stress the 
inappropriateness of the verb “agraciar172”. Unfortunately, this is not at all the case. The next 




4) O que realmente importa é o meio pelo qual Félix e Maria alçaram à liberdade; 5) Pode-se 
argumentar o fato de terem sido Caetano, Roberto e Getrudes filhos de João com Joana, caso não 
válido para Félix e Maria. Em função de seus serviços prestados, Joana obteve sua liberdade sem pagar 
por ela no momento da manumissão. Por amor a seus filhos ilegítimos, João os alforriou também 
gratuitamente. Por castigo à pulada de cerca de Joana, João somente conferiu a manumissão a Félix 
e Maria mediante pagamento, cena da qual participam os respectivos padrinhos – talvez os 
verdadeiros pais. 
Correctly (and expectedly), Kelmer Mathias works on the supposition that João de Brito, the 
master, fathered (at least) the first three children of Joana, the black woman he enslaved. But 
not even for a second did he ask about the conditions under which the then fourteen or 
fifteen-year-old Joana became pregnant. Definitely, sexual harassment and rape of slave 
women are issues with which Kelmer Mathias is not really concerned. If he were, this would 
be the perfect occasion to discuss, or at least briefly mention them. In failing to do that, his 
article becomes guilty of a kind of negligence that contributes to leave unquestioned a 
nefarious set of ideas about slave women. Such ideas, when not openly confronted, may do 
their evil deeds as implicit assumptions, for they have been academically widespread for too 
long a time. One of these ideas reads, cynically, that black women cannot be held responsible 
for the depravity in the patriarchal times, for “all that they [black women] did was to facilitate 
the [master’s] depravation by her docility as a slave, by opening her legs at the first 
manifestation of desire on the part of the young [and/or old] master. It was not a request but 
a command to which she had to accede.” (Freyre [1933] 1946: 396 – emphasis added) 
Providing then the ultimate proof of the position from which he speaks, Kelmer Mathias 
symptomatically leaves out the quotation marks he had used before to refer to João de Brito’s 
statements and reproduces literally the master’s words, now as part of his own argument.  
From this point of view, that is, speaking as the master, the author unfolds then an argument 
which is even more outrageous than that which he had written before, for here it is not about 
a “language slippage”, here it is not about “forgetting” pronouns and substantives: he 
unabashedly “argues” that Joana, the slave women who had throughout her whole life been 
giving birth to children of her master, must have been “unfaithful” to him!173 Further, he adds 
that the master “chastised” Joana by demanding a pecuniary payment for the manumission 
																																																								173	 In	 a	 case	 of	 flagrant	 and	 distasteful	 abuse	 of	 [writing	 style]	when	 approaching	 Joana’s	 life,	 Kelmer	Mathias	uses	here	the	vulgar	expression	“pular	a	cerca”:	“Por	castigo	à	pulada	de	cerca	de	Joana	[...].”	
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of her two last children. Finally, he decides that the freedom of precisely these two last 
children, the fruit of Joana’s “unfaithfulness”, is “what really matters”. Why? Because “other 
men” were involved. They had paid for the manumissions. Who may these men have been? 
Guess what Kelmer Mathias guesses: “Maybe the true fathers”. And so he closes his argument. 
 
(6) Notam-se as várias estratégias empreendidas por Joana, assim como seu universo de orientações 
valorativas (Barth, 1981). 
What exactly are the “many strategies employed by Joana”? Kelmer Mathias talks about only 
one: to have children who, she knew, were fated to be enslaved too. In his Historical 
representation, Joana’s agency is entirely limited to her sexual and reproductive capacities, 
which are then directly related with the obtainment of financial benefits from men, who 
happened to be her master and/or the fathers of her children. This is how HIStory represents 
her. From what other point of view if not from one deeply androcentric and paternalist can 
such a representation of enslaved black women be legitimated?174 
Latest at this point, after having heard the master’s voice so loudly and constantly, one may 
think that the sentence with which the author tied up his reasoning is surely ironic. It is a just 
a joke. Kelmer Mathias is kidding his readers. Unfortunately, there is no indication that he 
does not mean what he writes. As a matter of fact, he argues that on the basis of what he has 
been so far discoursing on, one can effectively see Joana’s “universo de orientações 
valorativas”! The loose bibliographical reference “(Barth, 1981)”, which, added at the end, is 
supposed to lend to this statement some more credibility, appears then just as melancholic 
as despairing. 
The way Kelmer Mathias develops his argument may be labelled as “hypnotic”: it 
fundamentally consists in uttering repeatedly, mostly at the end of every topic he discusses 
(as in both passages analysed), that his Historical account enables one to see the “recursos e 
orientações valorativas” of the slaves notwithstanding the fact that he badly addresses the 
slaves themselves and unabashedly adopts a master’s point of view. 
Had he been more skilled in dealing with Barth’s ideas, had he used them not to test out a 
hypothesis, namely, the hypothesis that slaves might have been able to understand the slave 																																																								174	The	paternalist	and	androcentric	 feature	of	Kelmer	Mathias’	account	 is	accentuated	by	 the	 fact	 that	although	the	author	underlines	that	the	strong	presence	of	women	among	the	manumitted	slaves	had	been	intimately	related	to	the	role	they	played	in	the	mercantile	activities	(Mathias	2008:	102),	he	chooses	to	give	Joana’s	case	as	an	example	supposed	to	leave	no	doubts	about	the	“versatilidade	da	mulher	no	trato	com	seu	senhor	em	prol	da	liberdade	própria	ou	de	seus	filhos	[…].”	(Mathias	2008:	104)	
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system and to act “strategically” guided by their own values and ideas175, had he done not 
that but, instead, tried to show which might have been these values and ideas, had he, in 
short, been successful in constructing a persuasive representation of the slaves’ 
Weltanschauung, his article would be even more dangerous.  
In this sense, what a boon that “O Braço Armado do Senhor” fails miserably to fulfil its aim! 
Otherwise, it would give potential to the kind of equivocation resulting from a perspective 
that combines that emphasis on a horizontal axis in the representation of dramatically 
asymmetrical power relations (Paiva’s approach) with that paternalistic view concerned with 
overlooking the “negative aspects” of slavery (Libby’s approach). In such a case, so to speak, 
the “master’s [historiographically] armed arm” would be sure-fire aimed at the slaves’ 
representation, which would not be safe from the master’s will [of truth and power] if he wins. 
And this master, Walter Benjamin rebukes Douglas C. Libby, “has not ceased to be victorious” 
(Benjamin [1942] 2007: 255). 
 
An anti-Brás Cubas 
Sidney Chalhoub’s A Força da Escravidão – Ilegalidade e Costume no Brasil Oitocentista (2012) 
is a book very dissimilar from Petrônio Domingues’ Uma História Não Contada. Inspired by a 
short-sighted variant of Marxism, the latter is deterministic in its approach, academic in style 
and militant in tone. The former, on the other hand, carefully avoiding conceptual digressions, 
is narrative in its approach, literary in style and politically engaged in a level-headed tone. 
Nonetheless, these two works have a great deal in common. Firstly, both set the problem of 
the clash between custom and law as the frame of reference within which slavery shall be 
addressed. Domingues, as discussed above, advances the thesis that, in the decades 
immediately posterior to the Abolition, a “segregacionista e costumeiro” type of racism had 
played a central role in the social marginalization of blacks in São Paulo. Sidney Chalhoub, in 
																																																								175	Speaking	about	the	fact	that	slaves	used	to	try	to	notarize	manumission	letters	as	a	way	of	obtaining	some	further	juridical	guarantee,	Kelmer	Mathias	comments:	“A	meu	ver,	isso	insinua	que	no	complexo	jogo	do	 sistema	 escravista	 colonial	 na	 América	 lusa	 os	 escravos	 não	 apenas	 eram	 capazes	 de	 identificar	 e	compreender	suas	regras	como,	por	vezes,	agiam	com	base	nelas.”	(Mathias	2008:	101	–	emphasis	added)	One	may	wonder:	what	had	been	the	Historian’s	assumption	before	he	happened	to	be	confronted	with	these	 sources	 in	 which	 he	 sees	 “insinuations”	 that	 the	 slaves	 had	 been	 able	 not	 only	 to	 identify	 and	understand	the	rules	of	the	slave	system,	but	also	that	they	sometimes	even	acted	on	the	basis	of	such	rules?	It	seems	he	had	assumed	that	slaves	could	have	been	perfect	imbeciles	incapable	neither	to	identify	nor	to	understand	the	rules	they	have	been	forced	to	follow.	Fortunately,	there	were	these	precious	sources	which	at	least	“insinuate”	that	the	slaves	were	not	so!	
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turn, shows how “a força do costume [of slavery social practices]” endangered the freedom 
of freeborn as well as of manumitted blacks all throughout the last century of the regime of 
slavery in Brazil. In both cases the authors address colonial slavery by pushing to the fore the 
issue of the precariousness of black people’s experience of freedom, a perspective that has 
been so far little explored in the Brazilian History of Slavery. 
Domingues gives his own disciplinary voice to the discourse articulated by the “imprensa 
negra” and deploys Marxism’s authoritative theoretical aura as a way of making of his 
Historical account a true content of a History which has not been told yet: Black History. In 
doing so, he effects what has been called “identity politics” with its usual “strategic 
essentialism.” Although Domingues’ essentialism is perhaps not as strategically well 
positioned as the author might have wished, his analysis has the great merit of keeping 
steadily in sight that the Historian’s craft is less about “what actually happened” than about 
what happened to be historiographically represented as the actual past. 
As Joan Scott points out, the trouble with essentialism is that “whether it’s strategic or not, 
essentialism appeals to the idea that there are fixed identities, visible to us as social or natural 
facts.” It works well because it makes of History a “foundationalist discourse” within which 
“explanations seem to be unthinkable if they do not take for granted some premises, 
categories or presumptions […] [that] are unquestioned and unquestionable.” (Scott 2005: 
211; 204) It is this a-historical element imbedded in the heart of History that grants the unity 
and identity of whatever may be historiographically represented. 
A Força da Escravidão is also strategically essentialist (or foundationalist). It also fixes a 
particular entity that guides the whole Historical representation somehow from the outside. 
Its particular form of essentialism may be called “strategical legalism”. In order to understand 
what that means, a few words about the specific problem Sidney Chalhoub deals with in 
discussing the precariousness of black people’s experience of freedom is needed: 
“o tema da precariedade da liberdade só adquiriu maior profundidade quando comecei a 
reparar melhor na questão da lei de 7 de novembro de 1831, de proibição do tráfico Africano 
de escravos, e as controvérsias e problemas que ela suscitou. Afina, nas duas décadas 
seguintes à promulgação da lei, mais de 750 mil negros foram introduzidos no território 
nacional por contrabando, permanecendo ilegalmente escravizados, assim como seus 
descendentes. Nas fontes que compulsava, esses negros estavam por toda parte, mas custei a 
entender os sentidos e as consequências da intrincada engenharia institucional e política 
necessária para permitir que as autoridades e os cidadãos ditos de bem fingissem não ver o 
que se apresentava a seus olhos. A expansão da cultura cafeeira na atual região Sudeste e a 
riqueza daí advinda tiveram origem nesse rime contra as leis do país e contra a humanidade. 
Por isso esse meu livrinho se tornou também a história desse processo, busca entender como 
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tal coisa pode acontecer. Manter tanta gente escravizada ao arrepio da lei [...].” (Chalhoub 
2012: 30–31 – emphasis added) 
 
“Ao arrepio da lei!” This set phrase is usually found both in the unintelligible intricacies of the 
juridical jargon and in the pompous artificiality of political speech. For this reason, it produces 
an almost caricatural effect when employed in other contexts. Sidney Chalhoub repeats it 
umpteen times in his book. But he is also a fine writer. This is just the stylistic device he uses 
to draw attention to a question that has been frequently treated in a rather casual way: the 
inefficacy of the Lei Feijó.  
Presumably, the plain and open inobservance to this law, which was enacted in 1831 to forbid 
slave trade, is at the bottom of the popular expression “lei para inglês ver”. In some sense, the 
empirical force of this expression had lead Historians to deal with the disobedience towards 
the Lei Feijó as a kind of non-problem. There is no controversy over the fact that the law 
remained practically unobserved for almost twenty years, that is, until 1850, when the Lei 
Eusébio de Queirós was promulgated to put another official (and this time effective) end to 
the slave trade. Still, does that means that the law had been passed just to obtain the United 
Kingdom’s diplomatic recognition of Brazil as a new independent country as well as to die 
down English pressure on the slavery system as whole? In a word: was there from the 
beginning no intention to obey that law? 
Instead of capitulating to the empirical force of that usual expression and say again and again 
that the Lei Feijó was just something “pra inglês ver”, Sidney Chalhoub insists that it was a law 
that should have been obeyed. It is an original viewpoint and a strong attitude that evinces a 
sensible change in his treatment of colonial slavery, at least if compared to his most famous 
book, Visões da Liberdade. 
In the 1990 Visões da Liberdade Chalhoub wrote: “Deixemos de lado, por alguns momentos, 
nosso desconforto diante de uma sociedade onde eram comuns as compras e vendas de 
homens e mulheres, e tentemos penetrar mais fundo nas racionalidades e sentimentos de 
pessoas de um outro tempo.” (Chalhoub [1990] 2011: 50) 
Twenty two years later, in 2012, as A Força da Escravidão was released, it was perhaps even 
easier to ask his readers to put aside a possible uncomfortable feeling provoked by the 
awareness that the Lei Feijó had been systematically disobeyed, for, as everyone still knows 
very well in Brazil, this was not the sole law that existed only on paper without any form of 
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practical effect. Sidney Chalhoub does however the opposite: he reminds the reader all along 
his book that for over twenty years Africans had been enslaved not only against what came to 
be later called “human rights”, but also against the very law that ruled the matter back then. 
Thus, all descendants of the 750-thousand illegally enslaved people forcefully brought to Brazil 
over this time were, legally, free people! The greatest merit of A Força da Escravidão is to 
evince why this question must cease to be treated somehow dismissively as a kind of natural 
result of historical circumstances. 
In performing this task, Sidney Chalhoub writes a Historical account whose general 
countenance makes of A Força da Escravidão a book that in many respects is also Uma História 
Não Contada. In fact, he puts some more pressure on the same sensitive points that Petrônio 
Domingues had also touched on.  
For instance, against the widespread idea that in Brazil politics has never been openly based 
on criteria of racial exclusion, he offers the case of the sailor Brown, who was a “homem de 
cor e súdito inglês”, and of an unnamed free-born black woman, who was a housemaid of J. 
A. Cole, an American farmer who wanted to emigrate. Both the “colored” sailor and the black 
maidservant were refused entry into Brazil. The reasons the “Ministério de Estrangeiros” 
alleged for refusing them is an instructive example of the extent to which “scientific racism” 
went hand in hand with political calculation. In the case of the black woman:   
“Alegaram três motivos para a proibição: queriam ‘obstar ao crescimento e preponderância da raça 
africana’; desejavam favorecer a ‘colonização Europeia’; por fim, urgia evitar a fraude da introdução de 
escravos sobre o pretexto de libertos. Como o assunto em pauta concernia uma negra norte-americana, 
aduziram que não convinha admitir ‘a imigração de homens [e mulheres] de cor provenientes dos 
Estados Unidos’, pois ‘o contato dessa gente recentemente emancipada’ em virtude de uma guerra 
poderia instilar rebeldia entre os escravos brasileiros. Três luminares da política imperial assinaram o 
parecer: Nabuco de Araújo, Eusébio de Queirós e o visconde de Jequitinhonha.” (Chalhoub 2012: 222 – 
emphasis added) 
 
The case of the sailor was a great deal more difficult: there was no indication that he had ever 
been a slave and, in addition to that, he was an English man. During the decades of 1850 and 
1860 the British consular office in Rio de Janeiro had even “invited” Africans suspected of 
having been illegally enslaved to come to the embassy to report their stories. Chalhoub 
remarks that not only did these Africans become better informed about the usurpation of 
their rights, but also that these experiences spread among those Africans who had arrived in 
Brazil after 1831 and remained illegally enslaved. At any rate, the Brazilian minister found 
quite an original way of justifying the decision to refuse Brown’s entry into the country: he 
invented a new definition to the word “liberto”: 
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“Segundo ele [the minister], apoiado na consulta [...] dos conselheiros de Estado, “a expressão 
- libertos – de que usa a citada lei é a antítese de escravos”. Nessa acepção, portanto, o 
vocábulo “liberto” incluía os libertos propriamente ditos, ou ex-escravos, e os nascidos de 
ventre-livre, ou ingênuos. Todos os que não continuavam a ser escravos passaram a ser 
libertos, pois um vocábulo virava a antítese do outro. No entanto, subentende-se que os 
nascidos de ventre-livre ou ingênuos incluídos no âmbito reinventado da palavra “liberto” 
eram apenas os ingênuos negros, não os nascidos de ventre-livre em geral, pois nesses 
estariam incluídos os supostamente brancos. Por conseguinte, chegamos à conclusão de que 
todo negro que não permanecia escravo doravante ficava liberto. Como resultado, não 
entrariam mais negros no Brasil de jeito nenhum, uns por serem escravos, outros por terem 
virado libertos.” (Chalhoub 2012: 223 – emphasis added) 
 
Having examined the matter by providing this evidence, Chalhoub concludes ironically: “Neste 
país, ao que parece, nunca se fez mesmo política adotando critérios de exclusão racial.” 
(Chalhoub 2012: 223). 
Irony is also the weapon Chalhoub uses to attack that which in Petrônio Domingues’ stiff 
language is said to be in the “bojo de uma linha ideológica de construção de conhecimento 
histórica eurocentrista” (Domingues 2004: 21), namely, the many guises of Eurocentrism. 
The targets of Chalhoub’s irony are sometimes the Historical actors, as when he mockingly 
refers to Nabuco de Araújo, Eusébio de Queirós and the viscount of Jequitinhonha as 
“luminares da política imperial’ (this sentence is underlined in the passage quoted above). In 
another passage, in which his irony gains a touch of the comical, he writes that the ministers 
of the Brazilian Imperial Monarchy thought of themselves as being “o tipo de alimária humana 
supimpa em luzes e civilização.” (Chalhoub 2012: 19) In the context in which they emerge, 
both passages function as critical allusions to the intimate relationship between 
Enlightenment, racism and slavery. 
Sometime however, Chalhoub levels his irony at the empiricist-positivism belief underlying 
the Historicism that has been granting History a special position in what concerns the true 
representation of the past. Pretending to put his own credentials as Historian at stake, he 
affirms: 
“Se meus leitores são como os historiadores de outros tempos, que só se referiam a fatos 
quando tinham certeza deles, hão de me atormentar se eu afirmar, como afirmo, que o 
assunto de quantas sessões secretas houve sobre o tráfico, no Senado e na Câmara dos 
Deputados, em 1837, 1848, 1850, foi como lidar com as consequências do descumprimento 
da lei de 7 de novembro de 1831.” (Chalhoub 2012: 122) 
 
Chalhoub admits that there are no records of the parliamentary secret sessions about the 
slave trade. He does not provide any other consistent evidence, which could allow him to 
affirm so positively that the matter discussed in all of those sessions had been precisely the 
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ineffectiveness of the Lei Feijó. Nevertheless, he does it. Of course, he does it because he 
guesses that on the basis of what he has been arguing, his supposition makes a lot of sense so 
that his readers will believe him. But he does it mainly because he knows that even if the 
readers did not believe him, his Historical account as a whole would not be jeopardised.  
As a matter of fact, one may argue that perhaps not all, but just half of those secret sessions 
were about the problems involving the disobedience to the Lei Feijó. It might have been the 
case, indeed. The main thing is that this fact would neither compel Chalhoub to change nor 
even amend anything of what he generally claims about the “force of slavery.”  
What Chalhoub is saying to his readers in a particularly charming and clear way is that History 
is not too much about “what actually happened” but rather about what can be held as having 
actually happened, that is, what can re-presented as a Historical event. And what can be 
Historically represented as having actually happened had, actually, not necessarily happened. 
In this example, the matter at stake is something marginal. It is understandable that it does 
not play a significant role in the developments of Chalhoub’s account, when one looks at it as 
a whole. But the main finding of A Força da Escravidão is also brought about in the very same 
manner in which the issue of those parliamentary “secret” sessions happened to be 
“uncovered”. 
The guiding question of Chalhoub’s book is derived from a narration of the event he calls “O 
Grande Medo de 1852”. “O Grande Medo de 1852” was a series of popular rebellions 
triggered by two imperial decrees. The first decree establishes a general register of births and 
deaths in the whole country; the second one determines that a national population census 
would be carried out as soon as possible. By trying to enforce these two decrees the public 
authorities had met with fierce popular resistance. Chalhoub traces it in the governmental 
correspondence: 
“Ao examinar os ofícios que chegavam naquele fatídico mês de janeiro de 1852, o ministro 
soube que “a causa” dos motins residia “não na dificuldade de executar-se o Regulamento, 
mas sim no boato arteiramente espalhado, e loucamente acreditado pelo povo rude, de que o 
registro só tinha por fim escravizar gente de cor. [...] Na realidade, chegavam a apelida-lo “Lei 
do Cativeiro”, pois o “povo rude” estaria “seduzido pela falsa ideia de que o quererem cativar.” 
(Chalhoub 2012; 18 – emphasis in the original) 
 
A Força da Escravidão is essentially an attempt to explain, first, that the “gente de cor” had 
very good reasons for being afraid that the new decrees effectively aimed at reducing them 
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to slavery; second, that these reasons were in no way a kind of by-product of a process of 
ideological manipulation guided by the interests of the political elites.  
In general terms, black people’s precarious experience of freedom rests upon three main 
factors. First and foremost, the presumption of slave status: unless they could proof they were 
not, both black people and “gente de cor” were considered to be slaves. Second, the laxity of 
the legal control on the property of slaves. Third, the officially revocatory character of 
manumissions.  
The two first factors, inasmuch as they are primarily about ascertaining the slave’s identity, 
are intimately related to the 1831 prohibition of the slave trade. In order to register slave 
properties, slaveholders must ensure that these slaves had not entered into Brazil after 
November 1831. Chalhoub reports on countless ways of falsifying documents so as to give the 
appearance of legality to the illegal acquisition of slaves. Numerous were also the ways of 
reducing (of course, illegally) freeborn blacks to slavery. Due to that general “presumption of 
slave status” that weighted on black people’s shoulders, it was not especially difficult to 
enslave and to keep them enslaved illegally.  
By making this point, Chalhoub narrates Histories that share a “nexo estrutural comum, qual 
seja, a existência de zonas amplas de incerteza social sobre as fronteiras entre escravidão e 
liberdade na sociedade brasileira oitocentista.” He comments that the reading of the primary 
sources gives one the strong impression that there was a “constrangimento sistemático à 
liberdade dos negros.” (Chalhoub 2012: 232–233; 251). 
On the other hand, theoretically, every slave who could “prove” to have been bought or to be 
a descendant of an enslaved woman brought to Brazil after the promulgation of the 1831 Lei 
Feijó must be considered legally free. Expectedly, this way round things used to be much more 
difficult. However, since a zone of social uncertainty lay between freedom and slavery, the 
slaves learned how to explore it. Chalhoub reports also on countless cases of slaves who, 
depending on the situation, identified themselves as freeborn or manumitted, as well as 
several cases of freed blacks who presented themselves as slaves (for example, with the 
purpose of escaping forced recruitment). According to Chalhoub, the general developments 
showed that towards the end of the 1870s the “presumption of slave status” began to be 
replaced by the “presumption of freedom”. This was a clear sign that the social machinery 
that had been working in favour of the slave system was about to face the crisis that would 
lead to its definitive legal dismantlement.  
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Still, back in 1852, the year of the “Grande Medo”, the scenario was not so promising yet. In 
Chalhoub’s own words: 
“Durante o “grande medo” de 1852, pretos e pardos livres atribuíam ao governo a intenção 
de reduzir à escravidão a gente de cor. Pode ser que temor tão generalizado seja indício de 
que os revoltosos soubessem bem que a escravidão vinha se reproduzindo pela prática maciça 
da escravização ilegal desde a década de 1830, por conseguinte supusessem que a cessação 
do contrabando de africanos os colocaria na alça de mira de traficantes e fazendeiros.” 
(Chalhoub 2012: 262–263)  
 
None of the sources analysed by Chalhoub reads that the resistance against those two 
decrees, the implementation of which had rendered the task of identifying people much more 
precise and efficient, stemmed directly or indirectly from the fact that the blacks and the 
“gente de cor” were aware of the relationship between such mechanisms of social control, 
the illegal enslavement of thousands and thousands of them (after 1831), and the possible 
consequences of the definitive abolition of slave trade that occurred in 1850. The subaltern’s 
awareness of this fact is the kind of Historical event that cannot be found anywhere except in 
Historical representation itself. It is a “fact” that results from historiographical labour as 
whole.  
Put differently, A Força da Escravidão itself is empirical evidence of the force of slavery: it is a 
re-presentation by means of which one may experience empirically what might have been the 
precariousness of black people’s experience of freedom in colonial slave system so as to 
become able to believe in it. 
But, of course, readers may not quite believe in Chalhoub’s main claim. Such disbelief, even 
without casting any doubt on the accuracy of the description of all other particular events 
comprised by the book, would imply to question A Força da Escravidão as a whole. It is with 
respect to this point that the rhetorical force of Chalhoub’s “strategic legalism” plays its 
central role, which is effected on two levels. 
Firstly, the author’s intransigent defence of the view that the 1831 law forbidding slave trade 
should have been unconditionally obeyed is coextensive to the Historical awareness 
attributed to black people and “gente de cor”. It is coextensive in the sense that it is 
Chalhoub’s translation of that awareness into a contemporary language fitting to 
Historiography. Exactly this feature shows, secondly, that what is at stake in History—
accepting the more or less compulsory assumption that to give a full description of 
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“what(ever) actually happened” is a chimera—is to transform that which can be represented 
as having actually happened into that which shall be represented in this way176. 
It is as though, twenty-three years after having written Visões da Liberdade, Sidney Chalhoub 
had found the type of “moral economy of historiographically exercised discursive violence” 
needed to perform the task of envisioning what had been the meanings of freedom within 
that Thompsonian “moral economy of violence” reigning in Brazilian colonial slavery. The 
precise type of discursive violence that A Força da Escravidão historiographically exerts is that 
one which keeps the tension uniting re-presentation (darstellen) and representation 
(vertreten) by ever attempting to conflate both entirely. 
 
Chalhoub is very dexterous in exploring his literary skills in order to produce fine narrative 
effects. That “Grande Medo de 1852”, with recourse to which the book’s guiding question is 
formulated in the fashion of introduction, happened to be resumed only in the penultimate 
chapter, where it finds its final answer in the presentation of the main finding of the work. 
This it, however, not the work’s climax yet.  
The last chapter consists of a brilliant analysis of Machado de Assis’ Memórias Póstumas de 
Brás Cubas. The hypothesis Sidney Chalhoub advances and convincingly underpins is that a 
reflection on both the illegal slave trade and the property of enslaved people constitutes the 
very organizing principle of the fictional content of that masterpiece by Machado de Assis. 
(Chalhoub 2012: 278) 
Towards the end of this last chapter, by fashion of general conclusion, Chalhoub begins 
commenting on the legacy left by the way in which the smuggling of Africans and their illegal 
enslavement has been dealt with both in the public and in the domestic life of that Brazil of 
imperial times. To be sure, he resumes the topic, for he had already acidly remarked, in a 
chapter wittingly called “Em 1850, a precisão de calar sobre 1831”, that the habit of 
sidestepping the questions about the racial problem is still parte of the sap that nourishes the 
																																																								176	The	“can”	refers	to	two	elements	of	History:	first,	to	the	“empirical	core”	of	it,	that	is,	to	evidence	that	meet	its	disciplinary	standards;	second,	it	refers	also	to	the	fact	of	occupying	a	particular	power	position,	that	 is,	 to	 the	 properly	 institutional	 character	 which	 makes	 of	 the	 historiographical	 discourse	 an	exceptionally	privileged	sphere	 for	 the	 legitimate	establishment	of	 the	 truth	about	 the	past.	The	 “shall”	refers	to	the	rhetoric	movement	that	acts	limiting	both	raw	realist	empiricism	and	boundless	relativism	by	putting	 in	 evidence	 the	 value	 judgment	 that	 necessarily	 involves	 the	 deployment	 of	 that	 mixture	 of	empirical	and	institutional	power.	The	general	terms	of	this	explanation	were	drawn	from	Carlo	Ginzburg’s	“History,	Rhetoric	and	Proof”	(Ginzburg	1999).	
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so-called “Brazilian national character”. One hundred and thirty six pages later, when he was 
closing a discussion especially devoted to the issue of the precariousness of black people’s 
freedom, Chalhoub returns to the issue. He writes that the legacy of the social machinery that 
had made possible to hold millions of people captive against the law goes beyond the scope 
of his book, it is, in fact, another History, but it is still Brazil’s History (Chalhoub 2012: 276). It 
is still Uma História Não Contada, Petrônio Domingues would probably add. 
Petrônio Domingues does not finish his book with his own words, but with the ones of the old 
black politic activist Aristides Barbosa. Sidney Chalhoub does something similar. The final lines 
of A Força da Escravidão is a passage by Machado de Assis177, who, in turn, hands the 
responsibility over to his character, Brás Cubas: 
“Outrossim, afeiçoei-me à contemplação da injustiça humana, inclinei-me a atenuá-la, a 
explicá-la, a classificá-la por partes, a entendê-la, não segundo um padrão rígido, mas ao sabor 
das circunstâncias e lugares.” (Chalhoub 2012: 296) 
 
The polivocality in the identity of the voice that ends Chalhoub’s book does not produce any 
heteroglossia. There is no ambiguity. Quite the opposite, it makes perfectly clear to which 
extent Chalhoub’s stance on slavery is the historiographical embodiment of an anti-Brás Cubas 
view: the former’s “strategic legalism” is a counterpart of the latter’s cynical casuistry. Thus, 
Sidney Chalhoub not only presents his own writing as a historiographical version of the same 
criticism that Machado de Assis had voiced literarily, but also reinforces how much re-
presentation and representation happen to be mobilized in the effort of writing the last words 







The programmatic texts by Libby and Paiva, the heads of the research group “Escravidão e 
Mestiçagens”, put forward a theoretical approach that, resorting to different fashions of 
empiricist reasoning, bypasses the issue of re-presentation/representation. The “theoretical” 
is here conceived as tools designed with the purpose of increasing the cognitive power of 
establishing “what actually happened”. Little energy is spent in reflecting on the problem of 
what Historical representations, when written by deploying theory in this way, may possibly 
represent in political terms. The historiographical result of such an approach takes, for 
instance, the form of “O Braço Armado do Senhor” by Mathias Kelmer. 
Petrônio Domingues’ book is also openly programmatic. It equally puts forwards a theoretical 
approach that relies strongly on empiricist reasoning. However, unlike the intellectual 
production of the research group “Escravidão e Mestiçagens”, the very center of gravity of 
Uma História Não Contada is constituted by the problems posed by the tension between re-
presentation and representation. The “theoretical” is here thus conceived as a tool designed 
with the conspicuous purpose of increasing cognitively the political power of establishing 
“what actually happened”. Therefore, a lot of energy is spent in reflecting on the problem of 
what Historical representation politically represents. The historiographical result of such a 
viewpoint demonstrates, for instance, the “Força da Escravidão” [by Sidney Chalhoub]. 
A theoretical approach such as that one underlying “O Braço Armado do Senhor” is unable to 
account for the political consequences represented by the Força da Escravidão because the 
former produces a History that, as Carlo Ginzburg puts it, “is absolutely transparent, but also 
absolutely incomprehensible […] because it has been cleansed of all power relationships” 
(Ginzburg 1991: 16). These power relationships are not only those involving the Historical 
actors themselves, but also those, as Ginzburg remarks in a later work, “that condition, 
through the possibility of access to the documentation, the general image that a society leaves 
of itself” (Ginzburg 1999: 24).  
That power relationships condition the Historian’s work from the very beginning, and not only 
in a general or abstract manner, but also in that they are directly related to the production of 
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the raw material Historians deal with178; that, to use the famous Foucault’s expression, 
Historians move themselves on the minefield of “power/knowledge”. All that shall not lead 
one to think that History amounts either to merely an ideological instrument used to satisfy 
the desires of whoever may be in the position of exercising the power of legitimately 
establishing “what actually happened” or to an open game where “what actually happened” 
is nowhere to be found. In other words: the power relations that make of the narrative and 
rhetoric a constitutive element of History shall not be extrapolated to a reduction of 
historiography to its narrative or rhetorical dimension.  
Nevertheless, theoretical approaches that put forward such skeptical theses have been in 
vogue for a few decades. But “the theoreticians of historiography who propose them”, 
Ginzburg complains, “care little for the concrete work of Historians.” (Ginzburg 1999: 1) 
Ginzburg cares about it. Therefore, he intervened in this debate advancing a thesis according 
to which rhetoric and proof do not exclude one another. Quite the contrary: proof constitutes 
the “rational core within rhetoric”. (Ginzburg 1999: 34) 
Ginzburg’s attempt to rehabilitate empiricism so that it does not enter into a collision course 
with rhetoric and narrative is sagacious on a twofold level. First, he promptly recognizes how 
deceptive the notion is that the discussion on history, rhetoric and proof concerns only a small 
circle of adepts actually involved in these labors: Historians, philosophers, students of the 
methodology of history. This discussion, he stresses, “touches on a question that concern us 
all: the coexistence and clash between cultures.” (Ginzburg 1999: 2) Second, he notes that 
some poststructuralist approaches179 projected on to rhetoric a relativist power to liquidate 
truth that was strong enough to “fascinate at the same time both the heirs of the colonizers 
and the heirs of the colonized.” (Ginzburg 1999: 19) 
The strong empiricism integral to all five historiographical works scrutinized in this section 
may be offered as evidence of the importance of taking into consideration the point Ginzburg 
makes about proof (if one indeed cares for the concrete work of Historians). The abundant 
empirical proof found in those Histories do not yet prove that they are not constructions. No 
																																																								178	In	Trouillot’s	strong	words:	“In	history,	power	begins	at	the	source.	[…]	This	is	one	of	the	many	reasons	why	not	any	fiction	can	pass	for	history:	the	materiality	of	the	socio-historical	process	sets	the	stage	for	future	historical	narratives.”	(Trouillot	1995:	29)	179	The	target	of	Ginzburg’s	criticism	here	is	principally	Derrida	(Ginzburg	1999:	18;	36).	
	 208	
matter how much empirical proof may be adduced, the content properly Historical produced 
by Historiography is primarily a non-referential one. 
At any rate, Ginzburg’s fear is not ill-founded. An excessive emphasis on this non-referential 
element may just hone instruments likely to be used to bring about a process within which 
the West, which has been being incriminated as logocentric, ends up “being absolved in the 
name of the innocence of becoming proclaimed by Nietzsche.” (Ginzburg 1999: 19)  
The step Ginzburg takes in establishing the epistemological role as well as the relations of 
force entailed in the “materiality of the socio-historical process” (Trouillot 1995: 29) is crucial. 
There shall be no controversy over the importance of keeping in mind that the rhetorical 
compels History to move in the sphere of probable truth, “which coincides neither with 
sapiential truth, guaranteed by the persons who proposes it and as such beyond proof, nor 
with the impersonal truth of geometry, entirely demonstrable and accessible to anyone” 
(Ginzburg 1999: 24). On the other hand, it must also be clear that these ideas privilege an 
angle of attack that treats History-writing as something practiced in a positivist and 
objectifying way. Thus, while they cover very well the relationship between rhetoric and proof 
in History, they leave almost undefended the flank where rhetoric meets (or mingles with?) 
theory. To advance in this terrain without weakening the position Ginzburg had fought to 
secure is the central effort of the work by thinkers like Chakrabarty, Spivak and Trouillot. 
Their point is, so to speak, to demonstrate that the [rhetorical] power of [historiographically] 
questioning the truth differently affects Western Historical Thinking depending on the 
position of those who are performing this task- as either “the heirs of the colonizers or the 
heirs of the colonized”. 
The “heirs of the colonized” may be here seen as one of the many subject-positions from 
which the act of re-presenting the past as History may claim to produce a kind of Historical 
representation saturated by relations of power. Bringing about this saturation requires 
necessarily the articulation of three points: 1) How much “Histories” about how Human beings 
live and develop (in all imaginable respects) are the main product of the rhetorically 
constructed non-referential structuring elements generally called “theories”; 2) That these 
“theories” refer to something empirically verifiable inasmuch as they represent Western 
positionings in and on History; 3) That the latent non-referentiality of such theories allows one 
to explore them rhetorically so as to disrupt the relations of power they play a central role in 
shaping.  
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These three points correspond to those three main propositions developed in this same 
section of the first chapter, as it was argued that History and Theory of History cannot be 
thought of as two different epistemological domains. The first point matches the idea that 
historical accounts are substantially constituted by what they are theoretically believed to be. 
The second one relates to the continuous establishment of a theoretical substance of History, 
which Chakrabarty calls the “hyperreal Europe”. Concerning the third and last point, the 
“politics of translation” to which Chakrabarty subjects his “hyperreal Europe” is an example 
of a rhetorical disruption of theory that aims at (producing epistemological interventions) that 




Amanhã é dia santo 
Um e dois, três 
 
Dia de corpo de deus 
Três e três, seis 
 
Quem tem roupa vai na missa 
Seis e três, nove 
 
Quem não tem faz como eu 
Nove e três, doze 
 
Um e dois, três 
Três e três, seis 
Seis e três, nove 
Nove e três, doze 
Capoeira song 
 
Denn es gibt zwei Labyrinthe für  
den menschlichen Geist: das eine  
betrifft die Zusammensetzung  
des Kontinuums, das andre  
das Wesen der Freiheit. 
G. W. Leibniz 
 
Running away from the sea 
Depths and breaths of History: the idea of totality and the Annales School 
Heraclitus’ river180 is water under the bridges of History. Contemplated from the heights of 
Louis Mink’s standpoint, as exposed in the first chapter181, this river is no longer that one in 
which one steps into, taking the risk of being swept along, but the river “in aerial view, 
upstream and downstream seen in a single survey.” (Mink 1987: 57) 
Louis Mink uses this image to illustrate the “synoptic judgment” integral to what he terms 
“configurational mode of comprehension”, a mode of comprehension that, in the words of 
Frank Ankersmit, “enables us to detect a certain pattern or structure in a complex and 																																																								180	Heraclitus’	philosophical	view	rests	on	a	twofold	philosophical	assumption	that	sounds	quite	trivial:	first,	 there	 is	 nothing	 that	 could	 be	 adequately	 called	 permanence,	 except	 change	 itself;	 second,	 that	everything	that	be	this	universal	changing	flux,	in	an	everlasting	process	of	coming-to-be	and	passing-away,	does	obviously	not	mean	 that	everything	does	so	at	 the	same	rate	or	with	 the	same	degree	of	outward	appearance.	 This	 self-evident	 truth	 on	 which	 Heraclitus’	 philosophy	 of	 change	 hinges	 is	 concretely	represented	in	his	work	by	the	flowing	river	(Wheelwright	1959:	1–36;	Long	2005:	366–367).	One	of	the	most	famous	fragments	with	this	river	image	reads	that:	“We	both	step	and	do	not	step	in	the	same	rivers.	We	are	and	are	not."	(Harris	1994)	Since	it	synthetizes	the	elementary	historiographical	problem	involving	the	notions	of	change,	permanency	and	identity,	Heraclitus’	river	can	be	taken	as	an	ontological	metaphor	for	History.		181	See	the	section	“Long	event	and	long	duration”.	
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incoherent set of data” (Danto [1965] 2007: 385). The skill necessarily needed to perform this 
task is the recognition of resemblances. Mink goes as far as to affirm: “There is reason to 
believe that the recognition of resemblances is a kind of terminal judgement, which is not 
replaceable by an analysis of factors, as an explicit methodology would require.” (Mink 1987 
81) 
The discussion conducted in the first chapter—departing from the basic idea that there is an 
elementary relationship between sameness and duration in the sense that every 
phenomenon subject to change must nonetheless be represented as remaining either the 
same or identic to itself, so as to allow an ascription of having become something else—
attempted to unravel the ways in which a kind of “logic of resemblances” turns out to be 
operative in the construction of the sense of Historical continuity of long-term. 
Historiographical representations of this type at once rely on, and produce, what Martin Jay 
calls “longitudinal totality”. This concept refers to a “notion of closed yet dynamic totality that 
incorporated all history into the whole” and entails a circular image of time, which meant that 
the difficult problem of origin and end need not to be raised. Such histories, Jay synthetizes, 
possess “coherence and structure as a whole” (Jay 1984: 59; 47). They are also examples of a 
“genetic” or “expressive totality”, which means that they support an identification of their 
particular totality with their authors, not yet as Hegel thought it, but in line with Foucault’s 
definition, that is, “not the author in the sense of the individual who delivered the speech or 
wrote the text in question, but the author as the unifying principle in a particular group of 
writings or statements, lying at the origins of their significance, as the seat of their coherence.” 
(Foucault 1972: 222) 
To address the question of Historical continuity of long-term from the point of view of the 
discussion about totality is a problem that has haunted Historians since the beginnings of the 
institutionalization of the profession. As Martin Jay remarks, 
“the historiographical tradition known as historicism saw history in holistic terms, either as a 
universal process with a coherent meaning or as a series of discrete totalities that were the 
separate nation states of world history. […] Holism was so much a part of the historicist world-
view that when its exponents talked of the individuals of history, they generally meant those 
collective entities known as nations or states, a bias that emerges in their well-known 
insistence on the primacy of foreign policy. Although the historicist tradition underwent a 
severe crisis in the 1890s, when its underlying religious assumptions were called into question, 
its holistic bias was rarely challenged.” (Jay 1984: 74) 
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To be sure, the “holistic bias” of Historicism has not only rarely been challenged, but even 
intensely further developed … as a critic of Historicism itself! 
Perhaps the most prominent example of such a criticism was delivered by the first generation 
of the Annales School, by its two co-founders, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre.  
Marc Bloch’s famous remark that “even those texts or archaeological documents which seem 
the clearest and the most accommodating will speak only when they are properly questioned” 
(Bloch [1940] 1963: 64) was not only a critique of what Jacques Le-Goff would later label—in 
the preface of a new edition of Bloch’s book—“the imperialism of the sources” typical of the 
historiographical Rankean tradition (Bloch [1940] 2002: 8), but also a plea for that form of 
historiographical thinking that came to be known, in Febvre’s formulation, as “history-
problem”. To think of History in these terms begins with the recognition that historical facts, 
regardless how well empirically grounded they may be, are never properly “positive facts”. 
They are rather the product of a construction in which the Historian plays not just an active, 
but a decisive role. It is the Historian who transforms sources into documents, documents into 
historical facts and, finally, these historical facts into an intellectual problem that can be 
rooted anywhere but in the present (Bloch [1940] 2002: 19).  
At this point the thesis can be advanced that, in its kern, the “regressive method” proposed 
by Bloch for writing this type of “history-problem” was less concerned with, as Peter Burke 
argues, the “need to ‘read history backwards’ on the grounds that we know more about the 
later periods and that it is only prudent to proceed from the known to the unknown” (Burke 
1990: 23); rather the thesis proposes that the “solidarity of the ages [of past and present] is 
so effective that the lines of connection work both ways” (Bloch [1940] 1963: 43). Thus, the 
essential aspect of the “regressive method” is not about the ages “we know more”; rather, it 
is about the understanding that what might be called “historical time” arises from this 
reciprocal interaction between past and present, which is at once both condition of possibility 
and inescapable subject of every historiographical inquiry.182  
																																																								182	Peter	Burke	belittles	the	importance	of	Bloch’s	“regressive	method”	by	virtue	of	its	presumed	lack	of	originality.	Having	mentioned	other	authors	who	had	already	used	similar	methods,	he	points	out	that	Block	himself	does	not	claim	to	have	invented	it,	and	finishes	his	appreciation	of	the	matter	by	stating	that	“what	he	[Bloch]	did	was	to	employ	it	in	a	more	self-conscious	and	systematic	manner	than	his	predecessors.”	(Burke	1990:	24).	Not	very	surprisingly,	Jacques	Le	Goff	is	much	more	thoughtful	to	his	fellow	countryman.	He	 argues	 that	 the	 elaboration	 and	 practicing	 of	 a	 method	 prudently	 regressive	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	essential	of	the	Bloch’s	legacies,	and	it	is	one	that	has	been	quite	insufficiently	greeted	and	explored	(Bloch	[1940]	2002:	25).		
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With this critique Bloch prepared the terrain for a deeper critique of positivist tendencies to 
all-encompassing and reductive mono-causal explanations in History. He is aware that “in 
history, the fetish of single causes is all too often only the insidious form of search for the 
responsible person—hence a value of judgment”, and therefore he warns that “the monism 
of cause can be, for history, only an impediment” (Bloch [1940] 1963: 193–194). An 
impediment that was preventing Historians from asking not only about the particular causes 
of the events they intended to explain, but also about their own particular explicatory choices. 
Bloch argues that a historiographical explanation shall seek for “causal wave-trains and is not 
afraid, since life shows them to be so, to find them multiple”. Among this multiplicity, he draws 
special attention to the psychological dimension: “Historical facts are, in essence, 
psychological facts” (Bloch [1940] 1963: 194 – emphasis added)183.  
Lucien Febvre’s epistemological position does not differ essentially from Bloch’s. He was a 
fierce advocate of the “history-problem” (with all its consequences in what concerns the 
conception of Historical time) as well as a precursor of the “History of Mentalities”. What 
Febvre showed in a measure far more extensive than Bloch was a profound interest in Human 
Geography, a discipline that, in the names of Vidal de La Blache and Friedrich Ratzel, exercised 
a profound influence upon the Annales School (Burke 1990; Le Goff [1978] 1990a: 25–64). 
Lucien Febvre made even the effort of writing a general study184 about the relationship 
between these two broad fields of knowledge.  
Deeply influenced by Émile Durkheim, the expression Bloch more than once used for 
describing his concerns with the psychological in History was “collective representations” 
(Burke 1990: 18; Reis 2008: 57). Bloch’s psychology was thus rather a sociology inwardly 																																																								In	favor	of	Le	Goff	it	might	be	said	that,	in	fact,	in	Bloch’s	hands	the	“regressive	method”	can	be	understood	as	the	methodological	surrogate	of	a	way	of	conceiving	History,	within	which	an	inexorably	structuring	role	is	 played	 by	 the	 displacement—from	 the	 past	 to	 the	 present—of	 the	 main	 problem	 which	 Historians	necessarily	deal	with.	In	this	sense,	it	is	ultimately	secondary	whether	the	“regressive	method”	had	already	been	used	before,	if	in	these	earlier	usages	neither	the	terminus	nor	the	procedure	was	charged	with	an	epistemic	function	of	such	a	caliber.	On	the	other	hand,	the	adjective	“regressive”	still	suggests	a	notion	of	“chronological	order”,	even	if	in	an	anticlockwise	direction.	This	feature	may	lead	to	overlooking	that	the	Historian’s	 craft	 indeed	 demands	 a	 stance	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 historical	 time	 that	 chronology,	 while	indispensable,	helped	to	make	invisible.		183	 The	 History	 of	 Mentalities,	 a	 historiographical	 domain	 of	 pronounced	 importance	 in	 the	 later	developments	of	the	Annales	School,	is	deeply	indebted	to	this	idea,	which	Bloch	had	given	consistence	in	the	form	of	the	Les	Rois	Thaumaturges	(1924),	a	work	that	Peter	Burke	describes	as	“one	of	the	masterpiece	of	 the	genre	 ”	 and	as	having	 “a	 strong	 claim	 to	be	 regarded	as	one	of	 the	great	historical	works	of	our	century”	(Burke	1990:	17;	1992:	93).	For	an	overview	of	the	History	of	Mentalities	that	goes	beyond	the	French	context,	see	Burke	1997:	162–182.	184	La	Terre	et	l'évolution	humaine:	introduction	géographique	à	l'histoire	(1922).	
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oriented185 in the sense that it pointed to the History’s possibility of exploring the 
incommensurable landscape of human affairs related to phenomena situated in the “world of 
ideas”. Febvre’s geographical opening, in turn, incited the Historian to look at the outside 
world, at the concreteness of the geo-physical environment within which human affairs 
necessarily take place. Sociology and Geography (together with Economics) back then 
constituted the domains of knowledge through which Historians should transit in order to 
write the “histoire tout court”, that Febvre liked to speak of (Burke 1990: 114). 
Fundamentally, the work of Marc Bloch and Lucien Fevbre, the two Annales School’s founders, 
makes the point that the achievement of History’s desired “longitudinal totality” might 
require some considerable investments in a “latitudinal one”, where it meant that “any part 
in a larger whole might be itself an organized whole from the perspective of its internal 
dynamics.” Historical reality should, in this sense, 
“be populated by multitudes of hierarchically linked or horizontally juxtaposed totalities, 
which defied comprehension through the reduction to their components’ parts. Indeed, the 
concreteness of the meta-totality depended on the existence of these internally related but 
differentiated sub-totalities.” (Jay 1984: 59) 
  
To sprawl itself across the domains of other disciplines through the assimilation of their 
theoretical and methodological procedures might be here presented as a way of exponentially 
enlarging History’s own epistemological power so as transform it into a paradoxical social-
scientific meta-totality. 
 
Braudel’s longue durée or the “unitary white light” of History 
Fernand Braudel happened to be the Historian who most successfully explored the potential 
of the “latitudinal totalities” for the sake of an even more powerful “longitudinal totality”. 
Accordingly, he went a step further than Lucien Febvre, his mentor, in the conspicuous 
exposition of his holistic penchants, and instead of “histoire tout court”, preferred to qualify 
his magnus opus The Mediterranean (1949) explicitly as “total history” (Burke 1990: 114; 
Braudel [1949] 1973b: 1238).  
The talk about the historiographical need of an organizing principle premised upon some idea 
of totality was a very old one within the Annales School. The overriding target of the critique 
																																																								185	In	the	opinion	of	Peter	Burke,	in	one	aspect	at	least	Bloch	might	be	criticized	with	hindsight:	he	had	been	at	times	somewhat	too	Durkheimian.	(Burke	1990:	19)	
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of the first generation had already been the type of History labelled as événementielle. This 
was a depreciative term used to refer to the way in which academic History had been generally 
written back then in France: a mere description of isolated events, mainly political ones, 
enumerated chronologically and detached from any conceivable structure. Such a History, as 
Jacques Le Goff would restate as late as in the 80s, “was superficial in all senses of the word”; 
it was in fact just a “teatro de aparências que mascara o verdadeiro jogo da história, que se 
desenrola nos bastidores e nas estruturas ocultas em que é preciso ir detectá-lo, analisá-lo, 
explicá-lo.” (Le Goff [1978] 1990a: 31 - emphasis added).  
“Structure” was thus the catchword. It is still Le Goff who, harking the concern with “structural 
History” back to Voltaire, over Chateaubriand, Guizot and Michelet, up to François Simiand, 
provides the Annales School with a genealogy comprised just by “fathers” who form a pure 
lineage of male French intellectuals (Le Goff [1978] 1990a: 37—42). 
Still, since History’s most important contribution to the discussion about whatever might be 
generally conceived as a “structure” entered definitely into social science’s vocabulary in the 
form of the “longue durée” by Fernand Braudel, who, in turn, does not fail to recognize that 
none of those presumed “fathers” but Karl Marx had been the “first to invent real social 
models based on the historical ‘longué durée’” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 275), Le Goff must grant 
some honorific title to Marx as well. So he says that Marx, “sob vários aspectos, é um dos 
mestres de uma história nova”, but not quite the one whom Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre 
were descended in direct line from.	 
Peter Burke emphasizes as well that neither Febvre nor Bloch entertained great interest in 
Marx’s work. Furthermore, he observes that in France “the sympathy with Marxism generally 
went with a certain detachment from Annales”186 (Burke 1990: 54; 97). Fernand Braudel is a 
case apart. His longue durée-approach unfolds an analytical framework for doing what Marx 
dreamed of, that is, a way of accounting of history as a whole, but without having to deal with 
the political-epistemological inconveniences of proceeding so … as Marx did187. 																																																								186	 There	 are,	 although,	 dual	 loyalties	 like	 that	 of	 Michel	 Vovelle,	 Pierre	 Vilar	 and	 Guy	 Bois,	 Marxist	Historians	who	are	prominent	names	of	the	Annales	School	(Burke	1990:	54;	97;	Le	Goff	[1978]	1990a:	51–52;	Bois	[1978]	1990:	241–260).		187	This	point	will	 be	 resumed	 later.	 For	 the	 time	being	 it	 suffices	 to	bear	 in	mind	 that	Braudel’s	most	ambitious	historiographical	project,	 the	three-volume	Civilization	and	Capitalism,	15th–18th	Centuries,	 is	devoted	to	give	account	of	the	history	of	the	world	as	the	History	of	the	emergence	of	capitalism	between	1400	and	1800.	It	is	worthy	to	note	that,	as	in	Marx,	under	the	word	“world”	one	should	understand	Europa	"alargada	à	dimensão	do	mundo",	and	under	“history”	essentially	(but	not	only)	economic	history.	(Rocha	1995:	239–249)	
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It is well known that all elements that came to comprise Braudel’s concept of “longué durée” 
were already developed in his first and seminal work, The Mediterranean (1949)188. 
Nevertheless, “History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée”, the famous article that 
would popularize the idea, was published in 1958, almost a decade later… but shortly after 
the release of Lévi-Strauss’ Structural Anthropology. 
The approach adopted by Lévi-Strauss in Structural Anthropology is in fact the one that 
Braudel takes as the structuring axis of his analysis of how all social sciences “impose 
themselves on each other” in their attempts to “grasp the social in its ‘totality’”, which is, at 
the end of the day, the main topic of “The Longue Durée” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 242).  
In Structural Anthropology Lévi-Strauss stresses - suggestively in a postscript to the chapter 
“La notion de structure en éthnologie"189 – some similarities between his own and Marx’s 
thinking190. Later, in The Savage Mind (1962), he would affirm that his ambition was to make, 
at the level of the superstructure, a contribution similar to the one Marx had done concerning 
the level of the infrastructure (Burke 1992: 6; Lévi-Strauss [1962] 2000: 130).191 
If the common ground between Marx and Lévi-Strauss is as complete as the latter claims it to 
be, Braudel does no injustice when he lumps structuralism à la Lévi-Strauss together with 
Marxism. While being especially concerned with a diachronic apprehension of social totality, 																																																								188	Actually,	as	Braudel	says	in	the	preface	of	the	second	edition	of	The	Mediterranean	(1963),	“the	main	outline	of	the	book	was	already	determined	if	not	entirely	written	by	1939”.	So	the	programmatic	form	of	the	longue	durée	came	some	twenty	years	after	it	had	been	conceived.	189	The	title	of	this	chapter	was	translated	into	English	simply	as	“Social	Structure”.	The	original	French	title	was	used	here	to	make	clear	that	Lévi-Strauss	is	not	addressing	“social	structure	itself”	but	expressly	the	epistemological	uses	of	the	“concept	of	structure”	in	different	disciplinary	contexts.	190	 Lévi-Strauss	mentions	 two	 co-related	 features	his	work	 shared	with	Marx’s.	Departing	 from	Marx’s	assumption	 that	 “primitive	 societies”	 were	 governed	 rather	 by	 “blood	 ties”	 than	 by	 “economic	relationships”,	he	points	out,	first,	that	he	was,	in	effect,	trying	empirically	to	demonstrate	that	this	insight	was	correct.	In	his	own	words:	“According	to	their	view	[of	Marx	&	Engels]	in	the	non-	or	pre-capitalistic	societies	 kinship	 played	 a	 more	 important	 role	 than	 class	 relations.	 I	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 I	 am	 being	unfaithful	to	their	teachings	by	trying	[…]	to	work	out	a	typology	of	kinship	systems	in	the	light	of	knowledge	acquired	 in	 the	 field	 since	 then,	 by	myself	 and	 by	 others”	 (Lévi-Strauss	 [1958]	 1963:	 374).	 Second,	 he	remarks	that	the	temporal	category	applicable	to	“primitive	or	allegedly	primitive,	societies	[…]	has	nothing	to	do	with	the	one	we	employ	to	understand	the	development	of	our	own	[economic	industrial]	society”.	The	 distinctions	 drawn	 in	 Race	 and	 History	 between	 “stationary	 history”,	 “fluctuating	 history”	 and	“cumulative	history”	were	premised	upon	this	idea.	(Lévi-Strauss	[1958]	1963:	336)	191	While	he	was	attempting	to	accomplish	that,	he	adds,	“the	development	of	the	study	of	infrastructures	proper	is	a	task	which	must	be	left	to	history—with	the	aid	of	demography,	technology,	historical	geography	and	 ethnography.”	 (Lévi-Strauss	 [1962]	 2000:	 130)	 Here	 he	 is	 restating	 the	 distinction	 between	Anthropology	and	History	that	he	had	established	years	earlier	in	Structural	Anthropology.	According	to	this	distinction,	“the	anthropologist	goes	forward,	seeking	to	attain,	[…]	through	the	conscious,	more	and	more	of	the	unconscious;	whereas	the	Historian	advances,	so	to	speak,	backward,	keeping	his	eyes	fixed	on	concrete	and	specific	activities	[…].”	(Lévi-Strauss	[1958]	1963:	24)		
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each model is also promptly responsive to the temptation of becoming frozen in its simple 
form by being treated as “immutable laws, as a priori automatic explanations, universally 
applicable to all situations in all societies” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 274). Therefore, for Braudel, 
both Marxism and Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism represent perfect portraits of the dangers of 
anti-historical totalities.  
The longue durée-approach, on the contrary, should provide an analytical framework for 
achieving a sort of proper Historical totality, which would consist in preventing whatever may 
be thought as permanent (the so-called “structures”, for example) from being interpreted as 
immutable laws of social change. But at the same time, this permanent element shall be 
presented as being experienced as immobile at a societal level. Doing so required a procedure 
easier said than done: to immerse the structures in the element of time.  
At any rate, posing the problem in this way, Braudel shows himself faithful to the “founding 
father” Marc Bloch, who had written that History’s subject is neither “the past” nor the 
“human in the abstract”, but “men in time” (Bloch [1940] 1963: 27), as well as faithful to an 
age-old idea according to which History is primarily concerned with the “element of time” (as 
Geography with the “element of space”).  
Thus, giving continuation to the prestigious intellectual tradition of the Annales and backed 
by a kind of epistemological slogan, Braudel puts the concept of time in the center of his 
analytical construct, namely, in the form of a “dialectic of continuities” constituted by a 
“multiplicity of temporalities”. Among these continuities, the long-term one was “of 
exceptional importance”. “More then history itself”, Braudel trumpets, the longue durée was 
sure to be of interest to all neighbor disciplines (Braudel [1958] 2012: 243–244). 
The concept of longue durée can be roughly defined as a combination of two Enlightenment 
ideals: it makes viable the penetrating of “longitudinal totality” characteristic of Marx’s 
thinking by means of the dense “latitudinal totality” of Diderot’s encyclopedia. Remarkably, 
Diderot and Marx are eminent examples of radically egalitarian thinkers. Although, the 
Diderot and the Marx found in Braudel are carefully cleansed of the critical components that 
would bring the political implications of their ideas to the fore: the problem of (class) 
consciousness that makes difficult to equalize the economic forces with sovereign “laws of 
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History” whose directive power escapes entirely the human political agency, in the case of 
Marxism; the anti-imperialist critic, with respect to Diderot.192 
Marx and Diderot were also archetypical “men of ideas” or “intellectuals”. The term “totality” 
has had a special place in the lexicon of the representatives of this particular social type. They 
are indeed those who have “combined the time (and the economic support) to reflect on 
matters beyond their immediate material concerns with the hubris to believe they might know 
the whole reality. […] In Nietzsche’s pungent phrase, they have been the “knights of totality”, 
arrogating to themselves a teleological mission to speak for the whole.” (Jay 1984: 12–13) 
Intellectuals have also been members of what has been generally called “avant-gardes”, 
groups that share a distaste for the “vulgar”, “traditional” or old-fashioned expressions of 
whatever they are supposed to provide a better representation of. 
In the field of History, Fernand Braudel was both an avant-gardist and a “knight of totality”.193 
As such, he propagates the idea of History as the discipline capable of bringing totality to its 
highest degree, namely, to that chimerical conceptual dimension of meta-totality. Fittingly, he 
sells his longue durée as a kind of point of convergence, even if just an initial one, of all social 
sciences. Full of conviction, he asks: “the longue durée seems to us the one among them [the 
temporalities/continuities] that is most useful for common observation and reflection by all 
the social sciences. Is it too much of our neighbors that, when they think about how to 
proceed, they relate their assessments and their findings to this axis?” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 
273) 
Braudel opens the “The Longue Durée” diagnosing a “general crisis in the human sciences” 
and closes it by saying that those pages were “a call for discussion”. The proposal was pretty 
clear: in that moment of crisis, all social sciences had been invited to take shelter under a 
conceptual category that was at once broad and neutral enough to prune away the 
epistemological protuberances and the correlated political implications that produced a 
																																																								192	Ella	Shohat	and	Robert	Stam	point	to	some	salient	features	of	Diderot’s	work	that,	in	their	opinion,	make	him	a	forerunner	of	anticolonial	theory,	critical	race	theory,	and	even	critical	white	studies.	(Stam/Shohat	2012:	22–25).	193	 Symptomatic	 of	 this	 wannabe	 avant-gardist	 is	 the	 self-flattering	 epithet	 that	 the	 historiographical	current	of	which	Braudel	was	a	prominent	leader	gave	to	itself:	Nouvelle	Histoire.	Jacques	Le	Goff	makes	the	point	of	emphasizing	that	the	term	has	been	used	as	early	as	in	the	1930s,	around	the	very	foundation	of	the	Annales	School	(Le	Goff	[1988]	1990b:	5–7).	
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useless friction among the human sciences, and, not unimportantly, was institutionally settled 
into and disciplinarily associated with History.194 
It is again Peter Burke who provides an example that illustrates the degree of generality of 
Braudel’s usage of his own idea of longue durée. Burke assesses The Wheels of Commerce, the 
second volume of Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Centuries, a later work that has the 
same tripartite structure of The Mediterranean, as follows:  
“In this account about the mechanisms of distribution and change, Braudel characteristically 
offered explanations that were at once structural and multilateral […]. He had no time for 
explanations in terms of individuals. On the other hand, Braudel remained opposed to 
explanations in terms of a single factor. ‘Capitalism cannot have emerged from a single 
confined source’, he remarked, sweeping away Marx and Weber with a single flick of the wrist. 
“Economics played a part, politics played a part, society played a part, and culture and 
civilization played a part. So too did history, which often decides in the last analysis who will 
win a trial of strength.” This is a characteristic passage of Braudel, combining open-mindedness 
with a lack of analytical rigor, and giving weight to factors that receive little serious attention 
elsewhere in the book.” (Burke 1990: 50 – emphasis added) 
 
A lack of analytical rigor is also what characterizes Braudel’s 1958 famous article, at least with 
respect to its central argument, the notion of longue durée. It would be a vain attempt to look 
for a definition of it there. The problem, however, is not that there is none. Quite the opposite, 
there are too many. The longue durée is presented as a history of “sustained breadth” 
(according to its rhythm) or “of secular length” (according to its chronological time), as “a 
troublesome, complicated, often surprising figure” (as if it were a character), and even as a 
simple “sense”: “each of us has the sense that, beyond his own life, there lies a massive 
historical past whose power and thrusts he recognizes better, it must be said, than its laws 
and direction” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 244; 252; 260).  
Most times, however, the longue durée is normatively and in a remarkably corporate spirit 
regarded as the Historian’s time, which is, in turn, converted simply to “the time of the world, 
the time of history, imperious because irreversible and because it flows at the very rhythm of 
the rotation of earth” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 271). An impression of naturalness is almost 																																																								194	Peter	Burke	observes	that	“for	some	thirty	years,	from	Lucien	Febvre’s	death	in	1956	to	his	own	death	in	 1985,	Braudel	was	not	 only	 the	 leading	French	Historian	but	 also	 the	most	 powerful”.	Having	being	director	of	the	Annales,	of	the	Centre	des	Recherches	Historiques	at	the	Ecole	de	Hautes	Etudes	and	of	the	
Maison	des	 Sciences	de	 l’Homme,	Braudel	had,	 even	after	his	 retirement	 in	1972,	 “control	 over	 funds	 for	
research,	publication	and	appointments	[that]	gave	him	considerable	power,	which	he	used	to	promote	the	
ideal	of	a	 ‘common	market’	of	 the	 social	 sciences,	with	history	as	 the	dominant	partner.	The	scholarships	awarded	to	young	Historians	from	other	countries,	such	as	Poland,	to	study	in	Paris	helped	to	spread	the	French	style	of	history	abroad.	Braudel	also	made	sure	that	Historians	working	on	the	early	modern	period,	1500-1800,	were	given	at	least	their	fair	share	of	resources.	If	his	empire	was	not	as	vast	as	Philip	II’s,	it	had	a	considerably	more	decisive	ruler.”	(Burke	1990:	43–44	–	emphasis	added)	
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irresistible here. But Braudel’s longue durée is not natural at all. It is rather the moment of 
synthesis of the Historian’s “dialectic of duration” that, differently, for example, from the 
sociologist’s one, must not stop at the stage in which a multiplicity of temporalities reign. If it 
is true that social phenomena have multiple temporalities, the longue durée is “the general 
measure of all these phenomena”. As a measure, Braudel says patronizingly, “our time is like 
the economist’s time”. For this reason also “the philosopher, who pays attention to the 
subjective element internal to the concept of time, never feels the weight of historical time, a 
concrete, universal time […].” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 270–271) 
In favour of Braudel’s claim that the longue durée is the Historian’s time par excellence, is the 
fact that the notion effectively gains some concreteness when presented as “structure”, a 
term that, according to Braudel himself, “for good or ill pervades the discussion of the longue 
durée”: 
“For us Historians, a structure is certainly an assemblage, an architecture, but even more it is 
a reality that time can only slowly erode, one that goes on for a long time. Certain structures, 
in their long life, become stable elements of an infinity of generations. They encumber history 
and restrict it, and hence control its flow. Other structures crumble more quickly. But all 
structures are simultaneously pillars and obstacles. As obstacles they provide limitations (what 
mathematicians call envelopes) from which man and his experiences cannot liberate 
themselves. Think of how difficult it is to break through certain geographical frameworks, 
certain biological realities, certain limits to productivity, even one or another spiritual 
constraint. Mental frameworks are also prisons of the longue durée.” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 
249) 
  
At this degree of generality, who would dare to contend that Braudel might be wrong? Who 
would possibly argue that a longue durée so conceived were implausible? The problem, 
obviously, is not to assume that there might be “stable elements” that last long, covering 
infinity of generations, but rather how to establish them, a task that entails the assessment of 
the role played by the very idea of permanence. Braudel regards such a notion of “structure” 
as a very useful “key” to the “story195 of the longue durée”, but he is careful enough not to 
dissolve his own concept in it. Therefore it is prudent not to press this point further. 																																																								195	In	this	important	passage,	in	which	Fernand	Braudel	discusses	the	“keys”	to	the	longue	durée	History,	Immanuel	Wallerstein	 translates	 the	words	“utile	 introduction	à	 l’histoire	de	 longue	durée”	 into	“useful	introduction	to	the	story	of	the	longue	durée”.	Sarah	Matthews,	who	had	made	an	earlier	English	translation,	uses	the	word	“history”	(Braudel	[1958]	1982:	31).	So	do	also	J.	Guinsburg	together	with	Tereza	Cristina	Silveira	da	Mota	as	well	as	B.	Classen	and	Gerhard	Schwenke,	who	are,	respectively,	the	translators	of	the	Brazilian	and	German	editions,	in	which	one	finds	the	words	“história”	and	“Geschichte”	instead	of	“estória”	and	“Erzählung”	Braudel	[1969]	2013:	49;	Braudel	[1958]	1977b:	55)	Was	 it	 a	 slip	 of	 the	 pen	 that	Wallerstein,	 someone	who	draws	 so	much	 on	 the	 non-narrative	 aspect	 of	Braudel’s	work,	had	used	a	 term	that	accentuated	exactly	 the	narrative	dimension	of	 the	 idea	of	 longue	
durée?	Slip	or	not,	it	is	ironic	that	that	had	happened	in	this	major	paradigmatic	text	of	the	Nouvelle	Histoire,	
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Where else should one then press in order to obtain some substance out of Braudel’s 
celebrated essay? 
After having read the “The Longue Durée”, the impression might well be overwhelming that 
one knows perhaps even less than before what it is. One could even say—inverting here the 
judgment that the article lacks of analytical rigor—that Braudel errs on the side of overly 
analytical rigor: at every point of the text, he comes back to his longue durée, examining it 
again and again, trying to specify the “Historian’s time” in its relation to the time of the 
anthropologist, of the philosopher, of the sociologist, etc. In the end, the concept was loosely 
analysed from several perspectives, always without achieving a more or less precise 
formulation. There are nevertheless two passages that bring the concept of longue durée to 
its point of saturation. Here is the first one: 
“For the Historian, everything begins and ends in time, a mathematical time, a demiurge, easy 
to mock, time that is external to men, “exogenous” as the economists would say, a time that 
pushes us forward, constrains us, sweeps away our individual times of many varieties—yes, 
the world’s imperious time.” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 271 – emphasis added) 
 
There is no need to strain one’s eyes to descry in these words a metaphysical undertone. 
Arthur Lovejoy speaks about the “metaphysical pathos” as the power to arouse a positive 
mood on the part of its users by the congeniality of its subtle associations. According to Martin 
Jay, this pathos is a feature with which the Western discourse of totality has normally been 
imbued (Jay 1984: 21).  
Similarly, much more than in a finely elaborated analytical scaffold, the totalizing force of the 
Braudelian model of historical time lies in its way of making congenial associations, in its broad 
metaphoric allusiveness.196 In fact, in the Brazilian historiographical context the threefold 
time of Braudel’s longue durée has usually been explained not only by describing nominally its 
different planes, but also by expounding the relation between them having recourse to one 
of the most notable metaphors Braudel uses, namely, the metaphor of the sea (Rocha 1995; 
Rodrigues 2009). 																																																								a	 historiographical	 current	whose	 program	 included	 a	 violent	 denouncement	 of	 the	 harmful	 effects	 of	narrativity	 in	 History.	 Le	 Goff	 fiercely	 remarks	 that	 narrative	 history	 is	 a	 cadaver	 that	 should	 not	 be	resuscitated,	for	it	would	be	necessary	to	kill	it	again.	Narrative	history,	he	goes	on	claiming,	dissimulated	-	even	from	itself	-	ideological	choices	and	methodological	procedures	that	should	be	clearly	stated	(Le	Goff	[1988]	1990b:	7).		196	This	 feature	explains	at	 least	partially	 the	reason	why	Braudel’s	 longue	durée—a	 term	that	enjoys	a	widespread	and	recurring	presence	in	the	social	sciences—even	being	seldom	applied	methodologically,	has	been	used	quite	indiscriminately	(and	circularly)	to	designate	every	sort	of	social	phenomena	supposed	to	last	or	have	lasted	long	or	very	long.	
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History of events, or history “not on the scale of man, but of individual men”, Braudel writes, 
are “the surface disturbances, crests of foam that tides of history carry on their strong backs”. 
A level deeper flows what he would later call “recitative of conjuncture”, a history of “slow 
but perceptible rhythms”. About this history, he asks: “How did these swelling currents affect 
Mediterranean life in general”? Even deeper than that lies the “almost timeless history” of 
longue durée, a “history in which all change is slow, a history of constant repetition, ever-
recurring cycles”. Historians who get carried away by that “history of events” would find 
themselves transported into a state of blindness and unconsciousness “of the deeper realities 
of history, of the running waters on which our frail barks are tossed like cockleshells.” (Braudel 
[1949] 1973b: 20–21) 
This seaman-like description of Historical time was originally delivered in the last two pages 
of The Mediterranean’s preface. Around 1966/67, these two pages were translated - first in 
Polish and Spanish - and published together with other articles “on the nature of history”, 
which Braudel had written in the course of his academic career (Braudel [1969] 1982: 7). 
Uncommonly, the French edition, entitled Écrits sur l'Histoire, came later, in 1969. In Brazil, 
the book was released in the 1970s. 
Braudel’s metaphor of the sea suits well the conception of Historical time as formed by 
structures that are “simultaneously pillars and obstacles”. The immenseness of the sea, whose 
surface can be tamed to much the same extent as its vast profundities can be perfectly known, 
is an image that conveys vividly the individual’s insignificance before a concrete infinitude, 
which stands for the huge challenge represented by the writing of the “total history” Braudel 
yearns for. Despite the fact of being the most intelligible facet of his notion of longue durée, 
Fernand Braudel, as mentioned before, regards this way of conceiving structures as just an 
introductory first key to the problem. 
No wonder Braudel had entirely changed his metaphorical language, leaving The 
Mediterranean’s sea-metaphor (1949) completely out of 1958’s “History and the Social 
Sciences: The Longue Durée”, the programmatic article that would establish the lasting 
influence of his ideas about Historical time. The exploratory and tentative intonation of the 
The Mediterranean’s preface transmits a humbleness that seems to be out of tune with the 
“The Longue Durée”, a text which, in its fever of totality, is rather humbly pretentious. 
The intensity of this fever or rather the extent of these pretensions can be measured by 
condensing the meaning of the second metaphor chosen here as expressing at best the longue 
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durée’s desideratum. It is a metaphor that Braudel uses to criticize Georges Gurvitch’s 
temporalities, which, Braudel himself concedes, are as multiple as are his own. The problem 
with the temporalities of the sociologist Gurvitch is that they open “such a wide range of colors 
[that] it becomes impossible to reconstitute the unitary white light, which is indispensable to 
him”, Fernand Braudel, the Historian. (Braudel [1958] 2012: 273 – emphasis added) 
A totalitarian white light that enlightens erasing differences: this is History, in its longue durée 
form, by Fernand Braudel. 
 
Crossing the sea 
The idea of totality and the paradigm of Brazil’s formation 
There have been plenty of “knights of totality” parading through the Brazilian intellectual 
landscape. Not infrequently, professional Historians have occupied a prominent place there. 
Historiography, the fruit of the work of such intellectual laborers, is a term whose crystallized 
usage in Brazil occurred side by side with the development of History as a university course, a 
process which began in the 1930s, with the foundation of the University of São Paulo (1934) 
and of the Universidade do Distrito Federal (1935). (Pereira et al. 2015: 84–104) 
The foundation of these universities was an essential part of a broad project of development, 
the general aim of which was to impel Brazil towards “modernity”. Resulting from a broad 
consensus among the political and economic elites, this project has been conventionally called 
“nacional-desenvolvimentismo” (Nobre 2012: 15). With the emergence of “nacional-
desenvolvimentismo”, about one century after Brazil’s Declaration of Independence (1822) 
and just four decades after the promulgation of the Lei Áurea (1888), which had officially 
abolished slavery in the whole country197, it was as if an “ideal of nation”, an ideal that, to be 
sure, had been pursued for a long time, had finally been found.  
In this context, the human sciences were essentially regarded as an academic activity 
supposed to take part in the efforts of producing an understanding of Brazil that, premised on 
the opposition between the “archaic” and the “modern”, happened to play the role of social 
scientific expression of “nacional-desenvolvimentismo”. 
																																																								197	It	has	been	accepted	that	in	Ceará	the	Abolition	was	officially	proclaimed	some	four	years	earlier,	on	the	25th	of	March	1884.	Although,	Paulo	Henrique	de	S.	Martins	demonstrates	that	as	late	as	in	1889	there	were	still	people	“officially”	enslaved	in	that	state,	in	the	city	of	Milagres.	In	this	way,	he	re-opens	a	discussion,	which	harks	back	to	the	60s,	about	the	precursor	character	of	the	“abolicionismo	cearense”	(Martins	2012:	27–48).	
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“Nesse projeto [nacional-desenvolvimentista], ‘modernização’ significava, de um lado, o 
combate às diferentes formas de arcaísmo e, de outro, a criação de condições para a 
emergência da nação em sentido autêntico. Foi longa a hegemonia da oposição entre ‘arcaico’ 
e ‘moderno’, e ela moldou como nenhuma outra a autocompreensão do país.” (Nobre 2012: 
16) 
 
In the early 1940s, when the “nacional-desenvolvimentista” model was already well 
established, but not yet hegemonic, Caio Prado Junior’s Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo 
(1942) was published, a book that came to be the first “classic” of Brazilian “professional 
historiography” and which still belongs to the canon of the so-called “pensamento social 
brasileiro”. The work bears in its very title a word that epitomizes that which would be a 
paradigmatic and perennial subject of reflection within the human sciences in Brazil: 
“formação”. (Nobre 2012: 17) 
According to Marcos Nobre, the “paradigma da formação”, as he names it, consolidated its 
academic position in the short interstice between two dictatorial regimes, namely, the one 
spearheaded by Getúlio Vargas (1937-1945) and the military dictatorship (1964-1985). 
Indeed, this break from dictatorship would witness different academic disciplines within the 
human sciences giving birth to their respective versions of the Brazilian formation: from 
Literary Theory came Formação da Literatura Brasileira (1957) by Antonio Candido, from 
Political Science Os Donos do Poder – Formação do Patronato Político Brasileiro (1958) by 
Raymundo Faoro, and from Economics Formação Econômica do Brasil (1959) by Celso 
Furtado.  
These works are among the most important and ambitious attempts to offer an encompassing 
explanation of Brazil as a nation. And to put the “nation” at the center of attention entailed 
the claim of thinking essentially in terms of totality198. In this sense, it would be no 
exaggeration to say that, together with their ancestors199, these intellectual offspring of the 																																																								198	To	a	greater	or	lesser	degree,	all	these	works	are	paradigmatic	examples	of	methodological	nationalism,	that	is,	they	consist	of	exercises	in	that	triad	formed,	first,	by	ignorance	of	the	epistemic	and	epistemological	role	of	the	national	framing	as	constitutive	element	of	the	idea	of	modernity;	second	(and	consequently),	by	the	naturalization	of	the	nation-state	as	self-evident	and	absolutely	unavoidable	subject-matter;	third,	by	the	 reduction	 of	 the	 analytical	 focus	 to	 the	 territorial	 boundaries	 of	 the	 nation-state	 (Wimmer/Glick	Schiller:	2002).	It	is	precisely	by	virtue	of	these	three	“vices”	that	such	works	can	be	described	as	having	been	holistic.	In	fact,	they	adopted	the	largest	framework	epistemologically	allowed	to	them,	which	was,	if	one	takes	into	account	the	very	critique	of	the	methodological	nationalism,	in	no	way	necessarily	smaller	than	that	adopted	by	the	producers	of	‘grand	theory’.		199	Oliveira	Vianna’s	Evolução	do	Povo	Brasileiro	(1923),	Gilberto	Freyre’s	Casa	Grande	&	Senzala	(1933)	and	Sérgio	Buarque	de	Hollanda’s	Raízes	do	Brasil	(1936)	have	been	considered	the	three	forerunners	of	the	“paradigma	da	formação”.		
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“paradigma da formação” brought about the most prominent form of holistic thought 
stemming from the Humanities in Brazil.  
The contribution of History to the “paradigma da formação” did not remain limited to Caio 
Prado Júnior’s work. Rather, seminal as it turned out to be, the Marxism of Formação do Brasil 
Contemporâneo strongly influenced later developments in the historiographical field, showing 
once more its usual theoretical power for holistic thinking. The core of Caio Prado Júnior’s 
thesis was pointedly formulated in the following passage: 
“Se vamos à essência de nossa formação, veremos que na realidade nos constituímos para 
fornecer açúcar, tabaco, alguns outros gêneros; mais tarde ouro e diamantes; depois, algodão, 
e em seguida café, para o comércio europeu. Nada mais do que isto. É com tal objetivo, 
objetivo exterior, voltado para fora do país e sem atenção a considerações que não fossem o 
interesse daquele comércio, que se organizarão a sociedade e a economia brasileiras.” (Prado 
Júnior [1942] 2001: 32) 
 
The colonization of Brazil was thus just an element of the broad context of the development 
of capitalism, a process whose indisputable taproot was Europe. Therefore, to use Prado 
Júnior’s consecrated term, the “sentido” of the Brazil’s formation was, so to speak, exogenous 
to itself. Having its own formation being determined from the outside was the trait that allows 
for the distinction between what he defines as “colônia de exploração” (Brasil) and “colônia 
de povoamento” (USA).  
These two interdependent ideas, that is, the type of colonial exploration and the “sentido” of 
the formation of the nation would enjoy a long life in Brazilian historiography, History of 
Slavery included. They are in some sense reinforced, for instance, in Emilia Viotti da Costa’s 
Da Senzala à Colônia (1966), a monumental study that focuses on the abolition of slavery and 
subsequent transition to a free labor market as a key moment for understanding the 
emergence of capitalism in Brazil, or later criticized in Jacob Gorender’s O escravismo Colonial 
(1978) as well as in Ciro Flamarion Cardoso’s Agricultura, Escravidão e Capitalismo (1979). 
These are works that try to demonstrate that the formation of Brazil was fundamentally 
determined by the particular development of its slavery system, that means, endogenously, 
rather than by the dynamics of the European capitalism.  
It shall be noted that all these remarkable works were written during the military dictatorship 
(1964–1984), a period in which the “nacional-desenvolvimentista” paradigm became 
hegemonic (Nobre 2012:17). There was no change in that frame of reference within which the 
“archaic” and the “modern” stand in evolutionary tension: those Histories of Slavery in Brazil 
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were, summing it up (again) with Chakrabarty’s formula, versions of the master-History of 
transition to capitalism and modernity (Chakrabarty: 2000). 
The 80s, nicknamed in Brazil (actually, not only in Brazil but in Latin America) as “a década 
perdida” due to the profound economic crisis that the country went through at that time, 
foreshadowed the closure of the project “nacional-desenvolvimentista” and, as a 
consequence thereof, the closure of the aggiornamento of Brazil to the neoliberal agenda, a 
process that has been carried out since the 90s (Nobre 2012: 29–33). In this context: 
“Os Estados Nacionais são ‘atores’ decisivos certamente; mas o mero fato de passarem a ser 
designados como ‘atores’ (entre outros, portanto) já mostra muito da mudança estrutural 
ocorrida, dificilmente pensável até a década de 1980, por exemplo. Se a conversa de que ‘não 
há mais centro nem periferia’ desempenha um papel ideológico nada desprezível, também 
ela, como todo dispositivo ideológico, tem seu momento de verdade: a subordinação já não 
se organiza mais primordialmente em termos de nações, países ou Estados.” (Nobre 2012: 30) 
 
According to Marcos Nobre, this is the moment of the obsolescence200 of the “paradigma da 
formação” and of the emergence of the “lógica das redes”. As it had happened with Formação 
do Brasil Contemporâneo in the dawn of “nacional-desenvolvimentismo”, History pushed 
itself to the fore with a work that has been regarded as the latest classic of Brazilian 
Historiography: O Trato dos Viventes – A Formação do Brasil no Atlântico Sul (2000) by Luiz 
Felipe Alencastro. If the word “formação” is still in the title, Nobre remarks, Alencastro shows 
however that “o Brasil se formou fora do Brasil”, em um espaço transcontinental, sul-
atlântico” (Nobre 2012: 31).  
Alencastro’s argument can be seen as a kind of radicalization of Caio Prado’s. It is no longer 
the idea that Brazil’s formation had been determined from the outside. Rather, that Brazil was 
formed over there, outside itself. Formulated negatively, the great novelty of O Trato dos 
Viventes lies simply in the fact that Brazil’s “outside” is not that Europe with which Brazilian 
historiography is familiarized; it is not that Historical actor who, as a dynamic centre of 
capitalism, is used to play the role of the omnipresent protagonist that pushes history (even 
if not always in the best way) forward. 
Brazil’s outside by Alencastro is the “South Atlantic” (mainly Angola and the Rio da Prata 
Basin), parts of the world which have been historiographically presented as discrete elements 
within the two extra-peripheral vertices of the Atlantic colonial triangle. Against this backdrop, 
																																																								200	 If	Marcos	Nobre	 is	 right,	Darcy	Ribeiro’s	O	Povo	Brasileiro	(1995)	can	 then	be	regarded	as	 the	 final	milestone	of	this	type	of	interpretation.	
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the old question about the “sentido da evolução/colonização do Brasil”, put by Caio Prado in 
the 40s, must gain a different colour. 
In the following few pages, Luiz Felipe Alencastro’s O Trato dos Viventes will serve as a base 
for an examination of the problem involving the idea of totality (as the nation) on the one 
hand and the construction of Historical continuity of long-term on the other, in a series of 
important historiographical approaches to the “formação do Brasil”. 
 
The formation of Brazil and History of slavery: O Trato dos Viventes 
By reading the very two first paragraphs of O Trato dos Viventes, readers skeptical of the 
totalizing approach characteristic of the “paradigma da formação”, or rather, especially such 
readers, might perhaps be tempted to consider that the effort of carefully following the next 
four hundred sixty pages comprised by Alencastro’s work could be extremely worthwhile.  
“Formação do Brasil no Atlântico Sul”: o leitor que bateu o olho na capa do livro estará 
intrigado com o subtítulo. Quer dizer então que o Brasil se formou fora do Brasil? É exatamente 
isso: tal é o paradoxo histórico que pretendo demonstrar nas páginas seguintes. 
Nossa história colonial não se confunde com a continuidade de nosso território colonial. 
Sempre se pensou o Brasil fora do Brasil, mas de maneira incompleta: o país aparece no 
prolongamento da Europa. Ora, a ideia exposta neste livro é diferente e relativamente simples: 
colonização portuguesa, fundada no escravismo, deu lugar a um espaço econômico e social 
bipolar, englobando uma zona de produção escravista situada no litoral da América do Sul e 
uma zona de reprodução de escravos situada em Angola. Desde o século XVI, surge um espaço 
aterritorial, um arquipélago lusófono composto dos enclaves da América portuguesa e da 
feitorias de Angola. É daí que emerge o Brasil do século XVIII. [...] essas duas partes unidas pelo 
oceano se completam num só sistema de exploração colonial cuja singularidade ainda marca 
profundamente o Brasil contemporâneo.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 9) 
 
To be sure, what is paradoxical in the subtitle is not the announcement that Brazil formed 
itself outside Brazil. As Alencastro himself hastens to stress: “Sempre se pensou o Brasil fora 
do Brasil [...]”. He is rigorously right. In this sense, to demonstrate the “paradoxo histórico” of 
the “exteriority” of Brazil’s formation is a feature that his study shares with some others 
majors “interpretações do Brasil”. It is, putting it rudely, the commonplace aspect of his, in 
many senses, original book.  
Paradoxical would be then, consequently, the fact that Alencastro draws the attention of the 
readers first to this point, as imagining them as “intrigued” by this overused approach.  
Anyway, this interesting slip - or was it perhaps a deftly employed rhetorical artifice?—enables 
the readers to realize that the “paradox” might not exactly be the idea that Brazil formed itself 
outside Brazil; rather, that this formation, even if denominated as “aterritorial”, can be 
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situated in a geographically marked “where”: the South Atlantic. What seems to be 
paradoxical then, is this precise geographical place where Brazil’s formation took place. 
But…wait! Brazil is a part of the South Atlantic! Would it sound really paradoxical to speak 
about “the formation of Germany in Europe” or “the formation of South Africa in the South of 
Africa”? At first glance, it is more likely to sound redundant. So, if Brazil is part of a whole 
called the South Atlantic, what does it mean to regard this part as “external” to the whole? Is 
this the paradox? Or is there ultimately no paradox at all in Alencastro’s formulation? Should 
the reader be “intrigued” rather by the fact that his book aims at demonstrating an either 
inexistent or at least apparently half-baked paradox?  
These questions, which might appear somehow provocative, are perhaps just the wrong initial 
ones. To approach Alencastro’s general argument so as to expound the importance of his 
original contribution to the discussion on the formation of Brazil, it is better to ask why his 
“paradoxo histórico”, even dressed in a feeble and dubious way, seems not to have caused 
any estrangement.  
An answer to this question will require, first, a glance at another prominent “interpretation of 
Brasil” in which the historical paradox of the “exteriority” of Brazil’s formation plays a decisive 
role, and second, a brief analysis of the construction of long-term continuity in O Trato dos 
Viventes.  
 
Historical continuity of long-term in O Trato dos Viventes 
A preliminary comparison: Fernando Novais’ Portugal e Brasil na Crise do Antigo Sistema 
Colonial  
Reviewers have not failed to note that even more than with Caio Prado’s Formação Econômica 
do Brasil, Alencastro’s version of the formation of Brazil is engaged in a dialogue with Portugal 
e Brasil na Crise do Antigo Sistema Colonial (1979), Fernando Novais’ acclaimed book that 
refines and improves Caio Prados’ seminal ideas about the “sentido da colonização/evolução 
do Brasil” (Ohata 2001; Bicalho 2001).  
It is not just because Novais’ work had been considered the last great historiographical 
“interpretação do Brasil”- until the publication of O Trato dos Viventes, of course – that makes 
it almost irresistible to compare them. The main reason of this comparison lies primarily in 
the fact that Portugal e Brasil na Crise do Antigo Sistema Colonial became the prototype of a 
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painstakingly developed Marxist historiographical approach through which “o Brasil aparece 
como prolongamento da Europa”: 
“As economias coloniais, em que resulta afinal a expansão ultramarina, acabam por configurar, 
encaradas globalmente no contexto da economia mundial, setores produtivos especializados, 
enquadrados nas grandes rotas comerciais, e pois mercados consumidores em expansão. 
Neste sentido, significa ampliação da economia de mercado, respondendo assim às 
necessidades do capitalismo em formação.  
Mais ainda, toda a estruturação das atividades econômicas coloniais, bem como a formação 
social a que servem de base, definem-se nas linhas de força do sistema colonial mercantilista, 
isto é, nas suas conexões com o capitalismo comercial. E de fato, não só a concentração dos 
fatores produtivos no fabrico de mercadorias-chave, nem apenas o volume e o ritmo em que 
eram produzidas, mas também o próprio modo de sua produção define-se nos mecanismos do 
sistema colonial. E aqui tocamos num ponto nevrálgico; a colonização, segundo a análise que 
estamos tentando, organiza-se no sentido de promover a primitiva acumulação capitalista nos 
quadros da economia europeia, ou noutros termos, estimular o progresso burguês nos 
quadros da sociedade ocidental. É esse o sentido profundo que articula todas as peças do 
sistema [...].  
Ora, bem encaradas as economias coloniais periféricas em conjunto e as suas relações com a 
economia europeia, como apêndice dela, a expansão colonial apresentava-se como expansão 
da economia de mercado.” (Novais 1979: 97; 110 – bold and italics added) 
 
Within this Marxist theoretical framework, slavery was, as Eric Williams says (and Novais 
resorts to him in order to make his point), a historical necessity: “in the early stages of colonial 
development, ([…] when slavery is adopted, it is not adopted as the choice over free labour; 
there is no choice at all.” (Williams [1944] 1994: 6; Novais 1979: 102). Initially an imposition 
of the historical-economic conditions, slavery would develop itself in a central historical 
contradiction that Fernando Novais, in fluent Marxist language, explains as follows: 
“A colonização foi de fato um desdobramento da expansão comercial. Examinadas 
internamente, entretanto, na sua estrutura, as economias coloniais configuram um modo de 
produção escravista-mercantil, o que limita a constituição de seu mercado interno; há toda 
uma substancial camada da população (os produtores diretos) cujo consumo em grande parte 
se desenvolve à margem das transações mercantis [...] e isso trava a constituição de um 
mercado interno. No conjunto, tal configuração do mundo colonial responde ao 
funcionamento do sistema, enquanto as economias centrais se desenvolvem apenas no nível 
da acumulação primitiva de capitais, e a produção se expande no nível artesanal, ou mesmo 
manufatureiro. Quando porém essa etapa é ultrapassada, e a mecanização da produção com 
a Revolução Industrial, potenciando a produtividade de uma forma rápida e intensa, leva a um 
crescimento da produção capitalista num volume e ritmo que passam a exigir no ultramar 
mais amplas faixas de consumo, consumo não só das camadas superiores, mas agora da 
sociedade como um todo, o que se torna imprescindível é a generalização das relações 
mercantis. Então o sistema se compromete, e entra em crise. [...] Assim, pois, chegamos ao 
núcleo da dinâmica do sistema: ao funcionar plenamente, vai criando ao mesmo tempo as 
condições de sua crise e superação.” (Novais 1979: 110–111; 114 – emphasis added) 
 
At first glance, something seems to be contradictory in the very formulation of the historical 
contradiction of the colonial society as presented by Novais. Oversimplified, if the whole 
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circuit of colonial slavery was a “historical necessity” of the commercial stage in the general 
development of capitalism, how could then “the formation of Brazil”, one of the biggest 
slavery-based colonial economies at that time, have possibly been just an “apêndice” thereof?  
Clearly, the “exteriority” of Brazil in relation to the process supposed to have shaped Brazil 
itself is a sort of logical consequence of the theoretical assumption that pontificates capitalism 
as emerging in its original form in Europe, nowhere else. Always emanating from Europe, this 
process seems to command everything in the colonial world, including the rise and fall of the 
slave system.  
It is worth noting that although Fernando Novais’ analysis focuses strongly on the “economic 
dimension”, in his schema the different parts of the “Antigo Sistema Colonial” were also 
treated as “civilizational unities”.  
“A Europa, ou antes, a economia capitalista mercantil europeia, é o centro dinâmico de todo 
o sistema, gerador da ação colonizadora e naturalmente beneficiário dela. A Europa, porém, 
não é uma unidade política, é uma unidade civilizacional.” (Novais 1979: 33) 
 
Orbiting around the centre constituted by this indisputably hegemonic “civilizational unity” 
personified in Europe, Novais discerns in the Antigo Sistema Colonial another three 
“elementos básicos”:  
“[1] áreas já densamente povoadas quando do início da exploração marítima europeia, 
portadora de civilizações tradicionais, onde a dominação política permitia o comércio 
vantajoso de alguns produtos de alto valor unitário no mercado europeu como as famosas 
especiarias do mundo indiano; [2] zonas de povoamento e colonização europeia, onde se 
estruturam economias complementares ao capitalismo europeu, fornecedora sobretudo de 
produtos tropicas e metais nobres (a América é por excelência o teatro da ação colonizadora 
europeia durante o primeiro sistema colonial); [3] e, finalmente, a África fornecedora de mão 
da força de trabalho escravizada que permite pôr em funcionamento a produção colonial do 
segundo setor.” (Novais 1979: 33 – emphasis added) 
 
The first element, Novais explains, configures what the theoreticians of colonialism had called 
“commercial colonies”; the second one, following Caio Prado’s typology, he classifies as 
“colônias de exploração” and “colônias de povoamento”; the third element, namely, Africa, 
…well …apparently Novais forgot he had mentioned three not two basic elements, for he does 
not mention Africa when it comes to the task of giving theoretical definitions: Africa enters in 
Novais’ analysis descriptively characterized as a “supplier of enslaved labor force”, and it ends 
up being just that, nothing else.  
Novais’ reasoning leads one almost to conclude that not (yet) being a prolongation or 
appendage of Europe (as America already was) neither supposed to house any “traditional 
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civilization” (as was the case of India and other “areas densely populated”), Africa remains 
untheorized and, consequently, having no right to be invested with a higher defining abstract 
category. This is although not the case at all. It is very much the opposite: Africa is from the 
outset just a synthetic theoretical definition: “supplier of enslaved labor force”. And it remains 
so, so to speak, just theorized.  
The effect of this procedure is striking: while Africa is theoretically presented as important to 
the development of capitalism—due to the fact of having been supplier of the main labor 
force responsible for the primitive accumulation—,whatever might have happened there, in 
Africa, seems to play no significant role neither in the periphery of the system (in Brazil) and 
certainly not in the center (Europe).  
This happens because in Novais’ hands the development of capitalism takes the form of an 
evolutionist epiphany that has in Europe its manifestation and in Marx its prophet201. The 
formation of Brazil is a more or less accidental side effect of this process, in which Africa takes 
part as a necessary evil.  
From such a perspective, long-term continuity is obviously a non-problem, for the “longest” 
structure, set from the beginning, seems to be immanent, playing (somewhere, but always 
behind the scenes202) the demiurgic role of an organising principle. 
 
Alencastro’s constructions of Historical continuity of long term 
Alencastro argues that views such as this one held by Fernando Novais, which present Brazil 
as a prolongation or appendix of Europe, are incomplete. Thus, his purpose is, it seemed, to 
complement it. He does although something more (or other?) than that. One sees it perfectly 
by examining the issue of long-term continuity in O Trato dos Viventes. 
Alencastro resorts to three main strategies in order to construct long-term continuity in this 
work: first, by talking about longue durée structures in that geo-economic sense defined by 
Braudel as “pillars and obstacles” of social life; second, through his writing style, which is 
purposely marked by the effort of making patent the presence of the past by bringing into 
relief the permanency of some particular words; third, by means of anachronistic comments 																																																								201	 In	 Novais’	 eyes,	Marx	 succeeds	 in	 bringing	 his	 analysis	 to	 a	 point	 that	 goes	 “[…]	 além	 de	 todas	 as	mistificações	da	realidade”	(Novais	1979:	101).		202	Think	of	Walter	Benjamin’s	hunchback	who,	hidden	inside	the	table	on	which	the	chess	game	of	History	is	played,	guided	the	hand	of	a	puppet	thought	to	be	an	automaton	constructed	to	win	all	the	time.	“The	puppet	is	called	historical	materialism”,	Benjamin	says.	(Benjamin	[1942]	2007:	253)	
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that create temporal wholes which produce a non-stop connection between a distant past 
and the burning present.  
 
Long-term Historical continuity and the longue durée as structure 
The distinct presence of Braudel’s longue durée in O Trato dos Viventes is anything other than 
unexpected. Living in Paris since the 60s, Luiz Felipe Alencastro received, in the shadow of the 
Annales under the baton of Fernand Braudel, his scholarly education. However, Alencastro’s 
academic kinship to Fernand Braudel is neither indirect, nor a coincidence of the institutional 
environment: he was a postgraduate student of Frederic Mauro, pupil of Fernand Braudel. So, 
it is not exaggeration to say that Luiz Felipe Alencastro is, in historiographical sense, a lineal 
descendant of Fernand Braudel. 
The way the subject matter is presented at the beginning of O Trato dos Viventes shows 
indeed some typical features of the Braudelian scheme. After a summary exposition of the 
general problematic, which is provided in the initial chapter (O Aprendizado da Colonização), 
the first step of Alencastro’s “aterritorial interpretação da formação do Brasil” (Alencastro 
[2000] 2014: 42) is to draw attention, firstly, to geographical, then to economical main factors 
that condition, simultaneously, as “pillars and obstacles”, Brazil’s formation. 
Concerning the geographical dimension, the sea currents assume outstanding importance in 
Alencastro’s argument. An analysis of the regime of winds and tides helps him make especially 
significant the 1621 official separation between the “Estado do Brasil” and the “Estado do 
Maranhão”, a fact customarily belittled in Histories about the formation of Brazil, as well as 
to put more emphasis on the role of the relatively favourable conditions of navigation 
between Brazil and Angola as an element of political and economical integration. 
“Com efeito, a separação entre o Estado do Brasil e o Estado do Maranhão [...] responde aos 
quadros de ventos e marés predominantes na costa sul-americana: facilidade de comunicação 
com a Corte e transtorno da navegação litorânea sul-americana levam à criação de duas 
colônias distintas no espaço da América portuguesa.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 59) 
 
“Ao contrário, as travessias Brasil-Angola afiguravam-se ‘quase sempre acompanhadas de 
bonanças ou de mui pequenos incômodos do mar e ventos’, conforme observa um governador 
daquela conquista africana. Um dos eixos da bipolaridade escravista unindo a África à América 
portuguesa gira, justamente, na rota aberta entre as duas margens do mar por correntezas e 
ventos complementares.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 61) 
 
The complementary effect of the two remarks on the construction of Alencastro’s main 
argument is manifest: the political event of the official separation is used to displace the 
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unifying character of the spatial contiguity of that which came to be the future Brazil’s 
territory as a “sovereign nation”, while the economic integration blown by the trade winds 
function as a way of demonstrating how strong the connection of this future nation to the 
geographically distant Angola was. 
“Trade winds” says too little. Alencastro introduces then a significant amendment: those 
winds had been first and foremost African Slave Trade Winds203. In this way, pointing to the 
inextricable interaction between the geographical and the economical, he easily makes clear 
which economical factor play the role of longue durée as structure in his account. 
Something quite obvious but easy to downgrade or even to forget, if not looking at it from a 
Social Science perspective, is that colonial slave trade was not just the trade of enslaved 
people, but also the trade of an immense variety of things. From the fabrication of ships, an 
activity that Alencastro addresses at some length, to the production and distribution of 
foodstuff, the slave trade involves a huge complex of activities.  
“Men and things make up material life”, Braudel states opening the first volume of his 
Civilization and Capitalism. Where to start? His answer is categorical: “Clearly, our starting 
point must be the people of the world.” (Braudel 1973a: 1) But “people”, for historiographical 
purposes, are worth their weight in numbers204, whence his emphatic words stressing the 
supreme importance of demography in History. 
It is in this sense that Alencastro as well takes “people” as his point of departure: graphics and 
tables detailing the trade of enslaved Africans are not missed in the beginning of O Trato dos 
Viventes. Still, even though people are there as numbers, the numbers themselves do not gain 
special prominence in the History he tells. On the contrary, as soon as he warns the readers 
that “os números do tráfico negreiro são problemáticos para os séculos XVI e XVII”, he 
practically drops the matter, weakening in this way a pretension of transparent objectivity 
that has led some critics to consider the meticulousness of quantitative methods 
characteristic of the Braudelian phase of the Annales as “a newer, more technologically-
advanced form of positivism.” (Hunt 1986: 214)  
																																																								203	“Na	medida	em	que	se	zarpava	com	facilidade	de	Pernambuco,	da	Bahia	e	do	Rio	de	Janeiro	até	Luanda	ou	 a	 Costa	 da	 Mina,	 e	 vice-versa,	 a	 navegação	 luso-brasileira	 será	 transatlântica	 e	 negreira.	 [...]	 Na	contramão	dos	ventos	alísios.	Depois	chamados	“ventos	de	comércio”,	Trade	Winds,	pelos	anglo-saxões,	mas	que	foram	primeiro	e	sobretudo,	ventos	de	comércio	negreiro,	African	Slave	Trade	Winds.”	(Alencastro	[2000]	2014:	63).	204	In	fact,	this	chapter	is	entitled	“Weight	of	Numbers”.		
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One soon realizes—in a particular sense—that the slave trade is very much like the winds that 
blew it: it functions, so to speak, as a non-interpretive constant of Alencastro’s interpretation 
of Brazil’s formation. Therefore, it can be addressed as remaining identical to itself, 
notwithstanding the transformations it suffers in the course of the two centuries covered by 
the book.  
That the numbers of the slave trade were not reliable enough to provide statistical warrant 
for assumptions Alencastro might make or conclusions he might draw, is not so bad. The slave 
trade expresses here “concreteness” rather than “objectivity”. It is an example of the 
materiality of those socio-historical process, which, as Trouillot says,  
“seem to speak of an immensity of which we know little except that we are part of it. To solid 
to be unmarked, too conspicuous to be candid, they embody the ambiguities of history. They 
give us the power to touch it, but not to hold it firmly in our hands (…). We suspect that their 
concreteness hides secrets so deep that no revelation may fully dissipate their silences”. 
(Trouillot 1995: 30) 
 
Long-term Historical continuity and Alencastro’s writing style 
Alencastro’s second way of constructing long-term continuity takes the form of what he names 
his “estilo” or “modo de escrever” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 9–10). He makes no secret that: 
“numa cultura tradicionalmente oral como a nossa, um meio privilegiado de patentear a 
presença do passado consiste em dar relevo à perenidade das palavras. Das palavras, dos 
coloquialismos – ainda vivos agora – grafados nos textos, na linguagem das estradas, das ruelas 
e das praias brasileiras. Por isso, da leitura dos documentos e do textos seiscentistas, retomei 
expressões que encadeiam a narrativa das oito partes do livro.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 10) 
 
Mukambo, kilombo, libambo, libombo e kitanda, these and many others - such as banzo, 
quimbembe and banguela - are words that Alencastro subjected to a treatment that aims at 
making the past patently writable: 
. Mukambo/Kilombo 
“Mukambo, palavra do quimbumdo que significa cumeeira e, mais precisamente, “a forquilha 
do encaixe do teto da casa” – caracterizando a morada fixa da família ou da comunidade -, 
passa a designar o refúgio dos rebeldes de São Tomé. No Brasil, o termo vira sinônimo de 
povoado de negros insurrectos. Mais tarde, será substituído por kilombo – nome original do 
campo de guerreiros jaga dos reinos da Matmaba e Caçanje. Abolida a escravidão, mucambo 
ou mocambo passa a indicar lugares onde vivem negros, palhoças, habitações populares e se 
generaliza como sinônimo de “favela nordestina”. (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 66) 
 
 . Libambo/Libombo 
“De janeiro a abril a chuva atrasava a marcha dos libambos - colunas de cativos amarrados – 
para as feiras e os portos ( numa variante reveladora da truculência do quadro social brasileiro, 
libombo designa ainda hoje no Nordeste a levas de sertanejos que migram para o Sul em busca 
de trabalho).” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 83) 
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 . Kitanda 
“Deve ser notado que o escambo de escravos encadeia a oferta de uma série de outros 
produtos africanos. Mesmo com o transporte de camelos no Sahel, de canoas nas redes fluviais 
da Alta Guinés e da Costa da Mina, e de barcaças nos rios de Angola, o cativo apresentava-se 
como uma mercadoria capaz de carregar outras mercadorias. Assim, circuitos terrestres de 
tráficos de escravos formavam outras tantas vias de transporte de commodities entre o sertão 
e a costa africana. Era intensa a atividade das feiras sertanejas angolanas, designadas em 
quimbundo pelo substantivo que passou a definir no Brasil todo e qualquer pequeno comércio: 
kitanda.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 114) 
 
All these words are still used, frequently with different orthography, in contemporary Brazilian 
Portuguese. As the quotation expounds, Alencastro’s close attention to the spelling and the 
denotative meanings such words acquired in two different times, as well to the transposition 
of the nomenclature taken from the primary sources into historiographical account, is thought 
to play a double role: first, to create the sense of a temporal whole linking the colonial past to 
the reader’s present; second, to concatenate the narrative of events scattered over more than 
two centuries of chronological time. This rather rhetorical procedure contributes immensely 
to give coherence to the book: coherence at the level of the content, related to the way of 
unifying the myriad of issues he deals with, on the one hand, and coherence at the level of 
meaning, related to the claim of having written a book that explains the formation of Brazil 
accounting for its “exteriority”. 
Small wonder then that Alencastro is so ostensive concerning his “writing style”. Without 
going into a surely fruitful, but at this point inopportune discussion on the complexities of the 
concept of style, one can say that style refers both to “what remains of a representation when 
we subtract its content” and to “the relationship between representation and the one who 
makes the representation.” (Danto 1981: 197–198) 
In fact, Alencastro explores his “writing style” to bring about that “turning towards the South 
Atlantic/Africa” as that which remains (or emerges?) from his book when subtracted from the 
content of every concrete event; or, as that which remains when the book is not seen as a 
mere superposition of the events it presents in historiographical fashion.  
This “turning” effected by O Trato dos Viventes is also fleshed out in what Alencastro asserts 
himself by taking distance from the position of other authors. Symptomatically, Fernand 
Braudel is among them. Justifying why he refuses to name the Congo as “Kongo”, he writes: 
“O reino do Congo cobria o Norte do território atual de Angola e parte da República 
Democrática do Congo e da República Popular do Congo. Os historiadores da África, e muitos 
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outros, como Fernand Braudel, adotam a grafia Kongo, para diferenciar esse antigo Estado 
banto das colônias havidas posteriormente na área pela Bélgica e pela França. Não vejo 
fundamento nisso: o território da Dinamarca setecentista não corresponde à atual Dinamarca 
e nem por isso seu nome é alterado pelos historiadores.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 66) 
 
This is not the sole moment in which Alencastro criticizes Braudel. In the chapter “Angola 
brasílica”, reputed by a commentator as the most original and the highlight of the book (Ohata 
2001: 214), he remarks: 
“Braudel, ao estudar as plantas alimentares americanas, faz um largo elogio ao milho e à 
batata, mas desconsidera a mandioca. Esta, argumenta ele, só serviu de base a ‘culturas 
primitivas e regularmente medíocres’. Ao contrário do que escrevia o mestre, a mandioca 
constituiu uma das peças de encaixe da economia-mundo no Atlântico Sul.” (Alencastro [2000] 
2014: 256) 
 
A sensitive reader will not have failed to notice that a certain irony may arise from the 
patronizing way Alencastro calls Braudel “mestre”. Ironic is also Alencastro’s description of 
some Historical personages, for instances, Luís Mendes de Vasconcelos: 
“Autor dos Dialógos do sítio de Lisboa (1608) – livro-chave do iberismo setecentista – e de 
outras obras militares, políticas e literárias, Vasconcelos filia-se à raça de escritores-mata-
mouros, fidalgos práticos em prosa, verso e decapitação. [...] Refinado escritor e pensador na 
Europa, Luís Mendes de Vasconcelos virou um grande predador na África. Barbarizou em 
Angola junto com seus dois filhos, Francisco e Joane Mendes de Vasconcelos, pilhando aldeias 
aliadas, exigindo parte dos cativos escambados nas feiras, em prejuízo dos mercadores 
luandenses.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 96; 97 – emphasis added) 
 
Mauricio de Nassau, who Alencastro gives the noble epithet of “príncipe humanista e 
negreiro”, received identical treatment: 
“No ar livre da sociedade holandesa Spinoza (1632-77) concebeu teses do humanismo ateu 
que teriam sido esmagadas no ovo pela Inquisição em Portugal, terra de seus pais. Saído da 
Holanda, Nassau, o príncipe humanista, se assenhoreia de uma base colonial portuguesa cujo 
modo de exploração o induz a varrer o ‘escrúpulo inútil’ de seus patrícios e incorporar o 
escravismo no cálculo econômico dos burgueses de Amsterdam. [...] No livro editado em Haia 
no tricentenário da morte de Nassau (1979), os ilustres autores da obra não analisam nem 
sequer mencionam essa militância negreira, componente essencial da modernidade 
nassoviana. Aqui, como alhures, a segmentação dos eventos sul-atlânticos deixa o tráfico 
negreiro à deriva, apouca a complexidade da expansão europeia e facilita a biografia dos 
grandes homens.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 211–212) 
  
From the intention of animating meaning that might still be present in the “perenidade” of 
words stemming from African languages, through the critique of Braudel’s unequal 
epistemological treatment of Africa, up until the mockery of 17th Century European 
Humanism, the features of that which Alencastro defines as his writing style bring about a 
Historical painting executed with glaring anti-Eurocentric strokes.  
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A concept such as “civilization” or “civilizational unity”, which, as seen above with respect to 
Fernando Novais’ work, plays a key, but nevertheless undiscussed role in structuring a fairly 
Eurocentric-evolutionist view on the Antigo Sistema Colonial (and, consequently, on Novais’ 
version of the “formação do Brasil”), has no room in Alencastro’s argumentation. This 
avoidance of “civilization”, however, by no means leads him to a misrepresentation of the 
issue of power asymmetries involving the Historical actors of the “formação do Brasil”. On the 
contrary, always practicing his style, finely attentive to “words”, he uses an example of an 
African language to denounce such a problem directly at the level of the contemporary 
production of intellectual knowledge: 
“Kicongo: língua do povo bacongo, falada no antigo reino do Congo e, atualmente, na 
República Democrática do Congo (ex-Zaire) e na República Popular do Congo. Uma das línguas 
formadoras do português falado no Brasil, o kicongo, já estudado e dicionarizado, não consta 
nem como verbete no dicionário Aurélio205.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 94) 
 
As were expected, he is no less attentive to this question within his Historical narrative. 
Alencastro recognizes from the outset that in many colonial contexts “a relação de forças se 
afigurava favorável aos invasores europeus” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 11]. And he develops 
this assertion in great detail when he writes, for example, about the participation of the 
Catholic Church, especially of the Jesuits, in the colonialist undertaking (topically, in chapter 
five, but this is a subject more or less present in the whole book). 
Basically, Alencastro approaches the problematic of colonialism in terms of contextual and 
asymmetrical relations of force that answer to impulses of different orders. He never reduces 
the problem to a unitary dynamic liable to be presented as the result of “essentializable” 
degrees of [civilizational or economic] development of one single actor; certainly not that of 
Europe. From his perspective, Europe is definitely not the sole vanishing point.  
 
Long-term Historical continuity and controlled anachronism 
Finally, the third way Alencastro develops long-term continuity takes the form of a two-faced 
handling of the issue of anachronism.  
In talking about the slave trade between Brazil and Angola in the 16th Century, for example, 
which is one of the main subjects of Alencastro’s analysis, terms like “brasileiro” and 
“angolano” are highly amenable to anachronistic understanding. Alencastro addresses the 
																																																								205	The	Aurélio	is	the	most	popular	and	one	of	the	most	recognized	dictionaries	of	Brazilian	Portuguese.	
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problems involving anachronism in the act of naming - an issue as ordinary as rich in 
consequences for the writing of History - when he chooses the 17th Century word “brasílico” 
over “brasileiro”. He explains why: 
“farei uso do substantivo seiscentista brasílico para designar a sociedade colonial da América 
portuguesa dos séculos XVI, XVII e da primeira metade do século XVII, quando a palavra 
brasiliense se referia sobretudo aos índios, e brasileiro principalmente aos cortadores de pau-
brasil [...]. Àquela altura, o colonato dos enclaves da América portuguesa afirmava interesses 
distintos dos interesses dos reinóis, mas não tinha ainda a percepção de pertencimento a uma 
só comunidade. Os ‘brasílicos’ tornam-se ‘brasileiros’, no sentido atual da palavra, ao longo do 
século XVIII, depois que a economia do ouro engendra uma divisão inter-regional do trabalho 
e um mercado interno na Colônia, fazendo assim emergir a ideia de filiação a uma comunidade 
suprarregional dotada de uma mesma língua e vivendo num mesmo território.” (Alencastro 
[2000] 2014: 28 – emphasis in the original) 
 
This concern with anachronism also appears respecting analytical concepts. Making a 
reference to an article of his authorship published two years prior to O Trato dos Viventes, 
Alencastro explains that the distinction between “colônia de exploração” and “colônia de 
povoamento”, elaborated by Leroy-Beauliet in 1874, had been originally applied for 
characterising the “Segunda Expansão Europeia” (1870-1954), but not the “Primeira Expansão 
Europeia” (1450-1825). Caio Prado Junior, Alencastro then points out, had made anachronistic 
use of Leroy-Beauliet’s idea, a use that is nowadays widespread in Brazilian historiography 
(Alencastro 1998: 195; Alencastro [2000] 2014: 335). 
On the one hand then, there is this accuracy, this strictness in relating words and ideas to the 
right chronological time they belong to. On the other hand, passages like these: 
“Por causa da lenta rotatividade do capital investido, dos azares da cultura da cana, do vaivém 
dos preços, o endividamento dos proprietários se apresentava como uma das constantes do 
escravismo [...]. Porém desde o governo-geral de Telles Barreto (1583-87) se impediam as 
execuções hipotecárias nos engenhos, porque os mercadores ‘vinham destruir a terra, levando 
dela em três ou quatro anos que cá estavam quanto podiam’, explicava frei Vicente de 
Salvador. O estabelecimento da Relação na Bahia (1609) e a lei de 1612 efetivam esse 
privilégio, o ‘privilégio do senhor de engenho’, o qual, sob roupagens diversas, perdura até 
nossos dias em benefício dos usineiros”. (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 215 – emphasis added) 
 
“Notem-se ainda as nomeações do ex-capitão da guerra de Pernambuco, Cristovão de Barros 
Rego (1656-61), para o governo de São Tomé, e de seu parente, Roque de Barros Rego (1648-
50) para Cabo Verde (em atenção aos muitos serviços prestados na guerra do Brasil), onde 
também será governador Francisco de Figueroa (1658-63), um dos comandantes da segunda 
Batalha de Guararapes. Quase todos foram postos concedidos entre 1654 e 1655. 
Porque motivo d. João IV, qual um governador fisiológico do Brasil de hoje em final de 




“Desembarcado nos portos da América portuguesa, mais uma vez submetido à venda, o 
escravo costumava ser surrado ao chegar à fazenda. [...] Tal é o testemunho do Padre e jurista 
Ribeiro Rocha, morador da Bahia, no seu tratado sobre a escravatura no Brasil. Cem anos mais 
tarde o viajante francês Adolphe d’Assier confirmava a prática de espancar os escravos logo 
de entrada, para ressocializá-lo no contexto da opressão nas fazendas e engenhos do Império. 
Método de terror luso-brasílico, e mais tarde autenticamente nacional, brasileiro, o choque 
do bárbaro arbítrio do senhor – visando demonstrar ao recém-chegado seu novo estatuto 
subumano – voltou a ser praticado durante a ditadura de 1964-85. Instruídos pela longa 
experiência escravocrata, os torturadores do DOI-CODI e da Operação Bandeirantes também 
faziam uso repentino da surra, à entrada da delegacia e das casernas, para desumanizar e 
aterrorizar os suspeitos de ‘subversão’.” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 148 – emphasis added) 
 
The excerpts are sufficiently eloquent of the most common type of anachronism: sometimes 
Alencastro presents a contemporary event as the past, just garbed in a different way (the 
“usineiro” as the “senhor de engenho”); sometimes, inverting the direction, he ask the reader 
to see a 17th Century absolutist monarch as today’s “fisiológico” Brazilian governor. Finally, 
the past reappeared in a later moment of the past itself, when the military dictatorship 
reinstituted “o choque bárbaro do arbítrio do senhor”. 
The effect of this procedure is manifestly very similar to that adopted for unveiling the 
“perenidade das palavras”: it creates the same temporal wholes, non-stop connections 
between present and past. But the procedure itself is completely different. In the first case, 
the word itself, say, mukambo/mocambo, functions as the stable element that carries the 
[meanings of the] past into the present. Meanings that, explored at their denotative level, 
lend a non-interpretive physiognomy to the Historical permanence that the words end up 
meaning. In the second case—consider please the excerpt about João IV—there is no initial 
stable element; the very comparison between the political behaviour of both rulers is 
constructed on the basis of a logic of resemblance that brings about the Historical permanence 
(the “fisiologismo”) as an anachronistic attribution of meaning. 
 
Alencastro and his critics: missing Eurocentrism 
The articulation of these three ways of constructing long-term continuity produce something 
whose centrality can be gauged by the recurrence of a particular criticism on O Trato dos 
Viventes. Milton Ohata poses it as follows: 
“podem ser feitas ao livro de Luiz Felipe as críticas que um suposto marxista faria a um 
braudeliano. Sem esquecer os muitos pontos de contato, o marxismo cobraria dos esquemas 
braudelianos mais mediações entre os diferentes níveis de temporalidade histórica, que 
muitas vezes são apenas organizados em camadas sobrepostas sem contato entre si. Assim, 
por exemplo, ocorre com a noção de pacto colonial, inexistente no livro. Ou com o peso da 
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tributação direta ao comércio de escravos, em favor da Coroa, que mereceria um capítulo à 
parte. Em ambos os casos, mediações propriamente ditas, que fazem a colônia ser uma 
colônia, são apagadas por um recorte que privilegia tão-só a ‘autonomia’ do comércio bilateral 
e do colonato brasílico. Com esta escolha, Luiz Felipe responde a muitíssimas questões exceto 
a uma (talvez o x do problema): sendo a Colônia ‘autônoma’ naquilo que lhe era imprescindível, 
por que continuou durante tanto tempo ligada à Metrópole? (Ohata 2001: 215 – emphasis 
added) 
 
Ohata then argues that Alencastro could have answered this question satisfactorily had he 
incorporated in his work “a produção do marxismo uspiano, que se empenhou em identificar 
mediações entre a história do país e a história do capitalismo”, especially Fernando Novais’ 
concept of “pacto colonial”. Another reviewer, addressing the same question, disagrees with 
Ohata and, less diplomatically, hits the raw nerve by concluding that O Trato dos Viventes 
simply 
“contradiz […] o que há de mais vigoroso nas analises de Caio prado Júnior e Fernando Antonio 
Novais, a capacidade de explicar a mudança. Pois se aceitarmos, com Alencastro, que a vinda 
da Corte não representou uma grande ruptura, como poderemos entender a mudança de 
estatuto político da colônia e mesmo o processo de Independência?” (Teodoro 2005: 192).  
 
As discussed above, both Caio Prado and Fernando Novais explain the formation of Brazil 
basically as a prolongation or appendix of the European commercial expansion. If one wants 
to be more precise: many of Brazil’s defining features were a result of Portugal’s incapacity to 
answer the challenges posed by the development of capitalism in Europe from the 18th 
century on. 
This point is particularly salient in Fernando Novais work. According to him, what makes the 
analysis of the relations between Portugal and Brazil in the context of what he calls “the crisis 
of the ancient colonial system” especially difficult is exactly the fact that Portugal, which had 
played a leading role in the beginnings of European expansion in the 16th Century, occupied 
an increasingly marginal position respecting the big changes that brought about modern 
industrial capitalism, two and half centuries later. It is in the center of the system that the 
relevant changes occur, and, he explains, “situado Portugal fora dos centros propulsores 
dessas grandes transformações, a maior dificuldade estará sem dúvida na apresentação das 
metamorfoses que inevitavelmente sofrem esses processos ao atingir estas áreas limites 
[Portugal/Brazil] do sistema” (Novais 1979: 15). 
The idea of “pacto colonial”, based on the most fundamental mechanism of the Mercantilist 
economy, that is, the “exclusivo metropolitano”, which consisted primarily of the “reserva do 
mercado das colônias para a metrópole, isto é, para a burguesia comercial metropolitana” 
	 241	
(Novais 1979: 88), functions as an empirical warrant for the centripetal character of Fernando 
Novais’ theoretical approach and leads him to the conclusion that  
“a acumulação gerada no comercio de africanos […] fluía para a metrópole, realizavam-na o 
mercadores metropolitanos, engajados no abastecimento dessa mercadoria. Esse talvez seja 
o segredo da melhor adaptação do negro à lavoura…escravista. Paradoxalmente, é a partir do 
tráfico negreiro que se pode entender a escravidão africana colonial, e não o contrário.” 
(Novais 1979: 105 – italics in the original) 
 
Alencastro agrees without reservation with this “paradox”, but he does not conceive Portugal 
as a reverse mechanical belt that transmitted force, that is, capital, to the propulsive centre 
of the system. The reason for this, a particularly relevant point he makes in his book, is because 
a substantial part of the capital resulting from the slave trade did not indeed flow neither to 
Portugal nor England, but remained in the hand of “brasílicos” traders.206 
Another critic, Maria Fernanda B. Bicalho, even considers this finding a “grande viragem 
interpretativa” of O Trato dos Viventes: 
“A grande viragem interpretativa da análise de Alencastro consiste no argumento de que o 
tráfico atlântico de africanos ‘modifica de maneira contraditória o sistema colonial’, pois, 
‘desde o século XVII interesses luso-brasileiros ou, melhor dizendo, brasílicos, se cristalizam 
nas áreas escravistas sul-americanas e nos portos africanos de trato [...] carreiras bilaterais 
vinculam diretamente o Brasil e a África Ocidental.” (Bicalho 2001: 269). 
 
Nevertheless, demonstrating once more how important it is to ensure the primacy of the ties 
that linked Brazil to Portugal/Europe against Alencastro’s “turning to the South”, she 
somehow downgrades this “grande viragem interpretativa” by attempting to reinsert a 
“political version” of Novais’ “pacto colonial” in Alencastro’s argument. In order to do that, 
she comes back to the question Ohata raised: 
“Ohata estranha a inexistência de pacto colonial no livro de Alencastro, que, a seu ver, 
“privilegia tão só a ‘autonomia’ do comércio bilateral e o colonato brasílico’. E se pergunta: 
sendo a colônia ‘autônoma’ naquilo que era imprescindível, porque motivo continuou durante 
tanto tempo ligada à metrópole?” 
O que talvez pudesse responder a esta questão fosse uma re-leitura do pacto, não 
propriamente em sua vertente econômica, como a tecida por Novais, mas em sua configuração 
política, mais afeita à interpretação de Evaldo Cabral de Mello. (Bicalho 2001: 272 – emphasis 
added)207 
																																																								206	This	is	also	the	main	argument	of	an	important	work	published	in	1997:	Manolo	Florentino’s	Em	Costas	
Negras	–	Uma	história	do	tráfico	de	escravos	entre	a	África	e	o	Rio	de	Janeiro	(séculos	XVIII	e	XIX).	In	this	book,	Florentino	demonstrates	consistently	that	at	least	since	the	first	half	of	the	18th	Century	traders	from	Rio	de	Janeiro	had	controlled	the	slave	trade	between	Brazil	and	Africa.	207	Evaldo	Cabral	 de	Mello	 keeps	his	 analysis	 focused	on	 the	 “nativismo	nobiliárquico	pernambucano”,	which	evocated	the	Restoration	War	against	the	Dutch	(1645-1654)	as	the	foundational	event	of	a	 local	identity:	 “O	 imaginário	 político	 da	 restauração	 comportou	 também	 o	 aparecimento	 de	 uma	 relação	
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For different reasons, what all these critics are unwilling to fully accept is that a proper 
understanding of Brazil’s formation could possibly be achieved by an analysis focused on the 
economic and political208 relations that connected Brazil to Africa/South Atlantic rather than 
to Europe. This common yearning for the central elements in the interpretation by Caio Prado 
Júnior and by Fernando A. Novais points to an impotence regarding an understanding of how 
the formation of Brazil could be conceived, respecting its essential elements, as something 
other than an offspring of Portugal/Europe and, consequently, how the separation from the 
metropole, literally, “the parent state of a colony”, could not be the central event in such a 
History. In relegating Europe to the background, Alencastro had orphaned Brazil in the sense 
that he partially deprives it from the comforting explanatory power209 that emanates from a 
long-term History, which its motherland is a closer relative of.  																																																								contractual	das	relações	entre	Pernambuco	e	a	Coroa.	[…]	Na	idéia	deste	pacto	entre	Permabuco	e	a	Coroa,	ressoava	a	justificação	juridical	da	própria	restauração	portuguesa.”	(Mello	1986:	125–126).		It	is	in	the	hands	of	two	other	Historians,	namely,	João	Fragoso	e	Manolo	Florentino,	that	the	attempt	to	re-enact	in	the	colony	the	aristocratic	relations	proper	to	the	motherland	becomes	a	defining	feature	of	Brazil.	In	O	Arcaísmo	como	Projeto,	they	argue	that	in	Portugal:	“Havia	uma	aliança	tácita	entre	os	fidalgos	e	o	pequeno	comércio,	no	sentido	de	prevenir	o	crescimento	dos	grande	mercadores	 e,	 pois,	 contrário	 à	modernização	 que	 eles	 porventura	 pudessem	 implementar.	 [...]	Enfim	prevaleciam	valores	não-capitalistas,	para	os	quais,	ascender	na	hierarquia	social	necessariamente	implicava	 tornar-se	 membro	 da	 aristocracia.	 Daí	 a	 grande	 propensão	 dos	 meios	 mercantis	 à	aristocratização,	e	a	canalização	e	esterilização	de	vultosos	recursos	adquiridos	na	esfera	mercantil	para	atividades	de	cunho	senhorial.	Daí	poder-se	assumir	que	o	“atraso”	português,	em	pleno	século	XVII,	não	se	constituísse	em	mero	anacronismo,	fruto	de	uma	putativa	incapacidade	de	acompanhar	o	destino	manifesto	capitalista	europeu;	ao	contrário,	o	arcaísmo	era,	 isto	sim,	um	verdadeiro	projeto	social,	cuja	viabilização	dependia,	 no	 fundamental,	 da	 apropriação	 das	 rendas	 coloniais.”	 (Fragoso/Florentino	 2001:	 51-52	 –	emphasis	added)	According	to	the	authors,	the	19th	Century	Brazilian	urban	mercantile	elites,	which	had	accumulated	great	capital	 running	 the	 slave	 trade,	 denoted	 “a	 presença	 de	 um	 forte	 ideal	 aristocratizante”	 of	 Portuguese	background,	which	lead	them	to	close	down	their	trade	business	and	to	invest	heavily	in	realty	instead.	This	created	a	small	 “grupo	de	rentistas”	 that	nonetheless	provoked	“um	grande	desvio	de	 investimentos	da	produção	 para	 um	 setor	 que	 não	 multiplicava	 a	 riqueza	 –	 pelo	 contrário,	 esterelizava-a.”	(Fragoso/Florentino	2001:	229–231)	Thus,	a	Portuguese	“aristocratic	ideal”	had	induced	in	Brazil	the	same	“arcaizantes”,	 that	 is,	 “non-capitalist”	 and	 “non-modernizing”	 effects	 it	 had	 brought	 about	 earlier	 in	Portugal.	Fragoso	&	Florentino	mention	two	deep	features	these	developments	had	impressed	on	Brazil:	the	first	one	is	a	type	of	persistent	social	inequality	“em	que	a	riqueza	se	concentra	de	tal	modo	a	não	ensejar	sequer	a	existência	de	grupos	intermediários”;	the	second	one	“refere-se	ao	comprometimento	de	toda	sociedade	com	a	exclusão.”	(Fragoso/Florentino	2001:	235–237)	The	conclusion	Fragoso	&	Florentino	come	to	with	regard	to	the	contemporaneous	Brazilian	elites	 is	so	strikingly	formulated	that	it	is	worth	transcribing	here	so	as	to	conclude	the	quotation:	“A	cultura	política	das	elites	brasileiras	as	tem	permitido	transformar	o	sono	sobre	um	barril	de	pólvora	em	repouso	em	berço	esplêndido.”	(Fragoso/Florentino	2001:	235)	208	 It	 is	 not	 irrelevant	 to	 note	 that	 these	 criticisms	 concern	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 dimension.	 No	problem	 arises	with	 regard	 to	 other	 cultural	 aspects	 Alencastro	 touches	 on	 by	means	 of	 his	 recurring	remarks	related	to	the	“perenidade	das	palavras”	stemming	from	African	languages.		209	 In	 fact,	 when	 Historians	 have	 recourse	 to	 the	 Marxist	 theorization	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 industrial	capitalism	or	to	the	social	values	and	political	practices	of	the	Ancient	Regime,	they	resort	to	broad	social,	
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This is by no means the same as saying that the “master narrative of the development of 
European capitalism” or that the “social and political structures of the Ancient Regime” are 
completely absent from Alencastro’s account. They are there210, but their characteristic 
totalizing power concerning long-term continuity was weakened. In other words: the more 
Alencastro pushes Africa/South Atlantic to the fore of his narrative the more he undermines 
the “monumental time” that supports the heroic narrative of Western civilization extending 
its power, for better or for worse, over the world (Gilroy 1993: 197). 
The recurring criticism centered on the lack of concepts such as “sentido da colonização” or 
“pacto colonial”, no matter if preferentially concerned with the London of future capitalism 
or with the Lisbon of the Ancient Regime’s backwardness, is the cry for a particular type of 
historiographical reification that conflates the formation of Brazil with the History of the 
“forces propelling Europe into commercial expansion and industrial capitalism” and has 
therefore little to say about the History of “the people without history” (Wolf [1982] 2010: 
xxv-xxvi).  
How then to be surprised with “mestre Novais”, as Milton Ohata addresses him (without any 
irony!), when he, having “forgotten” to include any African societies among his “civilizations”, 
seems satisfied with regarding Africa as just a “supplier of slaves”? Caio Prado, who in the 
genealogy of Brazilian historiography would be the “mestre de mestre Novais”, goes so far as 
to subtly question whether the African slaves had a “culture” at all!211 
The master’s time of such a History as written by Caio Prado or Fernando Novais - and ardently 
desired by the critics of Alencastro - is, parodying Braudel, a demiurge time that is external to 
man. Exogenous, as the economists would say, this time pushes forward, constrains, sweeps 																																																								economic	and	political	long-term	developments	which,	had	taken	place	first	in	Europe,	have	been	already	analyzed,	 dissected,	 categorized,	 historicized,	 theorized,	 etc.	…	 and	 can	now	 serve	 as	 useful	models	 for	explaining	 what	 happens	 elsewhere.	 They	 are,	 as	 a	 rule,	 surreptitious	 ways	 of	 centering	 Europe	(Chakrabarty	2000).	210	See,	for	example,	how	Alencastro	explains	the	social	forces	that	set	the	colonial	system	in	movement:	“Se	é	certo	que	os	colonos	se	queixam	de	“falta	de	braços”	desde	o	século	XVII,	também	é	verdadeiro	que	eles	protestam	 já	na	mesma	época	–	 coisa	bem	mais	 surpreendente	–	 contra	a	 ‘falta	de	 terras’.	Terra	e	trabalho	não	se	apresentam	aqui	como	dados	independentes,	mas	como	variáveis	que	são	resultantes	das	forças	motrizes	do	capitalismo	comercial.	O	esquecimento	ou	a	insuficiente	avaliação	desse	traço	essencial	da	colonização	deu	azo	a	confusões	que	parte	da	historiografia	custa	a	se	desembaraçar.	Intencionais	ou	não	intencionais,	os	efeitos	produzidos	pelo	tráfico	negreiro	geram	a	acumulação	específica	ao	capitalismo	comercial	e	à	‘Pax	Lusitana’	no	Atlântico.”	(Alencastro	[2000]	[2014:	41)	211	“O	trabalho	escravo	nunca	irá	além	de	seu	ponto	de	partida:	o	esforço	físico	constrangido;	não	educará	o	indivíduo,	não	o	preparará	para	um	plano	de	vida	mais	elevado.	Não	lhes	acrescentará	elementos	morais;	e	pelo	contrário,	degradá-lo-á,	eliminando	mesmo	nele	o	conteúdo	cultural	que	porventura	tivesse	trazido	
do	seu	estado	primitivo.”	(Prado	Júnior	[1942]	2001:	342–343	–	emphasis	added)	
	 244	
away individual times of many varieties – yes, it is the world’s imperial time! And this type of 
time, as the Braudelian one, forms a trinity in unity as well: it is the time of capitalism (firstly 
commercial, then industrial), the time of modernity, and the time of the nation. To neatly 
distinguish these three entities—in historiographical fashion—is a task almost metaphysical. 
To deny them might mean a historiographical damnation; or rather, not to eat the fruit of the 
tree of knowledge they offer entails the banishment from the disciplinary Garden of History. 
However, when one deals with a subject denominated “a formação do Brasil”, by virtue of the 
very nature of the enterprising, the redemption is warranted: the “time of the nation” is 
inexorable. It is precisely this time that, ultimately, saves O Trato dos Viventes. This last 
statement calls for explanation. 
 
 
The longue durée variable of Brazil’s formation 
In constructing the long-term continuity of Brazil’s formation by means of that threefold 
strategy, Luiz Felipe Alencastro manages to begin neutralizing the most harmful effects of that 
imperial time of History, among them that opposition between the “archaic” and the 
“modern” which, as mentioned above, has shaped the understanding of Brazil’s self-image. It 
was out of the articulation of those three ways of constructing long-term continuity that he 
produces something unheard of in classic historiographical “interpretações do Brasil”: a slight 
displacement of Europe as the template for conceiving historical continuity of long-term. 
“Slight” because at the very end, as crying out for salvation as the book exhales’ its last breath, 
Alencastro writes: 
“Fica patente que o sistema colonial é atravessado por uma crise refundadora no Seiscentos: 
na saída da guerra holandesa se estabelece uma cogestão portuguesa e brasílica no espaço 
econômico do Atlântico Sul. Por isso, a ruptura de 1808 não será tão radical como se tem dito 
e escrito: ainda se movia no oceano o braço brasilanizado do sistema colonial: a rede de 
importação de mão de obra cativa, o tráfico negreiro. Depois de 1850, o mercado de trabalho 
nacional continua dependente, nos seus setores dinâmicos, do trato de imigrantes europeus, 
levantinos e asiáticos. Só nos anos 1930-40 a reprodução ampliada de força de trabalho passa 
ocorrer inteiramente no interior do território nacional. 
Essa é a variável de longue durée que apreende a formação do Brasil nos seus prolongamentos 
internos e externos: de 1550 a 1930 o mercado de trabalho está desterritorializado: o 
contingente principal da mão de obra nasce e cresce fora do território colonial e nacional. 
A história do mercado brasileiro, amanhado pela pilhagem e pelo comércio, é longa, mas a 
história da nação brasileira, fundada na violência e no consentimento, é curta.” (Alencastro 
[2000] 2014: 354–355 – emphasis added) 
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These are the last three paragraphs of O Trato dos Viventes. And they are so bewildering that 
they deserve a kind of exegesis, even if just a very brief one.  
Alencastro begins by stating that his analysis refutes “the time of the nation” as conceived by 
Caio Prado and Fernando Novais, for both parties identify 1808 as the year of the decisive 
rupture that would found Brazil as a “nation”. The slave trade, Alencastro insists, not the 
“pacto colonial” had been the essential element of Brazil’s formation. After having established 
that, he makes the first redemptive move: to equate colonial slave trade with later 
immigration so that both become defined as the “importation of workforce”. Thus he can 
easily conclude that even after 1850, that is, after the official definitive cessation of the slave 
trade, the national labour market continued dependent of “workforce” coming from abroad. 
This dependence was yet not general, it affected just the “dynamic sectors” of the national 
economy. 
At this point, considering this argument about the dependence on foreign immigrant workers 
for Brazil’s economic development in the second half of the 19th century, some obvious 
questions arise: what about the whole local population? Were there perhaps other “solutions” 
for the problem212? Summarizing a long academic discussion, one can say that in arguing that 
the end of the slave trade provoked a shortage of workforce, firstly Alencastro adopts, without 
further questioning, the position taken by the hegemonic fraction of the agrarian elites at that 
time; secondly, he makes generalizations from a São Paulo case-study, a state in which an 
immigration policy was implemented that had no parallel in other parts of the country; third, 
by leaving completely unexplained why just the “dynamic sectors” had been “dependent of 
importation of foreign workforce”, he comes close to unwillingly supporting the widespread 
claim about the ineptness of the “old slave workforce” as well of freedmen and freedwomen 
to keep pace with the new developments of the free labour market; fourth, by speaking 
indistinctly of immigration of “europeus, asiáticos e levantinos”, without making not even a 
																																																								212	Discussing	this	point,	Petrônio	Domingues	points	out	that	“No	Congresso	Agrícola	do	Recife	[in	1879],	a	classe	dominante	agrária	nordestina	entendia	que	a	solução	para	o	problema	da	mão-de-obra	residia	no	aproveitamento	do	trabalhador	nacional,	em	geral,	e	dos	agregados	e	ingênuos,	em	particular.”	Also	from	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	Minas	Gerais	came	alternatives	suggestions	to	foreign	immigration:	“Já	a	fração	carioca	e	mineira	da	classe	dominante	avaliava	que	o	principal	problema	da	lavoura	era	a	escassez	de	crédito.	No	que	 concerne	 ao	 debate	 sobre	 a	 crise	 de	 mão-de-obra,	 ela	 defendia,	 basicamente,	 duas	 propostas:	 o	aproveitamento	 dos	 ingênuos	 e	 libertos,	 após	 uma	 fase	 de	 habilitação	 desses	 segmentos	 em	 escolas	agrícolas;	 e	 o	 emprego	 do	 trabalhador	 nacional,	mediante	 uma	 série	 de	 recursos	 (incentivos	 positivos,	escolas	 agrícolas,	 lei	 de	 locação,	 leis	 que	 criminalizassem	 a	 ociosidade	 e	 obrigassem	 ao	 exercício	 do	trabalho).”	(Domingues	2004:	61;	63)	
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brief remark about the open eugenicist preference for white West Europeans workers, 
Alencastro entirely overlooks an issue that helps a great deal to understand some other 
fundamental reasons for that “dependence”. 
It is no exaggeration to say that Alencastro imports into the heart of his analysis a series of 
shortcomings arising from a baffling inattention to a wide spectrum of questions related to 
the role of scientific racism in the “formação do Brasil”.  
Alencastro’s negligence with respect to that becomes even more patent if one considers the 
amplitude and importance of the Brazilian intellectual contribution towards this issue, which 
is part of a wide research field that, as Sérgio Costa ponders, “talvez seja a áera de estudos 
mais consistente e consolidada de todas as ciências sociais brasileiras.” (Costa 2008: 152) 
There could have been reasons for regretting that such a clumsy move - in a book written in a 
manner especially shrewd - came in the form of conclusive remarks not accompanied by more 
substantiated explanations. In fact, this would just be a pity, if it were not also the very 
preparation for the grand finale, that is, for the announcement of the totalizing element that 
should allow one to apprehend four centuries of Brazil’s history in its internal and external 
prolongations: the de-territorialisation of the labour market or, as Alencastro puts it, the 
“longue durée” variable of Brazil’s formation.  
Always attentive to words, Alencastro carefully named his analytical construct in French, the 
language of the master Fernand Braudel, as mending fences with him and, simultaneously, 
endowing his own statement with all the epistemological-institutional force that the 
expression conveys. These two discursively strategic steps enable him finally to draw the 
ultimate line that gives unity to the “(short) time of the [Brazilian] nation”: its separation from 
the “(long) time of the [Brazilian] market”.  
Voilà! There it is again213, brought to the forefront, that kind of economically demiurgic and 
exogenous time that constrains and pushes forward until the many varieties of other possible 
times are swept away! 
“What’s the Time? Nation Time!” This is the provocative title Paul Gilroy gives to one sub-
chapter of his Black Atlantic – Modernity and Double Consciousness. In this text, Gilroy argues 
that the “time of the nation” entails a specific time-consciousness that usually reifies a 
																																																								213	As	it	is	the	case	in	the	works	by	Fernando	Novais	and	by	Caio	Prado	Júnior.		
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Eurocentric master narrative of modernity which leaves no epistemological room for a 
Historical repositioning of colonial slavery.  
Gilroy suggests then a counter-concept of time based on the idea of diaspora, which, in his 
definition, can be understood “as an utopian eruption of time into the linear temporal order 
of modern black politics which reinforces the obligation that space and time must be 
considered relationally in their articulation with racialised being.” (Gilroy 1993: 198 – 
emphasis added).   
Taking this diasporic concept of time into account could possibly prevent one from, for 
example, hastily subsuming both the enslavement (of black Africans) followed by forced 
transport that characterized the colonial slave trade and the later not-compulsory 
immigration (preferentially of white Europeans, when financed by public funds!) under the 
same Historical category of “importation of foreign workforce”. But, evidently, if such a 
distinction is made, unless one feels at ease speaking about slavery as a “labour market”, then 
the related idea of “deterritorialisation of the labour market” can hardly serve as the lynchpin 
of long-term Historical continuity respecting the formation of Brazil. 
In point of fact, such a concern with the Historical specificity of “modern” slavery must rather 
be thought of as a move “charged with the function of constantly interrupting the totalizing 
thrusts214” of that longue durée variable of Braudelian extraction. 
Still, like Braudel, Alencastro is an old style “knight of totality”. He speaks, even more than 
about the wholeness, for the whole. This is why that paradox about the externality of Brazil’s 
formation relative to the part to which it itself belongs goes unnoticed.  
After all, it is true that O Trato dos Viventes can be regarded as the first ambitious 
historiographical attempt to interpret Brazil no longer, as Marcos Nobre puts it, from the 
senile point of view of the “paradigma da formação” but from that of the blossomy “lógica 
das redes”. Nevertheless, as Nobre also notes, in Alencastro view the moment in which the 
determining variable, that is, the longue durèe one, of Brazil’s formation, came to be entirely 
internal to the national territory coincides exactly with the emergence of the “nacional-
desenvolvimentismo” and, within it, of the very “paradigma da formação”.  
																																																								214	This	is	what	Chakrabarty’s	labor	History	intends	to	do	with	the	Marxist	narrative	of	capital	(Chakrabarty	2000:	 66).	 This	 point	 is	more	 extensively	 discussed	 in	 the	 first	 chapter’s	 section	 “Postcolonial	 Ends	 of	History”.	
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This seems to suggest that, differently from what Marcos Nobre thinks, Alencastro does not 
quite manage to decouple his own idea of formation from the “ideia-força da ‘nacionalidade’, 
com seu vínculo pretensamente intrínseco a um determinado território, a uma determinada 
população e a uma forma específica e exclusiva de soberania” (Nobre 2012: 31). What 
Alencastro creates is very much just another time for them to converge. And when they 
converge, giving rise to the nation, the longue durée immediately appears, masterly 
performing its Braudelian role of world’s imperial time that “sweeps away” all other times.  
As consequence thereof, the “trato dos viventes”, that is, the slave trade itself - which has 
been the constant, the non-interpretive permanent element that answers for the heavy 
concreteness of Alencastro’s book - suddenly disappears … carrying along with itself all other 
concerns that a black diasporic understanding of time would project over the nation time. 
In the end, in O Trato dos Viventes, the highly praised historiographical work where—due to 
a complex and innovative way of dealing with long-term Historical continuity—there was 
plenty of room for the opening of a “black diasporical time”, this is decidedly swept away! 
Premonitorily, Braudel had described his longue durée as History’s “unitary white light”… that, 
it shall again be added here, enlightens erasing differences. 
 
Flowing into the depths of the sea 
Fernand Braudel’s longue durée and Eurocentrism 
In O Trato dos Viventes, Braudel’s longue durée functions as a double agent. When endowing 
an event with a structural character by exploring its concreteness in the sense of a “setting of 
limits”215, as it is the case both of the trade winds as environmental and of the slave trade as 
economic conditionings, the longue durée plays an outstanding but nevertheless steady 
supporting role in Alencastro’s effort to turn southwards. Consequently, this has the effect of 
creating a partial de-centring of Europe within his historiographical construction of Brazil’s 
formation. However, when naming the Historical category that comprehended this formation 
in its totality, the longue durée, at the very end and with no more than a short and discrete 
																																																								215	Ulysses	Santamaria	&	Anne	M.	Bailey	maintain	that	“In	this	definition	of	structure,	Braudel	seemingly	raised	structure	to	the	level	of	determinants,	if	only	in	a	negative	way	–	as	limits	to	human	action.”	This	interpretation	approximates	Braudel’s	way	of	dealing	with	determination	to	that	by	Raymond	Williams,	who	reconciles	agency	and	determination	in	Marxism	by	treating	the	latter	as	“the	setting	of	limits”	instead	of	“the	‘laws’	of	a	whole	process,	subject	to	inherent	and	predictable	development.”	Interestingly,	Williams	calls	his	view	on	determination	“historical	objectivity”.	(Williams	[1977]	2009:	85)		
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apparition216, spectacularly takes the leading role by—all of a sudden—fully re-centring 
Europe. 
Now, please disregard momentarily this latter role and try to suspend the effect of the final 
conclusion of O Trato dos Viventes, or, more complexly yet, try to imagine it without those 
three last sentences. What would you have? Yes, there you have a work where Braudel’s 
longue durée is just a part of a broad discursive strategy quite successful in partially divesting 
Europe of its Historical prominence. 
Postcolonial approaches, guided by the main concern of underpinning radical critiques of 
Eurocentric modernity, have not failed to recognize that: 
“Postkoloniale Ansätze haben die auf den Leitkonzepten von Entwicklung und Fortschritt 
basierenden Geschichtsmodellen der Moderne grundsätzlich in Frage gestellt und in Hinblick 
auf die machtpolitischen Implikationen dekonstruiert (vgl. Escobar 1995). An die Stelle 
universaler Modele temporaler Abfolge, die den vermeintlich unterentwickelten 
Gesellschaften den Anspruch auf Gleichzeitigkeit verweigern (vgl. Fabian 1983), treten 
relationalen Ansätze, die gerade das Ineinandergreifen unterschiedlicher Temporalitäten und 
Zeitschichten fokussieren. [...] Dabei ergibt sich- zum Teil explizite – Anschlüsse an die 
geschichtstheoretische Konzepte des longue durée von Fernand Braudel oder der 
Zeitschichten von Reinhard Koselleck.“ (Kaltmeier 2011: 204–205) 
 
The applicability of Braudel’s concept for a post-colonial critique of modernity requires yet 
also the explicit recognition that the longue durée is by no means inherently critical to 
Historical models of modernity based on the idea of progress and development. The best 
proof of that is Braudel’s own use of the concept. 
Such a reservation has been nevertheless absent in the words of some authors who have 
recommended the longue durée as an antidote to Eurocentrism. In this sense, Eric Mielants 
argues:  
“If one can traverse the micro, meso and macro levels, as Braudel did, from the structures of 
daily life to the wheels of commerce and ultimately a perspective of the world, one is inevitably 
forced to rethink Eurocentric epistemological assumptions about temporal linearity.” (Mielants 
2012: 207 – emphasis added)  
 
Assuming Mielants’ view is tenable, how then to interpret these passages, mostly excerpted 
from the very work he refers to, namely, the three-volume Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–
18th Centuries (1979): 
“These immature civilizations [Black Africa, Mexico and Peru], which were really cultures, 
collapsed in the face of a small number of men. Today these countries are once more Indian 																																																								216	This	is	comparable	to	Brad	Pitt’s	short	but	providential	apparition	in	the	end	of	12	Years	a	Slave.	He	is	the	 one	who	 finally	makes	 possible	 the	 release	 of	 Samuel	Northup,	 the	 “illegally”	 enslaved	 protagonist	played	by	Chiwetel	Ejiofor.	
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or African. A culture is a civilization that has not yet achieved maturity, its greatest potential, 
nor consolidated its growth. […] But it has been proved that the cultures, the semi-civilizations 
(the term is even applicable to the Tartars in the Crimea) were no mean adversaries. They were 
pushed back but they reappeared; they were wrong enough to survive. They could not be 
permanently deprived of their future.” (Braudel 1973a: 63–64) 
 
“As a general rule, the civilizations played and won. They won struggles against ‘cultures’ and 
primitive people. Even better, they also won their war against empty space217.” (Braudel 
1973a: 60) 
  
“De ces différences entre ‘cultures’ et ‘civilisations’ le signe extérieur le plus fort est sans doute 
la présence ou l’absence de villes.” (Braudel 1989: 48)  
 
“It must also be noted that the ‘barbarians’ who were a real danger to civilisation belonged 
almost entirely to one category of men: the nomads—the nomads of the deserts and steppes 
in the heart of the Old World—and it was only the Old World that experienced this 
extraordinary breed of humanity. […] The nomads strength lay also in the carelessness and 
relative weakness of the men who held the approaches to the civilisations.” (Braudel 1973a: 
56 – emphasis in the original) 
 
 “Civilizations against Civilizations—When civilizations clash the consequences are dramatic.” 
(Braudel 1973a: 64)  
 
The saga of the childish cultures towards the maturity of civilization, trying to catch up with 
the civilized future; the city as the strongest exterior sign of civilization and, correspondingly, 
the nomads as the true danger for civilizations; the autonomous development of writing as 
the threshold of the emergence of a civilization218, and, finally, the clash of civilizations!219  
Is this all really a way of writing History that “inevitably forces to rethink Eurocentric 
epistemological assumptions about temporal linearity?”, as Mielant suggests? Is that not 																																																								217	Braudel	gives	here	an	example	draws	from	Brazil:	“In	Brazil,	the	primitive	Indian	slipped	away	when	the	Portuguese	 appeared.	The	Paulist	bandeiras	 scattered	over	more	or	 less	 empty	 land.	 In	 less	 than	 a	century	 the	 adventurers	 from	 São	 Paulo	 had	 overrun,	 although	 not	 colonised,	 had	 the	 South	 America	continent,	from	the	Rio	de	la	Plata	to	the	Amazon	and	Andes,	in	their	pursuit	of	slaves,	precious	stones	and	gold.	They	met	no	resistance	until	the	Jesuits	formed	the	Indians	reserves,	which	the	paulistas	shameless	pillaged.”	(Braudel	1973a:	60).	218	Concerning	this	point,	it	is	Pierre	Chaunu	who	refers	to	Braudel:	“Avec	Fernand	Braudel,	nous	réservons	l’expression	de	 civilisation	pour	 les	 emsembles	 culturels	 qui	 ont	 franchi	 d’une	manière	 autonome,	 doc,	d’eux-mêmes,	le	seuil	de	l’acquisition	d’une	écriture.	(Bennassar/Chaunu	1977:	48)		In	his	“Grammatology”,	Jacques	Derrida	unfolds	a	deep	reflection	about	the	concept	of	writing.	Derrida’s	philosophical	argument	gives	ground	for	assessing	the	essential	role	that	the	concept	of	writing	has	been	playing	within	the	humanities	in	the	raise	of	an	ethnocentric,	violent	and	fairly	evolutionist	view	on	the	development	of	human	collectivities.	(Derrida	[1967]	1997:	1-18;	95–140)	219	Even	when	Braudel	concedes	that	there	are	non-European	“civilizations”,	as	in	the	case	of	the	Chinese,	he	 remarks,	 that	 China	 has	 remained	 “uninventive	 and	 backward	 at	 the	 capitalist	 level,	 despite	 its	intellectual	power	and	its	discoveries”	(Braudel	1973a:	64).	In	the	original	French	text	this	passage	bears	another	adjective	that	is	suppressed	in	the	English	version:	“peu	moderne”:	“la	Chine	est	restée,	malgré	son	intelligence	et	ses	trouvailles	(le	papier-monnaie,	par	exemple),	si	peu	inventive,	si	peu	moderne	sur	le	plan	capitaliste.”	(Braudel	1979:	79)	The	Brazilian	translation	follows	the	French	text	literally.	(Braudel	1997:	86)	
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instead a kind of History that exemplarily applies Eurocentric epistemological assumptions 
about temporal linearity, allocating its actors in the past, in the present or in the future of an 
one-dimensional view of historical development that, based on a nakedly evolutionist concept 
of civilization, has a vague West European one as summit? 
Steve Feierman answers this question making a point about Africa’s History: 
“Fernand Braudel, the great leader of second-generation Annales Historians, opened up the 
boundaries of historical space in a way that made it easier for us to understand Africa in world 
history. […] Braudel, along with other Annales Historians, insisted on asking how 
representative our historical knowledge is in relation to the totality of the universe that might 
be described, if only we knew the full story. […] Yet Braudel himself could not break out of a 
unidirectional history of the world with Europe at its center. Civilisation matérielle, économie 
et capitalisme, his three-volume history of the world between the fifteenth and eighteenth 
centuries, is driven by a tension between Braudel’s disciplined attempt to find the correct 
spatial frame for each phenomenon […] and his definition of modern world history as the rise 
of a dominant Europe.” (Feierman 1993: 171–172)  
 
Further, Feierman stresses that “Braudel describes African developments in terms of racial 
essences. In his view all civilizations originated from the north, radiating southwards.” 
(Feierman 1993: 174) 
Richard Evans made a similar but much more biting criticism in his review of that which would 
be Braudel’s last work. This work is, he says: 
“in some ways a profoundly conservative, nationalist text. It argued France and its borders had 
not changed in essence since the thirteenth century, and declared that French blood had not 
been diluted since prehistory. This claim went together with Braudel’s racist belief that 
between the French and the other nations, including by implication all kinds of immigrants 
[were they contemporary nomads?], ‘there may be some intermingling but there is no 
fusion.’” (Evans 2000: 192 – rhetorical question in brackets added) 
  
Symptomatically (and unfortunately), Braudel calls this book The Identity of France (1988)! It 
follows the same schema based on the time trinity that he had used in his two others main 
historiographical works (The Mediterranean and Civilization and Capitalism) as well as the 
same aim: the kind of History this book proposes to bring to light, Braudel repeats once more 
at the end of his life, is “an obscure history, running along under the surface, refusing to die.” 
(Braudel 1988: 20). 
Such a treatment of the issue of civilization220, along with all its mournful consequences for 
the writing of History, gives Fernand Braudel a background that justifies putting him together 
																																																								220	It	 is	 interesting	to	note	that	Braudel	himself	remarks,	without	explaining	why,	that	“civilization”	is	a	“convenient	word”	(Braudel	[1958]	2012:	248).		
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with Oswald Spengler221, Gilberto Freyre222, Arnold Toynbee223 or Samuel P. Huntington224, 
thinkers whose works have not earned any recognition for conceiving Historical time in an 
especially innovative manner.  
Notwithstanding, a recurring remark about Braudel’s longue durée is that it was, as an original 
synthesis of Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre’s prior contributions, the conceptual embodiment 																																																								221	Peter	Burke	holds	the	view	that	Oswald	Spengler	is	a	Historian	with	whom	Braudel	has	more	in	common	than	 is	generally	admitted.	As	evidence	thereof,	Burke	points	 to	 the	positive	remarks	about	Spengler	 in	Braudel’s	Ecrits	sur	l’histoire	(1969)	as	well	as	in	the	last	two	volumes	of	Capitalism	and	Material	Life	1400-
1800.	(Burke	1990:	47;	123)	As	is	well-known,	Braudel	wrote	his	The	Mediterranean	in	a	German	prisoner-of-war	camp.	His	interest	in	the	deep	structures	of	history,	according	to	his	own	confession,	was	a	way	of	not	capitulating	to	the	present	(Braudel	[1958]	2012:	270).	In	this	sense,	Kinser	points	out	that	“Braudel’s	spatial	 concept	 of	 fast	 and	 slow	 times,	 times	 that	 entrap	men	 either	 in	 the	 eventful	 surface	 or	 in	 the	structural	 depths	 of	 historical	 processes,	 reflects	 the	 experiences	 of	 a	 certain	 man	 living	 in	 a	 certain	configuration,	the	highly	disjunctive	configuration	of	a	Europe	convulsed	by	the	monumental	events	of	the	Great	Depression	and	World	War	II	and	by	conjuncture	like	totalitarianism	and	the	‘decline	of	the	West’	[…].	With	the	latter,	Spenglerian	phrase,	I	refer	to	the	psychological	impact	upon	several	European	generations	of	the	destructiveness	of	the	world	wars	and	of	the	emergence	of	non-European	political	powers.”	(Kinser	1981:	99)	222	While	 the	experience	as	war-prisoner	 in	 the	Second	World	War	 is	usually	 remembered	by	virtually	every	reviewer	as	having	playing	a	role	in	shaping	Braudel’s	thinking,	the	biographic	episodes	of	his	stays	in	Algeria	and	then	in	Brazil	have	received	less	attention	in	what	concerns	their	possible	epistemological	consequences.	Susanne	Klengel	and	Peter	Burke	are	exceptions	that	help	fill	the	gap	concerning	Brazil.		Susanne	Klengel	speaks	of	a	“Wissentheoretische	und	ästhetische	Dialoge”	between	Fernand	Braudel	and	Gilberto	Freyre,	and	argues,	with	respect	to	The	Mediterranean,	that	if	on	the	one	hand:	“Man	kann	[...]	festhalten,	dass	die	erste	Fassung	von	La	Meditterraneé	mit	ihrem	gleichsam	geschlossenen	mediterranen	 Raum	 in	 der	 historischen	 Situation	 der	 Nachkriegsjahren	 tatsächlich	 den	 Effekt	 eines	Identitätsdiskurs	hatte.	Sie	 ist	als	Appell	und	Erinnerung	an	eine	Geschichte	der	Alten	Welt	 lesbar	–	zu	einem	Zeitpunkt	großer	geopolitischer	Veränderungen.”	(Klengel	2011:	229)	On	the	other	hand:	“Festzuhalten	ist	aber	gleichzeitig,	dass	Braudel	in	seinem	Mittelmeerbuch	des	Jahres	1949	mehrfach	auf	das	Werk	Gilberto	Freyre	 anspielt,	 und	dass	damit	 sowohl	 inhaltlich	 als	 auch	methodisch	Spuren	eines	nicht-europäischen	 Wissens	 bei	 Braudel	 eingeflossen	 sind,	 die	 auf	 die	 neuen	 interkulturellen	Verflechtungen	in	der	Scientific	Community	der	Nachkriegsjahre	hindeuten.”	(Klengel	2011:	229)	In	2008	Peter	Burke	actually	published	a	proper	intellectual	biography	of	Gilberto	Freyre	(Gilberto	Freyre	
–	Social	Theory	in	the	Tropics).	The	influence	of	Freyre	on	Fernand	Braudel	is	of	course	among	the	issues	the	book	addresses.	Burke	had	already	observed	in	his	1990	book	on	the	Annales	School	that		“The	famous	trilogy	on	the	social	history	of	Brazil	by	the	Historian-sociologist	Gilberto	Freyre	[…]	deals	with	topics	 such	as	 the	 family,	 sexuality,	 childhood,	and	material	culture,	 anticipating	 the	new	history	of	 the	1970s	 and	 1980s.	 Freyre’s	 image	 of	 the	 great	 house	 (casa	 grande)	 as	 microcosm	 and	 as	 metaphor	 of	plantation	society	impressed	Braudel	and	is	quoted	in	his	work.”	(Burke	1990:	101)	223	It	suffices	to	remark	that	in	the	programmatic	Histoire	Nouvelle	(1978),	Jacques	Le	Goff’s	feels	the	need	to	 expressly	 define	 the	meaning	 of	 “civilization”,	 a	 concept	 that	 according	 to	 him	 has	 been	 playing	 an	important	role	within	the	Annales	School	since	its	foundation.	The	section	devoted	to	this	discussion	bears	the	 remarkable	 title	 “A	Escola	dos	Annales	 e	 a	 concepção	de	Toynbee”!	 Evidently,	 the	whole	 argument	consists	 of	 denying	 any	 proximity	 between	 the	 Annales	 School’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 and	Toynbee’s	one.	(Le	Goff	[1978]	1990a:	33)	224	According	to	Andreas	Leutzsch,	“Er	[Braudel]	klärt	den	Begriff	des	Kapitalismus	und	baut	sukzessive	eine	Weber-Kritik	auf,	um	schließlich	den	westlichen	Kapitalismus	als	einzigen	Weg	 in	die	 (zukünftige)	Moderne	zu	verwerfen.	Braudel	hat	auch	in	diesem	Werk	die	Gegenwart	im	Blick,	und	es	spricht	einiges	dafür,	 dass	 Huntington	 diesen	 Ansatz	 metonymisch	 in	 seiner	 räumlichen	 Konfliktlinienbeschreibung	weiterentwickelt	 hat.	 [...]	 Auf	 Seite	 55	 stellt	 er	 (Huntington)	 er	 sich	 selbst	 in	 die	 universalhistorische	Tradition	unter	anderem	Braudels,	den	er	für	sein	Unternehmen	als	Gewährsmann	zitiert.”	(Leutzsch	2009:	224–225)	
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of a kind of “epistemological revolution”225 in the theoretical understanding of historical time 
brought about by the French Nouvelle Histoire (Reis 2008: 19; 65–79).  
According to José Carlos Reis, the great novelty of the Braudelian viewpoint, as well as, for 
that matter, of the Nouvelle Histoire in general, lay in the replacement of the metaphysical 
and teleological time of Enlightenment philosophies of History by the “neutral time” of the 
social sciences (Reis 2008: 30; 71). The time of all of them at once! Yes, for, as another 
commentator, namely, Carlos Antonio Aguirre Rojas points out, instead of the primacy of the 
economic, the political or the cultural, Braudel “vertrat die Vorherrschaft der Strukturen 
länger Dauern – die zugleich ökonomische, politische, geographische, soziale, kulturelle, 
psychologische oder anthropologische Strukturen sind“. These structures, Rojas goes on in his 
exposition of Braudel’s ideas, “Da sie die Grenzen des Möglichen und des Unmöglichen 
festlegen, erweisen sie sich als die wahren bestimmenden Protagonisten des spezifischen 
Werdens der Gesellschaften”. The longue durée was therefore the fulfilment of an 
epistemological undertaking that, respecting historical time, had dropped the not quite 
fruitful distinction between „present” and „past” and seriously begun “mit der Ausarbeitung 
von Theorien, Kategorien and Modellen, dies es erlauben, die “Gesamtheit der Gesamtheiten” 
der “globalen Gesellschaft” wissenschaftlich und konkret zu durchzudenken.” (Rojas 1999: 43; 
37; 110) 
Quite in the same direction, Dale Tomich argues that 
“the longue durée implies a distinctive methodological approach and logic of explanation that 
redefines the intellectual heritage handed down from the nineteenth century. In contrast to 
more conventional social science logics based on formal comparison of commensurate units 
with common properties or the infinite repetition of individual actions, the assumption here 
is that analysis is grounded in a single spatially-temporally differentiated and complex unit 
subject to multiple determinations.” (Tomich 2012: 16; 30–31) 
 
Pondering, first, on Roja’s comments, one may wonder what it means to suppose that 
something, say, an idea or a concept “sets the limits of the possible and of the impossible” or 
allows encompassing the “totality of totalities”? Concerning Tomich, one could simply ask: 
what matches the description of “a single spatially-temporally differentiated and complex unit 
subject to multiple determinations” if not … everything! Such a “unit” could be a tree or a 																																																								225	 Carlos	 Antonio	 Aguirre	 Rojas	 goes	 even	 further	 in	 his	 book	 Fernand	 Braudel	 und	 die	 moderne	
Sozialwissenschaften.	He	sees	Braudel’s	work	as	a	prophetic	epistemological	break	in	the	social	sciences	as	a	whole:	“Mit	radikaler	Kritik	drängte	er	[Braudel]	auf	einen	Bruch	in	den	Sozialwissenschaften.	Damit	tat	Braudel	 nicht	 anders,	 als	 der	 offenen	 endgültigen	 epistemologischen	Krise,	 die	 1968	 einsetze,	 um	 zwei	Jahrzehnte	zuvorkommen.”	(Rojas	1999:	94–95)	
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person, a social or a meteorological phenomenon. But, of course, it could also be a city, a 
country, a continent, or the whole world … together with the stars and the other planets, even 
the Milk Way, if you so want it! So, if Braudel “methodological approach and logic of 
explanation” is grounded in such a “unit”, then it lies in immediate relation to whatever may 
be taken as its subject matter. Such an idea assumes that there is nothing between the 
grounds of knowledge and the grounds of what is (thought) to be(come) known. In some 
sense, such an idea takes the epistemological relation not as “elaboration of” but as 
“participation in” the subject matter, so that knowledge turns out to be not a particular form 
of representation but rather a kind of revelation! 
If the appraisal of these reviewers of Braudel’s oeuvre226 is right, and there is no reason to 
think it is not, the very terms they develop demonstrate how much closer the longue durée is 
to the metaphysics of the (old?) philosophies of history rather than to the “concrete” 
character of the (new?) social sciences, mainly Geography and Economy, which Fernand 
Braudel was so fond of. If the Braudelian approach allowed everything that these interpreters 
claim, then the writing of longue durée-History amounted to playing God… successfully! 
In a remarkably lucid passage that exposes the main flaw in his argument227, José Carlos Reis 
affirms that: “Percebe-se em Braudel uma concepção da história que não há muito se definiria 
como ‘filosofia da história’ e ainda hegeliana” (Reis 2008: 116).  
In fact, the totalizing drive of Braudel’s longue durée towards history is perfectly comparable 
to that of Hegel’s towards reason. But this is not something that deviates it from the right 
historiographical course. On the contrary: Braudel’s notion of an almost motionless longue 
durée element underlying all other possible and noticeable changes in a determined historical 
development approximates him to the historicist ideal of an immanent “historical idea”, as 
proposed by Humboldt and Ranke at a time in which the Historian’s craft began taking the 
professional form of its contemporary academic institutionalization. And the “historicist 
																																																								226	This	kind	of	intellectual	hagiography	of	Fernand	Braudel	corroborates	the	thesis	advanced	in	the	last	section	about	the	“metaphysical	pathos”	of	Braudel’s	ideas.	227	Unfortunately,	Reis	does	not	explain	why	Braudel’s	conception	of	History	should	no	longer	be	defined	in	this	way.	Would	there	be	a	distinction	between	Braudel’s	conception	of	History	in	general,	which	could	be	 still	 Hegelian,	 and	 Braudel’s	 conception	 of	 Historical	 time,	 which	 would	 be	 already	 “scientifically	neutral”?		
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historical ideal”, in turn, as Frank Ankersmit argues, bears striking similarities with the 
Hegelian “idea”	228:  
“In both cases the idea is a quasi-Aristotelian entelechy operative in a vague limbo between 
language and the world but whose nature the speculative philosopher or the Historian has to 
grasp in order to understand the past. Historical knowledge is the knowledge of the idea.” 
(Ankersmit 2012: 23 - emphasis added) 
  
In Braudelian idiom this would simply mean: “Historical knowledge is the knowledge of the 
longue durée.”  
The totalizing effect aimed at by the longue durée perspective accounts not only for the 
theoretical and methodological coherency of Braudel’s oeuvre but above all for an 
epistemological solidarity: from the beginnings of his search for a proper historiographical 
organizing principle of totality in The Mediterranean, with its empirical-objectivist emphasis 
on the geographically perceptible and/or economically and demographically measurable, over 
the “civilizational” ravings of Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Centuries, up to the 
“lamentations”229 of Identity of France, what Fernand Braudel shows in each one of his works 
is something that Olivia Harris appropriately denominates as Braudel’s “horror of 
discontinuity” (Harris 2004). The methodological objectivity advocated in the first (and 
repeated in the other two books) bears a relationship of mutualism both with the pronounced 
Eurocentric bias of the second and the almost xenophobic features230 of the third.  
A great deal of the good reputation that the longue durée enjoys among Historians comes 
however from the fact that it is thought to be not just a theoretical construct, not that sort of 
so-called meta-theoretical concept conjured up from some abstract ruminations written 
down by beings who had never ever set foot in an archive. Rather, the longue durée was 
deeply rooted in a historiographical praxis that, as Foucault argues in Archeology of 																																																								228	The	common	philosophical	ground	that	Ranke’s	and	Humboldt’s	“historical	idea”	shares	with	Hegel’s	view	on	history	was	already	discussed	in	the	section	‘The	Postcolonial	Ends	of	History’.	229	 In	 “Long	Run	Lamentations:	Braudel	on	France”,	 Steve	Lawrence	Kaplan	points	out	 that:	 “Of	 all	 the	qualities	 that	 constitute	 Frenchness	 for	Braudel	 across	 the	 long	 run,	 the	most	 striking	 are	 a	 genius	 for	missed	opportunities	and	a	gift	for	(relative)	failure.	France	experienced	missed	opportunities	and	failures	in	virtually	every	domain,	but	they	were	especially	telling	in	the	economic	sphere.	Economic	growth	is	the	overarching	preoccupation	of	Braudel's	lifetime	of	research.	Predictably,	it	is	at	the	very	core	of	his	quest	for	the	identity	of	France-the	scholar's	fascination	reinforced	and	quickened	by	the	citizen's	bedevilment.”	(Kaplan	1991:	344)	230	As	well	as	the	above	quoted	Richard	Evans,	Steve	Kaplan	also	highlights	the	conservative	nationalism	of	the	Identity	of	France.	According	to	Kapplan,	Braudel’s	view	on	the	question	of	immigration	runs	as	follows:	“Immigrants	today	have	no	choice:	‘they	must	choose’—to	be	French,	or	to	be	an	enduring	source	of	trouble	for	themselves	and	for	others,	a	peril	for	the	economy	and	the	society.”	(Kaplan	1991:	353)		
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Knowledge, had altered the position of the “new history”. In relation to its sources, this History 
had  
“taken as its primary task, not the interpretation of the document, nor the attempt to decide 
whether it is telling the truth or what is its expressive value, but to work on it from within and 
to develop it: history now organizes the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders it, 
arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not, 
discovers elements, defines unities, describes relations. [Therefore] The appearance of long 
periods in the history of today is not a return to the philosophers of history, to the great ages 
of the world, or to the periodization dictated by the rise and fall of civilizations; it is the effect 
of the methodologically concerted development of series.” (Foucault 1972: 8 – emphasis 
added)  
 
By virtue of this way of bringing about Historical continuity of long-term, the role of 
discontinuity had changed radically in History. 
“Discontinuity was the stigma of temporal dislocation that it was the Historian's task to remove 
from history. It has now become one of the basic elements of historical analysis. […] One of 
the most essential features of the new history is probably this displacement of the 
discontinuous: its transference from the obstacle to the work itself; its integration into the 
discourse of the Historian, where it no longer plays the role of an external condition that must 
be reduced, but that of a working concept; and therefore the inversion of signs by which it is 
no longer the negative of the historical reading (its underside, its failure, the limit of its power), 
but the positive element that determines its object and validates its analysis.” (Foucault 1972: 
emphasis added) 
 
Foucault’s Archaeology was precisely the attempt of formulating a “general theory of the 
discontinuities” that, if he was right, had already found a historiographical form in the France 
of the 60s.  
Introducing the reader to the final three-volume edition of his Civilization and Capitalism, 
15th–18th Centuries (1979), Fernand Braudel states the threefold schema of this monumental 
work: 
“peu a peu esquisse devant moi au fur et a mesure que les éléments de l’observation se 
classaient presque d’eux-mêmes […] C’est ainsi qu’un schéma tripartite est devenu la table de 
référence d’un ouvrage que j’avais délibérément conçu en marge de la théorie, de toutes les 
théories, sous le signe de la seule observation concrète et de la seule historie comparée.” 
(Braudel 1979: 9 - emphasis added) 
 
Here, Braudel echoes the archaeological Foucault. He is the embodiment of the Historian who 
pulls off long-term continuity by a certain way of disposing the discontinuous instead of by 
some theoretical overarching interpretation that would rather remove discontinuity.  
And Foucault, criticizing the structuralism, does in terms strikingly similar to those used by 
Fernand Braudel, but focusing on the opposing extremity: the event. 
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“I don’t see who could be more of an anti-structuralist than myself. But the important thing is 
to avoid trying to do for the event what was previously done with the concept of structure. It’s 
not a matter of locating everything on one level, that of the event, but of realizing that there 
are actually a whole order of levels of different types of events differing in amplitude, 
chronological breadth, and capacity of producing effects.” (Foucault [1972] 1980: 114) 
 
Fernand Braudel, the “structuralist by temperament”231 with his “horror of discontinuity” 
meets Foucault, the resolute “anti-structuralist” with his “obsession with discontinuity”, there 
where both, reinforcing each other’s position, profess together their eloquent animosity 
towards the type of historical continuity based on anything that could resemble the old 
“philosophies of history”.  
Foucault’s and Braudel’s unisonous praise of the historiographical method which goes hand 
in hand with a segmentation of time falls nevertheless apart as soon as their respective 
concepts of time are taken into consideration.  
This point shall be explained by having recourse to Foucault’s distinction between the systems 
of thought that frame the “old” and the “new” History. 
Within the system of thought of the “old history”, Foucault argues, “time is conceived in terms 
of totalization” and history, consequently, pursues the project of achieving a “total history” 
that “seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, the principle, material or spiritual, 
of a society, the significance common to all the phenomena of a period, the law that accounts 
for their cohesion—what is called metaphorically the `face' of a period.” (Foucault 1972: 9) 
The system of thought that frames the “new history”, in turn, was concerned not with 
homogeneity and cohesion, but with discontinuity. Although, in having difficulties 
constructing a theory, in drawing general conclusions and in deriving all the possible 
implications of the discontinuities unveiled by this History, Foucault confesses, is “as if we 
were afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought”, “as if we felt a particular 
repugnance to conceiving of difference.” (Foucault 1972: 12) 
The crucial problem Foucault’s reasoning poses, if formulated in proper Foucauldian terms, 
runs as follows: given that the system of thought that frames the “new history”, within which 
long-term Historical continuity appears as “the effect of that methodologically concerted 
development of series”, given that this system of thought has been unwilling to think 																																																								231	“I	am	by	temperament	a	‘structuralist’,	little	tempted	by	the	event,	or	even	by	the	short-term	conjunture	which	is	after	all	merely	a	group	of	events	of	the	same	area.	But	the	Historian’s	structuralism	has	nothing	to	do	with	 the	approach	which	under	 the	 same	name	 is	at	present	 caused	some	confusion	 in	 the	other	human	sciences.”	(Braudel	[1949]	1973b:	1244)	
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difference, is it then not perfectly legitimate to raise the question whether the History framed 
by it might also produce a totalizing “effect” similar to that of the (old?) philosophies of 
history, even without being a “return” to them? 
Braudel’s work is a paradigmatic example232 that the “displacement of the discontinuous” to 
the center of History, proper to the methods of the “new history”, is perfectly compatible with 
the “time conceived in terms of totalization” proper of the “old history”. 
Moreover, Foucault’s somehow complacent words would be ill suited to portrait Braudel’s 
work because Braudel’s attempts of a “total History” displays no signs of such a fear or 
repugnance.233 Rather, Fernand Braudel does enjoy conceiving the Other in his own 
incorrigible Eurocentric time, and in so doing he conceives difference in terms of fixed, 
asymmetrical, and binary categories. 
It is Braudel himself who casts some light on the reason why it occurs: 
“I confess that, not being a philosopher, I am reluctant to dwell for long on questions 
concerning the importance of events and of individual freedom, which have been put to me 
so many times in the past and no doubt will be in the future. How are we to interpret the very 
word freedom, which has meant so many different things, never signifying the same from one 
century to another?234 So when I think of the individual, I am always inclined to see him 																																																								232	 Foucault’s	 historiographical	 attempts	 are,	 in	 turn,	 paradigmatic	 examples	 of	 the	 opposing	 position.	Whereas	Braudel	seeks	for	a	permanent	underlying	element,	Foucault	advocates	a	form	of	History,	which	he	prefers	to	call	“genealogy”,	that	can	be	written	“without	having	to	make	reference	to	a	subject	which	is	either	transcendental	in	relation	to	the	field	of	events	or	runs	in	its	empty	sameness	throughout	the	course	of	history”.	(Foucault	[1972]	1980:	117)	However,	 in	 a	brilliant	 analysis	 of	 the	 genealogical	History	of	 Sexuality,	Ann	Laura	Stoler	 lays	bare	 that	Foucault’s	emphasis	on	discontinuity	by	no	means	entails	an	automatic	critique	of	Eurocentrism.	Making	the	crucial	point	that	one	should	refrain	from	neatly	separating	historiography	from	theory,	Stoler	poses	a	question	that	points	directly	to	Foucault’s	Eurocentric	view.	First	she	explains	that,	according	to	Foucault,	there	 are	 four	 privileged	 subjects	 of	 the	 19th	 century	 power/knowledge-discourse	 on	 sexuality:	 “das	masturbierende	 Kind	 der	 bürgerlicher	 Familie,	 die	 „hysterische	 Frau“,	 das	 Maltusische	 Paar	 und	 der	perversen	 Erwachsene.”	 Then,	 she	 asks	 penetratingly:	 “Konnte	 auch	 nur	 eine	 diese	 Figuren	 im	 19.	Jahrhundert	 als	Wissens-	und	Diskursgegenstad	ohne	 ihre	 rassistisch-erotische	Kontrapunkt	 existieren,	ohne	 dass	 auf	 die	 libidinösen	 Energie	 des	Wildes,	 des	 Primitiven,	 des	 Kolonisierten	 Bezug	 genommen	worden	wäre	–	also	Bezugspunkte	der	Differenz,	der	Kritik	und	des	Begehrens?”	(Stoler	2002:	319)	Foucault’s	flagrant	blind	spot	where	the	issues	of	colonialism	and	sexuality	are	concerned	lead	Stoler	to	the	following	conclusion:	“Foucaults	Genealogien	der	bürgerlichen	Identität	in	19.	Jahrhundert	bleiben	nicht	nur	 selbstbezogenen	 westlichen	 Kultur	 zutiefst	 verhaftet,	 sondern	 sind	 auch	 durch	 die	 geographische	Parameter	Europas	begrenzt.”	In	adopting	this	view,	Stoler	stresses,	she	is	following	and	complementing	the	 criticisms	 made	 both	 by	 Spivak,	 who	 had	 correctly	 described	 Foucault’s	 historiography	 as	 “eine	selbstgenügsame	 und	 westlich	 beschrankte	 Geschichtsschreibung”,	 and	 by	 James	 Clifford,	 for	 whom	“Foucault	sei	auf	umsichtige	Weise	ethnozentrisch”.	(Stoler	2002:	328)	233	Remarkably,	Braudel	evokes	the	motif	of	love	to	open	two	of	his	three	main	works.	The	first	sentence	of	
The	Mediterranean	reads:	“I	have	loved	the	Mediterranean	with	passion	[…]”,	an	emotional	statement	that	is	resumed	at	the	very	beginning	of	The	Identity	of	France:	“Let	me	start	by	saying	once	and	for	all	that	I	love	France	[…].”	(Braudel	[1949]	1973b:	17;	1988:	15)	If	fear	and	repugnance	may	grow	out	of	love,	then	maybe	Foucault	is	right.		234	 To	 abbreviate	 what	 could	 become	 a	 dull	 discussion	 about	 a	 nonsensical	 sentence	 (therefore	 it	 is	strikethrough),	one	could	argue	in	the	same	manner,	namely,	nonsensically,	that	if	the	word	“freedom”	had	
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imprisoned within a destiny in which he himself has little hand, fixed in a landscape in which 
the infinite perspectives of the long term stretch into the distance both behind him and before. 
In historical analysis, as I see it, rightly or wrongly, the long runs always wins in the end. 
Annihilating innumerable events—all those which cannot be accommodated in the main going 
current and which are therefore ruthlessly swept to one side—it indubitably limits both the 
freedom of the individual and even the role of chance.” (Braudel 1973b: 1243-1244) 
 
What Braudel refuses here is to concede—no matter if he is a philosopher or not—is that in 
claiming the totalizing status of his work, he had already entered into those two “labyrinths” 
that Leibniz defined as the “composition of the continuum” and “the nature of freedom” (see 
epigraph). But precisely because Braudel is unwilling “to dwell for long” on such a problem, 
his longue durée functions as a tool for playing the role of a Leibnizian god235: letting 
contingency and individual freedom dwindle to the point of insignificance, all that which 
remains are necessary truths!  
In order to convey even more faithfully Braudel’s creed, it is worthwhile rephrasing this point 
by borrowing some manly words he wrote to further underpin his stance on the matter. The 
god-like Braudelian truth is paradoxically brought about by “men”, namely by the 
“true man of action […] who can measure most nearly the constraints upon him, who chooses 
to remain within them and even to take advantage of the weight of the inevitable, exerting his 
own pressure in the same direction. [Since] [a]ll efforts against the prevailing tide of history—
which is not always obvious—are doomed to failure…” (Braudel [1949] 1973b: 1243-1244)  
 
… then History must happen to be written by the winners!  
The others, those who despite all efforts are not going to see their actions come true, who, so 
to speak, do not live in the “imperious time of the world” and thus are not allowed to 
commune with the world’s necessary truths, these others are, within Braudel’s framework, 
doomed to Historical inactivity.  
 
Having reached this point, how to censure Olivia Harris when she plainly asserts that 
“arguments in favor of deep continuity such as those of Braudel work best for the victors, for 
the centers of civilization.”(Harris 2004: 168).  
																																																								kept	(thanks	some	miracle!)	the	same	and	unmistakable	meaning	everywhere	for	centuries	and	centuries,	say,	 from	 1400	 to	 1800	 (the	 time-span	 covert	 by	 Braudel	 Civilization	 and	 Capitalism),	 this	 everlasting	character	would	not	reveal	per	se	“how	we	are	to	 interpret”	 it.	Anyway,	such	unwise	statements	end	up	saying	a	lot	about	one’s	general	understanding	of	History.	235	 “[D]ass	 es	 Wahrheiten	 geben	 kann,	 ja	 muß,	 welche	 sich	 durch	 keine	 Analysis	 auf	 die	 identischen	Wahrheiten	oder	das	Prinzips	des	Widerspruches	 zuruckzuführen	 lassen,	 die	 vielmehr	 eine	unendliche	Reihe	von	Gründen	als	Stütze	brauchen:	eine	Reihe,	die	allein	von	Gott	durchsichtig	ist.	Und	dies	ist	eben	das	Wesen	alles	dessen,	was	man	als	frei	und	zufällig	bezeichnet.”	(Leibniz	1966:	503)	
	 260	
Such a harsh criticism may entail the fatal risk of reinforcing the Eurocentric bias it wants to 
denounce. Nevertheless, it also has the great advantage of putting the finger on the sore spot, 
for, as a matter of fact, the term “longue durée” should not be conceived of as a general name 
for the process of assuring that a certain subject matter remains identic to itself despite the 
changes unveiled by the historiographical inquiry. Rather, it should be conceived as just a 
particular way of performing that function by meeting the exigencies of self-fulfilling prophecy 
of whatever be defined as the “center of civilization”.  
Might that be not as obvious as it seems it should, this is due to the fact that the longue durée 
has been usually mobilized in a sui generis manner. Take, for instance, “Gestalt” and 
“différance”, two other concepts whose translation is commonly avoided. How to use them 
without pretending to consider the particular epistemological viewpoints they represent? 
Difficult. More than that, such a procedure would convey a good deal of inconsistency. If such 
concepts happen to be found written in German and French, their respective original 
languages, it is exactly to stress that one is evoking a very specific perspective here.  
It would be expected that a comparable attitude towards the “longue durée” took place. Still, 
in the case of Braudel’s concept, things happen quite differently. The following passage, an 
excerpt of the introduction of the book Coloniality at Large – Latin America and the 
Postcolonial Debate, provides an instructive example thereof: 
“In the particular case of Latin American, a discussion of post- neo- colonialism – or that of 
coloniality, a term that encompasses the transhistoric expansion of colonial domination and 
the perpetuation of its effects in contemporary times – is necessarily intertwined with the 
critique of Occidentalism and modernity, a critique that requires a profound but detached 
understanding of imperial rationality.236 Concurrently, our goal has also been to register, 
analyse, and interpret the political, social, and cultural practices that reveal the resistance 
against imperial powers exercised by individuals and communities in a variety of contexts, 
throughout the longue durée of Latin America’s colonial and neo-colonial history.237” (Moraña 
et al. 2008: 2 – italics and footnotes in the original) 
 
The two footnotes (number 236 and 237) transcribed below are integral to this passage. If you 
checked them, you will have noted that they are there to make conceptual explanations, 																																																								236	“The	concept	of	‘coloniality’	coined	by	Aníbal	Quijano	has	been	pivotal	to	the	understanding	and	critique	of	early	and	 late	stages	of	colonialism	 in	Latin	America,	as	well	as	of	 its	 long-lasting	social	and	cultural	effects.”	(Moraña	et	al.	2008:	17)	237	“We	are	aware	of	the	wide	application	of	the	term	colonialismo	throughout	the	book,	as	well	as	of	the	use	of	postcolonialism	and	neocolonialism	by	different	authors.	Since	each	contributor	makes	a	specific	case	for	 the	 interpretation	of	 the	concept	and	 the	 term	of	preference,	we	have	respected	 this	 terminological	plurality	and	welcomed	the	different	critical	and	theoretical	avenues	they	open	to	the	reader.”	(Moraña	et	al.	2008:	17)	
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namely, about the notions of “coloniality” and “colonialism”. Not a single word about the term 
“longue durée”. To all appearances, it is a concept that requires no further clarification. 
But, if Braudel’s “imperial time” goes unnoticed in such a work explicitly concerned with “a 
profound but detached understanding of imperial rationality”, what may be expected from 
works not particularly interested in epistemological “practices that reveals the resistance 
against imperial powers”?  
The “longue durée” seems to be so “clear” that it becomes indeed “transparent”. Read please 
the following sentence again, as if the Braudelian reference were not there: “throughout the 
longue durée of Latin America’s colonial and neo-colonial history.” Since the word 
“throughout” literally means “from beginning to end of (an event or period of time)”, the 
sentence seems to undergo any substantial change if one crosses the “longue durée” out. The 
concept is there but one can read through it as if it weren’t.  
Though tempting, it might be misleading to suppose that when employed in this manner, 
concepts are just redundant in the sense of being repetitive, tiresome or useless. Exactly the 
fact that they are not noticeably redundant is what matters most. This conclusion begs the 
question: if the presence of the longué durée-concept indeed makes différance, how could it 
be felt?  
Its own epistemological pretensions forbid regarding the longue durée as just a loanword 
instead of a whole and programmatic concept. Nevertheless, the fact that it has generally 
functioned as a synonym for expressions like “long term”, “long time span”, “long time scale”, 
“long run”, “long-lasting”, that is, as a way of making reference to an unspecific assumption 
of Historical continuity does indeed pose a risk. Namely, this fact may denote that if the longue 
durée still contains conceptual substance, this manifests itself as a sort of “emptiness” that no 
longer conveys anything related to Braudel’s view on History238 and all the more not his 
obdurate Eurocentrism. 
The widespread presence of the longue durée in that transparently unqualified form within 
academic vocabulary (also in the spoken) can therefore be described as a particular mode of 
fulfilment of its ambitions. As argued above, the totalizing drive of the longue durée feeds on 
the metaphoric allusiveness arisen out of its “metaphysical pathos”. The allusion—in the 
metaphors Braudel uses for constructing the concept, wherefore in the concept itself when 
																																																								238	In	fact,	Fernand	Braudel’s	name	is	not	reported	not	even	in	the	general	index	of	the	Coloniality	at	Large.	
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evoked solely, without any further qualification—is to the desire that continuous History 
remains 
“the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject: the guarantee that 
everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse 
nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject—in 
the form of historical consciousness—will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back 
under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by difference, and find in them what 
might be called his abode.” (Foucault 1972: 12) 
 
All that has been said about the longue durée hitherto gives some good reasons to regard it 
with a healthy wariness. Braudel’s conceptualization of Historical time may show some 
potential to question “the master narrative that could be called ‘the history of Europe’” 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 27), but only if deployed with supreme analytical caution and great 
rhetoric skillfulness. Without any form of qualification239, as it frequently appears in current 
scholarly discourse, it represents a rather invisible danger to those who—opposing an 
epistemological insouciance that leads to a sometimes unwilling, sometimes treacherous 
Historical “fixation of essences”—struggle to hold the state of permanent tension that shall 
characterize a writing of History within which the concern with the “dissemination of 
differences” is driven by the desire of freedom and social justice. (Chakrabarty 2000: 237–255) 
 
In this sense, still taking cue from Chakrabarty’s idea of provincializing Europe, one should not 
shun Braudel’s thinking, but, in order to have the better of its metaphoric allusiveness, to put 
metaphoricity itself at the service of the longue durée. Thus, returning to the aquatic 
metaphor with which this text started, one could see—by exploring further an image already 
analyzed in this thesis240—the longue durée as a “river” like the one depicted in Escher’s 
“Waterfall” (1961).  
The striking particularity of this famous lithography is that it shows the impossible perpetual 
motion of a watercourse flowing upwards and downwards at the same time. There are 
however other significant features that deserve to be highlighted, the waterwheel, for 
example. As known, Escher’s visual paradoxes in this drawing, as well as in many others, result 
from their complex mathematical, or rather, geometrical composition (Schattschneider 2010; 																																																								239	Without	specifying,	for	example,	 if	the	 longue	durée	shall	be	understood	in	that	structural	sense	of	a	“setting	of	limits”.	240	 The	 reader	may	 probably	 recall	 that	 this	 image	 was	 already	 explored	 in	 the	 discussion	 about	 the	relationship	between	time,	event	and	long-term	Historical	continuity	in	first	chapter’s	section	‘Long	event	and	long	duration’.	
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Ernst 1986). Still, mathematically, there is no need of the waterwheel localized on the base of 
the hill. If the waterwheel241 is there, this is just to give the impression that it contributes to 
keeping the water stream moving. In fact, it attenuates the absurd self-sufficiency of the 
waterfall and, in doing that, it makes the scene more real. Adjacent to a big construction 
where one sees a chimney, the waterwheel can be imagined as used for generating power to 
supply the provincial small village depicted in the image. A woman looks down, hanging 
clothes on a line to dry; a man looks up, admiring the ingenious construction: the order of 
everyday life goes in its own time. Above them, much larger, the longue durée time of the 
“river” of History.  
The great advantage of Escher’s “river” as metaphor for the longue durée History is that it 
precludes any supposition of naturalness. It is undoubtedly a construction: the river is an 
aqueduct. There is no way to conflate “history as the past” or, metaphorically, the natural 
river of life flowing steadily into the present, with its historiographically represented form: 
History.  
The sole reason one can concede that History might be “total”, that is, why History can be 
presented as flowing in different and even contradictory rhythms and directions that, 
nonetheless, can be grasped as a whole without having to take distance from it, the whole 
reason why all that is possible, is because one is dealing with a construction. A construction 
thought to generate power and that produces in its own movement the preconditions of its 
reproduction. Although, the energy provided by this cunning Historical construction is not 
enough to supply much more than that provincial village. Think of this provincial place as 
Europe, if you want. Bearing that in mind, consider that the “necessary truth” of Escher’s 
longue durée river is conspicuously deceptive, but constructed rigorously premised on 
objective and measurable standards: the geometrical principles of perspectival 
																																																								241	Mind	The	Wheels	of	Commerce,	 the	second	volume	of	Civilization	and	Capitalism!	Braudel’s	 focus	on	commerce	is	absolutely	fundamental	in	the	unfolding	of	its	Eurocentric	argument	about	the	emergence	of	capitalism.	As	Antonio	Penalves	Rocha	observes,	“Para	Braudel,	a	gênese	do	capitalismo	ocorreu	bem	antes	do	período	em	que	Marx	a	localizou,	mesmo	porque	não	é	na	produção	que	ele	reside:	‘é	na	circulação,	por	excelência,	 que	 o	 capitalismo	 está	 à	 vontade.’	 For	 this	 reason,	 Braudel	 “recusa	 não	 só	 a	 cronologia	 do	capitalismo	 tal	 como	 fora	 feita	 por	Marx,	 como	 também	 o	 reconhecimento	 da	 sua	 existência	 como	 um	sistema	de	produção	baseado	na	exploração	do	trabalho	assalariado.”	(Rocha	1995:	248;	Braudel	1977a)	It	is	particularly	noteworthy	that	Braudel’s	version	of	the	development	of	capitalism,	which	was	supposed	to	have	been	“délibérément	conçu	en	marge	de	la	théorie,	de	toutes	les	théories	”,	is	embroiled	in	a	dispute	precisely	with	Marxism,	an	approach	that	prescribes	the	absolute	necessity	of	theory	for	the	understanding	of	the	very	same	process.	Could	it	be	that	both	views	are	closer	than	appears	at	first	glance?!		
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comprehension of the reality by Escher correspond to the objectifying emphasis on statistics, 
series and whatever could be quantified by Braudel.  
Still, “the past is never completely amenable to the objectifying protocols of historiography” 
(Chabrabarty 2000: 251). So, the deceptiveness of the historiographical representation itself 
evinces that the “necessary truth” represented by the course of the longue durée river rest 
upon the logic of its construction. Manifestly, this “truth” does not stem from an ontological 
“cunning of reason” of history, but rather from the self-referential cunning of the Historical 
reason. The reason that accounts for their congruence lies in the way in which the river of 
longue durée History is “geteilt”242. Indeed, if one knows how Escher geometrically “divides” 
his drawing, one may understand that everything is about how to dispose the fragments of 
the picture so as to create a perspective that presents an impossible continuity which 
nevertheless coincides with a “shared” (traditional and conventional) representation of 
reality. 
Therefore, if for some reason, you are not allowed to participate in that “necessary truth”, be 
sure that to know the source of the Historical power which supplies that provincial village, you 
will have to delve into the logic, into the whole mathematics involved in the construction of 
that wondrous river (see the first epigraphy).243 As soon as you do that, the wheel (of 
capitalism) moved by the water of history will become more significant as its role becomes 
less of a determining factor within the representation. 
																																																								242	The	reference	here	 is	 to	Shalini	Randeria’s	concept	of	 “Geteilten	Geschichten”:	 „der	Begriff	oszilliert	zwischen	den	Konnotationen,	 die	 im	Englischen	 als	 shared	und	divided	wiedergegeben	werden,	 und	 so	bringt	 die	 Ambivalenzen	 einer	 Geschichte	 des	 Austausches	 und	 Interaktionen	 zum	 Ausdruck.“	(Conrad/Randeria	2002:	17).	The	problem	of	longue	durée	in	Historical	pictures	is	that	the	Histories	they	may	comprise,	while	“geteilt”	are	not	necessarily	“verflocht/verwoben”	(entangled),	whence	its	potential	to	reproduce	 the	 asymmetrical	 duality	 focused	 on	 a	modernity	 eurocentrically	 imagined.	 (Randeria	 1999;	Costa	2007:	100–102)	243	Antiphony	(call	and	response)	is	the	principal	formal	feature	of	black	musical	tradition	(Gilroy	1993:	115).	In	this	capoeira	song,	the	first	line	of	every	verse	is	the	call,	the	second,	the	response.	The	last	whole	verse	 is	 the	 refrain,	 where	 all	 sing	 together	 again	 and	 again.	 The	 issues	 addressed	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 fit	together:	religion	and	mathematics.	In	response	to	the	call,	which	makes	reference	to	the	mass	(the	sacred	moment	 of	 public	 performance	 of	 God’s	 necessary	 truths),	 come	 mathematical	 equations	 (the	 human	being’s	mean	of	creating	axioms,	self-evident	necessary	truths).		However,	the	call	states	that	having	access	to	the	official	space	of	sacred	necessary	truths	is	not	a	matter	of	faith,	but	of	having	the	required	material	means.	It	expresses	an	asymmetry	that	may	be	compensated	if	those,	who	are	not	allowed	to	enter	in	the	“City	of	God”,	follow	the	alternative	way	that	is	repeatedly	sung	in	 the	 refrain:	 learning	 how	 to	 state	 and	 to	 reiterate	 non-excluding	 self-evident	 truths:	 1+2=3;	 3+3=6;	6+3=9;	9+3=12	…and	so	on	and	so	on	…infinitely.	Also	here,	“the	composition	of	the	continuum”	and	“the	nature	of	freedom”	are	inextricable	(see	the	second	epigraphy).	
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Finally, notice the coral-like vegetation on the left side of the image, observe that they seem 
to fluctuate in water, as if the whole scene took place far within the depths of the sea … 
precisely where Braudel’s longue durée, in its most meaningful and admirable metaphorical 
formulation, claims to have arrived at! 	  
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Yaô ê, 
Ererê ai ogum bê 
Com licença do curiamdamba 
Com licença do curaiacuca 
Com licença do sinhô moço 
Com licença do dono de terra 
O Canto dos escravos – Canto I 
 
Ai ai ai tâmo na escola 
Ai prendeno a lê 
Capoeira Song 
 
A lagartixa, a lagartixa, a lagartixa na parede 
E everybody  
Todo mundo dançando 
Na melô da lagartixa 
A massa swingando 
A massa sabe disso 
O quanto eu sei 
Que a melô da lagartixa 
É inovação do meu DJ 
Ndee Naldinho244 
 
O poeta é um fingidor 
Finge tão completamente 
Que chega a fingir que é dor 
A dor que deveras sente. 
Fernando Pessoa245 																																																								244	Naldinho’s	rap	song	“Melô	da	Lagartixa”	is	a	parody	of	Chubb	Rock’s	“DJ	Innovator”.	It	is	a	track	of	O	Som	




There was never a general crisis in History. Some remarkable achievements such as making 
thinkable the Haitian Revolution (Trouillot 1995: 70–107) or putting African Histories on the 
historiographical agenda have not rendered it impossible246 to sustain the claims of the 
inherited framework of History as positive knowledge. Having been integrated into the field 
as “minority histories” (Chakrabarty 2000: 97–113), the epistemological pressure exerted by 
such critical developments has not been as overwhelming as expected.  
However, what they have brought about is the understanding that there are “pasts that resist 
historicisation, just as there may be moments in ethnographic research that resist the doing 
of ethnography” (Chakrabarty 2000: 101). Such an understanding does not allow the 
enlargement or enrichment of History to be regarded as a bottomless “inventory of 
differences” (Veyne 1983) that, comprised by a horizontal accumulation of new knowledge, 
would appeal to a sort of democratic or deconstructive sense that impelled the discipline to 
renew while maintaining itself. 
Whether it wishes or not, History has been transmuted by these developments. They have 
had an impact on the shaping of the Historical imagination because they are the most quick-
witted ones in coping with historicism, or rather, in coping with what within it is insidious and 
misleading247. And History remains in the grip of historicism (Ankersmit 2012: 1–28; 
Chakrabarty 2000: 3–46). All types of History, with varying degrees of transparency, are in fact 
generally guided by the idea that “an adequate understanding of any phenomenon and an 
adequate assessment of its value are to be gained through considering them in terms of the 
																																																								mundo.	Civilizá-lo,	quer	religiosamente,	quer	de	outra	forma	qualquer,	é	querer	dar-lhe	aquilo	que	ele	não	pode	ter.	O	legítimo	é	obriga-lo,	visto	que	não	é	gente,	a	servir	aos	fins	da	civilização.	Escravizá-lo	é	que	é	lógico.	O	degenerado	conceito	igualitário,	com	que	o	cristianismo	envenenou	os	nossos	conceitos	sociais,	prejudicou,	porém,	esta	lógica	atitude.”	“A	escravidão	é	lei	da	vida,	e	não	há	outra	lei,	porque	esta	tem	que	cumprir-se,	sem	revolta	possível.	Uns	nascem	escravos,	e	a	outros	a	escravidão	é	dada.	O	amor	covarde	que	todos	temos	à	liberdade	é	o	verdadeiro	sinal	do	peso	de	nossa	escravidão.”	(Cavalcanti	Filho	2011:	58)	246	This	was	nevertheless	Steve	Feierman’s	expectation:	“Da	die	Afrikanische	Geschichte	die	Grenzen	der	historischen	 Sprache	 durchbricht,	 unterhöhlt	 sie	 das	 allgemeine	 historische	 Denken	 und	 untergräbt	schließlich	sogar	ihre	eigenen	Fundamente.”	(Feierman	2002:	50)	247	The	historicist	assumption	that	a	thing’s	nature	and	identity	lies	in	its	past	is	one	Historians	cannot	do	without.	This	is	not	a	problem.	But	the	idea	that	Historical	truth	results	from	a	correspondence	between	the	account	and	a	whole	and	unified	subject	amenable	to	be	in	one	way	or	another	empirically	“found”	in	the	world	must	be	revised	(Ankersmit	2012:	1–28;	102–125).	Ankersmit’s	translation	of	historicist	ideas	from	the	 idealist	 and	 romanticist	 idioms	of	 the	19th	 century	 into	 the	 contemporary	philosophical	 vocabulary	characteristic	 of	 the	 “linguistic	 turn”	 as	 well	 as	 Foucault’s	 genealogy	 are	 attempts	 of	 such	 a	 revision.	(Ankersmit	2012:	Foucault	1977:	139–164;	1980:	109–133)	
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place which it occupied and the role which it played within a process of development” 
(Mandelbaum 1977: 42)248, a task whose accomplishment necessarily arises the 
epistemological-political problem of how to come to terms with the(ir) present and the idea 
of modernity in its hegemonic, that is, Western fashion. 
Those varieties of History that deal more openly with the problematic of modernity—such as 
world History, Atlantic History, global History, transnational History—have been trying to 
address it by making an extra effort to define themselves (Conrad 2016; Hausberger 2013; 
Greene 2009; Saunier 2013). They have shown themselves preoccupied in defining their 
particular goals, methods and merits, even if recognising that there are many common 
features and areas of overlap.  
One salient trait shared by all these approaches is the attempt of putting into practice a 
critique of methodological nationalism, an issue that necessarily leads to another problem, 
broader and much more difficult to address, namely, that of Eurocentrism in the social 
sciences. In the case of global History, for example, the effort of being “self-reflective on the 
issue of Eurocentrism” is thought to be “one of the defining features that set this approach 
apart from most older variants of world history writing” (Conrad 2016: 67)249. The dream of 
going beyond Eurocentrism by having recourse to self-reflectivity can nonetheless take the 
form of an openly self-conscious—and somehow cynical—Eurocentric view (Osterhammel 
2009).  
A particular approach, the postcolonial one, has tried however to suggest that “beyond 
Eurocentrism” lies a realm that is no longer that of academic History. Postcolonial theory 
pushes History in the direction of a “politics of translation”, of the horizons of Historical 
“incommensurabilities” whose adequate comprehension produces neither a negation or 
gradation of the asymmetrical relationship of universalist political-theoretical Eurocentric 
categories to other forms of knowledge nor a successful set of equivalents, as “rough” as they 
might be (Chakrabarty 2000: 27). Postcolonial intellectuals are trying to establish an 
epistemological approach that counteracts Eurocentrism’s desire of universality not by self-
																																																								248	This	is	Maurice	Mandelbaum’s	definition	of	historicism.	It	is	the	one	that	both	Dipesh	Chakrabarty	and	Frank	Ankersmit,	two	authors	I	strongly	draw	on,	take	as	point	of	departure	of	their	reflections	on	History.	249	Assessing	“World	History”,	Barbara	Weinstein	makes	a	similar	remark:	“World	History,	in	its	current	paradigmatic	form,	is	not	conceived	as	a	mere	amplification	of	the	‘Western	Civ’	course.	Rather,	one	of	its	principal	 purposes	 is	 precisely	 to	 rethink	 the	 place	 of	 the	 West	 in	 the	 macro-historical	 narrative.”	(Weinstein	2005:	80)	
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condescendingly evoking one’s self-flattering self-reflectivity, but by arguing that this very 
exercise, rather than performed on the basis of a conceptual frame of reference within which 
the major aim is the production of fully transparent relations, should be open to the possibility 
of extending one’s right to opacity (Glissant 2004: 251-255). But is there anyone else ready to 
cross such an epistemological border and to realign things in this way? Who is prepared to 
waive the privilege History enjoys in what concerns the power of establishing representations 
that more legitimately than any other corresponded to the objective truth of the past? 
Confronted with a half danger of losing this prerogative, even perspectives that are at first 
sight dauntlessly nominalist turn out to be inclined to convert to a kind of “naïve realism”250 
which is on the verge of divorcing even constructivism!251 
But we must not be unfair. There are also other interests at stake here. The wish to speak 
primarily the Eurocentric language of universals is intrinsic to the fact that “there is no easy 
way of dispensing with these universals in the condition of political modernity. Without them 
there would be no social science that addresses the issue of modern social justice” 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 5). In addition to that, there are also academic-institutional pressures 
whose answer depends on one’s capacity of articulating this language. The wish to speak the 
Eurocentric language of universals is bound to result in widening one’s power. Even more, it 
is the language in which to deny the other is already to know the other. And not accidently, it 
																																																								250	See	discussion	about	this	in	the	section	‘Postcolonial	End	of	History”.	251	This	is	the	case	of	Conrad’s	interpretation	of	global	History.	He	begins	by	courageously	assuming	that	in	principle	any	subject	will	do	for	a	global	History,	for	“once	it	is	established	that	global	history	is	everything,	everything	can	become	global	history.	This	is	less	absurd	than	it	seems.	The	situation	was	not	so	different	when	national	history	reigned	supreme.”	(Conrad	2016:	8)	This	statement	is	perfectly	coherent	with	global	Histories’	 methodological	 concern	 of	 experimenting	 with	 alternative	 notions	 of	 space	 by	 not	 taking	“political	or	cultural	units—nation-states,	empires,	civilisations—as	their	points	of	departure.	Instead,	they	pose	analytical	questions	and	go	wherever	their	questioning	leads	them.”	(Conrad	2016:	65)		In	 such	 a	 fashion,	 however,	 the	 defining	 characteristic	 of	 being	 “global”	 is	 entirely	 an	 ascription	 of	 the	Historian’s	intellectual	labor.	Might	there	be	then	that	the	subject	historiographically	represented	had	not	been	as	“global”	as	it	appears	in	its	very	Historical	representation?	Faced	with	this	question,	Conrad	pulls	out	the	joker	called	the	heuristic	necessity	of	keeping	perspective	and	subject	apart	and,	by	resorting	to	one	of	 those	 three	 old	 “idols	 of	 the	 tribe	 of	 Historians”(François	 Simiand	 quoted	 by	 Burke	 1992:	 24),	 the	chronology,	explains:	“After	all,	the	approach	is	much	newer	than	the	process;	global	history	as	a	paradigm	is	of	fairly	recent	origin,	while	the	processes	it	studies	reach	far	back	into	the	past.	As	the	two	chronologies	do	not	neatly	correspond,	it	is	useful	to	separate	them	analytically.”	Concluding	his	discussion	on	the	issue,	he	yields	to	a	realist	position	by	suggesting	that:	“Even	if	we	assume	that	there	is	a	process	somewhere	‘out	there’,	 it	 is	crucial	to	ponder	the	methodological	challenges	of	uncovering	it,	and	the	implications	of	our	choices”	(Conrad	2016:	13–14).	In	the	end,	Conrad	does	not	manage	to	circumvent	the	specter	of	that	past	that	lies	somewhere,	independent	of	the	Historian’s	craft,	just	waiting	not	to	be	“constructed”,	but	rather	to	be	“uncovered”	by	those	ones	equipped	with	the	proper	methodological	tools.	
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is also the language of strongest currency when one tries to offer a social scientific 
representation of any phenomenon in its “totality”.  
In History as well as, for that matter, in all other social scientific disciplines, the totalising 
desire leads to that particular state of affairs in which the familiar vocabulary of the 
Eurocentric universals is most conspicuously deployed. It is in this frame of mind that the 
social sciences’ impose themselves on one’s comprehension of world, all the while believing 
(or at least stating) that they are just staying in their corner. 
Postcolonial approaches, perhaps the most critical252 ones among those at disposal nowadays 
in the “common market” of academic History, accept the lessons from the predominant 
Eurocentric view and are then at pains to reflect them back again. Instead of a radiating point 
that animates a heliocentric discourse, in whose center “the sun of theory, the Subject of 
Europe” (Spivak 1988: 274) stands, postcolonial approaches resemble rather the moon 
enlightening a public space of theoretical practice whose purpose is to playfully displace the 
dualist categories (Vila 1988; Costa 2006), through which the Eurocentric language of 
universals dissects and divides whatever happens to be subjected to its gaze253. So, despite 
the reticence, the oppositions, even the pretension of quiet ignorance, the outline of a 
position that amounts to a vindication of the [epistemological] rights of the subaltern [pasts] 
is beginning to come into existence: a vindication written in Wollstonecraft’s spirit. 
It is worth pursuing this path, even if, eventually, a more strictly Eurocentric view turns out to 
be the only one supposed to thrive in the academic soil; furthermore, due to the very battles 
																																																								252	 This	 critical	 stance,	 which	 is	 also	 the	 stance	 I	 take	 in	 my	 own	 writing,	 is	 the	 consecution	 of	 a	philosophical	ethos	that	Foucault,	contrasting	the	Enlightenment	project	with	the	critical	one,	characterises	as	“[A]	limit-attitude.	We	are	not	talking	about	a	gesture	of	rejection.	We	have	to	move	beyond	the	outside-alternative;	we	have	to	at	the	frontiers.	Criticism	indeed	consists	of	analysing	and	reflecting	upon	limits.	But	if	the	Kantian	question	[or	the	Enlightenment’s	question]	was	that	of	knowing	what	limits	knowledge	has	to	 renounce	 transgressing,	 it	 seems	 to	me	 that	 the	 critical	 question	 today	has	 to	be	 turned	back	 into	 a	positive	one:	in	what	is	given	to	us	as	universal,	necessary,	obligatory,	what	place	is	occupied	by	whatever	is	 singular,	 contingent,	 and	 the	product	of	arbitrary	constraints?	The	point,	 in	brief,	 is	 to	 transform	the	critique	conducted	in	the	form	of	necessary	limitation	into	a	practical	critique	that	takes	the	form	of	possible	transgression.	This	entails	an	obvious	consequence:	that	criticism	is	no	longer	going	to	be	practiced	in	the	search	for	formal	structures	with	universal	value,	but	rather	as	historical	 investigation	into	the	events	that	have	 led	us	to	constitute	 ourselves	 and	 to	 recognise	 ourselves	 as	 subjects	 of	 what	 we	 are	 doing,	 thinking,	 saying.”	(Foucault	[1984]	2010:	45–46)	253	Consider	the	meaning	of	the	word	“gaze”	in	this	sentence	as	a	shadow	of	Franz	Fanon’s	famous	passage:	“The	white	gaze,	the	only	valid	one,	is	already	dissecting	me.	I	am	fixed.”	(Fanon	[1952]	2008:	95)	
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for social justice, one might find it preferable to resume this path in order to be on the safe 
side. 
Until this day arrives, something that we need to do is to go on gingando within a 
historiographical world that, however molecular, however fragmentary and flexible, is still a 
world in which the main lines of force bear the combined marks of maleness, whiteness and 
Europeaness. This gingar can be enacted, for instance, by (mis)taking the potential both of 
the critique of methodological nationalism and of the change of metaphorical language 
brought about by the spatial turn254 for forces of breaching255 that can be mobilised to beguile 
Eurocentrism. 
It must not always be the case, but the search for alternative spatial configurations that 
circumvent container-based paradigms might give rise to the problem of how to deal with 
time in spaces conceived in this way. 
History is a discipline that does not arrive at this discussion empty-handed. In the course of its 
development as an area of social scientific knowledge, it has gained great expertise in this 
matter. Historians are used to dealing with the multiple temporalities of social life and to 
creating ingenious periodisations to give an adequate account of it; they are habituated to 
unfold both synchrony within a diachronic vector and, in turn, to make diachrony emanate 
from synchronic interactions. Historians are, in short, as Fernand Braudel once put it, “the 
faithful servants, if not always skilled advocates” of the “social continuities […] which 
constitute not only the substance of the past but the stuff of present-day social life” (Braudel 
[1958] 2012: 243). 
This is surely one of the reasons why they know so well the Eurocentric time ontology within 
which the present is imagined as a living anachronism comprised by (displaced) pasts 
personified in particular bodies, places, patterns of behavior, types of social relations, etc., 
which represented the backwardness whose correlate were the modernity hypostatised in 
																																																								254	For	reflections	on	the	spatial	turn	and	the	idea	of	time	in	History	see	Döring/Thielmann	2008:	7–47;	Schlögel	2003:	9-15.	Concerning	specifically	Global	History,	Sebastian	Conrad	is	emphatic	in	saying	that	“as	a	discipline	within	the	humanities,	global	history	forms	part	of	the	larger	‘spatial	turn’.	[…]	On	its	surface,	global	history	does	not	speak	the	 language	of	time.	 Its	 immediate	association	is	 instead	with	space.	The	privileged	vocabulary	of	global	Historians—mapping,	circulation,	flows,	networks,	deterritorialisation—is	almost	exclusively	concerned	with	a	new	understanding	of	the	role	of	space	in	history.”	(Conrad	2016:	66;	141)	255	Here,	I	am	thinking	of	“breaching”	with	the	meaning	given	to	it	by	Derrida	in	the	“Différance”.	It	shall	convey,	as	Alan	Bass,	 the	translator	of	 the	text,	explains,	 “the	sense	of	breaking	open	(as	 in	the	German	
Bahnung	and	the	French	frayages).”	(Derrida	1982:	18)	
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the Historical path followed by a handful of Western European countries, accompanied by 
some other few cases of exceptionalism (that of Japan and USA, for example). 
Integral to this temporalised Weltanschauung is still another issue, which Historians are also 
fairly acquainted with, namely, the fact that the bigger the time scale one chooses the more 
conspicuous is the role played by abstract linkages that happen to be those conceptual 
categories called Eurocentric universals256. This last aspect of Historical time, more than the 
general question of time in History—time with a hundred faces, with all its subtle concavities 
and saliences—is sure to be of interest to approaches concerned with developing an ostensive 
anti-Eurocentric view by experimenting with alternative spatial units, such as our “Between 
Spaces”.  
I have been discussing this particular aspect of History all the way hitherto. And I shall dwell 
on it for a while. I do this less for the sake of the scientific health of History than for staging 
an epistemological uprising whose aim is to find an escape route that leads to a position from 
which one becomes able to deploy Historical knowledge tactically as a way of opposing 
“primarily not the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but the effects of the 
centralising powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organised 
scientific discourse” such as the Historical one (Foucault 1980: 84). 
 
Historical continuity and fractality 
All Historical writing periodises the past, and Historians have generally no trouble in 
conceding, as Sydney Chalhoub does, that to periodise is an act of imagination, of 
interpretation (Chalhoub 2012: 30).  
History has long accustomed us to a more or less intuitive, commonsensical threefold 
classification of the size of the (imaginary) periods covered by particular historiographical 
interpretations: short, medium and long term.  
The new fields of deep History and big History, which have made the past prior to the 
existence of human beings central to its analysis and have even extended their “telescopic 
view”257 back to the time before the advent of life on the planet, have been called, 																																																								256	 Michel	 Rolph-Trouillot	 denominates	 it	 “The	 North	 Atlantic	 universals”	 (Trouillot	 2004:	 229–237),	which,	in	turn,	can	be	said	to	basically	correspond	to	the	traits	of	Chakrabarty’s	“hyperreal	Europe”.	I	am	going	to	use	both	formulations	interchangeably.	257	“Across	the	historical	profession,	the	telescope	rather	than	the	microscope	is	increasingly	the	preferred	instrument	of	examination;	the	long-shot	not	the	close-up	is	becoming	an	ever-more	prevalent	picture	of	
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accordingly, Histories of “very long term”. On the other extreme, a moment, one day, or 
perhaps some months constitute the “very short term” (Conrad 2016: 147), a label that no 
variety of History has claimed so far.258 
These denominations do not seem to be quite reliable. At any rate, that tripartite formula, for 
good or ill, has become a disciplinary standard for naming broad types of History on the basis 
of chronological duration. The designations themselves matter little; what matters is the fact 
that they function as a criterion for assessing whether a historiographical account delivers 
what it promises. In this respect, what they promise can also be exemplarily seen in the limit 
cases of deep/big Histories: they are supposed to extend their temporal frame to the extent 
to which the empirical proofs they provide stem from the chosen time. Thus, big and deep 
Histories resort to the expertise of astronomy, cosmology, evolutionary biology, genetics, 
archaeology, paleontology, etc. in order to address the human. They also make lasting 
permanence of climatic, geographic and geological conditions determining Historical actors. 
These approaches give such a preponderance to the domain of the natural and to what existed 
prior to and/or independently of mankind’s action that they end up making of History a 
determinist search for universal laws that makes of human agency just an epiphenomenon of 
“ultimate causes and primal driving forces in history” (Conrad 2012: 142–146; Armitage 2012: 
493–496). 
It seems that the trouble with such Histories is that they are too empiricist. They are empiricist 
to the point of bypassing History itself, of emptying it of its very content. But it is also perfectly 
tenable to affirm the opposite: the problem with such Histories is that their main findings 
result rather from sidelining what might have been empirically proven in favor of an 
argumentation whose main axis consist of hackneyed generalising formulae, if not fairly 
speculative assumptions, which bridge gaps that cannot be filled with any empirical data.259  																																																								the	past.”	(Armitage	2012:	493)	258	There	are	however	“history	of	the	present”	and	“immediate	history”,	terms	that	suggest	that	the	main	problem	is	not	the	length	of	the	time	span,	but	its	proximity	to	the	Historian’s	present	time.	It	shall	not	go	unremarked	 that	 these	 two	varieties	of	History,	 the	 first	commonly	associated	with	 the	name	of	Michel	Foucault	 and	 the	 latter	 with	 Benoît	 Verhaegen,	 bear	 close	 connections	 with	 post-colonial	 thinking.	(Foucault	1979;	Conrad/Randeria	2002;	Vansina	2000;	Fraiture	2013)	259	 This	 is,	 for	 instance,	 the	 case	 of	 Jared	 Diamond’s	 Guns,	 Germs	 and	 Steel.	 He	 deliberately	 let	 the	environmental	determinism	 (Blaut	1999)	of	his	 argument	 lead	him	 to	 the	 following	blind	alley:	 if	 15th-Century	China	had	basically	the	same	favorable	environmental	conditions	as	Europe	at	that	time	and,	in	addition,	was	technologically	much	more	developed,	why,	he	asks,	“didn’t	Chinese	ships	proceed	around	Africa’s	 southern	 cape	 westward	 and	 colonize	 Europe,	 before	 Vasco	 da	 Gama’s	 own	 three	 puny	 ships	rounded	 the	Cape	of	Good	Hope	eastward	and	 launched	Europe’s	colonization	of	East	Asia?	Why	didn’t	Chinese	ships	cross	the	Pacific	to	colonize	the	America’s	west	coast?”	(Diamond	1998:	412)	
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The example of big and deep Histories helps us to understand that that threefold order of 
Historical time had an ontology according to which the explanatory power entailed in each of 
its time scales held a relation of correspondence to the capacity of enabling one to establish 
connections between events on the basis of a more or less ostensive recourse to notions that 
are not amenable to be satisfactorily derived from the facts proved to be empirical in 
historiographical fashion. 
Let us try to put things more clearly. For the sake of argument, take the short term as the time 
of a safe and conscious deceptiveness. It would arise in its plenitude only if Historians were 
capable of making the main findings of their works coincide entirely with the empirical 
description of the so-called “discrete events” which Historical accounts as a whole are 
comprised of. “Empirical” means here the establishment of relations between events only on 
the basis of pieces of information directly derived from and referred to whatever might have 
been chosen as source.  
																																																								Diamond’s	answer	reads	that	“the	real	problem	in	understanding	China’s	loss	of	political	and	technological	prominence	to	Europe	is	to	understand	China’s	chronic	unity	and	Europe	chronic	disunity.”	(Diamond	1998:	413–414)	To	explain	this	thesis,	Diamond	resorts	to	geographic	factors	that	had	facilitated	connectedness	(the	spread	of	technology	and	ideas)	and	political	unification	in	China	while	making	it	difficult	in	Europe.	We	need	not	even	check	if	it	is	good	or	bad	geography.	It	suffices	to	read	the	conclusion	of	the	argument	to	identify	some	of	its	many	flaws:		“But	China’s	connectedness	eventually	became	a	disadvantage,	because	a	decision	by	one	despot	could	and	repeatedly	 did	 halt	 innovation.	 In	 contrast,	 Europe’s	 geographic	 Balkanisation	 resulted	 in	 dozens	 or	hundreds	of	independent,	competing	statelets	and	centers	of	innovation.	If	one	state	did	not	pursue	some	particular	innovation,	another	did,	forcing	neighboring	states	to	do	likewise	or	else	be	conquered	or	left	economically	behind.	Europe’s	barriers	were	sufficient	to	prevent	political	unification,	but	insufficient	to	halt	spread	of	technology	and	ideas.	There	has	never	been	one	despot	who	could	turn	off	the	tap	of	all	of	Europe,	as	of	China.”	(Diamond	1998:	416)	I	would	 like	 to	single	out	 just	 two	 interrelated	“gaps”	 that	 I	will	 formulate	 in	 the	 form	of	a	preparatory	assertion	accompanied	by	a	subsequent	question.	First,	the	boundaries	of	most	European	countries	do	not	match	 to	 topographic	 barriers.	 So,	 how	 to	 correlate	 geographical	 factors	 and	 the	 processes	 of	 political	unification	 that	gave	rise	 to	 the	particular	 formation	we	call	 “nation-state”?	Second,	political	unification	does	 not	 amount	 in	 any	 necessary	 sense	 to	 despotism.	Where	 do	 the	 “Chinese	 despots”	 in	 Diamond’s	“explanation”	come	from?		The	“gap”	left	by	the	first	question	is	sealed	with	a	sort	of	liberal	tale	of	human	progress	based	on	freedom	and	competition	whose	outcome	was	innovation	and	economic	growth,	something	that	had	happened	in	the	necessary	grade	only	in	Europe.		The	second	“gap”	is	filled	with	the	reverse	of	this	idea,	namely,	with	“the	theory	of	Oriental	despotism	[…]	the	belief	that	so-called	Oriental	civilisations—essentially	China,	India,	and	the	Islamic	Middle	East—have	always	been	despotic.”	(Blaut	1999:	401)	China,	as	all	other	members	of	this	unfortunate	group,	stagnated	more	or	less	in	the	(European)	Middle	Ages.	So,	Guns,	Germs	and	Steel	answers	the	crucial	questions	it	poses	by	filling	the	“gaps”	of	its	argumentation	with	elementary	Eurocentric	constructs	 that	circularly	explain	European	hegemony.	 I	am	not	especially	fond	of	“top	ten”	lists,	but	I	cannot	help	being	in	pleasant	agreement	with	James	M.	Blaut	when	he	includes	Jared	Diamond	in	his	selected	group	of	Eight	Eurocentric	Historians.	(Blaut	2000:	149–172)	
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A chimerical historiographical account whose content was made only out of such types of 
connections of events were supposed to be safe in the sense that virtually all its statements 
would be “factual” ones or, at least, plausibly so. It would have a sort of strong warrant against 
that sort of skepticism or incommensurate relativism that accuses History of being rather or 
just interpretation. It would also tell us something about History’s fragmentariness, making us 
maybe realise that if History, willingly or unwillingly, must be episodic, these episodes are 
nonetheless always liable to be reunited in a bigger and bigger chain, once one allows oneself 
to be carried along by the richness of the documents. But it would also be deceptive for, in 
order to do so, one must get oneself trapped within the time scale of these events. One must 
advance in time, passing from one event to another by making as few “leaps” (temporal, 
cognitive, conjectural, etc.) as possible. Where similar events due, for example, to their 
disposition in time or space, could not be directly related on the basis of documental empirical 
evidence, they must then remain unrelated completely. 
Such an account is a chimera if thought of as a pure form, but it is undeniable that it 
constitutes an aspect260 of Historical writing. An aspect that might be easily moved to the 
forefront, where it is more likely to cause a suppression of one’s capability of giving a 
configurational261 account of a context wider than that immediately (in a temporal sense) 
linked to the described events. Here, the past would happen to be represented just as a 																																																								260	My	use	of	the	term	“aspect”	is	analytically	designed	to	avoid	a	formulation	that	might	suggest	that	there	are	in	historiographical	writing	moments	in	which	representation	can	be	reduced	to	description.	That	is,	that	there	are	statements	that	might	be	purely	descriptive,	in	the	sense	that	they	would	exclusively	refer	to	facts	empirically	verified,	while	other	statements	could	be	interpretive,	for	they	would	then	attribute	certain	properties	 to	 what	 they	 refer	 to.	 Description	 and	 representation	 are	 inseparable	 in	 History.	 The	consequences	of	this	assumption	are	not	of	little	importance.	From	a	logical	point	of	view,	it	goes	straight	to	the	heart	of	the	notion	of	truth:	the	impossibility	to	distinguish	between	what	is	reference	and	what	is	attribution	 is	 also	 the	 impossibility	 of	 discerning	what	would	 be	 a	 true	 statement	 about	 the	 particular	subject	described/represented.	The	notion	of	“aspect”	introduces	a	third	operator,	whose	effect	is	to	break	both	the	one-to-one	relationship	usually	associated	with	the	notion	of	representation	and,	consequently,	the	whole	relation	between	reference,	truth	and	representation.	(Ankersmit	2012:	64–86;	103–108)	A	 basic	 understanding	 of	 what	 “aspect”	 is	 can	 be	 gained	 by	 an	 imagetic	metaphor	 provided	 by	 Frank	Ankermit:	“Aspects	 sometimes	have	a	more	pronounced	 individuality	 than	what	 they	are	aspect	of—a	 fact	 that	 is	exploited	to	the	full	 in	caricatures.	The	big	nose	of	a	politician	is	enlarged	beyond	proportion—and	you	recognise	the	politician	more	easily	than	from	a	photo.	Often	we	move	so	easily	from	aspects	to	what	they	are	aspects	of	that	we	completely	forget	that	we	are	dealing	with	the	former	rather	than	with	the	latter.	In	this	way	we	live	in	a	world	of	specters	to	a	much	greater	extent	than	we	realise;	mistaking	aspects	for	the	things	that	they	are	aspect	of	is	something	that	we	are	literally	doing	all	the	time.	In	this	way	(the	logic	of)	representation	 reaches	 far	 deeper	 into	 our	 interaction	 with	 the	 world	 than	 we	 ordinarily	 notice.”	(Ankersmit	2012:	70–71)	261	The	configurational	mode	of	comprehension	is	the	one	that	“enables	us	to	detect	a	certain	pattern	or	structure	in	a	complex	and	incoherent	set	of	data”	(Ankersmit	2007:	385).	See	discussion	about	it	in	the	chapter	Time	and	Event	of	Part	Two.	
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massive array of discrete facts interconnected via empirical proof. But such a mass has never 
been regarded as making up all the stuff Historians may subject to careful scientific reflection. 
This is one of the reasons why apprentice Historians are as a rule advised to avoid time spans 
that might appear rather short (or too short). Such a time scale, so to speak, might not be 
significant enough if one attempts to place and to assess the role of determined events within 
a proper process of development. As it is commonly said, it makes it much more difficult to 
achieve a reasonable “Historical depth”. 
Those who have been generally regarded as early great masters of our craft such as Jules 
Michelet, Leopold von Ranke, Jacob Burckhardt or Fustel de Coulanges, wrote works whose 
Historical profundity has been also regarded as inseparable from a lively distrust of the short 
term. A distrust expressed in the form of a feverish devotion to long-term History. These 
names have been a living presence262 in the process of education and training of countless 
generations of Historians, at least in the Brazilian academic milieu. Fernand Braudel, Jacques 
Le Goff, Carlo Ginzburg, Quentin Skinner, Charles R. Boxer, Eric Hobsbawn or E.H. Gombrich, 
to mention just a few contemporary Historians who are extremely influential in Brazil, share 
pretty much the same concerns of the “old great masters”.  
In the small corner of the recent Brazilian History of Slavery, the work that happened to 
become a masterpiece of the field, an “instantaneous classic”, as a critic describes it (Ohata 
2001), is also one focused on long-term Historical continuity: O Trato dos Viventes by Luiz 
Felipe Alencastro. But to go to that amplitude is not everyone’s cup of tea. 
As the reader had the opportunity to see, the absolute majority of the works about slavery 
analyzed in the course of this study focus on swaths of time whose duration range from three 
to six or seven decades approximately. The role given to sources liable to provide substantially 
quantitative data is here salient: first and foremost, numbers referring to demographic 																																																								262	 Following	 Chakrabarty,	 I	want	 to	 emphasise	 here	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 “so-called	 European	 intellectual	tradition	is	the	only	one	alive	in	the	social	sciences	departments	of	most,	if	not	all,	modern	universities.	I	use	the	word	“alive”	in	a	particular	sense.	It	is	only	within	some	very	particular	traditions	of	thinking	that	we	treat	fundamental	thinkers	who	are	long	dead	and	gone	not	only	as	people	belonging	to	their	own	times	but	also	as	though	they	were	our	own	contemporaries.”	(Chakrabarty	2000:	5)	I	would	just	add	a	comment	about	the	fascination	with	the	image	of	that	guild	of	hoary	white	men,	with	their	(probable)	sideburns	and	beards,	their	(even	more	probable)	suits,	spectacles	and	grave	countenance,	who	were	introduced	to	us	as	no	less	than	the	sheer	embodiment	of	intelligence	and	who	lose	a	part	of	their	phantasmagoric	character	by	being	seemingly	so	well	represented	in	appearance,	manners	and	language	by	most	of	our	faculty’s	chairmen.	The	idea	of	being	trained	to	be	accepted	into	such	a	brotherhood	entails	somehow	to	have	the	knowledge	of,	as	well	to	acknowledge,	that	one	of	its	secrets	is	a	diffuse	but	manifest	white	maleness,	which	 happens	 to	 be	 surreptitiously	 put	 across	 as	 an	 indefectible	 trace	 of	 intellectual	power	in	its	full	maturity.	
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developments of all possible types (from the common birth and death rates up to statistics 
related to the prison population); then measurements of productivity and of money supply, 
variations of price curves, analysis of trade and of distribution of wealthy among the white 
elite, etc. 
With the help of such data Historians give contour to what they customarily call Historical 
conjunctures or even, as in the case of economic History, attempt to define social structures.  
In this way, on the basis of an analysis of sources related to financial transactions of the 
wealthiest slave trader settled in Rio de Janeiro, Manolo Florentino detects a strong tendency 
to entreasurement evinced in patterns of long-term investments in real estate. This fact, 
combined with the verification of a remarkable fragility of the circulation of goods in specie, 
allows for describing Rio de Janeiro’s domestic economy as one within which the mercantile 
capital was preponderant, but contrasted with a constant transference to sectors where they 
rendered immobilised or, put it differently, serve primarily to rentier purposes. According to 
the author, the reiteration of this cycle over the time scrutinised (1790- 1840) endowed it with 
a structural character (Florentino [1997] 2010: 186). 
No doubt the chronological periods measured with the barometer of the quantitative 
methods, as every other one, have no absolute value. Using different kinds of measures, one 
could come up with distinct time markers, which might perhaps be even more cogent. We 
should therefore not allow ourselves to get bogged down in what is pointless in this 
discussion. What matters in the delineation of particular Historical conjunctures is the fact 
that it is supposed to share the hard empiricist aspect of the short-term descriptiveness, but 
also that it should allow Historians to escape its presumed deceptiveness.  
Moving themselves in the time span of conjunctures, Historians would then achieve some 
more ”Historical depth” by becoming able, for instance, to define social structures, as the case 
of Manolo Florentino exemplifies. They came thus closer to the achievements generally 
associated to long-term perspectives. But they would do that on a fairly empirical basis, that 
is, without having neither to generalise from the short-term's "discrete events" nor to cover 
the monumental frontispiece of the Historical account with a theoretical scaffold.  
In this way, a controversial question like that one about whether there are such things that 
deserve to be designated as constituting the “structure” of a social formation, and, if yes, what 
they are and how one might address them, all these questions can be kept far from the endless 
quarrels about the matter by turning “structure” into just empirically verifiable facts that 
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happen repeatedly over a certain amount of time considered long enough to begin bearing 
the weight of the very word “structure”, a term whose presence, for good or ill, has been a 
constant in the discussion on Historical continuity of long-term.  
And so, coming to the logical next step, the same rationale that makes possible to delineate 
conjunctures should lead, by the simple process of going beyond its temporal limits, to long-
term events that carry structuralising property in all their extension. 
Here, it is appropriate to look again at Manolo Florentino’s work, in order to see what he 
presents as example (of such a structure): 
“a ideia mais geral é a de que o comércio atlântico de almas exercia uma dupla função 
estrutural (isto é, recorrente no tempo). No Brasil era o principal instrumento viabilizador da 
reprodução física dos escravos […]. Por outro lado, perspectiva quase não abordada pelos 
historiadores nacionais, tal viabilização era necessariamente precedida pela produção social 
do cativo na África […].” (Florentino [1997] 2010: 9) 
 
Surely, no one would be surprised in attesting that the very slave trade and, for that matter, 
colonial slavery in general, is here taken as the element endowed with structural character. 
But Florentino does not have to spill too much ink over the issue. Rather than something that 
needs to be systematically established in historiographical fashion, the element “slave trade 
as structure” is the most general idea, a more or less primary empirical point of departure. 
This suffices to evince that the structural elements Historians are interested in are of another 
nature, namely, they are those which have been generally presented as supposed to mask 
regularities and continuities, those which are said to repose under the surface of the events 
and, therefore, cannot be seen with unaided eyes, that is, without History’s labour of 
uncovering them.  
Still, History is indetermination, as Sydney Chalhoub says, voicing a conviction generally 
shared among us, his fellow Historians (2012: 27). “Indetermination” means here simply that 
we shall assume that we cannot know in advance what we are going to find ahead or whether 
and how our initial assumptions might be changed by it. We must be open and willing to return 
to them with new eyes, with new uncertainties, with new questions.  
Historians concerned with Historical continuity of long-term are allowed to suppose that 
something might have happened hidden away, secretly structuring the visible, but they are, 
evidently, not supposed to know it from the outset. Pursuing long-term Historical continuity 
has therefore been presented as a march towards the “unknown” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 249). 
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The unknown element underlying the financial behavior of those wealthy slave traders from 
Rio de Janeiro was, according to Florentino, the aristocratic ideal typical of Portugal’s ancient 
regime, a regime within which the preponderance of non-capitalist values entailed an active 
resistance against modernisation. Thus, Portugal’s backwardness in the 18th Century did not 
constitute something like an anachronism stemmed from a putative incapacity to follow 
Europa’s manifest capitalist destiny. On the contrary, Portugal’s archaism was a truly social 
project. (Florentino [1997] 2010: 117) 
The “instantaneous classic” by Luiz Felipe Alencastro also has an “unknown element” that, as 
in detective stories, is strategically revealed only on the last page of the book. Speaking in 
fluent Braudelian idiom, Alencastro finds the longue durée variable of Brazil’s formation in the 
de-territorialisation of the labor market. He comes to the unfortunate conclusion that the 
History of the Brazilian nation is a rather short one: it began just after the nationalisation of 
the reproduction of the workforce, a process that only began between 1930 to 1940, the 
decade which is the initial milestone of the modernization project called “nacional-
desevolvimentismo” (Alencastro [2000] 2014: 354-355; Nobre 2012). 
These examples could be multiplied ad nauseam. A generous amount of prominent Marxist 
studies of different stocks, for instance, the works by Caio Prado Jr., Fernando Novais, Emilia 
Viotti da Costa, Jacob Gorender and Ciro F. Cardoso, as well as its Weberian “counterpart”, 
such as Maria Silvia C. Franco’s Homens Livres na Ordem Escravocrata (1969), will gravitate 
around the process of transition to capitalism as the problem of becoming modern, where 
modernity bears the features of what Chakrabarty calls the “hyperreal Europe”. 
I do not think I am misrepresenting the intention of all these authors if I say that it is not even 
necessary to make the point that perhaps there is nothing hidden under the surface of the 
reality we can see, that there is nothing to be “uncovered” by proceeding forward into the 
“unknown” that showed itself only when seen from the advantage point of the long time span. 
This is not needed because long-term Historical continuity has been very much about to 
replicate, to reiterate and to make widespread what is at best known from the outset: the 
traces of Eurocentric modernity as fundamental Historical structures. It is somehow, as 
Foucault says evoking Nietzsche, a “series of episodes of that profound history of the Same” 
(Foucault 1970: 387). 
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But more than “known”, these structures have to bear the proper form that knowledge must 
assume in order to be articulated as Historical discourse263. When one wants to go deeper in 
time, to follow the example of the “great masters”, speaking in a totalizing manner about 
developments presented as having taken place over centuries and centuries, one cannot do it 
without resorting to comprehensive abstract constructions. The problem is that any other sets 
of ideas have been systematically served for this purpose but only those which, signifying 
Europe’s historical experience, hold, so to speak, the “theoretical office”. This is why accounts 
focused on Historical continuities of long-term have been a privileged stage of 
Eurocentrism264. A stage that Historians, who are frequently too willing to act as theatrical 
directors, can set without ever giving up the episodic, even dramatic scenes stemmed from 
the short-term,265 which keeps in History the multidimensional vivacity of lived experience. 
 
Latest one sees here that the question of Eurocentrism in conceiving the idea of long-term 
Historical continuity is not a matter of “to be or not to be”. The constant use of catchphrases, 
works, formulas, quotations, models, concepts, thoughts, etc. by means of which, in one way 
or another, European thinking and History end up being referred or invoked so as to play the 
role of master key to the legitimation of a particular argument, such a procedure rather 
amounts to a necessity and a habit of asking whether one is allowed to share the property of 
speaking in non-particularistic terms. It is an act of asking that is always expressed, even if not 
stated, and whose answer, depending on which past makes the request, might be a 
permission given as self-evident authorisation or as authoritative condescendence. 
																																																								263	Still,	this	“revealing	of	the	already	known”	does	make	that	a	work	necessarily	loses	the	originality	and	intellectual	vigor	it	possibly	possesses.	In	principle,	whatever	findings	a	work	has	to	offer,	they	may	remain	“unknown”	in	the	sense	that	they	were	not	known	yet	in	the	precise	constellation,	grounded	on	the	sources,	in	a	word,	comprehending	the	particular	Historical	contexts	chosen	to	be	specifically	addressed.	264	The	field	of	“historical	sociology”	is	one	of	these	privileged	stages	of	Eurocentrism.	See,	for	example,	McLenan’s	analysis	of	 the	works	of	 the	 “historical	 sociologists”	 John	Hall	 and	Ernst	Gellner.	 (McLennan	2000)		265	So,	even	a	Historian	like	Jacob	Gorender—whose	concern	is	with	a	Historical	interpretation	of	Brazil	from	 the	prism	of	 sociological	 categories	 that	 account	 for	 long-term	continuity,	 in	his	 case,	 the	Marxist	category	of	mode	of	production	(Gorender	1978:	15–44)—enters	into	debates	over	particular	events,	for	example,	the	revolt	of	slaves	of	the	Engenho	de	Santana,	in	Ilhéus	(Bahia).	This	insurrection	left	a	document	that,	according	to	Stuart	B.	Schwartz,	the	Historian	who	found	it,	“é	o	único	texto	escrito	em	que	os	próprios	escravos	brasileiros	registravam	o	que	pensavam	e	queriam”	(Gorender	1990:	234;	Schwartz	1977).	Apart	from	Gorender	and	Schwartz,	many	other	renowned	Historians	have	written	about	this	topic,	for	instance,	Ciro	Flamarion	Cardoso,	Clóvis	Moura,	João	José	Reis	and	Eduardo	Silva.	(Gorender	1990:	233–245)	
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If I am allowed, I would like to base my argument concerning long-term Historical continuity 
on an example, one which may not be promptly recognised. Close at hand—but occupying a 
space that is neither congruent with the political-geographical containers of any nation nor 
corresponds to any particular array of traces supposed to be capable of strictly defining the 
genuineness or authenticity of a particular ethnic identity—there is transcultural and 
transnational formation266 whose fractal structure makes it unsuitable to be presented as 
inscribed within a clear set of rules. Fully operative nowadays, this formation can be traced 
back to the 15th-Century or, to be quite sure of our ground, to the 16th-Century, as the 
Europeans’ colonial project gained consistency through the invasion of the lands they 
narcissistically called America, through the conquering of the people they arbitrarily called 
“Indians” and the subsequent increment of the trade of enslaved Africans to that part of the 
world.  
Throughout whole centuries, the movement of things and human beings within this colonial 
project required primarily water and ships. Slave ships too, of course. An untold number of 
them. As well as the European cities, the slave ship—“a living, micro-cultural, micro-political 
system in motion” (Gilroy 1993: 4)—needs also, as Paul Gilroy argues, to be thought of as a 
major cultural and political unity for thinking about the issues involved in the process we call 
modernisation: the clear rationality of the commerce cheerfully harmonised with the racial 
terror, the circulation of commodities, persons and ideas traversed by the necessity of 
exchange and translation into different languages, the potential possibilities of conducting 
self-reflexive political dissention and even of creating a distinct mode of cultural production, 
etc. [Slave] “ships were mobile elements that stood for the shifting spaces in between the 
fixed places that they connected.” (Gilroy 1993: 16–17) 
																																																								266	 A	 formation	 in	 Raymond	William’s	 sense:	 “These	 [formations]	 are	 most	 recognisable	 as	 conscious	movements	and	tendencies	[…]	which	can	usually	be	readily	discerned	after	their	formative	productions.	Often,	when	we	look	further,	we	find	that	these	are	articulations	of	much	wider	effective	formations,	which	can	by	no	means	be	wholly	identified	with	formal	institutions,	or	their	formal	meanings	and	values,	and	which	can	sometimes	even	be	positively	contrasted	with	them.[…]	Moreover,	since	such	formations	relate,	inevitably,	to	real	social	structures,	and	yet	have	highly	variable	and	often	oblique	relations	with	formally	discernible	 social	 institutions,	 any	 social	 and	 cultural	 analysis	 of	 them	 requires	 procedures	 radically	different	from	those	developed	for	institutions.	What	is	really	being	analysed,	 in	each	case,	 is	a	mode	of	specialised	practice.”	(Williams	[1977]	2009:	119)	
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In this sense, the “Middle Passage”267 presents an alternative to what has remained repressed 
due to the bedazzling and self-indulgent fixation268 with and at the “Parisian passages” of 
Baudelaire and Benjamin (and all its possible surrogates: London, Berlin, New York, etc.). And 
a fundamental aspect that has been problematised by turning the eyes to Paris but stopping 
dreaming of it269 is the fact that, throughout whole centuries, the colonial project was also the 
project to constitute the colonized, the enslaved, in a word, the subaltern subject as Other: a 
“precarious Subject-ivity” whose “unhappy consciousness”270 struggles against the 
asymmetrical obliteration of its own trace (Spivak 1988: 281), as it may be seen in the works 
by Gayatry Chakravorty Spivak, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Paul Gilroy.  
A further characteristic of this formation has been the primacy of the tension between the 
national and the racial ontologies expressed in the disproportionate role accorded to the 
search for “roots” and rootedness, which contrasts with the difficulties and afflictions 
provoked by the anti-essentialist challenge of constructing “routes” to identity (Gilroy 1993: 
																																																								267	“As	it	were,	getting	on	board	promises	a	means	to	reconceptualise	the	orthodox	relationship	between	modernity	and	what	passes	for	its	prehistory.	It	provides	a	different	sense	of	where	modernity	might	itself	be	 thought	 to	begin	 in	 the	 constitutive	 relationships	with	outsiders	 that	 both	 found	and	 temper	 a	 self-conscious	sense	of	western	civilization.”	(Gilroy	1993:	16–17)		268	This	passage	deploys	a	Freudian	psychoanalytical	vocabulary	with	the	deliberate	purpose	of	exploring	some	 diffuse	 negative	 connotations	 common-sensically	 associated	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 “fixation”,	 such	 as	immaturity,	 perversion,	 obsession,	 etc.	 To	 discuss	 whether	 Freud’s	 theory	 of	 sexuality	 is	 still	 of	 any	relevance	may	be	here	beside	the	point,	but,	nevertheless,	I	would	like	to	voice	a	conjecture	made	by	Stefan	Etgeton.	 According	 to	 him,	 Freud’s	 passage	 about	 the	 ‚’perverse	 Verlangen’	 possibly	 remains	 quite	interesting	nowadays,	for,	he	guesses,	readers	“fühlen	sich	[...]	bei	den	Schilderungen	der	‚Perversen’	besser	verstanden,	oftmals	gar	ertappt;	sie	erkennen	sich	selbst	heute	wie	vor	hundert	Jahren	nicht	im	‚Normalen’,	sondern	im	‚Perversen’	wieder.“	(Freud	[1905]	1961:	13–78;	Etgeton	2006:	69–73)	269	I	am	here	referring	to	the	importance	of	the	works	of	thinkers	who	lived	and	taught	in	Paris	(Derrida,	Foucault,	Deleuze,	Guattari,	Lyotard,	etc.)	for	the	postcolonial	critique	of	Eurocentrism.	By	the	same	token,	I	 am	 pleased	 to	 hint	 at	 the	 deeply	 Eurocentric	 fascination	 attached	 to	 the	 indigenous	 products	 of	 this	location,	a	trace	that	is	utterly	valid	to	the	intellectual	production.	The	oneiric	imaginary	associated	with	Paris	is	a	sort	of	cultural	commodity	whose	exploration	ranges	from	street-commerce	to	the	Hollywood	film	industry.		An	illustrative	example	thereof	is	Woody	Allen’s	Midnight	in	Paris	(2011).	270	In	‘Gilroy’s	definition,	the	vernacular	variety	of	“unhappy	consciousness”	to	which	the	Black	Atlantic’s	cultural	manifestations	have	contributed	to	form	is	one	that	is	“acutely	aware	of	the	potential	of	the	modern	world”,	but	equally	aware	that,	to	the	extent	that	the	“advances	of	modernity	are	in	fact	insubstantial	or	pseudo	advances,	contingent	on	the	power	of	the	racially	dominant	group	[…],	the	critique	of	modernity	cannot	 be	 satisfactorily	 completed	 from	 within	 its	 own	 philosophical	 and	 political	 norms,	 that	 is,	immanently.”	 This	 “unhappy	 consciousness”,	 he	 argues,	 “demands	 that	 we	 rethink	 the	 meanings	 of	rationality,	autonomy,	reflection,	subjectivity,	and	power	in	the	light	of	an	extended	meditation	both	on	the	condition	of	the	slaves	and	on	the	suggestion	that	racial	terror	is	not	merely	compatible	with	occidental	rationality	but	cheerfully	complicit	with	it.	In	terms	of	contemporary	politics	and	social	theory,	the	value	of	this	project	lies	in	its	promise	to	uncover	both	an	ethics	of	freedom	to	get	alongside	modernity’s	ethics	of	law	and	the	new	conceptions	of	selfhood	and	 individuation	that	are	waiting	 to	be	constructed	 from	the	slave’s	 standpoint—forever	 dissociated	 from	 the	 psychological	 and	 epistemic	 correlates	 of	 racial	subordination.”	(Gilroy	1993:	56)	I	will	resume	the	issue	of	the	“unhappy	unconsciousness”	at	the	end	of	this	text	(see	footnote	302).	
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1-40). In addition, there are the damages caused by the association of this formation with 
androcentrism and misogyny, and finally the prominent role of music as its “central and even 
foundational element”. (Gilroy 1993: 173–186; 75) 
I have thus defined, or rather invoked, a synoptic271 view of traits that comprehends the Black 
Atlantic, a long-term Historical event. Despite the empirical character of the events referred 
to above, the Black Atlantic does not correspond to them in the sense that it did not happen 
like them. But it happened. And its very emergence272 is what instigates the elaboration of 
disruptive contributions to a well-established semantic pattern of how to conceive continuity 
of long-term in the writing of History. 
Among the different forms of Historical time that of long-term has stood out as an easy-going, 
uncomplicated and welcomingly expected one. To admit it into the very heart of History has 
not been a difficult task because it entails a repeated reinforcement of the most firmly 
established ways of conceiving social affairs: it basically means becoming able to mobilize at 
any time the whole epistemological apparatus of the social sciences so as to define and to 
stabilise whatever a Historian choses to be the subject matter thought to remain the same 
over a determined time span whose long duration is presented in terms of chronological 
measurement. Not by accident, one of the—if not “the”—most famous canonical texts about 
the issue bears the title “History and The Social Sciences: the Longue Durée”. At the longue 
durée stage, “though not at any other”, as the text’s author, Fernand Braudel, makes a point 
of emphasising, Historians find themselves on the deepest possible point of observation. From 
these depths they can rethink the totality of history: “all the stages, all the thousands of 
stages, all the thousands explosions of historical time can be understood, as if on the basis of 
an infrastructure.” (Braudel [1969] 1982: 33) 
																																																								271	Synoptic	view,	in	the	sense	I	use	it,	which	is	the	one	put	forward	by	Louis	Minks,	“directs	the	attention	to	the	act	of	‘seeing	things	together’.	That	events	occur	sequentially	in	time	means	not	that	the	Historian	must	“relive”	them—by	reproducing	a	determinate	serial	order	in	his	thought—to	understand	them,	but	that	he	must	in	an	act	of	judgment	hold	together	in	thought	events	which	no	one	could	experience	together.”	(Mink	1987:	84)	272	Raymond	William’s	ideas	about	cultural	phenomena	are	of	great	value	in	preventing	the	evocation	of	that	usual	image	of	“emergence”	as	the	sudden	appearance	of	something	that	already	existed	and	just	came	fully	to	the	light	or	to	the	surface.	For	the	purposes	of	the	argument	I	am	developing	here,	two	features	of	his	 idea	 of	 emergence	 of	 cultural	 formation	 are	 of	 fundamental	 importance:	 first,	 “definitions	 of	 the	emergent	[...]	can	be	made	only	in	relation	to	a	full	sense	of	the	dominant”;	second,	an	emergence	is	“never	only	a	matter	of	immediate	practice;	indeed	it	depends	crucially	on	finding	new	forms	or	adaptations	of	form.”	In	the	strict	sense,	Williams	says,	rather	than	merely	novel,	emergent	is	what	is	“new”	because	it	is	being	continually	created.	(Williams	[1977]	2009:	123–127)	Its	main	quality	is	to	be	steadily	and	insistently	at	hand,	not	hidden	somewhere.	
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Braudel behaves here like a historiographical personification of Atlas, who is sure to know 
better than anyone where the whole (history of the) world ultimately rests: upon the 
shoulders of his longue durée: a time which stands for a space underlying everything. This 
titanic effort to conquer totality presupposed a panoptic architecture where, contemplating 
the full magnitude of his domains from the central tower (Foucault 1979: 200–209), the 
Historian can calmly meditate on the most reasonable way of dividing them in Cartesian 
extensions thought to reassure him that totality would never escape from his hands. 
When that happens, the restoration of the sovereign subject’s consciousness also happens:  
“the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the certainty that 
time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one 
day the subject—in the form of historical consciousness—will once again be able to 
appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by 
difference.” (Foucault 1972: 12) 
 
To personify a Black Atlantic-perspective requires an entirely different attitude, a change of 
style, a perversion of familiar ways of thinking Historical continuity of long-term. First and 
foremost, we shall eschew to spatialise time in terms of superposed or juxtaposed slayers 
hierarchically endowed with immanent epistemological power. This entails a particularly 
careful deployment of the vocabulary proper of the metaphysics of presence whose basic 
assumption reads that long-term History—in one way or another—“uncovers”, “reveals” what 
is behind or hidden under the surface of reality. Such a procedure brings into question the 
explanatory discursive frame articulated around the notion of “infrastructure” and, for that 
matter, of “superstructure”, in all its variants and, for obvious reasons, with special emphasis 
on the Marxist one. The idea of structure itself although need not be given up (Hall 1985: 91). 
Long-term Historical continuity might be imagined as a self-referential process of 
comprehension by means of which fragments are supposed to be part of fractal structures, 
related on the basis of criteria of similarity and self-similarity. Historical events resulted from 
such a procedure would follow a pattern of development that prevents them from being 
smoothly inscribed into any organic or systemic form whose morphological fixedness 
functions as proof and guarantee of the totalizing universality of their own generative 
principles.273 																																																								273	The	fractal	geometric	conception	of	space	was	thought	to	study	the	forms,	“that	Euclides	leaves	aside	as	being	formless,	to	investigate	the	morphology	of	the	‘amorphous’“	(Mandelbrot	1983:	1).	I	would	say	that	to	spatialise	History	in	this	manner,	that	is,	ascribing	amorphousness	to	it,	amounts	to	an	attempt	to	make	that	“the	world	may	once	again	be	imagined	as	radically	heterogeneous”	(Chakrabarty	2000:	46).	
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Three consequences ensue from this way of spatialising Historical time. First, long-term 
continuity loses its traditional epistemological prerogative in what concerns the issue of the 
“totality of history”. The Historian who addresses the past reality “at the stage” of long-term 
continuity does not necessarily see further and certainly not “deeper” than any other. At least 
not, if one means by this to see what might be concealed under the surface of reality. In such 
spatiality there is no room for hidden elements. What it makes visible are not underlying 
permanences but rather certain types of general, wide range changes spread on the surface 
of reality itself or, if you want, “emergencies”274. 
Second, one of the main features of fractals is its recursive self-referentiality. The 
discombobulating conspicuousness of self-reference and recursion makes a nuisance value 
out of an aspect whose banality easily leads to an underestimation of its importance: Historical 
accounts are themselves a defining element in the emergence of the long-term processes they 
historiographically represent, and an element that, evidently, was not present in the past. In 
this sense, such a structure of Historical time works against History’s historicism, for it makes 
plain that in giving an actual account of past realities, one, actually, excludes the possibility of 
presenting them as they actually were275.  
These two points lead us to the third and last one: fractal forms are spatial ways of 
representing infinity in a finite space (Schnattschneider 2010: 712). Gilroy says he thinks of 
fractal geometry as an analogy for the long-term Historical character of the Black Atlantic 
because “the opposition between totality and infinity is thus recast in a striking image of the 
scope for agency in restricted conditions” (Gilroy 193: 237). Here, the spatial metaphor that 
gives shape to long-term Historical time represents (darstellen) not only an analytical tool that 
granted the Historians’ epistemological power but also represents (vertreten) subject 
positions in asymmetrical relations of power with respect to that which undergoes 
historiographical examination.276 Gilroy’s insight points to the fact that every conception of 
Historical time, no matter how schematic it might be, is used to signify subject positions that 																																																								274	 By	 a	 lucky	 semantic	 coincidence	 the	 term	 “emergency”,	 by	 referring	 to	 a	 state	 of	 affairs	 requiring	immediate	action,	helps	to	obviate	the	idea	of	passivity,	the	suggestion	that	History	“simply	happens”.	275	If	it	were	possible,	it	would	nevertheless	be	pointless,	for	in	such	a	representation	the	very	movement	that	constitutes	History	must	be	pure	absence.	I	do	not	see	what	else	could	be	of	interest	to	us,	Historians,	if	not	exactly	to	re-present	the	past	as	it	is	seen	from	now.	276	Thus,	Paul	Gilroy’s	remark	on	long-term	Historical	continuity	and,	by	extension,	my	own	reflections,	are	in	a	 sense	an	effort	 to	 think	 together,	on	 the	one	hand,	Ginzburg’s	preoccupation	with	how	 to	combine	morphology	and	“relation	of	forces”	among	social	actors	and,	on	the	other,	Spivak’s	concern	with	epistemic	violence	and	representation.	(Ginzburg	1999;	Spivak	1988)	
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correlate the explanatory power of “Historicising” with the agency of what happens to 
become “Historicised”. Such a procedure counterbalances the currency and powerful 
suggestiveness of the historicist idea that time is something empty and homogenous “within 
which” a process of development “takes place”. This secular externality of Historical time 
respecting the events which they are constituted of has been one of most ostensive 
assumptions of historiographical views that are frankly evolutionist (Benjamin [1942] 2007: 
258–261), what is a matter of far graver concern than being “just” Eurocentric.  
Such an assumption has an equally powerful and suggestive correspondent in the idea that 
the discipline of History is “the sum of all possible histories—an assemblage of points of view 
from yesterday, from today, and tomorrow” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 253). The commonplace 
friendliness of these words is compelling to the point of unfairness, at least if taken into 
account that such a stance—which is, by the way, a patronisingly comfortable and still 
widespread277 viewpoint—such a stance on our discipline, I was saying, was stated with the 
conspicuous purpose of arguing that among all “possible histories” there was one, namely, 
the one the author himself professes, which should alone occupy the fairly privileged position 
of being able to speak about the world and the times in its full totality. 
For me, History is a sum of all possible Histories in very much the same way in which a 
historiographical work is the sum of all its statements, that is, in no way at all! Whether you 
take 1958 or this year of grace of 2017, the problem of Historians learning their craft is not 
only to comprehend their subjects but also tackling the hierarchy of forces that constitute 
their own field of knowledge.  
These three points succinctly elaborated here, relating fractal spatiality to long-term Historical 
time, correspond roughly to those three pairs of concepts which were unfolded—in a more or 
less fractal fashion—in the course of this work. By way of conclusion, I would like to resume 
them briefly.	
 
Ideology and anachronism 
Many of the remarks I have been making so far are, of course, banal. Nevertheless, since 
historiographical works usually find small room, or any reason, for writing about the issue of 																																																								277	The	new	technologies	have	given	us	curios	ways	of	“measuring”,	or	at	least	noticing,	the	influence	of	some	ideas:	the	passage	we	are	here	discussing	is	automatically	underscored	in	the	latest	electronic	version	of	Braudel’s	text	(in	English).	(Braudel	[1958]	2012:	253)	
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time, some of those remarks address not properly “untouched” points —as banalities might 
be deservingly treated—but “untouchable” ones, a quality that makes them run the risk of 
playing all roles except that of banalities.  
Still, how strange it feels to try drawing up a firm accusation against History so as to declare it 
guilty of not accepting time as a dimension necessary of its studies. The concern with 
periodisation and anachronism, for example, which restores the centrality of the element of 
time in every historiographical work, is never omitted from its theoretical-methodological 
deliberations. But what an unequal treatment! It must be admitted that Historians, by taste 
or more probably by training, have a constant tendency to treat periodisation with care and 
curtsies, devoting to them deep acknowledgment and shrewd explanations. At the same time, 
they frequently tend to shy away from discussing anachronism, evading it in a very precise 
way: by making it a matter of course to present anachronism as a mistake, a serious one.  
Although, in performing what I called a theoretically oriented exploration of the disciplinary 
semantic278 of History, I maintained that the writing of History is precisely the practice of 
anachronism. I do not hold this view alone	279. Even if I did, it should not be difficult to my 
fellow Historians to see the cogency of my point. Which Historian was never confronted with 
the basic problem of anachronistic names? The trouble with a trivial phrase like “The discovery 
of Brazil” is not just some unease at times associated with the idea of “discovery”280, but also 
																																																								278	 It	 had	 been	wiser	 to	 follow	 Lyotard’s	 example	 and	 to	 name	 it	 an	 exploration	 into	 the	 disciplinary	“pragmatics”	of	History,	for	I	am	interested	in	how	the	meaning	of	some	concepts	depends	not	only	on	a	knowledge	of	the	literal	code	of	historiographical	language,	with	its	proper	lexicon,	grammar	and	syntax,	but	above	all	on	contexts	of	utterance,	inferentially,	non-truth	conditionality	and	others	issues	assumed	to	be	 classical	 pragmatic	 topics.	Unfortunately,	 I	 thought	 about	 this	point	more	 judiciously	only	when	 the	thesis	was	practically	finished.	At	any	rate,	this	lapse	is	not	so	great	if	one	considers	what	Ariel	conjectures	about	 the	difficulties	 in	distinguishing	grammar	 from	pragmatics	and	pragmatics	 from	semantics	 (Ariel	2010:	 1–16;	 230–273).	 Jean-François	 Lyotard,	 I	 almost	 forgot	 to	 say,	 structures	 distinction	 between	“narrative	knowledge”	and	“scientific	knowledge”	around	the	 idea	of	 “pragmatics”.	This	distinction	 is	 in	some	sense	very	close	to	the	one	I	draw	on	the	basis	of	Danto’s	 idea	that	philosophy	of	history	is	 like	a	“theory	of	narrative	representation.”(Lyotard	1984:	18-27;	Danto	[1965]	2007)	279	An	author	who	develops	his	argument	by	formulating	this	point	as	explicitly	as	I	do	is	Seth	Sanjay:	“Far	from	being	defined	by	its	avoidance	of	‘anachronism’,	history-writing	as	discipline	and	practice	is	in	fact	based	upon	anachronism,	continually	translating	the	understandings	of	historical	subjects	into	our	modern,	anthropological	understanding.”	(Sanjay	n.d.:	71–81)	280	If	you	think	this	expression	is	no	longer	used	in	scholarship,	you	are	deluded.	In	a	book	released	as	late	as	 in	 2016	 you	 will	 find	 such	 a	 passage:	 “The	 world	 historical	 process—the	 European	 discovery	 of	America—posed	 crucial	 challenge,	 but	 the	 responses	 to	 this	 event	 remained	 in	 many	 ways	incommensurable”	(Conrad	2016:	22).	The	comment	refers	to	two	15th-	Century	works	that,	in	Sebastian	Conrad’s	opinion,	represent	early	example	of	“world-historical	models”.	Even	if	the	“discovery-viewpoint”	might	be	the	one	adopted	in	the	works	he	analyses,	this	of	course	does	not	force	the	reviewer	to	subscribe	to	it	and	even	less,	to	subsume	the	“world	historical	process”	under	“European	discoveries”.	Now,	I	would	like	to	observe	that	you	will	find	in	the	same	book,	just	some	forty	pages	later,	a	remark	that	reads	that	one	
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the obvious character of the fact that the Portuguese cannot have “discovered” “Brazil” 
because there was no Brazil back then. Names are split (and badly split) between those which 
work better for the past and those which do the same for the present. If they were wise, 
Historians would balance between them. They  largely have no other choice281 but to refer 
and to describe past events by using names that must be misplaced in time. 
The anachronism brought into effect through naming, by virtue of its very practical 
inevitability, is neither very clear nor worrisome. It grows therefore less important when 
compared with the anachronistic attribution of qualities, features and characteristics. This 
would be a much more serious error, and one which Historians are supposed to avoid at any 
price. 
Still, we saw how João José Reis advanced his thesis about "Catholicism baroque" by deploying 
narratively his sources in such a manner that conflates present and past temporal orders. The 
present, the order of Reis' own voice, is the time in which the concept of Catholicism baroque 
is an analytical tool. The past, the temporal order in which the religious phenomenon he 
names Catholicism baroque took place, is re-presented by the voice of 19th-Century European 
travellers. The bottom line in this is that an actual set of characteristics defined on the basis 
of sociological and aesthetic notions applied to early religious practices, which is synthesised 
under the idea of Catholicism baroque, happens to be rendered into something that 19th 
century European travelers had already witnessed! 
The main operative element in such a procedure can hardly be characterised as something 
other than an anachronism. Historiographical accounts of the most variegated fields and 
subfields are unfolded by following a similar impulse. There is no Historical account, however 
sophisticated, which can escape the claws of an anachronism of this stock; nor any which can 
entirely cover the scars it left. There is no need to complain about this matter nor insist on it 
further, for, judged by the disciplinary yardstick of historiography, there is nothing wrong with 
it. To put it in Richard Evans’ words, João José Reis simply does his job by following “the usual 
																																																								crucial	feature,	which	set	global	History	approaches	apart	from	older	variants	of	world	history	writing,	is	that	they	are	“self-reflective	on	the	issue	of	Eurocentrism”	(Conrad	2016:	67).	281	Mostly,	not	always.	Luiz	Felipe	Alencastro,	for	instance,	uses	“brasílica”	instead	of	“brasileira”	to	refer	to	 the	 colonial	 society	 of	 the	 Portuguese	America	 of	 the	 16th	 and	 17th	 centuries.	 According	 to	 him,	 the	“brasílicos”	became	“brasileiros”,	 in	the	actual	sense	of	 the	word,	only	 in	the	course	of	 the	18th	century.	(Alencastro	[2000]	2014:	28)	
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rules of evidence” established by “scholarly criteria” for assessing the merit of a particular 
Historical argument (Evans 2000: 219). 
On the other hand, the quarrel about anachronism is a rather bitter one in cases in which it 
stems from the fact that the Historian’s “political or moral aims become paramount in the 
writing of history” (Evans 2000: 219). When that happens, Richard Evans warns, “scholarship 
suffers. Facts are mined to prove a case; evidence is twisted to suit a political purpose; 
inconvenient documents are ignored; sources deliberately misconstrued or misinterpreted.” 
In such a scenario, Historians are no longer “engaged in the pursuit of truth” and “objectivity 
is [thought to be] merely a concept designed to repress alternative points of view” (Evans 
2000: 219). Here one arrives at the point where the issue of anachronism unmistakably meets 
that of ideology. 
Historiographical investigations that follow the “usual rules of evidence”, which are a mixture 
of the belief in a crude empiricism and a deference to academic protocols, are, according to 
Richard Evans, more likely to achieve truth, that is, objective, scientific truth. Although, he 
hastens to remark, “no historian really believes in the absolute truth of what they are writing, 
simply it is the probable truth.” (Evans 2000: 219)  
This perspective concedes that History is brought about “through the use of a disciplined 
historical imagination” and that “historians are certainly swayed, consciously or 
unconsciously, by present moral or political purposes in carrying out their work”. Their main 
task is in fact to control them. The more control they have the more probable is that truth, 
which is arrived at “without distorting or manipulating the reality of the past”. For “the truth 
about patterns and linkages of facts in history is in the end discovered not invented, found not 
made” (Evans 2000: 214; 222–223; 252). An obvious and dangerous oversimplification. But 
the power of this vocabulary ravishes more than enough supporters to justify expounding 
briefly what happens to possible dissidents.  
When Historians’ present moral and political convictions take control over the Historical 
imagination, instead of scientific truth, subjectivity and positionality arise as keywords. These 
are notions that encourage Historians “to intrude into the text to such a degree that in some 
cases their presence all but obliterates the historical subject.” (Evans 2000: 200) But even 
when things do not go that far, those guided by such epistemological principles would be more 
liable to distort and to manipulate facts and, in so doing, they would stop pursuing the 
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empiricist dream of making of Historical science the true and truthful mirror of the reality of 
the past. Rather than “scientific” such Histories would then be “ideological”. 
Even more to the point, researchers occupied with their own political and moral aims will be 
unable to arrive at “probable truth” because they are unwilling to attempt to switch off the 
filters of the present so as not refusing to accept at face value the past reality they perceive. 
They rather truncate it, try to transcend it. Such maneuvers are thought of as a way of 
controlling it. In doing so what they deliver would be perhaps a true photography of the 
present time as an ideologically distorted portrayal of the past.  
Still, Historians come all too oft to the conclusion that works which had been for a long time 
regarded as “scientific” are also “ideological” to a degree that makes them incapable of 
representing that objective, “probable truth”. The mea culpa for such failures is usually 
synthetised in the idea that Historians are in the end just “children of their time”. This 
expression is not only a sort of resigned confession that historiographical writing is the 
exercise of a particular form of (controlled) anachronism. It also insinuates that there are 
perhaps too many “probable truths” whose trueness and truthfulness cannot be established 
on the basis of our “usual rules of evidence”.  
Imagine, for example, that a Historian, relying primarily on ecclesiastic documents of the 
Catholic Church, but also crossing them with other types of empirical evidence, were able to 
prove that during a particularly severe yellow fever epidemic in Angola of the 16th-Century, 
Jesuit monks had successfully treated their slaves with a preparation made out of local plants 
with curative properties.282 Consider still that the evidence were also enough to determine 
that the slaves attended the religious services which took place regularly in the place where 
they are kept captive. 
																																																								282	As	early	as	in	the	16th	century	the	Jesuits	were	already	active	in	the	business	of	slave	trade	between	Africa	 and	 Portuguese	 America.	 Luiz	 Felipe	 Alencastro	 reports	 that:	 “Ultrajado	 pelos	 negócios	 dos	missionários	que	arrebanhavam	escravaria	negra	e	indígena,	padre	Miguel	Garcia	previne	Roma	em	1583:	‘A	multidão	de	escravos	que	tem	a	Companhia	nesta	Província,	particularmente	neste	colégio	[da	Bahia]	é	coisa	que	de	maneira	nenhuma	posso	tragar.’	Em	seu	juízo,	todos	os	índios	e	africanos	empregados	na	Bahia	haviam	sido	ilicitamente	cativados	[...].	Não	era	o	único	inaciano	a	pensar	assim.	De	Lisboa,	o	procurador	de	missões,	padre	Jerônimo	Cardoso,	escreve	ao	geral	para	criticar	o	fato	de	a	Companha	possuir	escravos	no	Brasil	em	Angola.	‘Pedimos	ao	rei	que	mande	que	todos	[os	índios]	sejam	livres,	tendo	nós	muitos	cativos	e	servindo-nos	dos	das	aldeias,	mais	que	 todos	os	brancos.’	Em	Angola,	 completava	ele,	 todos	dizem	que	‘temos	trato	e	exercitamos	mercancia	sub	praetextu	coversionis	[a	pretexto	de	conversão]:	e	diria	que	se	não	podemos	sustentar	muitos	[padres]	sem	ter	estes	[escravos]	que	sustentemos	menos	sem	tê-los,	que	assim	faziam	os	antigos.’”	(Alencastro	[2000]	2014:	163)	Also	 Jacob	 Gorender	 remarks	 that	 the	 Catholic	 religious	 orders,	 especially	 the	 Company	 of	 Jesus,	administrated	properties	where	lived	thousands	of	slaves	(Gorender	1990:	42;	58).	
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If our hypothetical Historian used these facts to state that those Jesuits saved the lives of their 
African slaves as well as provided them with spiritual care, he would not be wrong, for such a 
statement could be directly confirmed by the empirical evidence adduced. Within a 
framework within which the “rules of evidence” instate a binary opposition between the 
positive objectivity of scientific truth and the negative proclivities of ideology and which treats 
anachronism just as a mistake to be avoided, more than not wrong, he would be rigorously 
right! So, if pressed to relate his statement to the central role played by the Catholic Church 
in the process of legitimation of colonial slavery and/or with the fact that the Society of Jesus 
had been a player in the very business of slave trade between Angola and Brazil283, he could 
serenely answer that there is no contradiction at all between these empirically verified 
Historical facts and his own statement, whose true character had been equally established on 
the basis of empirical evidence. But Historical truth is more cunning prey than that. 
To be truthful, why should we, Historians, be interested in writing History like that? It 
reassures us that the past can be, so to speak, mapped out in that sense in which maps point 
to the possibility and effectiveness of producing representations of reality whose truthfulness 
is achieved by rendering idle any question about what else they might represent rather than 
what is immediately re-presented.284 Therefore, it provides not even an adumbration of an 
answer to the question about whether those pious slaveholders should not be re-presented 
in a very different light, for example, by stressing that the treatments for diseases under the 
slaves were rather (or at least “also”) an obvious way of preventing financial loss as well as 
that the attendance of slaves to the Mass might be seen as an imposition aiming at forced 
religious conversion, a practice that was regularly used as ideological justification of the very 
process of enslavement.  
																																																								283	Again,	Alencastro	words	are	exemplary:	“Seria	[...]	excessivo	pensar	que	a	legitimação	do	tráfico	decorre	exclusivamente	 da	 política	 colonial	 da	 Coroa	 e	 da	 atividade	 dos	 negociantes	 negreiros.	 Boa	 parte	 dos	missionários,	e	singularmente	os	jesuítas	da	África	e	da	América	portuguesa,	tiveram	um	papel	decisivo	nesse	processo.”	(Alencastro	[2000]	2014:	168	–	emphasis	added)	284	Map	users	do	not	ask	the	question	“‘What	does	‘looking	at	a	map’	mean?’	as	long	they	get	from	the	map	the	information	they	need,	as	long	as	the	map	does	not	challenge	the	map	literacy.	A	map	is	[in	this	sense]	transparent	to	its	meaning,	to	the	information	it	delivers.”	But	“maps	suggests	ways	of	thinking	as	well	as	seeing.	They	materialize	a	view	of	the	mind	rather	than	of	external	reality.	They	project	an	order	of	reason	onto	the	world	and	force	it	to	conform	to	a	graphic	rationale,	a	cultural	grid,	conceptual	geometry”,	maps	are,	in	short,	“formidable	instruments	of	power.”	(Jacob	[1992]	2006:	1–9)	Unless	we	want	that	our	reader	does	not	ask	the	question	“What	does	‘reading	History’	mean?”	we	should	carefully	avoid	such	an	empiricist	approach	to	History.	
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It is impressive and somehow delightful to see how Historians organise the huge volume of 
information they generally deal with, the interesting problems they formulate and the way 
these are then solved, in short, all the peculiar intricacies of Historical pictures. But if the 
probable response we can give to the question about whether our imaginary Historian—in 
speaking about those Jesuits as people who saved the lives of African slaves and provided 
them with spiritual care, which is very much the way in which the Jesuits used to present 
themselves285—was not effecting a Synchronisierung286 of his own voice with that of the 
Jesuits so that the words of old slave holders becomes presently “speakable” not only without 
any embarrassment but also with some of the (religious or academic?) nonchalant authority 
of those who are sure of their impeccable righteousness.287 If the probable response we can 
give to this question is that it, the question itself, amounts to an exercise in “manipulating and 
distorting the reality of the past” by inappropriately giving paramount importance to “moral 
and political aims” which do not allow for performing the movement entailed in the genuine 
writing of History, if, in one word, such a question must be regarded as an attempt on the 
historiographical building of the complex called empiricist social scientific truth, then we 																																																								285	Jacob	Gorender	believes	that	the	Padre	Antônio	Vieira	“tinha	clareza	acerca	do	papel	pretendido	pela	religião	cristã	como	cimento	ideológico	supostamente	capaz	de	conciliar	senhores	e	escravos”	(Gorender	1990:	41)	and	Luiz	Felipe	Alencastro	adds	that	he,	Vieira,	wrote	in	the	Sermão	XIV	a	passage	that	could	be	considered	one	of	the	most	audacious	ideological	justifications	of	Atlantic	trade	of	enslaved	Africans:	“Assim	a	Mãe	de	Deus,	antevendo	esta	vossa	fé,	esta	vossa	piedade	e	esta	vossa	devoção,	vos	escolheu	de	entre	 tantos	outros	de	 tantas	e	 tão	diferentes	nações,	e	vos	 trouxe	ao	grêmio	da	 Igreja,	para	que	 lá	 [na	África],	como	vossos	pais,	vos	não	perdêsseis;	e	cá	[no	Brasil],	como	filhos	seus,	vos	salvásseis.	Este	é	o	maior	e	mais	universal	milagre	de	quantos	faz	cada	dia,	e	tem	feito	por	seus	devotos	a	Senhora	do	Rosário	[...].	Oh!	se	a	gente	preta,	tirada	das	brenhas	da	sua	Etiópia,	e	passada	ao	Brasil,	conhecera	bem	quanto	deve	a	Deus	e	a	 sua	Santíssima	Mãe	por	este	que	pode	parecer	desterro,	 cativeiro	e	desgraça,	 e	não	é	 senão	milagre,	e	grande	milagre.”	(Viera	quoted	by	Alencastro	[2000]	2014:	183)	As	you	see,	according	to	Vieira’s	terms,	the	Catholic	faith	and	Church	in	general,	the	Company	of	Jesus	in	particular	and	his	very	person	were,	in	what	they	supported	the	slave	trade,	working	the	wonder	of	“saving”	the	lives	of	the	enslaved	Africans.	286	As	explained	in	the	section	‘On	the	issue	of	representation:	synchronising	History	and	theory	of	History’,	I	use	the	cinematic	metaphor	of	“Synchronisierung”;	in	German	common	parlance	this	word	bears	a	meaning	which	is	absent	in	English:	it	also	stands	for	the	process	of	replacing	the	voice	of	the	actors	shown	in	the	screen	with	those	of	different	performers	speaking	another	language.	“Synchronisierung”	means	thus	not	
only	 the	process	of	making	adjusts	so	as	 to	correlate	 the	subject	(of	 the	past)	with	the	demands	(of	 the	present),	that	is,	the	first	and	more	or	less	literal	meaning	of	“synchronizing”	different	Historical	times;	it	
also	means	the	act	of	silencing	Other’s	voice	through	what	one	paradoxically	utters	in	a	way	that	ideally	grants	its	full	meaningfulness:	a	translation.	287	Richard	Evans	with	the	word:	“For	my	own	part,	I	remain	optimistic	that	objective	historical	knowledge	is	both	desirable	and	attainable	[...].	I	will	look	humbly	at	the	past	and	say	[…]:	it	really	happened,	and	we	really	can,	if	we	are	very	scrupulous	and	careful	and	self-critical,	find	out	how	it	happened	and	reach	some	tenable	though	always	less	than	final	conclusions	about	what	it	meant.”	The	“key	point”	to	be	accomplished	within	History	is	then	to	consider	that	“the	element	of	moral	judgement,	insofar	as	it	is	exercised	at	all,	is	in	the	end	extraneous	to	the	research	rather	than	being	embedded	in	the	theory	or	methodology	of	it.”	(Evans	2000:	253;	52)	
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definitely shall continue sparing no effort in writing Histories assumedly anachronic and 
ideological!288 Let us beware of thinking we should pursue the truth for truth’s sake. 
One last remark: we Historians are the first ones to stress, not seldom by means of dull 
repetition, that past and present illuminate each other reciprocally or, to borrow Marc Bloch’s 
lapidary formulation, “the solidarity of the ages [past and present] is so effective that the lines 
of connection work both ways.” (Bloch [1940] 1963: 43) To be sure, in current 
historiographical language, to affirm that present issues play a pivotal role in shaping 
Historical accounts is perhaps a platitude even more obvious than to regard anachronism a 
mistake.  
These two platitudes shall also be seen in their reciprocal lights. The role of the lesson to be 
drawn from it would be to caution us against our possible fear of anachronism, where this fear 
means to be “moral and political”: do not think that any particular state of affairs is, as such, 
already a Historical one, do not believe that the act of writing History, of making the 
“Historical” comes true could ever be at any moment an apolitical and an amoral one. 
Otherwise, History will be the everlasting representation of those Historical actors who, 
having produced the archives that circularly guarantee their own authenticity, encapsulate 
themselves in a soundproof cave that reverberates incessantly their own words and is 
permeable just to the silence coming from the outside(rs). Embracing anachronism enables us 
at least to try listening whether there is some noise coming from the cave’s margins and 
beyond and beyond them … for the others inhabiting over there might have been never quite 
silent. As if anybody did not know that already! 
 
History and theory of History 
The preceding question about the borders of anachronism and ideology may be a passionate 
matter, but it is also one whose debate, here at least, has been conducted without any great 
revelations. The crucial point in lingering on it is to carry it over into a problematic that lies 
elsewhere, in the relation between the so-called meta-theoretical and theoretical-
methodological levels in History.  
																																																								288	Paraphrasing	Spivak:	the	limits	of	History’s	“naïve	realism”	are	reached	when	it	conflates	the	arena	of	Historical	 truth	with	that	of	 the	“concrete	experience”,	as	“what	actually	happens”.	This	epistemological	move	induces	a	foreclosing	of	the	difficult	task	of	counter-hegemonic	ideological	production,	a	foreclosure	that,	Spivak	assesses,	has	not	been	salutary.	(Spivak	1988:	274–275)	
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It was not difficult to plead the case that no historiographical account can avoid anachronism 
as well as that this anachronism is performed through an epistemological procedure that 
necessarily entails an ideological movement. I believe it will be by no means more difficult to 
argue—again—that Historiography is not to be separated from theory of History289. 
Those who have followed my argument so far, whether in agreement or not, will have 
certainly weighed for themselves each conceptual pair which has been reworked in our 
semantic exploration of the disciplinary vocabulary of History. In any case, I would like to be 
more explicit about the concepts of structure, model and translation. The following 




Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the idea of “structure”, a preeminent category of 
social analysis to which Historians—no less than social scientists in general—invariably resort 
to, are, first, its recurrence when one intends to bring up the idea of totality; second, the fact 
of granting a “meta-status” to the subject categorised as “structural”. Structure has been 
insistently presented as what is “hidden”, “under” or “behind” that which can be immediately 
apprehended, as though it were our abstract amulet against the evils originated from 
believing that any truth could ever coincide with the description of what is perceived by direct, 
empirical observation. If the truth about things were directly accessible to us in our “normal 
modus”, the idea of structure reiterates, there would be no need of engaging ourselves in 
scientific investigation at all. 
Within this framework, the main effect of the very idea of structure has been, in fact, that of 
increasing the scientific potential of an explanation, where “scientific” means simpler, easier 																																																								289	It	is	a	relatively	easy	task	to	put	together	a	dozen	renowned	authors	who	remark	that	in	spite	of	the	solid	establishment	and	high	reputation	of	theoretical	works	stemmed	from	the	field	of	History,	“der	‘Alltag	des	Historikers	und	die	historische	Theorie’	relative	unvermittelt	nebeneinander”,	a	fact	to	be	interpreted	as	 a	 sign	 that	 “im	 Bereich	 der	 Theoriegebrauchs	 oder	 auch	 ‘Theorieanwendung’	 in	 der	Geschichtswissenschaft	bleiben	nicht	wenige	Probleme	ungeklärt.”	(Hacke/Pohlig	2008:	7–8)	Ann	Laura	Stoler,	in	her	brilliant	analysis	of	Foucault’s	History	of	Sexuality,	writes	some	words	that	express	in	 a	 straightforward	 manner	 the	 watchword	 of	 postcolonial	 approaches	 to	 History:	 “Während	 viele	Historiker	Foucaults	empirische	Arbeiten	als	hoffnungslos	falsch	abgetan	haben	und	auch	Anthropologen	und	andere	Sozialwissenschaftler,	die	sich	von	seinen	Theorien	anregen	lassen,	seine	konkrete	historische	Thesen	für	weniger	richtig	halten,	muß	man	diese	klare	Trennung	zwischen	Theorie	und	Historiographie	in	
Frage	stellen.”	(Stoler	2002:	317	–	my	emphasis)	 In	 this	sense,	postcolonial	approaches	are	particularly	promising	in	what	concerns	the	development	of	analytical	strategies	designed	to	prevent	the	avoidance	of	the	rapprochement	between	History	and	theory.		
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to exploit—something which includes to be questioned—than others in which the “structure” 
is a missing link in approaching the subject matter at stake. One has, then, to concede that 
the “structural”, in order to be so, must not be only clearly perceived but perhaps even 
conspicuously exhibited.  
The very conspicuousness of the “structure” makes of it an especially well-suited way of 
evincing dominances, of manifesting certain tendencies, of displaying distinct dispositions, in 
short, of demonstrating that “structures” organise themselves around particular 
configurations, or, as Hall says, that they have “a definite structuration” which, to the extent 
that it constitutes itself on the basis of its own relative openness and indeterminacy, might be 
conceived as fairly complex (1983: 83–84). Or at least complex enough to enable one “to live 
in and with difference” by satisfying “the necessity of thinking of unity and difference […] 
without this becoming hostage [neither] to the privileging of difference as such” nor of 
structural foreordinations. “This is why the term ‘structure’ remains important” (Hall 1985: 
91; 95). All the more with respect to the main subject matter of this thesis, since the time 
assigned to “structural Histories” has been par excellence that of long-term continuity. 
The association of “structure” with this peculiar task of demarcating dominances, 
asymmetries, spheres of control, renders the distinction between weak and strong lines of 
“structural” force an undertaking that is not properly difficult and surely not uncertain. 
That, for example, not “beyond”, not “over and above” but in the very fabric of 
historiographical accounts lies a massive History whose power and thrusts are as perfectly 
recognizable as its laws and directions is an acknowledgment that, nowadays, has been finding 
institutional ways of increasing its sharpness: Chakrabarty’s expresses this insight catchy in 
the simple formula “first in Europe than elsewhere”. Yet, the (double) consciousness out of 
which this conception of the “structure of global historical time” (Chakrabarty 2000: 7) 
emerged has not been in play since only yesterday. And the Histories which may ensue from 
such a double consciousness shall call for no revolution of the mind, or at least not if one 
supposes that this amounted to treating “structures” as a “half-darkness” (Braudel [1958] 
2012: 260) that, once bravely confronted and put at reason’s feet, would then bring about 






“Structures” commonly appear through theoretical models. Such models play a pivotal role in 
social science to the extent that they form an essential part of knowledge shared by different 
scientific communities—despite their particular fields of expertise—and are a dominant 
aspect of teaching/learning inasmuch as they are supposed to strongly condition the 
apprehension of reality. 
One may think of models as being nothing but hypothesis, systems of explanation tied solidly 
together in the form of an equation or a function so that a certain element A would always be 
equal to or determine another element B, or, Historically speaking, one particular reality 
would never occur without being accompanied by another determined one in such a manner 
that reveals strict, constant relation existing between them. In this case, once thoroughly 
established, the concept should allow one to inquire, across time and space, into other social 
spheres similar to the one on the basis of which the model was originally created. It is this 
feature that endows models with recurring validity. (Braudel [1958] 2012: 260) 
But if one thinks of models in this way, in adopting, say, Lévi-Strauss structuralism as a model, 
one must—among other assumptions—accept that the “exchange of women” is a 
precondition of culture. Consequently, as Gale Rubin remarks, “it can be deduced that the 
world historical defeat of women occurred with the origin of culture”. In such a scenario, she 
adds wittily, “the feminist program must include a task even more onerous than the 
extermination of men; it must attempt to get rid of culture and substitute some entirely new 
phenomena on the face of earth” (Rubin 1975: 176). Putting it in other and harsher words: 
modeled in its pure form, Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology is, in one sense at least, a 
highly sophisticated ideology of sexism (Rubin 1975: 200). 
It is blatant—and widely discussed—that pretty much the same occur with Marxist models in 
what concerns the question of social evolutionism (Chakrabarty 2000: 12). 
But if one considers that models function also like metaphors290, the discussion would then 
be conducted in an entirely different set of conditions. More than “functioning like 
metaphors”, some models are manifestly metaphorical. This is the case, for example, of 
																																																								290	If,	as	a	very	first	and	tentative	move	in	a	train	of	thought	about	this	complex	point,	one	considers	that	“ontologically,	a	model	is	something	as	which	something	is	being	conceived	of,	and	concretely,	being	a	model	is	 the	 content	 of	 a	 judgment	 in	which	 something	 is	 being	 conceived	of	 as	 a	model”	 (Mahr	2011:	 301	–	emphasis	in	the	original),	one	may	already	prefigure	some	aspects	in	which	models	and	metaphors	overlap.	
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Braudel’s longue durée, which we examined at length in the section ‘Fernand Braudel’s longue 
durée and Eurocentrism’.  
We can conceive a (metaphorical) model as a filter, as a way of evoking a system of 
commonplaces and/or implications that organises our view on the subject(s) referred to 
metaphorically. Establishing metaphor-based relations—for instance, by using a “subsidiary 
subject”, say, Braudel’s three-leveled “sea” or unifying “white light”, to foster insights into a 
“principal subject”, in this case, “the longue durée”—amounts to a distinct intellectual 
operation that demands simultaneous awareness of both subjects but is not reducible to any 
comparison between them. Indeed, one of the most important points in employing metaphors 
at first place is that they cannot be replaced by a literal paraphrase without a substantial loss 
of cognitive content: the most relevant weakness of literality is that it fails to be a translation 
that gives the type of open-ended insights that metaphors do. (Black 1968: 39–47) 
But, of course, as Max Black remarks 
“explication, or elaboration of the metaphor’s grounds, if not regarded as an adequate 
substitute for the original, may be extremely valuable. A powerful metaphor will no more be 
harmed by such probing than a musical masterpiece by analysis of its harmonic and melodic 
structure.” (Black 1968: 39) 
 
So, it will do no harm to strike again a note of attention to the fact that Braudel’s metaphors 
evoke a certain geometry (Euclidian), a certain subject (centered), a certain consciousness 
(sovereignly sure of its power to penetrate the surface of reality until arrive at its very—and 
impassable—bottom).  
The suggestion that we might conceive Historical continuity on the basis of fractal spatiality, 
with its faculty of disturbing the naturalistic and reassuring perspective of Euclidian geometry, 
its emphasis on notions such as self-referentiality and recursivity, which points out to 
narratives of the self that constitutes a (decentered) subject, and, finally, its property of 
representing infinitude in the finitude as a manner to relate the issue of totality with that of 
agency, all that evokes a particular system of implications that challenges the positivist 
empiricism inherent to the representationalist realism of hegemonic approaches that have 
been epistemologically organizing our view on what it means to write History. 
Braudel once said he has sometimes compared models to ships. What interests him, as soon 
as the ship is built, “is to put it in the water to see if it will float, and then to make it ascend 
and descend the waters of time, at my will.” And the most significant moment, he stresses, is 
always the shipwreck, which will, according to him, show that the model is no longer adequate 
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(Braudel [1958] 2012: 267). It is an interesting exercise to see this metaphor in light of that 
other famous one, which Braudel uses to compare structures with the sea itself, the longue 
durée being presented as constituted by the deepest currents of history, running almost 
unaltered in the bottom of the ocean. Ironically, only shipwrecked vessels (failed models) 
would arrive at the depths where the longue durée structures lie! And a structure, Braudel 
explains elsewhere, again metaphorically but this time resorting to physics’ language: “is a 
body removed from gravity, removed from the acceleration of history” (Braudel [1969] 1982: 
76). 
Remaining in the field of nautical metaphors but launching my ship so as to have the wind of 
Braudel’s physical-aquatic imaginations in my sails291, I would rather suggest that we (also) 
think of models as a body thrown into the water. Not a peaked, perforating body, which would 
sharply pierce the fabric of the past until its structural depths, but rather one that, sharing the 
fate of Historical gravity, would fall flat and hit the water with a thud. The unavoidable 
dispersion provoked by the shock of such bodies against the water produce contingent fractal 
structures—the pattern of their splash and of the waves rippling away—which would then be 
the result of an intentional act of breaking the surface tension of the past in order to bring 
about History. 
At the limit, this kind of model explores relations kin to those used in “ordinary” language. Its 
claim to be rather “theoretical” is purposely catachrestic in the sense that it is meant to 
represent something “for which there is no adequate referent to be found” (Spivak [1993] 
2009: 67). Such a model creates a productive confusion that could give rise to a practice of 
historiographical writing whose aim would be to swerve us from the closures provided by the 
straight line of of “model in the form of a function or of an equation” and facilitate the kind of 
openness that can be put under the general name of “translation” (Spivak [1993] 2009: 200-
225). 




Stuart Hall underlines the enormously generative power of the metaphor of language for the 
task of rethinking many fundamental questions in the social sciences. On the other hand, he 
warns us against the dangers entailed in the conceptual slippage of thinking that something is 
a language when it just operates like a language (Hall 1996a: 146). Such a misstep, Hall argues, 
often becomes a kind of reductionism, and this, I may add, should not surprise anyone, for in 
this case language is no longer taken as metaphor but as the “thing itself”: it usurps the 
position of the subject matter. And since the metaphorical relation is where the conceptual 
fruitfulness of the operation comes from, its erasement provokes a collapse of the explanatory 
chain. But the main danger, coming back here to Hall’s argument, is that “of losing the 
reference to material practice and historical conditions”. (Hall 1996a: 147) 
If we want to avoid these risks when architecting our translational escape from the positivist-
empiricist chains of the realist representationalism that functions as a trampoline of the 
manifold coercions of another “isms” (sexism, evolutionism, racism, imperialism, colonialism 
and neo-colonialism, etc.) potentially put forward in the act of adopting—even if 
“reflexively”—the theoretical models resulting from the hypostasis of that “hyperreal 
Europe”, we have nonetheless to take a perilous course, namely, one along which the 
metaphor of language is not thought of in the distanced terms of the grammarian, but, as 
Spivak says, as 
“a staging of the agent within a three-tied notion of language (as rhetoric, logic, silence). We 
must attempt to enter or direct that staging, as one directs a play, as an actor interprets a 
script. That takes a different kind of effort from taking translation to be matter of synonym, 
syntax, and local color.” (Spivak [1993] 2009: 203) 
 
A three-tied notion of language, then: rhetoric, logic, silence. It must be stressed straight away 
that rhetoric has absolutely nothing to do with setting any limits to Historical inventiveness in 
the sense of giving ourselves a blank check to joyously exercise a Nietzschean “affirmation of 
a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active 
interpretation” (Derrida 1978: 292). No, it is definitely not like that. Here, we shall follow—
without reservations—Carlo Ginzburg, who takes great pains to explain not only that empirical 
“proofs, far from being incompatible with rhetoric, are its fundamental core” but also that 
“the projection of desire, without which there is no research, is not incompatible with the 
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refutation inflicted by the principle of reality. Knowledge (even historical knowledge) is 
possible.” (Ginzburg 1999: 25; 50) 
Yes, it is. The trouble has always been with its “value of truth”, the validity and legitimacy of 
which has the consolidated disciplinary structure of the authoritative apparatus of universities 
as its headquarters.  
However, it is a really bad idea to argue that Historical truth is established only by “power” if 
one understands by “power” that the canon of authors and works, the methods and theories, 
even the very Historical narratives supposed to interpret and explain them, in short, all the 
contents taught by the traditional academic authority are merely and indistinctly ideological 
impositions. A joke (told by Bernard Williams) is worth a long explanation: 
“The hard-pressed chairman of an English department once confessed to me that, faced with 
a group of faculty accusing him of being an agent of the hegemonic power structure, he would 
have liked to say, ‘You are right, and you are fired.’” (Williams 2002: 8) 
 
The role and position of that “principle of reality”, which Carlo Ginzburg talks of, in the 
establishment of “truth” is defined by a network of techniques of knowledge and strategies 
of power that, no matter how tangling and shifting (Foucault 1978: 98–99; Spivak [1993] 2009: 
67–68), has been spoken in the language of the Eurocentric universals which constitute the 
“theoretical skeleton” of History (Chakrabarty 2000: 29). These universals stand for the logic 
of the social scientific language and, as such, provide the logical systematicity perceived as the 
scientific detachment proper of scholarly works.  
To me, this is perfectly acceptable (as though I had another choice!). We should take it this 
way and we should really welcome, learn and articulate as masterly as possible this language, 
for, in fact, it has a tremendous heuristic power and indispensable political utility. But we 
should not proceed as though this language were deprived of rhetoric. As Spivak says,  
“There is a way in which the rhetoric nature of every language disrupts its logical systematicity. 
If we emphasise the logical at the expense of the rhetorical interferences, we remain safe. 
‘Safety’ is the appropriate term here, because we are talking of risks, of violence to the 
translating medium.” (Spivak [1993] 2009: 201) 
 
So, to translate it the other way round, that is, so that rhetoric may be disrupting logic is, as 
already argued in the chapter “The Heart of Blackness”, everything except “safe”. Rather, it 
presupposes to advance a point of view willing to put at stake its own condition of possibility 
of speaking. And it is so because it indicates “the founding violence of the silence at work 
within [the] rhetoric” of the universals (Spivak [1993] 2009: 201). In such a framework, the 
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language of the Eurocentric universals operates like the original from which translational 
accounts constitute both a “return of the same” and its necessary “deviation” (Spivak 1988: 
284–285).  
Yet this “deviation” is not just another name for the stock-in-trade procedure of testing a 
theoretical model against the reality and then, in the case it does not fit, going back and forth, 
from reality to the model and vice-versa, making adjusts, until either they fit well … or one or 
both gets discarded. Neither is it a search for the right place for ideas regarded in principle as 
right until otherwise proven. 
It is a procedure that rather, without pretending to avoid or to deny entirely these two 
movements, represents the effort of leaving as little room as possible for the exteriority 
produced by the idea that there is a gap between meta-theoretical and theoretical levels in 
History. As epistemologically self-explanatory as institutionally well-established, this gap 
opens the void through which it is delivered the building material for the construction of the 
gated condominium where the old-established couple of binary categories like 
primitive/civilized, modern/backward, conscious/alienated settled down and has been raising 
a large—and loyal—family, while deporting difference to the confines of mere identity 
politics.292 
The undaunted acknowledgment that the “teaching machine” of History can digest anything—
provided it is fed into with the right regime, prepared in advance and with stuff rendered 
edible by being finely seasoned with Eurocentric theoretical spices—is what furnishes the 
translational act performed “outside in the teaching machine”293 with the necessary energy 
for carrying out its proper labour, which is neither that of sabotaging nor of attempting to 
squeeze itself into a blind-ended appendix connected to, but kept apart from the moving 
course of the disciplinary regime of Historical truth.  
																																																								292	But,	 as	Spivak	puts	 it,	 the	emancipatory	 intervention	entailed	 in	 identity	politics	 “is	not	primarily	a	question	of	 redressing	victimage	by	 the	assertion	of	 (class-	or	gender-	or	ethnocultural)	 identity.	 It	 is	a	question	of	developing	a	vigilance	for	systemic	appropriations	of	the	unacknowledged	social	production	of	a	differential	 that	 is	one	basis	of	exchange	 into	 the	networks	of	 the	cultural	politics	of	class-	or	gender-
identification.”	(Spivak	[1993]	2009:	70	–	emphasis	in	the	original)	293	By	“teaching	machine”	Spivak	means	the	universities	as	the	most	privileged	site	of	neocolonial	education	system,	a	consolidated	authoritative	apparatus	that	has	among	its	mains	functions	the	training	of	teachers.	The	 intended	 mistake	 of	 the	 formulation	 “outside	 in”	 is	 her	 way	 of	 emphasising	 the	 necessity	 of	acknowledging	the	complicity	of	postcolonial	thinkers	in	the	functioning	of	this	machine.	(Spivak	[1993]	2009:	64;	xi–xv)	
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To conceive Historical writing in terms of translation, resorting once more to Spivak’s 
reflections, is a question of developing a vigilance for and a protection against the systemic 
appropriations of difference by showing that in dealing with the Eurocentric universals one 
must always consider the seductions of the “miming of the responsibility to the trace of the 
other in the self”, a feature that provides plenty of room to get around the confines of one’s 
identity, which is, in turn, something highly touted by our disciplinary norms. By the same 
token, it evinces that Historical knowledge arises from “a relationship by which a world is 
made for the agent, so that the agent can act in an ethical way, a political way, a day-to-day 
way” (Spivak [1993] 2009: 203). 
The task of the Historian294 concerned with this particular problematic while translating a 
given past experience into historiographical language—with the compulsoriness of its social-
scientific structures and models—is to make of it the plain recognition that the “what actually 
happens” of History is indelibly constituted by and as “what they are theoretically believed to 
be” and that this very fact ensures a disposition of pasts within which the political-
epistemological power that might be derived from them has been regarded as asymmetrical 
from the outset.  
So far as I know, in what concerns the Brazilian historiography of slavery, there have not been 
attempts in this direction. Such work is long overdue. I would wager that this kind of 
epistemological venture will tempt at least a few of our fellow Historians. Some others will 
probably follow, but, disciplinarily claiming the necessity of identifying which were the new 
impulses that could effectively prompt changes in History, they will try to delve into what will 
perhaps be regarded as the rhetorical haze advanced by the initial endeavours (Costa 2007: 
118). I would further wager that this very movement will precipitate, first, a necessary revision 
of deep-rooted ideas about the ways of representing historiographically colonial slavery, in its 
articulations with racism, sexism, and colonialism, and, second, that this revision will be 
accomplished through creative investment in the coinage of a vocabulary in which notions 
such as political (consciousness, participation, action), reflexivity, emancipation, and freedom 
																																																								294	It	is	as	though	theories	endowed	with	universal	pretensions	were	Benjamin’s	“reine	Sprache”	that	the	Historian-translator	should	try	to	release	in	his	own	language:	“Jene	reine	Sprache,	die	in	fremde	gebannt	ist,	in	der	eigenen	zu	erlösen,	die	im	Werk	gefangene	in	der	Umdichtung	zu	befreien,	ist	die	Aufgabe	des	Übersetzers.”	(Benjamin	[1923]	2006a:	60)	What	in	Benjamin	is	“just”	linguistic	freedom,	becomes,	in	the	writing	of	History,	 ’freedom’	 in	a	much	more	broader	 sense,	which	 is	anyway	closely	 related	 to	what	 I,	following	Chrakrabarty’s	rhetoric,	would	like	to	call	loosely	“social	justice”.		
	 303	
will be brought in relation with as well as expressed by words like mocambagem, trança, gira, 
ginga, etc. (Rosa 2013) As a result thereof, the whole representation of Brazil’s History might 
be affected. Anyone who expects that future disciplinary developments follow a course akin 
to this cannot help desiring that that rhetorical haze be a thick one! 
 
Time and event 
After this incursion into the realms of anachronism, ideology, structures, models, translation, 
etc., here I am, back at the question of the relation between long-term Historical continuity 
and totality. Still working on becoming the Historian I want to be, it is the reverse of pleasant 
to attest that, yes, there is afoot in our discipline some ill-defined idea, some vague notion 
that can be called, as Fernand Braudel did long ago, the “uniform time of the historians” or 
plainly “the world’s imperious time”, which has been providing us with an “unitary white light” 
capable of enlightening everything under the/its sun. This time, however undiscussed, 
stretches over our problems and our reflections as a tegument. 
I will take now the liberty of re-baptising this time “imperial time” for I want here to shift the 
emphasis away from any vestige of metaphysics or pure epistemological necessity and 
towards a particular gaze that unmistakably points to a broad and intricate field of violent and 
asymmetrical power relations in whose ambit knowledge is turned into normative truth.  
The distinctive characteristic of History has been that of the discipline that per se cannot 
neglect that any social phenomena must be conceived as in movement, as always changing 
over time, no matter how static may be the explanatory device through which it happens to 
be represented. It is the discipline that prevented one from thinking of human affairs as a 
mechanism that can be frozen at one’s leisure so that an immobile picture thereof could be 
presented. 
The utility of this maxim against teleology has been meant to be almost infallible. History was 
supposed to avoid following consistently the systematicity of theoretical models or reasoning 
because, regardless of the process of change possibly presented, that ever-changing Historical 
time eventually remained confined to the static sameness provided by the encompassing 
framework, which teleologically grants the arrival at the aimed final destiny, like Odysseus’ 
vessel blown up by Aeolus’ fair wind. Historians were rather those who open Aeolus’ goatskin, 
liberating all winds of the past so that they can go to wherever they have to, to wherever the 
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empirical evidences and the particular circumstances of production of the historiographical 
account bring them.  
I have myself witnessed Historians stating either directly or by implication that the 
complexities of deconstructive approaches, whose supporters like calling, in a mood of self-
congratulation, “theoretical sophistication”, besides being boring, can achieve no more than 
History achieves with its most basic assumption, namely, that for social-scientific purposes, 
there is in human social life nothing that could be taken as an essence except the steady 
process of changing itself. 
I would be the last one interested in raising objections against such a dictum. But, besides the 
fact that no one needs to be lectured about Historical time to know that, when I ask myself 
what History has been making in order to meet it, I do not find a great deal of contributions.  
The writing of History, as I argued by voicing the criticisms made by postcolonial theorists and 
tried to demonstrate on the basis of my analysis of the recent Brazilian History of slavery, has 
been far from engaged in the deconstruction of essentialisms. History’s fundamental role in 
the dissemination of the master-narrative of modernity as well as in the related process of 
conformation of nation-states and of national identities, two features that partially explain its 
weight in the very methodological nationalism, makes of it a discipline as bogged down in the 
profoundly essentialist quagmire of Eurocentric views as any other of its relatives in the social 
sciences.  
My interest in the brotherly realm of Fernand Braudel’s work stems from the same wonder. 
His concept of longue durée is one of the most prestigious theoretical-methodological 
reflections on the nature of Historical time and has been considered by some commentators 
as containing powerful anti-Eurocentric epistemological potential (Tomich 2012; Mielant 
2012; Kaltmeier 2012). Braudel’s genius, one of the reasons of his lasting influence, lies in the 
fact that he, taking as target Marxism and Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism, fiercely attacks the 
pretension of universality of theoretical models rooted in the neighbouring social sciences, 
whereas, by putting forward his concept of longue durée, he does not give away an inch of 
History’s own claims on embracing totality. 
In order to illustrate it, it suffices to note that he unabashedly suggests the model for 
explaining commercial capitalism he had developed in his The Mediterranean as an alternative 
to the ones that can be drawn from Marx’s work, for this latter, he alleges, leave the door 
open to all sorts of extrapolation, whereas his own, even if more limited in scope, would be 
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much more easily extended in time and space (Braudel [1958] 2012: 261). Eventually, he 
proved he was not just boasting: some twenty years later, Braudel released the last volume 
of Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Centuries (1979), a work of monumental dimensions 
and pretensions based on that model.  
Here, I would like to repeat Steve Feierman’s words and expressly make of them my own, for 
I think that he, thinking from the perspective of a Historian concerned with African History, 
offers a lucid and critical appraisal of Braudel’s oeuvre:  
“Braudel himself could not break out of a unidirectional history of the world with Europe at its 
centre. Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, his three-volume history of the world 
between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, is driven by a tension between Braudel’s 
disciplined attempt to find the correct spatial frame for each phenomenon […] and his 
definition of modern world history as the rise of a dominant Europe.” (Feierman 1993: 171–
172) 
 
Braudel’s idea of longue durée, as we saw in the chapter “Time and Event” (Part Two), is a 
multitude of metaphors whose purpose is to convey an idea of how to grasp historical totality. 
These metaphors, as such, require a particular kind of interpretation that may lead into many 
different understandings, but I sustain that none of them would even roughly allow the kind 
of emancipatory reading supported by other thinkers concerned with the issue, such as Marx 
or Foucault, as we can see, to mention just a few names, in the re-elaboration of their ideas 
in the works by Dipesh Chakrabarty, Stuart Hall, Gayatry C. Spivak, or Anibal Quijano.  
If to be “too enamoured of the pure model, of the model for the sake of the model” entails 
the risk of treating them “as immutable laws, as a priori automatic explanations, universally 
applicable to all situations and all times” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 275), to keep distance from 
them in the way Braudel does, in turn, is by no means an antidote to what is most dangerous 
in their teleologies, that is, the theoretical performance of Eurocentric modernity. On the 
contrary, it is a way of putting it fully into effect, equipping theory with the concreteness of 
empirical evidence and the powerful rhetorical force of creative metaphors.  
Putting it in metaphorical terms: it is as though Braudel had forgotten that, once released 
from the goatskin, Aeolus’ winds brought Odysseus’ vessel straight back to the same aisle 
where he had departed from. Translating it now half-literally: in his eagerness to achieve 
totality, to attest that “history is called by nature to give a prime consideration to all the 
movements into which it [Historical time] can be distinguished” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 274 – 
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italics in the original) Braudel makes of Europe’s History a point of both departure and of 
arrival, with a journey to nowhere separating them in between! 
Nevertheless, Fernand Braudel’s longue durée is very instructive because it shows us how to 
present Historical events in “structural” form while relegating clear-cut theoretical scaffolds 
to an accessory position. His model, he explains, “notes a phenomenon (some might call it a 
dynamic structure, but all historical structures are to some degree dynamic) that can recur in 
many different situations and is easy to recognise” (Braudel [1958] 2012: 262). 
The operative principle here is a very simple one, and one that we effortlessly perform in many 
spheres of life: the recognition of resemblances. According to the procedure of juxtapositional 
spatiality proper of the Braudelian model, through this procedure one can “reveal” underlying 
permanences lying deep in the structure of society. The changes that occur at this level are 
not to be in any old Historical time, but in the epistemologically distinguished realm of the 
longue durée, for, as Braudel puts it: “In historical analysis, as I see it, rightly or wrongly, the 
long runs always wins in the end.” (Braudel 1973b: 1244 – my emphasis) 
 
In conclusion, what I would like to emphasise (again) is another possibility for conceiving 
spatially long-term Historical time, and one that is decisively concerned with a non-reiteration 
of that (or those?) which (or who?), rightly or unjustly, “always wins in the end”.  
Instead of thinking of long-term Historical events or, let’s use the magic word, “structures”, in 
that very prosaic term in which they are the base of superposed layers, we can imagine them 
as having the fractal morphology of coloured tiling or tessellations dispersed over the broader 
and fairly intangible shapeless form of “history as whole”. These fractal patterns, whose 
identification must be effected through that procedure of recognising resemblances, would 
then provide us with traces that rendered “history as whole” amenable to variegated degrees 
of organisation and hierarchy. 
In such a Historical spatiality, if there is a “revelatory process” at all, it does not unveil what 
had been hitherto hidden under the surface of reality, but rather what is apparent and 
repeated at different levels of magnification. In this way, a “structure” arises not as a solid 
remnant, emerging stolidly from a subterraneous past, but rather as an emergence of the very 
present, the result of a view that recognises a general change made out of actual traces. Here, 
the Historian’s eyes are like those that identify not a definite form, but a certain pattern of 
development in a shapeless natural formation (as in a cloudy sky, in trees’ dry leaves or their 
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writhing roots on the ground of a woodland, in the silhouette of a mountain belt or in the 
contour of a coast line, or still, if you prefer a human creation, in an abstract expressionist 
painting such as Jackson Pollock’s295 Number 5). 
Fractals have some characteristics that make of them particularly interesting as a spatial 
metaphor for conceiving Historical time. First, they are a way of representing infinity within 
finitude. One has to imagine that to think in terms of “structures” is not a matter of electing 
winners and losers in the long run, but above all a “setting of limits” within which the 
possibilities of historiographical representation and re-presentation of a subject matter are 
truly infinite. This keeps History open, but not arbitrary. It is an image that calls for considering 
agency and contingency without losing sight of the scope within which they might be 
meaningfully represented. 
Second, fractals, due to the property of recursivity and self-similarity (which is, by the way, 
why they are thought to be able to represent infinity), may function as a way of maintaining 
in evidence a kind of motif that in Western thinking goes by the name of “the return of the 
same”. It is that which, in the opening lines of the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 
Marx touches on by repeating Hegel’s words, which Foucault and Freud deal with by bringing 
back Nietzsche’s, and which has been addressed with a strong accent in theoretical-
methodological concerns in the postcolonial debate about Eurocentrism in History and the 
representation of non-Western pasts.  
In making the effort of imagining how to construct a long-term Historical event so that it could 
be represented as if spatially organised around the dazzling fractal principles of recursivity and 
self-similarity, one has an easy way of avoiding to evade the difficulties posed by tackling with 
“the return of the same”, whose many different guises are, in at least two interwoven 
manners, related to the general problematic of modernity: firstly, the political-epistemological 
problem of having (with or without a fairly evolutionist bias) no choice but to address this 
issue, and of having to do so by representing what it means to be(come) modern by steadily 
either accomplishing or struggling not to accomplish it as a return of what had already 
happened in/to (or because of) Western Europe’s agency or thinking; secondly, the question 
of the never-ending “return of the same” in the confines of the individual, that is, the whole 																																																								295	In	1999	Richard	Taylor	advances	the	thesis	that	Pollock’s	paintings	are	fractal	and	introduces	then	the	term	“fractal	expressionism”	to	name	them.	Since	then	there	has	been	an	academic	debate	over	the	fractal	character	of	Pollock’s	works	(Taylor	et	al.	1999;	2006;	Jones-Smith/Mathur	2006).	
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set of delicate matters concerning issues such as identity/identification, trauma, and 
subjectivity, which can subsumed under the rubric of the “de-centring of the subject” that had 
come into being in the course of Westernising modernity.  
And finally, third, an essential feature of fractal forms is that the boundaries of each 
completely defines the others, leaving no room for gaps between them. This very formulation 
gives a basic idea of the type of urgent questions that can be said to be here at stake. The 
most obvious one is perhaps the critique of methodological nationalism and the vast number 
of problems it has been posing within the social sciences. Among the many developments of 
this debate, I would like to single out one: the redress of a question as elemental as that of 
the concept of self-consciousness. In this sense, it is significant that path-breaking works such 
as Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic or Anzaldua’s Borderlands make of this point an integral part of 
their arguments.296 
This set of characteristics hint at some reasons why fractal spatiality might be explored 
towards the development both of metaphorical constructions, that is, of “ways of thinking 
of”, and of rhetorical devices, that is, of “ways of producing a competent discourse about”, 
which, notwithstanding its use of complex spatial arrangements such as those evoked by ideas 
related to entangle, entwine, interweave, etc., which seem to underline horizontality, 																																																								296	A	central	argument	of	Paul	Gilroy’s	“transnational	and	intercultural”	Black	Atlantic	is	the	idea	of	“double	consciousness”.	He	strengths	this	concept	by	means	of	a	critique	of	the	Enlightenment	project,	and	a	critique	whose	main	axis	is	a	reading	of	Frederick	Douglass’	work	as	an	alternative	to	Hegel:	“a	supplement,	if	not	exactly	a	trans-coding	of	his	[Hegel’s]	account	of	the	struggle	between	lord	and	bondsman”.	According	to	Gilroy,	“Douglass	can	be	read	as	if	he	is	systematically	reworking	the	encounter	between	master	and	slave	in	a	striking	manner	which	inverts	Hegel’s	own	allegorical	scheme.	It	is	the	slave	rather	than	the	master	who	emerges	from	Douglass	account	possessed	of	“consciousness	that	exists	for	 itself”	while	his	master	becomes	the	representative	of	a	“consciousness	that	is	repressed	within	itself.”	(Gilroy	1993:	60)	Hegel	himself,	in	explaining	the	journey	of	the	mind	toward	the	condition	of	self-conditioned	principle	of	unity,	that	is,	as	the	consciousness	that	exists	for	itself,	resorts	to	a	notion,	the	notion	of	force,	which	evinces	the	generative	character	of	boundaries	as	a	“zone	of	contact”	where	something	fundamental	emerges	rather	than	ends.	Firstly,	Hegel	postulates	that	“the	notion	of	force	becomes	actual	when	resolved	into	two	forces.”	(Hegel	[1807]	2014:	347)	Then,	he	explains	that:	“Sie	[die	nun	verdoppelte	Kräfte]	sind	nicht	als	Extreme,	die	etwas	festes	für	sich	behielten,	und	nur	eine	äußere	Eigenschaft	gegen	einander	in	die	Mitte	und	in	ihre	Berührung	schickten;	sondern	was	sie	sind,	sind	




inextricability and dispersion, allow for expressly making a point of asymmetrical power 
relations. 
A geometry for conceiving long-term Historical events from a non-referentialist (but not anti-
empiricist), de-centred (but not non-situated), and anti-essentialist (but not horizontal) point 
of view, this could be a provisory definition of the metaphorical spatiality that fractals could 
open to History. 
 
In practice—for this thesis has a practical aim—I would hope that in trying to develop 
differentiating viewpoints and possible new ways of approaching the phenomenon of 
globalisation on the basis of what we have called its “Between Spaces”, we begin arguing more 
and more about Historical time, but not only in terms of what is or is not an appropriate 
temporal frame for projecting globalisation’s modern origins, nor (only) in terms of what is or 
is not its more adequate periodisation. Let us also talk about time in more substantive terms, 
I mean, in terms that make indelible that to the extent that Historical time can only be 
constituted by events historiographically narrated, one must think it with the events, as a 
necessary outcome of the events themselves instead of being either the element within which 
events (happen to) happen or a chronological tape measure. In the time “Between Spaces” 
there should be no space nor any in-between spaces which allow for any “emptiness” where 
our particular subject matter could be smoothly located. The very long-term Historical 
continuity of globalisation—as the abstract construct resulted of our possible desire of 
hypostatising “what(ever) actually happened” as globalisation—will then assume the 
character of an always empirically based but nevertheless non-referential event. 
Mingling Spivak, Chakrabarty and Gilroy’s thoughts, I would say that what I have tentatively 
sought to provide throughout the whole discussion unfolded in and along the consecution of 
this thesis—that is, with the written and performed meditations on a sketch of a model of 
long-term Historical time guided by the idea of fractal spatiality—is a sort of vocabulary, 
rudiments for thinking and enacting a possible form of Historical representation that, by trying 
to keep its own categories unstable and open without giving up the commitment to theory, 
aims at generating larger amounts of epistemological energy certain to be spent in political 
struggles for social justice (Chakrabarty 2000: 86-90).297 Such a writing of History must attach 																																																								297	Appadurai	also	argues	that	the	human	sciences	perhaps	need	macrometaphors	of	the	family	of	fractals,	polythetic	 classifications,	 and	 chaos	 in	 order	 to	 understand	what	 he	 calls	 a	 “word	 of	 disjunctive	 global	
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positive value to the strive to incorporate the problems of coping with its own openness and, 
in so doing, must be accomplished with the conspicuous purpose of making the world “once 
again be imagined as radically heterogeneous.” (Chakrabarty 2000: 86; 46; Gilroy 1993: 223) 
This means an effort to undermine some premises on the base of which the hegemonic 
historicist time of Eurocentric modernity might be historiographically reproduced within the 
“Between Spaces” of globalisation or, alternatively, the concern with having recourse to a 
whole set of reflections and insights derived from the archives of “Black Atlantic” in order to 
mine the terrain where “North-Atlantic Universals”298 have been overindulgently exhibiting 
their epistemological power. All that is understood as a fundamental step in the construction 
of a subject position from which the very rhetoric of in-betweenness might be more skilfully—
or less awkwardly—articulated. 
This subject position assumes the role of a common line that traverses disciplinarily our 
collective research program. I personally think this common line is the thematic of 
subalternity299. 
Thus, it goes without saying that it was not by pure chance that this thesis deployed the double 
strategy of combining an extended reflection about a “minor”, “subaltern past”, namely, that 
of Brazilian colonial slavery, with an exaggeratedly clear-cut working hypothesis directed 
towards something as feeble as the idea of a metaphorical model. Within the knowledge 
protocols of scholarly History, to adopt such a combination as a guiding line toward research 																																																								flows”.	But	he	puts	more	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	such	an	undertaking	for	the	construction	of	a	“social	theory	of	postmodernity’	 that	 is	adequately	global”	(Appadurai	1996:	46–47)	rather	than	on	the	way	 in	which	such	a	theory	might	be	politically	mobilised	by	subaltern	groups.	That	is	why	even	sharing	precisely	Appadurai’s	concern,	I	prefer	articulating	Chakrabarty’s	position.		298	Of	course,	I	am	here	playing	on	words,	using	Trouillot’s	formulation	to	make	a	reference	to	that	which	Sérgio	Costa	points	to	in	the	title	of	his	Vom	Nordatlantik	zum	„Black	Atlantic“:	Postkoloniale	Konfigurationen	
und	Paradoxien	transnationaler	Politik.	299	In	fact,	the	pool	of	authors	who	have	consistently	pointed	to	the	existence	of	“interstices	of	globalisation”	have	defined	this	globalisation	with	the	expression	“from	below”	so	as	to	provide	a	perspectival	gaze,	a	subject	 position	 that	 makes	 clear	 that	 the	 main	 question	 at	 stake	 is	 one	 of	 asymmetry	 of	 power	(Mathews/Alba	Vega:	2012:	10;	Ribeiro	2012:	223).	Ethnography	plays	a	central	role	in	constructing	the	idea	of	“globalization	from	below”,	and	not	only	because	it	is	the	sole	way	of	having	access	to	empirical	data	that	is	beyond	the	reach	of	the	institutional	apparatus	of	economic	measurement,	but	also	because	it	allows	one	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 subaltern	 voices	 coming	 “from	 below”	 are	 amplified	 to	 the	 point	 of	 becoming	prominently	heard	(Mathews/Alba	Vega	2012:	7).	In	addition	to	the	particular	difficulties	that	this	formulation	of	the	problem	poses	(Spivak	1988)	as	well	as	to	 the	 quite	 usual	 dilemmas	 of	 perspective	 and	 representation	 each	 ethnographical	 work	 is	 anyway	confronted	with,	the	researcher	working	ethnographically	can	almost	prefigure	the	fact	that	there	will	be	“moments	in	ethnographic	research	that	resists	the	doing	of	ethnography”	(Chakrabarty	2000:	101).	The	Historian	working	on	long-term	Historical	events,	on	the	other	hand,	lives	in	a	sort	of	paradise	of	universals	where,	 without	 the	 pressures,	 feelings	 and	 ethical	 issues	 involved	 in	 the	 ethnographic	 interpersonal	contact,	the	subaltern	cannot	speak.	
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does not properly contribute to increase the strength of one’s argument300, and less so if one 
sets about tackling a major issue like that of long-term Historical time. 
The subaltern replication produced by the puny positivity of this pronouncedly precarious 
angle of attack aimed at putting myself in the shoes301 of those who have been authorised to 
pose, even if not to resolve, some type of very distinguished epistemological problems that 
have been addressed as the privilege of exposing oneself to happy disciplinary risks. Once 
occupying this position, I could pluck up enough courage to claim that this thesis lays bare an 
unhappy302 resolution to the question of how to pose those problems once again. These pages 
are thus a call for epistemological rights. 	  










as	an	analogy	 for	 imagining	 the	articulation	of	historical	 events,	 it	will	become	clear,	 in	
which	sense	all	this	stuff	might	be	related.”	
	





II:	“Ok,	then	go	ahead!”		This	 conversation	 took	place	 after	 a	 complete	one	hundred	eighty	degree	 twist	 in	 the	reflections	that	culminated	in	this	thesis.	At	first,	 it	followed	closely	the	guiding	thread	advanced	 by	 the	 International	 Research	 Training	 Group	 (IRTG)	 ‘Between	 Spaces.	Movements,	Actors	and	Representations	of	Globalisation’,	in	whose	frame	the	work	was	written.	This	means	that	it	focused	on	the	spatialising	character	of	the	Black	Atlantic	as	a	conceptual	 category	whose	main	potential,	 for	our	purposes,	would	be	 to	provide	one	more	 way	 of	 dealing	 analytically	 with	 the	 limitations	 posed	 by	 national	 borders	 in	historiographical	analysis.			Things	 changed	 quite	 radically	 after	 I	 took	 part	 in	 a	 two-day	 general	meeting	 held	 in	Potsdam	 in	 April	 2013.	 Confined	 in	 a	 hotel	 congress,	 we	 discussed	 intensively	 many	aspects	of	our	research	programme;	above	all,	the	theoretical	one.	In	fact,	even	a	glossary	of	 key	 concepts	 was	 presented	 in	 the	 occasion.	 The	 event	 was	 a	 preparation	 for	 the	forthcoming	process	of	evaluation	of	the	IRTG.	Unsurprisingly,	one	of	our	main	tasks	was	to	 foresee	 possible	 criticisms,	 to	 identify	 conceptual	 weaknesses,	 to	 pose	 thorny	questions	and,	of	course,	to	give	cogent	answers	to	them,	if	available.			I	 was	 still	 in	 the	 first	 semester	 of	my	 PhD	 and,	 expectedly,	 quite	 unassertive,	 though	somehow	confident	about	my	competence	to	make	a	relevant	contribution	to	the	ongoing	discussion.	Playing	on	words,	I	remember	having	made	a	remark	phrased	more	or	less	as	follows:			“The	issue	of	time,	I	mean,	the	representation	of	it,	has	it	not	been	a	bit	neglected	in	our	questioning	 about	 the	 ‘between	 spaces’	 created	 by	 the	 movements	 and	 actors	 of	globalization?	Would	it	be	too	far-fetched	to	speak	about	the	time—or	perhaps	specific	temporalities—of	these	‘between	spaces’?”			We	had	no	more	than	crude	emergency	answers	to	this	question	back	then.	From	that	moment	 on,	 I	 decided	 that	 my	 main	 intellectual	 task	 in	 the	 program	 would	 be	 the	formulation	of	more	elaborate	ones.	The	best	anchor	idea,	because	of	its	epistemological	
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range,	 should	 to	 be	 the	 notion	 of	 long-term	 historical	 continuity;	 and	 my	 main	interlocutor,	due	to	his	great	interdisciplinary	influence,	Fernand	Braudel.	As	skeptical	as	I	might	 be	 about	 the	 fact	 of	 having	 been	 successful	 in	my	 enterprise,	 I	 tell	 this	 story	nevertheless	because	it	makes	clear	a	decisive	feature	of	this	study:	its	steady	disposition	to	react	 to	 the	 idiosyncrasies	of	 the	 immediate	academic	environment	 in	which	 it	was	produced.		Thus,	as	my	main	focus	shifted	from	space	to	time	due	to	the	contingent,	but	by	no	means	arbitrary,	 circumstances	 surrounding	 that	 specific	 process	 of	 evaluation,	 many	 other	important	 topics	 of	 the	 thesis	 were	 elaborated	 by	 following	 the	 same	 principle.	 This	
modus	operandi	makes	this	study	especially	indebted	to	the	debates	and	dynamics	of	the	IRTG	Between	Spaces.		Four	 of	 the	 seven	 chapters	 that	 comprise	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 thesis	 are	 slightly	modified	versions	of	texts	I	presented	in	our	forums	of	academic	exchange.	A	first	schematic	draft	of	Part	One	was	discussed	in	the	interinstitutional	colloquium	that	took	place	in	March	2014	at	the	CIESAS,	in	México	City.	In	this	occasion,	with	his	known	delicacy,	professor	Carlos	 Alba	 drew	my	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 colonial	 slavery	 was	 not	 as	 visible	 as	expected	 in	 the	 text,	 even	 though	 its	 importance	 for	 the	 general	 argument	 was	 fully	perceptible.	 Professor	 Luz	 Elena	 Gutiérrez	 de	 Velasco,	on	 other	 hand,	made	magically	visible	in	the	text	the	presence	of	Walter	Benjamin’s	fantasmagoria,	a	notion	that	I	had	indeed	in	mind,	but	which	I	thought	of	as	being	still	out	of	service	at	that	point.	Connecting	both	comments,	I	learned	that	a	meditation	on	colonial	slavery	must	haunt	the	whole	text,	making	 spectacular	 apparitions	 where	 it	 was	 already	 expected	 as	 well	 as	 remaining	suspiciously	hidden	where	it	was	already	almost	absent.		But	 like	 everything	well	 learnt,	 it	 did	 not	 happen	 at	 once.	 The	 enjoyable	 commentary	delivered	by	professor	Ricardo	Pérez	Montfort	at	my	paper	in	2nd	Summer	School	of	the	IRTG	Between	 Spaces,	 in	 September	 2014,	 found	me	 still	 groping	 for	 the	 best	way	 of	accomplishing	what	I	had	discovered.	His	good-tempered	approach	had	the	great	merit	of	 not	 attempting	 to	 straighten	 a	 text	 that	 was	 perhaps	 too	 playful	 for	 the	 academic	purposes	 it	 should	 fulfil.	 Had	 he	 done	 otherwise,	 his	 attitude	would	 have	 conveyed	 a	message	usually	sent	to	novices:	do	not	to	step	out	of	line!	I	appreciated	his	gesture	and	took	it	a	sign	of	encouragement.		This	courage	was	nurtured,	on	the	one	hand,	by	the	admiration	and	intellectual	exchange	with	Kenya	Herrera	Bórquez,	who	had	developed	a	provocative	approach	to	a	research	on	feminine	performativity	and	narcoculture	in	the	northern	border	of	Mexico,	and	on	the	other,	by	my	own	process	of	writing	the	first	configuration	of	the	twin-chapter	History	
and	Theory	of	History.	I	decided	to	put	this	text	through	its	paces	in	the	next	edition	of	our	interdisciplinary	colloquium,	which	was	entitled	“Concepts	and	Categories	for	Studying	the	Process	of	Globalization”	and	scheduled	for	February	2015.			My	 remembrances	of	 this	day	are	 remarkably	vivid.	 Just	 as	hungry	as	 I	was	 relaxed,	 I	allowed	myself	to	enjoy	a	cup	of	coffee	while	giving	my	talk.	After	that,	listening	to	the	comments	and	questions,	I	ate	some	bread	as	I	took	my	notes.	It	was	an	amiable	morning	smelling	 of	 out-of-season	 spring.	 The	 form	 and	 colours	 of	 the	 building,	 the	 room,	 the	chairs,	 the	 table,	 the	walls,	no	 less	 than	of	all	 faces	around	were	 familiar	 to	me.	 It	 felt	intimate	and	safe.	
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	There	was	maybe	no	better	environment	to	begin	to	comprehend	that	one	of	the	main	problems	of	my	thesis	was	not	exactly	that	it	was	ambitious.	The	problem	was,	in	fact,	that	it	was	like	that	blissfully.	If	it	was	an	invitation	for	thinking	together	about	History,	it	was	made	 in	such	an	abstruse	manner	 that	 its	every	 intention	appeared	almost	cynical.	 	 It	became	 clear	 that	whereas	 the	 position	 I	 tried	 to	 inhabit	 by	 carving	 out	 that	 locus	 of	enunciation	was	only	as	potency	conceptually	fruitful,	 its	feeble	productiveness	from	a	disciplinary	 standpoint	 as	well	 as	 its	 at	 best	 deleterious	 character	 in	what	 concerned	possible	institutional	interests,	that	is,	with	regard	to	my	academic	career,	was	a	virtual	certainty.		These	 issues	were	spoken	of	 in	a	 fashion	far,	very	far	away	from	the	 ill	atmosphere	of	frustration	or	anger	provoked	by	the	everyday	effects	of	academic	hierarchy	and	its	petty	vicious.	Rather,	the	day	had	come	in	which	I	felt	as	if	our	intellectual	energy	had	been	fully	hijacked	by	 the	 very	discussion,	 impelling	us	 thus	 to	 an	unreserved	dialogue.	Nothing	comparable	to	this	would	have	ever	happen	without	the	support	of	professor	Susanne	Klengel,	who,	as	commentator,	gifted	me	with	a	as	generous	as	enlightening	assessment	of	 my	 text,	 as	 well	 as	 without	 the	 engagement	 of	 Marianne	 Braig	 and	 Stefan	 Rinke,	professors	whose	enthusiastic	interest	in	discussing	my	ideas—in	a	broader	manner—made	of	that	hitherto		pleasant	morning	a	memorable	occasion.	In	several	other	academic	encounters	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 last	 few	 years,	 these	 trio	 have	 showed	 me	 a	 similar	disposition	for	an	intellectual	exchange	of	this	nature.	I	hope	these	words	can	express	how	much	I	appreciated	this	and,	naturally,	how	grateful	I	am	to	them.		However,	from	then	on,	my	writing	became	murkier,	as	if	it	were	somatising	at	once	all	those	valuables	criticisms.	That	moment	marked	a	true	turning	point	in	the	construction	of	my	argument.	I	had	entered	into	a	transitional	state,	transiting	in	fact	through	a	liminal	space	between	two	epistemological	alternatives	that	seemed	not	be	properly	considered	so	 far.	The	result	of	 this	phase	was	 the	 text	The	Heart	of	Blackness,	which	was	 indeed	designed	as	a	“transition”	to	another	moment	of	the	thesis.	Through	the	allusion	to	Joseph	Conrad’s	 The	 Heart	 of	 Darkness	 I	 intended	 to	 evoke	 an	 oppressive	 and	 tenebrous	atmosphere	 for	 delivering	 an	 oblique	 analysis	 of	 historiographical	 accounts	 that,	 in	attempting	to	rescue	“the	point	of	view	of	the	slave”,	happen	to	reproduce	the	conditions	in	which	 the	 state	 of	 being	 unable	 to	 speak—if	 not	 as	 a	 “double”—threatens	 to	 have	always	been	and	to	continue	to	be	a	permanence.		 		At	 latest	here	 I	should	have	noticed	how	much	these	 thoughts	 instantiate	 the	 idea	put	forward	 by	 Sérgio	 Costa’s	 Von	 Nordatlantik	 zum	 ‘Black	 Atlantic’:	 from	 a	 small	 flat	 in	Berliner	 student	 housing,	 I	was,	 everyday,	writing	 southward	 or,	maybe,	 “blackward”.	Paradoxically,	having	the	Sérgio	Costa	of	flesh	and	blood	as	(second)	supervisor	ended	up	preventing	me	from	realising	this	fact,	which	remained	thus	a	secret,	revealed	much	later,	as	the	thesis	was	already	handed	in	and	about	to	be	defended.	I	probably	became	(too)	habituated	to	the	decisive	contributions	he,	with	the	unpretentiousness	that	habit	lends	to	deeds,	made	to	the	work,	tactful	and,	it	seemed,	even	tactically	helping	me	to	sort	out	the	theoretical	mess	I	sometimes	got	into.			It	does	not	look	like	it,	but	my	work	has	very	much	to	do	with	theory	of	democracy.	Its	main	claim	is	even	phrased	in	that	outworn	and	almost	unfashionable	“language	of	rights”,	in	 this	 case,	 epistemological	 rights.	 Having	 written	 a	 great	 deal	 about	 it,	 theory	 of	
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democracy	is	an	issue	which	Sérgio	is	well	versed	in.	As	a	rule,	people	can	best	teach	what	they	know	well.	But	they	not	necessarily	are	able	or	inclined	to	live	up	to	what	they	know	and	 teach.	My	 impression	 is	 that	 if	 there	 is	 something	 Sérgio	 also	 always	 teaches	 his	students,	this	is	the	sense	in	which	to	deal	with	the	institutional	power	of	academia	is	a	matter	of	making	democracy	theory	a	daily	practice.	If	I	understood	it	right,	part	of	the	game	is	not	to	be	thankful	to	him	for	that.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	I	thank	him.			In	a	somewhat	different	sense,	I	would	like	to	thank	Ingrid	Simson.	It	is	not	uncommon	that	difficult	circumstances	appear	in	the	life	of	a	poor,	black,	foreign	student,	and	above	all	during	the	periods	 in	which	he	has	no	 longer	a	scholarship.	 Ingrid	was	particularly	present	in	these	hard	times	both	before	and	after	my	official	phase	in	the	IRTG	“Between	Spaces’.	 I	would	 like	 to	 stress	 that	 a	person	 can	be	 supportive	 in	 somehow	unwonted	ways:	she	used	to	ask	my	opinion	about	things	that,	maybe	wrongly,	I	thought	I	should	demonstrate	either	no	competence	to	judge	or	some	reservation	in	doing	so.				Concerning	issues	more	narrowly	academic,	my	participation	in	the	thematic	symposium	
La	historiografía	en	tiempos	globales,	coordinated	by	Ingrid	and	by	professor	Guillermo	Zermeño	as	part	of	 the	XVII	AHILA	 International	Congress	 (September	2015),	was	 the	moment	 she	 chose	 to	 give	me	precious	 advices	 about	 dealing	with	Walter	Benjamin’s	peculiar	writing	style.	Maybe	because	of	this	fine	attention	to	the	act	of	writing,	the	most	invaluable	advice	Ingrid	ever	gave	me	was	a	quite	practical	one:	words	are	mostly	enough	to	get	one	into	big	troubles;	I	did	not	need	to	engage	my	body	into	that!		It	would	have	been	perhaps	more	 correct	 to	 say	 that	one	 shall	 engage	 the	body	 in	 an	adequate	manner.	Ximena	Alba	was	the	person	who	brought	me	to	think	with	some	more	profundity	about	epistemological	issues	in	its	gendered	relations	with	gestural	and	vocal	presentation.	We	 attended	 together	 a	 couching	whose	 promise	was	 to	 prepare	 us	 for	delivering	the	best	academic	performance	in	the	defense	of	our	thesis.	I	lost	track	of	how	many	hours	we	discussed	the	gendered	language—also	the	corporal	one—used	by	the	male	 coach	 for	 convincing	us	how	utterly	harmful	 to	 appear	 “girlish”	 could	be	 for	 the	purposes	at	stake.	Countless	were	also	the	number	of	conversations	we	had	on	the	series	“Body,	Gender	&	Power”	in	the	course	of	more	than	two	years	of	intellectual	exchange.	Actually,	even	a	series	(a	proper	one!)	was	part	of	the	package:	two	exciting	seasons	of	
Orange	is	the	New	Black!	Last	but	not	least,	I	would	like	to	thank	her	for	the	enormous	help	in	the	final	writing	phase,	above	all	with	the	infernal	work	of	revising	footnotes	and	bibliographical	references:	Thank	you	very	much!		It	 is	 a	 commonplace	 in	 acknowledgements	 like	 this	 to	 close	 them	 with	 final	 words	thanking	again	the	people	for	contributing	to	possible	merits	the	work	may	contain	and,	by	the	same	token,	to	restate	that	all	errors	and	failures	are	of	total	and	sole	responsibility	of	the	author.	I	would	like,	however,	to	make	Debora	Gerstenberger,	my	(first)	supervisor,	responsible	also	for	fundamental	mistakes	found	in	this	thesis.	To	be	sure,	from	a	strict,	or	 rather,	 from	 a	 pragmatically	 academic	 and	 disciplinary	 viewpoint,	 as	 the	 dialogue	recollected	 above	 illustrates,	 the	 whole	 project	 of	 the	 thesis	 was,	 at	 first	 place,	 a	tremendous	 mistake!	 As	 such,	 it	 accomplished	 itself	 generating	 series	 and	 series	 of	further	smaller	mistakes	that	could	be	synthetised	by	saying	that,	at	the	end	of	the	day,	this	study	ended	up	being	neither	philosophical	enough	to	belong	to	the	field	of	theory	of	history,	 nor	 detailed	 and	 systematised	 enough	 to	 be	 a	 history	 of	 historiography	 nor	
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ABSTRACT This	dissertation	advances	 the	 sketch	of	 a	metaphorical	model	of	 long-term	Historical	time	based	on	the	idea	of	fractal	spatiality	as	outlined	by	Paul	Gilroy	in	his	Black	Atlantic	
–	Modernity	and	Double	Consciousness	(1993).	
This task is carried out by combining aesthetics and analytical philosophy of History with post-
colonial theory so as to perform a semantic exploration of the disciplinary vocabulary of 
History understood as social science. An exploration that, stemming from a reflection upon 
colonial slavery unfolded in the form of a review of the recent Brazilian historiographical 
production about the issue, deploys discursive strategies and analytical tools—such as 
diasporic time, Synchronisierung, rethoricity, etc.—that express a distinctive concern with an 
interpellation of the (excesses) of Eurocentrism, which is here depicted with an accent in its 
phallogocentric and racist axis. 
What results from this analysis is presented in the conclusion (Time Between Spaces:  fractal 
spatiality and long-term Historical time), a theoretical effort that, by assuming the semblance 
of a mirrored dialogue with Fernand Braudel’s longue durée, spells	out	 its	own	political-epistemological	consequences	and	faces thus its limits. 
 
Abstract		Diese	 Dissertation	 nähert	 sich	 dem	 Entwurf	 eines	 metaphorischen	 Models	 von	langfristiger	historischer	Zeit	an,	basierend	auf	der	Idee	von	fraktaler	Räumlichkeit,	wie	sie	von	Paul	Gilroy	in	seinem	Black	Atlantic	–	Modernity	and	Double	Consciousness	(1993)	entworfen	wurde.	Diese	 Aufgabe	 wird	 durch	 die	 Kombination	 von	 Ästhetik	 und	 analytischer	Geschichtsphilosophie	 mit	 post-kolonialer	 Theorie	 erarbeitet,	 sodass	 dadurch	 eine	semantische	Exploration	des	disziplinarischen	Wortschatzes	der	Geschichtswissenschaft	zustande	kommt.	Die	Exploration	entstammt	einer	Reflektion	über	koloniale	Sklaverei,	die	 sich	 in	 der	 Form	 eines	 Reviews	 der	 jüngsten	 brasilianischen	 historiographischen	Produktion	 über	 das	 Thema	 entfaltet.	 Dabei	 werden	 diskursive	 Strategien	 und	analytische	 Instrumente	 –	 wie	 diasporische	 Zeit,	 Synchronisierung,	 Rhetorizität,	 etc.	 –	genutzt,	 die	 ein	 unverkennbares	 Interesse	 an	 einer	 Interpellation	 des	 „Exzesses“	 des	Eurozentrismus	 ausdrücken,	 welcher	 hier	 mit	 einem	 Akzent	 auf	 seinen	phallologozentristischen	und	rassistischen	Achsen	dargestellt	wird.	
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Das	 Ergebnis	 dieser	 Analyse	 wird	 in	 der	 Schlussfolgerung	 präsentiert	 (Zeit	 Zwischen	Räumen:	 fraktale	 Räumlichkeit	 und	 langfristige	 historische	 Zeit),	 ein	 theoretischer	Versuch,	 welcher	 sich	 als	 ein	 gespiegelter	 Dialog	mit	 Fernand	 Braudel’s	 longue	 durée	gestaltet	 und	 dabei	 sowohl	 seine	 eigenen	 politisch-epistemologischen	 Konsequenzen	verdeutlicht	als	auch	seinen	Grenzen	gegenübersteht.		 	
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